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ABSTRACT
This study presents a rationale for the proliferation, in 1983-88, and subsequent
restructuring, in 1989-92, of subcontracting relationships in Venezuelan plastics
manufacturing that differs from common explanations of this phenomenon in developing
countries. It argues that firms did not adopt subcontracting primarily to cut labor costs
or to avoid lumpy and irreversible investments in the context of demand uncertainty. In
most cases, subcontracting mitigated supply-side uncertainty and constraints by helping
client firms gain access to restricted input markets, primarily for resins, the main input
for plastics transformation. The study explains why subcontracting, because it played a
role in intermediating and stabilizing input supply, had more benign effects on
subcontractors during 1983-88 than it would have had if its purpose had been to
transfer the costs of demand-side uncertainty from clients to subcontractors.
This alternative rationale for subcontracting growth in the Venezuelan case
raises an important question: How did difficult access to resins come to be the reason
for this institutional adaptation in 1983-88? Venezuela has rich reserves of oil and
natural gas and was among the first oil-exporting developing countries to invest heavily
in petrochemical capacity. The findings are reminiscent of the resource curse thesis, as
they highlight the perverse outcomes of managing a rich resource base. Yet they differ
from that thesis in two important respects: (i) in Venezuela, forward linkages from the
key natural resource did develop, but (ii) problems associated with the management of
the resource base still affected industrial development, resulting in an organizational
shift downstream---i.e. an increase in subcontracting relationships in plastics
manufacturing. I frame my explanation of how subcontracting came to play this role in
terms of policy design and implementation. Trade protection, foreign exchange, and
price policies established to avert further capital flight and depletion of foreign exchange
reserves during the 1983 debt crisis stimulated the demand for phedti manufactures, but
they also created severe bottlenecks in input supply, exacerbated by quota distribution
mechanisms with a bias against new and fast growing enterprises. Subcontracting
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relationships of increasing complexity, interlinking the markets for resins, transformation
services, and capital, represented the micro-institutional response.
In 1989, macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment did away with the old
rationale for subcontracting, as trade, exchange rates, and input markets were freed.
Subcontracting networks underwent a major restructuring in 1989-92. Many
disappeared and selective vertical integration occurred in the rest. However, coping
strategies observed until 1992 suggested that, under the new conditions, one of the two
"roads" along which firms could pursue growth might lead to a qualitative improvement
in subcontracting relationships. Successful small and medium-scale enterprises followed
a strategy based on achieving economies of scope, in a rudimentary version of flexible
specialization and industrial district development. Large enterprises, on the other hand,
helped by liberalized markets, have engaged in capital-intensive production for low-cost
export activity. Although freer markets are all that the large firms (especially those
backed by multinational capital) may need to succeed in their export-oriented strategy,
specific support would be required for the continued strengthening of small- and
medium-scale firms and their subcontracting networks.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of Political Economy
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L INTRODUCTION
In trying to understand the reasons for the upsurge in subcontracting
relationships in Venezuelan plastics manufacturing in 1983-88, 1 encountered a puzzling
paradox. Subcontracting served primarily as a mechanism for resolving firms' severe
problems in gaining access to input markets, especially to the market for petrochemical
raw materials. Yet Venezuela ranks among the world's largest oil producers and among
the largest developing country investors in petrochemical capacity. This finding was
reminiscent of the resource curse thesis,' yet it differed from it in two important
respects: (i) in Venezuela, forward linkages from the key natural resource did develop,
but (ii) problems associated with management of the resource base still affected
industrial development; such problems manifested themselves in an organizational shift
downstream in plastics manufacturing-i.e. an increase in subcontracting relationships.
Why did subcontracting come to play such a role in this country? And what
does the analysis of subcontracting in the recent past tell us about its prospects in the
future? This study analyzes how policy making and implementation, and entrepreneurs'
responses, contributed to this unexpected outcome, explores the prospects for plastics
manufacturing in Venezuela's restructured economy of the early 1990s (which, I
propose, might include rudimentary flexible specialization as well as mass production
options), and draws lessons for future analysis of industrial organization and policy in
developing countries.
I The title for this dissertation, in fact, paraphrases the titles for two documents dealing
with the mownarc curse thesis: Alan Geib's Oil Widalls: Blessing or Curse? (Gelb,
1988), and Richard Auty's "Industrial Policy Reform in Six Large Newly
Industrializing Countries: The Resource Curse Thesis" (Auty, 1994).
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A. The Point of Departure: A Shift in Industrial Organization
Between 1983 and 1988, the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing sector
underwent an organizational transformation as production increasingly moved toward
vertical disintegration and subcontracting networks proliferated. A subcontracting
network is loosely defined here as a set of suppliers of plastics manufacturing services
that regularly serve a "client" firm-which may or may not itself be a plastics
manufacturer--under custom orders.2 These suppliers transform resin or polymer
pellets, by applying heat and pressure in molding or extruding machines, into batches of
plastic pieces (in the case of molding) or continuous items (pipes, sheets, filaments, in
the case of extruding). They then sell these products to their client firms for use as parts
and components. Resins (also referred to in this study as "polymers"), the suppliers'
main material inputs, are products of the secondary petrochemical industry and direct
derivatives of oil and natural gas (Figure .I).3
The observed increase in subcontracting in the 1980s marked a departure from
the industry's earlier experience. At the end of the 1970s, subcontracting remained
limited, even though local content requirements had forced multinational corporations
to buy some of their plastic components from local manufacturers during the early
import-substitution drive of the 1960s. But in 1983, the industry's traditional structure
started changing. In diverse industrial sectors (automotive, toys, personal care items,
household appliances, processed foods), firms that earlier had undertaken in-house all
the plastics molding that they needed now tended to buy those services from dedicated
plastics manufacturers-either to complement their own capacity or, in some cases, to
2 1 have opted for a broad definition that aliowed rne to capture a wide range of
subcontracting networks and to retain them in my sample as they evolved during the
period studied. I use the terms "subcontractor" and "supplier" interchangeably. And I
refer to client firms as "customers,""cr firms," or "parent firms."
3Chapters II and V describe the structure of the petrochemical-plastics industrial
complex and technical features of plastics manufacturing in mere detail.
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substitute for it. Firms that had never undertaken molding in-house, outsourcing it
instead to subcontracting networks, allowed such networks to grow and become more
complex. And many firms that had traditionally produced a variety of plastic products
for final consumption started producing intermediate goods under contract to other
firms. These shifts led to a far more interconnected industrial structure.
Figure I The Venezuelan Petrochemical-Plastics Value Chain
Natural Gas Molds,
Additives,
Final
Markets
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent firms in the sectors in 1988, according to the
Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informitica (OCEI).
Basic Petrochemical Industry: State-owned, produces basic chemicals and monomers.
Secondary Petrochemical Industry: Joint-venture companies (public, private, national,
and foreign capital); produce resins or polymers.
Plastics Manufactwing Industry: Called here also "plastics transformation" or
'plastics" industry. Private ownership, mostly national. Transforms resins into plastics
pieces, primarily through molding or extrusion.
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (1991): Estudio de la Cadena de Resinas y Pidsticos.
This change in industrial organization occurred in the context of a major push
toward protectionism. Pressed by a balance of payments crisis in 1983, the Venezuelan
government set severe restrictions on trade, prices, and foreign exchange transactions.
Three years later, in anticipation of the 1988 elections, it adopted a highly expansionary
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fiscal policy. This combination of interventions generated an upsurge in demand and
rapid growth for consumer-oriented industries and their suppliers. With many plastics
imports subject to outright bans or to high tariffs, plastics manufacturing grew by 7.3%
a year in real terms between 1983 and 1988, compared with an average of 3% for all
manufacturing industries. As a result, Venezuela ranked high among plastics
manufacturers in volume produced per year.
Six years later, both the policy environment and the industry's organization
exhibited another marked swing. In February 1989, a major stabilization and structural
adjustment program swept away trade and exchange rate restrictions. Under the
contraction in demand that immediately ensued, many subcontracting networks shrank
or disappeared.
These parallel trends in demand and subcontracting could support a perception
of subcontracting as a capacity-enhancing mechanism associated exclusively with
upsurges in demand. But further observation casts doubt on such a simple correlation
between demand and subcontracting. Although demand recovered in 1991-92 following
the post-stabilization economic contraction, subcontracting did not grow commensurate
with the growth in demand. It seemed, therefore, to be the specific nature of the
protectionist scheme put in place in the 1980s-not simply trends in demand-that
drove subcontracting growth in the 1980s. The questions, then, are: What factors
drove subcontracting? And what can they tell us about the industrial organization,
development, and growth prospects of Venezuela?
B. Flexible Spedialzaton or Cost-cutting Segmentation? The Debate
Although interesting in their own right; the observed change in inter-firm
relationships and the questions it raises are particularly intriguing when set against the
backdrop of the heated debate on industrial organization and development in the 1980s
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and 1990s. At the risk of oversimplifying, for analytical purposes I characterize this
debate as having two sides.
On one side of the debate lie relatively recent political economy analyses of
industrial organization that put forward a favorable view, from both an efficiency and an
equity standpoint, of vertical disintegration, small-scale production, and inter-firm
networking. This view was pioneered by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel in The
Second IndustrialDivide (1984).4 These authors claim that two structural
developments are eroding mass production's long-standing dominance as the most
effective way to organize industrial operations. First, the breakdown of the extensive
system of macroeconomic regulation that helped to stabilize national and global markets
during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s has made it increasingly difficult to realize the scale
economies of mass production (ibid.:4, Ch. 7). Second, industry's adoption of new
electronic technology favors flexible systems, because it lowers the cost of batch
production and allows firms to realize economies of scope (ibid.:5, 258-260). 5
Against that backdrop, this first side of the debate attributes toflexible
specialization6 and industrial ditrictS the ability of successful industrial regions to
Other works representative of this approach are Hirst and Zeitlin, 1988; Sengerberger
and Loveman, 1988; Sengenberger, Loveman, and Piore, 1990; Pyke, Beccattini, and
Sengenberger, 1990; and Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992.
5 "Scope economies are said to exist when the joint cost of making more than one product
on the same basic equipment, or 'platform,' in the same facility is less than the cost of
turning out the same set of products in separate facilities"(Harrison, 1994:13-14).
6 In the words of the authors who coined the term, flexible specialintin is "a strategy of
permanent innovation: accommodation to ceaseless change, rather than an effort to
control it..."(Piore and Sabel, 1984:17). Conceptually, these authors contrast the
notion of flexible specialization with that of mass production, which is based on the use
of specialized equipment and low-skill or unskilled labor and the presence of a
macroeconomic regulatory system supporting the large markets that make mass
production economically feasible. flexible specialization relies instead on '"flexible-
multi-use-equipment; skilled workers; and the creation, through politics, of an
industrial community that restricts the forms of competition to those favoring
innovation..." (lbid.:17). Piore and Sabel favored flexible specialization as the way out
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adapt to increasingly fragmented, differentiated, and rapidly evolving markets. Flexible
specialization and industrial districts are associated with increased cooperation among
small- and medium-scale firms, rather than with large-wale corporations organized
along Fordist principles. In industrial districts, regulation at the micro level-by local
governments, entrepreneurs associations, and the rules of a tightly knit civil society-
substitutes for decaying macroeconomic regulatory systems (formal labor institutions,
economic policy) afforded by the nation-state. Flexible specialization in the context of
industrial districts thus becomes one viable way out of economic stagnation-as
exemplified by successful industrial regions in Italy, Germany, and Denmark, among
others.
of the global economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s; in a response to a critical article
by Amin and Robins (1990), Piore admits that "[plostulating two trajectories, Sabel and
I were forced to look for some basis for the commitment to one or the other. We found
that basis in ideology. But this in turn raised the issue of the source of the ideological
commitment... In The Second Industrial Divide, we left this question open. That is
admittedly the book's greatest analytical weakness." (Piore, 1990:227). Yet these
authors never unequivocally predicted that flexible specialization would come to
predominate over mass production: "This chapter argues that either outcome is
possible, neither necessary... It is hard to see, in the current relations among machines,
workers, and economic institutions, any reason to think any one of these two outcomes
any more probable than the other" (Piore and Sabel, op.cit:252, Chapter 10).
7 Alfred Marshall first applied the term "industrial district" to Lancashire and Sheffield,
in England, to characterize "the concentration of specialized industries in particular
localities..."(Marshall, 1961:267). This spatial agglomeration led to such benefits as
"the easy exchange of ideas, information and goods, the accumulation of skills and
innovative capability, and the development of cultural homogeneity allowing
cooperation, trust and consensus among and between employers and workers..." (Amin
and Robins, op. cit.:195). The term has since been applied to agglomerations of small,
competitive firms in Italy (Brusco, 1986; Becattini, 1987) and in many other contexts.
In the view of Piore and Sabel, the reliance of flexible specialization on the
microeconomic regulatory system provided by coherent, tightly knit industrial
communities establishes a relationship between the success of flexible specialization as a
technological model and that of geographical concentration as a spatial configuration.
Other authors suggest a more deterministic and bidirectional relationship: "...vertical
disintegration encourages agglomeration, and agglomeration encourages vertical
disintegrrtion..." (Scott, 1986: p. 244). Yet authors applying these concepts to the
developing world tend to adopt a more eclectic position: while they emphasize the
benefits of clustering, particularly for small firms, they highlight the key role of actors
outside the clusters: "(tihe sectoral connection has priority over geographical
proximity" (Schmitz, 1992:68).
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The flexible specialization literature has had a significant influence on theory and
policy, although followers do not always build on the theoretical foundations proposed
by Piore and Sabel. Of particular interest to my study is the attention to the potential
contribution of inter-firm networks to economic development that this literature has
helped to generate. 8 Analysts from different schools of thought are devoting more
attention to the range of experiences in countries in which inter-firm cooperation has led
to economic success. These experiences include not only those based on small-scale
industry, as in Northern Italy, but also that of Japan, based on a more hierarchical
structure. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry states that the
"Japanese manufacturing industry owes its competitive advantage and strength to its
subcontracting structure" (White Paper on Smal and Medium Enterprises in Japan,
Mrfl, 1987:36-37). Management professors in mainstream universities have
enthusiastically adopted the belief that subcontracting enhances performance: "U.S.
companies need to develop a capability for partnering or be at a competitive
disadvantage..." (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993:61). And Oliver Williamson, a leading
proponent of the new institutional economics, now concludes that "[wlidespread
reliance on subcontracting will...be observed in a high-performance economy..."
(Williamson, 1994:18).
Interest in the flexible specialization literature (and in the role of inter-firm
networks) has also spread to analysts and practitioners in the developing world.9 There,
traditionally fragmented markets, demand and policy uncertainty, and a smaller average
firm size call for exploring sources of competitiveness beyond scale economies
(Rasmussen et aL, 1992:3). A technological and organizational paradigm that suggests
8 On the success and somewhat indiscriminate use of the concept of "networking," see
Piore (1995:70-71).
9 For an illustration of recent applications of the flexible specialization and industrial
district tenets to industuies in the developing world, see World Developmsent, Vol. 23,
No. 1 (.January 1995).
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possibilities for prosperity based on alternatives to highly developed mass production-
for instance, what Hubert Schmitz has called colectie efflieney&-naturally offers
hope and merits serious consideration.
On the other side of the debate on industrial organization and development are
those who believe that flexible specialization is neither a viable nor a broadly replicable
industrial development paradigm; that it lacks the autonomy and dynamism that Piore,
Sabel, and their followers attribute to it; and that it may hide elements of subordination.
Bennett Harrison, for instance, rejects the thesis that small-scale flexible specialization
"is driving economic development."'I He bases his rejection on industrial country
evidence showing that (i) the upsurge in small firms is nothing but strategic downsizing
by large-scale firms (which thus ultimately control the process); (ii) countries with a
high percentage of small-scale enterprise do not display superior economic performance;
(iii) rapid employment growth is still restricted to large-scale enterprise; and
(iv) productivity, profit rates, and the quality of working conditions appear lower among
small-scale firms (Harrison, 1994:17-22). He argues that the relationship between
industrial districts and "the outside world" is stronger and more complex than admitted,
in his view, by the proponents of flexible specialization, and that industrial districts may
10 The concept of collective efficiency is akin to that of industrial districts. It refers to the
efficiency and flexibility gains emerging from the clustering of [small]firms, and
resulting from "the scope for division of labour between enterprises and hence for
specialisation and innovation, essential for competing beyond local markets [that
clustering allows for. In clusters,)... there is also substantially greater scope for
collective action" (Schmitz, 1992:64).
11 The Second Industrial Divide does not really make the claim that industrial districts
are driving development in general. As mentioned in footnote 6 above, although Piore
and Sabel clearly favor flexible specialization, they explicitly present it as one of two
possible outcomes, with the other being a revamping of mass production (Piore and
Sabel, IbId.:252). It is also true, however, that the evidence cited by Harrison and
smnmrizd i ths pragaphweakens the argument that industrial districts, in general,
should lead to "benign" outcomes. Amin and Robins (1990) also take this critical
approach in the industrial country debate.
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have their own "dark side": an unequal and exploitative organization of work
(ibid.:24).
I include on this second side of the debate some of the writings on the informal
sector in developing countries (see, for instance, Castells and Portes, 1989) and the
earlier product market segmentation models (Piore, 1980), which also characterize
subcontracting as a subordinating and somewhat involutionary phenomenon. Much of
the informal sector literature relies on the basic premise that informal sector
relationships are aimed at cutting labor costs. Castells and Portes argue, for instance,
that "informal arrangements seem to be growing rapidly"; that "there is a tendency for
the informal economy to rely predominantly on networks, and [that] its connection to
the formal economy, through subcontracting, is also network-based"; and that "the best
known effect of the informalization process is to reduce the costs of labor ,
substantially..." (Castelis and Portes, op. cit.:29-30). 12 By forcing subcontractors to
rely on low-paid labor, and then squeezing surplus revenue from them by imposing a
low regulated price, client firms increase their average rate of profit, but also stymie
subcontractors' chances to accumulate capital and grow (Holmes, 1986:88). Piore's
1980 product market segmentation model postulates that customers transfer to their
subcontractors the costs of demand uncertainty (the efficiency costs of maintaining idle
capacity during demand downturns) by restricting their access to the stable segments of
demand, that is, to products for which the demand supports large-series, year-round
production. In this model, too, the subcontracting relationship clearly works against the
subcontractor's ability to accumulate and grow.
Summing up, the flexible specialization literature would lead one to consider the
possibility that the proliferation and strengthening of inter-firm networks in Venezuelan
12 Chapter III includes an expanded discussion of this strand of the informal sector
literature, including the contributions of such authors as Holmes, Rubery and
Wilkinson, and Gouvemeur.
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plastics manufacturing in 1983-88 indicated firms' movement away from the typical
mass production paradigm, and towards the development of areas of collective
efficiency among small batch producers. From the viewpoint of the informal sector and
product market segmentation literatures, in contrast, the proliferation of subcontracting
in the Venezuelan plastics industry in 1983-88 might be interpreted as a sign of a more
aggressive cost-cutting stance on the part of core firms. The expected result would in
this case be the weakening and stagnation of small- and medium-scale enterprise and the
further impoverishment of the least privileged sectors of labor in the industry. In the
light of the debate on industrial organization, consequently, my initial question-why
the growth in subcontracting during the protectionist period of the 1980s?-evolved
into one with more obvious policy relevance: Did the expansion of subcontracting over
the span of almost a decade mean the opening of a new "possibility for prosperity," or
did it reflect a plunge into a subordinating and involutionary model of industrial growth?
C. The Evidence: Survey and Case Studies, 1987 and 1992
To address the question on what factors drove subcontracting in Venezuela's
plastics manufacturing sector, I undertook fieldwork in Venezuela during two periods:
March to December 1987 and February to August 1992. My research in 1987 included
three stages. During the first two months of my 1987 stay in Venezuela, I visited
government institutions, entrepreneurs organizations, and labor unions and reviewed
literature in order to develop a view of the plastics industry's economic policy and
institutional environment and its technical and organizational characteristics,
summarized in Chapter U. Then, between June and October 1987, 1 participated in a
survey of plastics manufacturing firms conducted by the Planning Department of the
Venezuelan Ministry of Industry. The survey, whose objective was to explore areas in
which the industry could improve its competitiveness, covered a representative sample
of 126 finns. These firms comprised 30% of all plastics manufacturers identified by the
Venezuelan Central Statistical Office-but only about 11% of the total number of
plastics firms that my team in the Ministry suspected existed on the basis of information
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obtained from informal contacts and commercial publications. Administering the
questionnaire to a firm often took an entire day and, in a few cases, required more than
one visit The questionnaire, which covered the firm's history, human resources,
investment practices, technologies, and market position,13 allowed me to pinpoint which
firms acted as clients or subcontractors and to identify their characteristics.
Based on the survey results and on further research to identify links between
firms in the sample, I identified five subcontracting networks as representative of the
industry: two plastics-transforming toy makers (a large, well-established one that I call
Transtoys, and a small, relatively new one, Minitoys) and their plastics suppliers; two
subsidiaries of multinational corporations that produced personal care items
(Multinac-razors, shampoos, deodorants) an" school products (Transchool-writing
devices, watercolors) and their suppliers of plastic pieces and containers; and a supplier
of plastic parts to automakers (Carplast). At each client firm and subcontractor in these
networks, I interviewed the managers and some workers during October-December
1987 on the history of the firms' subcontracting relationships. 14
The 1987 field research provided a comprehensive view of the context in which
Venezuelan plastics manufacturing has developed, the industry's internal structure, the
pervasiveness of subcontracting relationships, and the difference, on average, between
the subsample of client firms and that of subcontractors with regards to certain
performance indicators and economic characteristics. This research produced the
material that I analyze in Chapters I-v.
Unable to repeat the sample survey when I returned to Venezuela in 1992, 1
used industrial statistics from the Central Statistical Office to identify significant changes
in the sector's main performance indicators (gross output, investment, employment,
13 SeAnnex II.
14 The description of each case study is at Annex mI.
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value added, and profits). I revisited most of the firms in the five subcontracting
networks and outlined their experiences during 1988-92. Through this exercise, I
identified the preliminary responses of the subcontracting networks to the "big bang"
stabilization and adjustment that Venezuela initiated in February 1989, discussed in
Chapter V.
D. Idiosyncrasies in a Complex Story Line
Did the expansion of subcontracting over the span of almost a decade mean,
then, the opening of a new "possibility for prosperity," or did it reflect a plunge into a
subordinating and involutionary model of industrial growth? The answer to this
question was not straightforward. Far from clarifying the picture, trends in economic
indicators during the proliferation of subcontracting pointed to more questions and
paradoxes.
First, average wages and labor's share in total production costs declined faster in
plastics manufacturing than in other industries at the same time that subcontracting in
the sector was growing. From that observation, and following the informal sector
approach sketched earlier, one might infer that firms used subcontracting to reduce
average labor costs.
Second, as already mentioned, the increase in subcontracting coincided with the
introduction of severe protectionist measures. If subcontracting had been a mechanism
for cutting costs, one would not have expected it to grow, ceteris paribus, during a
time of greater protectionism, which is conventionally assumed to reduce the pressures
for price competition. Either subcontracting was not adopted to cut costs, or the
protectionist scheme pursued in the 1980s did not reduce cost-cutting pressures.
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Third, during the period of growth in subcontracting, the industry as a whole
experienced a historically high rate of growth in output In the absence of further
details, one would be tempted to link the proliferation of subcontracting with the
industry's economic buoyancy. But the concentration of output and investment in the
sector's largest enterprises also increased, suggesting that the growth in subcontracting
may have hurt smaller firms.
The goal of my study thus became to construct a story line that not only
explained the apparent shift in the industry's organization, but also fit together these
disparate observations. The evidence gathered resulted in a story line that is somewhat
convoluted and spotted with country and sector anecdotes and idiosyncrasies, but that is
useful in charting the limits of broad generalizations. According to this story,
subcontracting in Venezuelan plastics manufacturing was a clear case neither of flexible
specialization nor of informal sector-based subordination. It was, instead, an hybrid
institution playing an intermediation role in the restricted market for raw material inputs.
As such, it exhibited some of the "benign" features of inter-firm networks under flexible
specialization, although without many of its technological, social, and broader
institutional preconditions.
E. How an Abundant Input Became a Constraint... and Why Subcontracting
Became the Solution
I organize the information gathered for this study around the testing of specific
hypotheses using the data collected in 1987 and 1992. These hypotheses try to
ascertain whether the tenets of the informal sector literature (that subcontracting is a
labor-cost-cutting strategy) and the product-market segmentation literature (that
subcontracting is a means for transferring the costs of demand uncertainty) fit the case
of the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry in the 1980s. In the process of
testing-and rejecting-these hypotheses an alternative model emerges that, although
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not an exact fit with the flexible specialization model, nevertheless reveals a generally
balanced and benign relationship between clients and their subcontractors in 1983-88.
Subcontracting offered sometking heond reduced labor cost. The
hypothesis that the industry used subcontricting exclusively as a labor-cost-cutting
mechanism was not borne out by the evince. Because I was unable to obtain firm-
level information on wage and nonwag7 paymeus, I relied on surrogate indicators for
labor costs. To start with, I assumed iat institutions (government regulation, union
rules) make labor more costly and th4 such enterprise characteristics as large size,
central location, and union presence 'ply a higher probability of compliance with the
norms imposed by the government unions and thus would be associated with higher
labor costs. Economywide evidencejshowed that these assumptions were reasonable. I
then observed whether there were sianfcant differences in firm size, location, and
unionization between the subsample of client firms and the subsample of subcontractors
that I visited in 1987. If subcontractors had been, on average, smaller, in more remote
locations, and less likely to have a union presence than client firms, I would have had
reason to believe that, indeed, subcontracting was being used as a strategy to cut labor
costs.
Contrary to my expectations, the 1987 sample survey revealed, first, that most
clients and subcontractors tended to be of similar size, that is, medium-size enterprises
(21-100 employees). Second, rather than seeking to avoid government regulation or
unions by locating in remote areas, subcontractors tended to concentrate in central
regions-even more so than clients. And third, subcontractors were no less likely than
their clients to have a union presence.
In fact, evidence also indicated that the segment of firms more likely to be under
competitive pressures to cut costs did not rely on subcontracting as their main
mechanism for reducing labor costs. Compared with all firms in plastics manufacturing,
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large-scale firms showed a sharper decline in profit rates during the protectionist period;
they may have faced harsher competition than other segments of the industry, where
profits showed no such erosion. Large firms also hired casual labor (a way to cut labor
costs) far more frequently than they turned to subcontracting. Similarly, in networks,
clients, not subcontractors, relied more on casual labor. These observations indicate
that hiring casual labor, not subcontracting, may have been the most common strategy
for cutting labor costs.
In sum, subcontractors seemed to offer to clients something more than the
opportunity to cut labor costs. Surrogate indicators, because they are based on
assumptions, cannot lead unequivocally to the rejection of the possibility that
subcontracting was used to cut labor costs to a limited extent or by some networks.
They do irdicate, however, that the subcontracting networks analyzed did not conform
to the typical model of a subordinating relationship between client and supplier put
forward in the informal sector and segmentation literatures.
Subcontracting was not being used to avoid bulky investments under
uncertainty. My second hypothesis postulated that subcontracting was a flexible
capacity-enhancing mechanism that enabled client firms to avoid bulky, indivisible, and
irreversible investments under fluctuating and uncertain demand and to transfer the costs
of uncertainty to their subcontractors. This model would lead inevitably to a sharp and
growing difference in size, performance, and perceived prospects (that is, increased
segmentation) between clients and subcontractors. And it would subject subcontractors
to greater uncertainty and to greater difficulties in advancing technically and
organizationally than their clients.
This hypothesis led me to expect several things. First, I expected client firms to
be operating at near-full capacity. Yet I found that, in 1987, at least a third of the client
firms reported very high levels of idle capacity (more than 40% of capacity was
- 30-
considered "idle" based on a three-shift day). In fact, average capacity utilization
differed little between clients and their subcontractors.
Second, I expected client firms to avoid investing in new capacity because,
under this hypothesis, that was the rationale for subcontracting. I found instead that
more than two-thirds of the client firms in my 1987 sample had invested in new capacity
in the previous three years, despite the onset of the debt crisis cznd major
macroeconomic instability. Subcontracting coinciding with new investment would have
been understandable for multiprocess firms, which could expand in one process (e.g.
injection molding) and subcontract in another (e.g. blow molding or extruding). But,
paradoxically, many single-process firms that had been subcontracting plastics
transformation since 1983 had recently purchased new equipment.
Finally, I expected sharp contrasts between clients and subcontractors in
technological and organizational performance. Evidence in this regard was
inconclusive. On average, client firms showed greater use of systematic productivity
programs and computer-aided manufacturing and greater participaticn in formal
business associations. But client firms also reported being more affected by predatory
competition in final markets and by the shortage of specialized skills. Subcontractors
had developed better preventive maintenance systems and, in general, showed at least as
much optimism about the future as clients did, as reflected in their plans for investment
and expansion.
I do not interpret these findings as invalidating the basic assumptions about
investment behavior underlying this second hypothesis. In other words, I presume that,
under well-performing markets, Venezuelan plastics manufacturers probably would have
behaved as the model predicted-that is, this puzzling coincidence of idle capacity with
subcontracting and further investment in capacity would not have arisen. I explain the
contradictory findings as suggesting that, in fact, Venezuelan investors were operating
in such a complex environment that transferring the costs of uncertainty through
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subcontracting, consistent with the segmentation model, may have been the least of their
concerns.
But my interprtation of the Venezuelan case differs from the segmentation
model in its perception that local investors considered supply uncertainty (difficult and
irrgular access to inputs) far more important than demand fluctuations. In the study, I
present two examples showing how supply uncertainty may have explained
subcontracting growth and the "atypical" investment behavior the fact that the supply
of sophisticated imported molds experienced unpredictable peaks and troughs, and
investors' hoarding behavior in response to exchange rate uncertainty15.
Getting access to resins: The main reason for subcontnacting in the 1980s.
Analysis of the supply of resins further confirms that supply-side uncertainty was a
major f, or driving subcontracting. Most entrepreneurs in the representative sample
interviewed in 1987 reported difficulties in getting access to domestic resins as the most
serious problem they faced. Further, the managers of the client firms in the five
subcontracting networks that I visited in 1987 reported that the problems in raw
material procurement heavily influenced their decision to subcontract and their choice of
subcontractors.
Why did access to resins become the main problem facing plastics manufacturers
in Venezuela? The country is one of the world's largest producers and exporters of oil
and natural gas, one of the first oil-rich developing nations to adopt a major
petrochemical investment program, and one of the developing world's large
petrochemical producers. I place faulty design and implementation of policies at the
core of my explanation of this paradox. Policy design was faulty because it was, on the
one end, strongly encouraging the demand for plastics manufactures and, on the other,
imposing severe bottlenecks and uncertainties on tIhe supply side. Faulty design,
15 See ChapterlV.
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however, was not the result of the state's lack of capacity or willingness to address the
problem of industrial linkages, but rather an unintended result of the fact that trade,
exchange rate, and price policies were being designed with a very different objective in
mind: to curtail capital flight in the context of a severe external debt crisis. The
implementation deficiencies consisted primarily of the establishment of inadequate
distribution channels, biased against newcomers to plastics manufacturing, as well as
against smaller and rapidly growing manufacturers. They were the consequence of the
overburdening of the administrative capacities of petrochemical corporations and the
corporations' hasty response to such burdens (a quota system and the delegation of the
small-scale segment of the market for resins to a cr ple of private retailers) that was not
subject to appropriate monitoring on the part of other official agencies.
How did subcontracting facilitate firms' access to raw materials? Former
importers of plastics products that became manufacturers after the government imposed
import restrictions in 1983, lacked a history of resin consumption to support their
request for a resin quota. Similarly, producers of final goods that wanted to increase
their production rapidly were constrained by the rigid quota system or discouraged by
the retailers' unpredictable markups. To these new and growing producers, traditional
plastics manufacturers with sizable quotas and well-established links (bypassing the
retailers) to the petrochemical corporations offered a solution. In the five
subcontracting networks that I studied in detail, subcontractors supplied and maintained
stocks of resins for their subcontracting transactions.
Subcontactng was a dynamic, yet possibly ineffcien4 institution. Conscious
of the edge gained through their access to resin quotas, subcontiactors developed
increasingly complex arrangements interlinking markets and transactions to ensure their
clients' continued business. For example, to ensure that a client had a stable supply of
resin through the peak season, a subcontractor might offer to reserve part of its quota
during the off-season, storing it (for a fee) until needed. But, in exchange, the
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subcontractor would obtain a commitment from the client to give the subcontractor the
right to transform at least part of the reserved material. This "strategic bundling" of
subcontracting transactions with transactions in the resin market enabled the
subcontractors to ensure that their alliances with clients weathered seasonal or
temporary demand troughs. It also allowed client firms to transfer the cost of
transactions in the resin market to their subcontractors. In sum, as seen in 1987,
subcontracting networks had developed into intricate, multi-interest institutional
arrangements as strategies had evolved to adapt to the complex set of incentives and
conditions prevailing during the protectionist period of the 1980s. Subcontracting was
a sensible institution from which both parties stood to gain. But it was built on an
oligopsony (by subcontractors over the resin supply) that, in turn, thrived thanks to
official trade protection. Subcontracting constructed on these bases ran a high risk of
being economically inefficient.
Responding to Adjustment in the 1990s. The stabilization and structural
adjustment program introduced in 1989 ended the trade protection and led to a deep,
short-term contraction in the demand facing domestic plastics manufacturers and resin
producers. As a result, plastics manufacturing output declined by 20% in the first year
of adjustment (1989) and by 2% in the second year (1990), and employment by 5% and
4%. A sharp recovery followed this contraction, however, and the sector's gross output
in 1992 exceeded its previous record, reached in the pre-adjustment year of 1988.
The changes in the policy framework eliminated the rationales for subcontracting
that I had identified during the protectionist period of the 1980s. Devaluation and
simplification of the foreign exchange regime mitigated exchange rate uncertainty. The
government eased the constraints on temporary imports of molds, ending the irregular
mold supply that had often led to subcontracting; it also lifted most restrictions on resin
supply, dissolved the quota and monopolistic retailing system, and freed the prices for
domestic resins. Those interested in engaging in plastics manufacturing both gained
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direct access to resin imports and could compete more freely for access to the relatively
cheaper, locally made resins. Subcontractors that bad earlier served as "rokers" of raw
material thus lost their source of oligopsonistic power.
After these reasons for subcontracting disappeared, did subcontracting also
disappear, or had partners discovered other advantages of joint production that led them
to continue the subcontracting networks? My answer to this question remains tentative,
as it relies on the observation of only three years of post-adjustment experience.
Emerging trends nevertheless indicate that the answer varied greatly across
networks. The elimination of protection sharpened distinctions across subcontracting
networks. This diversity in emerging coping strategies in the 1990s leads me to propose
that both the concept of flexible specialization and that of efficient mass production
ought to be considered in developing future sectoral strategies.
As would be expected, less efficient networks and firms became particularly
vulnerable. The basis of the subcontracting relationship, whether horizontal
disintegration ("capacity" subcontracting) or vertical disintegration ("specialization"
subcontracting), became significant. Many capacity subcontracting networks
disappeared or shrank (fewer participating firms, less volume transacted), revealing, in
hindsight, that the demand upsurge of the 1980s had accounted for some of the growth
in subcontracting. Intrigued by the pervasiveness of supply-side complications, I had
underemphasized demand factors when observing the networks in 1987.
Networks based on vertical disintegration or specialization, in contrast, survived
the economic adjustment, but underwent restructuring. Client firms in the surviving
networks-often subsidiaries of multinational corporations-learned from the heavy
reliance on subcontracting in the 1980s. In general, they followed a threefold strategy
after adjustment. First, a mass production strategy: they integrated the production of
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the simplest plastics components and those produced in the largest series. Second, a
strategy of outsourcing batch-produced parts: they continued contracting out the
production of more complex components or those produced in shorter series to the
subcontractors that offered the highest-quality service. And third, an import strategy:
they started importing finished products in the most sophisticated lines from
headquarters.
Subcontractors also were forced to restructure their operations in order to
survive. After adjustment, the system of interlinked transactions that had given them
control over their business in the mid-1980s became obsolete. Yet subcontractors'
specific responses were not determined by their clients' choices only: those responses
varied significantly from one another, depending on the subcontractors' resources,
capabilities, and location. The strategies followed by subcontractors that adjusted most
"successfully"16 also varied. For instance, some subcontractors that stabilized their
markets by gaining control over proprietary technology (patents) or the market for a
nontradable good, 17 so as to achieve scale economies, adjusted successfully in the short
term. But so did also other subcontractors that adopted a strategy akin to flexible
specialization, whether catering to a diversified local clientele or a large customer.
F. Some General Lessons for Research on Inter-Firm Relations: Approach
and Methodology
Any developing country case is bound to exhibit idiosyncrasies such as those in
my story. Yet studies need to go beyond asserting that (i) no transferable lessons can be
extracted, and (ii) most productive systems are likely to lie between the two extremes of
16 Here I define "success" as a firm's short-term recovery, i.e. the resumption of gross
output and employment growth within the three years following macroeconomic
stabilization and structural adjustment. I could not gather data to ascertain profit levels.
17 Containers, for instance, have a high volume-to-weight ratio and can be very expensive
to transport across boundaries. This feature renders them virtually "nontradable."
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segmentation and flexible specialization. 18 In stepping back from the details of the
Venezuelan example, some general methodological lessons emerge that might help
improve on the shortcomings of the few available studies of inter-firm networks in
developing countries:
Do no diui the power of1macreniciro nkages (national policies,
firms' networking decisions). In keeping with the emphasis in the
industrial country literature on local regulatory systems, much of the
available developing country literature tends to study the behavior of
subcontracting networks largely in isolation from their national
macroeconomic context. Except for a few recent attempts (Schmitz and
Musyck, 1993; Schmitz, 1995), this literature thus tends to neglect the
interaction between macro and micro contexts that, as my study will
make clear, can be thenain reason for those networks' existence in
some developing country cases. .Acknowledging the strong influence of
national policy does not detract from the recognition of diverse local
initiatives and responses in developing country contexts-or the
existence of "larger' underlying factors, such as technological
innvation. Much to the contrary, it would make the application of new
theories of industrial organization and inter-firmnetworks more relevant
to developing countries, where policy upheaval tends to be much more
frequent and profound than in industrial countries.
18 This is an assertion with which, for that matter, the leading proponents of the flexibte
specialization approach and those of the aternative "subordination" approach might
well agree. In his response to Ash Amin and Kevin Robins's criticism of flexible
specialization (Amin and Robins, 1990), Sabel says that "...i~f I were interested, as I
am, in ambiguity and organisation equivocation, I would turn my attention not to the
reductive cases, but to the many hybrids which show that there are indeed important
distinctions to be drawn between the limiting cases of nass productioo and flexible
specialization... I agree that the problem of categorising and assessing empirical
significance of hybrids of Pordism and flexible specializatin.is among the most
difficult and chalienging in aur research agenrda.."(Sabel, 1990:223).
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Go beyond one-time sa'des. Most available developing country studies
are snapshots in time and cannot offer an assessment of the stability of
networks' features or identify their long-term dynamics. That may lead
these studies to conclude that a given shift in industrial organization
reflects a permanent trend (again, in keeping with the focus of the cited
industrial country literature on long-term, structural changes) when it is
in fact a transitional strategy. This study follows the trajectory of the
plastics manufacturing sector and of five subcontracting networks in that
sector during a decade in which the economy was in upheaval (subject
first to a major protectionist scheme in 1983-88 and then to a "big bang"
stabilization and adjustment program in 1989-92). From the study's
observations emerges the view that networks can evolve significantly and
rapidly in response to changes in policy and the economic environment,
and that, even if such changes render the networks obsolete, their
disappearance cannot always be judged the result of "bad performance,"
as they tend to fulfill specific, timely functions while they are operating.
e Look for, and then interpre4 diverity in inter-firm linkages. Much of
the developing country literature treats subcontracting as a monolithic
phenomenon and generalizes conclusions across networks that may differ
widely. 19 This study illustrates that networks with very different
rationales and roles can coexist even in a small industrial sector such as
Venezuela's plastics manufacturing, and that the fact that some survive
major adjustment and others do not can inform industrial analysis and
policymaking.
19 This problem is less pervasive in recent literature than in earlier work. Now many
authors tend to devote at least a section of their articles or books to the discussion of
classifications. (See, for example, Watanabe, 1983; Holmes, 1986; Kelley and
Harrison, 1990; Laweson, 1990.)
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* Consider supply-side as wel as denand-sidefactors. Much of the
literature on segmentation and inter-firm networks postulates that
uncertainty in the demand for the firm's product is the main reason for
the disintegration and outsourcing of the production process. My
Wnezuelan example suggests that supply-side uncertainty (restrictions
or instability in access to crucial inputs) also can act as a strong incentive
for subcontracting-particularly in a developing country setting where
supply uncertainties are frequent I claim that in subcontracting
networks that arise in response to supply-side uncertainty,
subcontractors exhibit stronger bargaining power. Subcontractors enjoy
a specific comparative advantage over clients in dealing with input
bottlenecks or problems, whether demand is up or down. But policy or
- structural changes can erode such comparative advantage (for example,
when a policy shift makes the input or asset more broadly available).
Consequently, learning to reproduce or renew the sources of
comparative advantage-such as the control over a strategic resource or
asset-is key to the continuing success of a subcontracting network.
* Consider the likelihood that '"possibilitiesforprosperity" can be
sought in more than one direction (Piore and Sabel, 1984: Chapter 10;
306-308)--at least in the short- and medium-run. Studies of industrial
sectors in the developing world tend to remain entrenched either in the
logic of scale economies and mass production or-in the recent
literature-in the flexible specialization logic. In developing countries,
where severe uncertainty has been and will continue to be a fact of life,
hybrids of flexible specialization and mass production may continue to be
the rule and not the exception (Sabel, 1990:223). Moreover, in many
sectors, multinational corporations will remain important in terms of
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output, employment, and as sources of subcontracting opportunities
(Harrison, 1994:12-13). Inthinking of options for industrial
organization and development in the developing world, then, it would
seem as if a certain degree of contradiction has to be tolerated. Sectoral
policy prescriptions for a sector such as plastics manufacturing will need
to be eclectic, incorporating support to incipient flexible specialization
(and exploring to what extent the social and economic preconditions for
this paradigm can be found or encouraged in a developing country
context), as well as viable manifestations of mass production, and taking
advantage, where possible, of multinational procurement systems.
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II THE VENEZUELAN PLASTICS SECTOR IN THE 1980s: GROWTH
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Between 1983 and 1988, Venezuela's plastics manufacturing sector experienced
not only rapid output growth, but also a significant transformation of inter-firm
relationships. Before 1983, most firms in diverse industrial sectors requiring plastic
parts and components used to produce them in-house; starting in 1983, many of them
tended to outsource, either to complement their own plastics manufacturing capacity or,
in some cases, to substitute for it. And firms that had never undertaken plastics
transformation in-house, but had traditionally outsourced it to subcontracting networks,
allowed those networks to become larger and more complex. The result was an
industrial structure more interconnected than ever before.
This chapter places the growth of plastics manufacturing subcontracting of the
1980s within its sectoral and macroeconomic policy context After explaining the main
technical features of the process of plastics transformation, highlighting those bearing on
subcontracting decisions, the chapter shows that, historically and internationally, a
strong oil resource base has had little to do with the development of a plastics
manufacturing industry. Geopolitical factors (e.g. wars and the oil booms of the 1970s),
the standardization of technology, and trade protection have facilitated plastics
manufacturing growth, both among pioneering countries and late industrializers. That
Venezuela ranks among the world's top oil producers and also among the largest
producers of petrochemicals and plastic products in the developing world is,
consequently, the exception rather than the rule. The turn taken by Venezuela's plastics
manufacturing in the 1980s as the government established a heavy trade protection
scheme-faster growth; acceleration of subcontracting, yet increasing concentration of
output, employment, and investment among largest producers; and gradual erosion of
the sector's international competitiveness-thus required some examination. In
particular, why would trade protection, which is assumed to reduce the pressures to cut
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costs in the protected sectors, beaccompanied by subcontracting growth, which is
usually conceived as a means to cut costs?
Throughout this study, I suggest that neither the trade protection scheme of
1983-88 nor the observed subcontracting relationships were playing exactly the roles
that much of the available literature attributes to them. Protection created great
uncertainties indeed, and firms undertook subcontracting for reasons other than cutting
costs. Towards the end of this chapter, I focus on the macroeconomic situation of the
1980s. I propose that the motivations underlying the trade protection scheme of
1983-88-responding, in contrast to previous import-substitution efforts, to a severe
external debt crisis-lie at the heart of the industrial outcomes. Subsequent chapters
deti with the nature of subcontracting in more detail.
A. Plastics Transformation: The Difficulties of Surmounting the Primary
Mineralrc "ump"
My interest in studying the effect of policy on the Venezuelan plastics sector did
not stem from the sector's weight in the Venezuelan economy-in 1982, the plastics
industry accounted for only 3% of the country's gross industrial output. Instead, I
focused on plastics manufacturing because of the combination of factors that granted it
a strategic position in Venezuelan manufacturing. First, the sector's close technical
linkage to oil, the country's most important resource and industry, presumably gave it
an advantageous economic position. Second, it was one of the fastest growing sectors
during the 1980s, expanding twice as fast as manufacturing as a whole. Third, the
industry exhibited a relatively and competitive structure; in 1983,
large-scale enterprise (i.e. firms with more than 100 employees) accounted for only 43%
of the total gross industrial product of the plastics manufacturing industry, and 41% of
its workers (compared with 73% andS58% for manufacturing as a whole; Tablel i). It
seemed safe to assume that, other things equal, an industry that had access to a crucial
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natural resource within its own national boundaries would have an advantage over other
industries that lacked such an access to strategic resources. If, in addition, that industry
had a relatively competitive stmcture, the benefits of (well-designed) industrial policy
would have a good chance of being broadly distributed. If a policy of industrial
promotion could have a positive effect on any industrial sector, plastics manufacturing
would be it.
In trying to understand what drove plastics subcontracting growth in the
1980s-and to understand the behavior of the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing
industry in general-an important first step is thus to know whether the presence of a
strong resource base upstream facilitated the development of the industry, as it was
supposed to. The analysis that follows indicates that, even if Venezuela was one of the
few developing countries that exhibited well-developed oil, petrochemical, and plastics
manufacturing sectors, this was not an unequivocal sign of well-functioning
interindustry linkages. In general: (i) oil richness is far from a sufficient condition for
the successful development of the plastics manufacturing industry, and (ii) besides the
help of favorable international geopolitical conditions, a combination of protection and
active public investment has been necessary for the generation of successful
petrochemical-plastics linkages, both in the industrial world and in emerging developing
country producers. Conversely, policy inconsistencies can lead to bottlenecks in
otherwise promising inter-industry linkages. (Such policy inadequacies, I will argue
later, were associated with subcontracting growth in the 1980s.)
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Size and Concentration Indicators for the 15 Target
Gross industrial output
Total
(Bs. InILSE
Sector millions) (%)
Food processing
Oil Refinries
Transport equipment
Iron and steel
Other chemical products
Beverages
Metal products
Chemical industrial substances
Nonmetallic minerals
Garments
Textiles
Pasts n re
Electrical machinery
Paper and cellulose
Graphic arts
Tota manufcuig
26,204
21,274
11,700
8,623
8,501
7,334
7,292
5,094
4,962
4,527
4,267
4,075
4,047
3,801
3,614
150,226
69
98
90
89
84
87
47
77
64
32
66
43
65
86
50
73
Note: Sectors are ranked by value of gross industrial produc
ISIC classification includes 29 manufacturing sectors.
LSE = Large scale enterprise (more than 100 workers).
Employmn
Total (numer In LS
of workers) (%)
71,130
7,021
24,715
24,120
24,927
15,875
30,814
10,603
20,184
27,674
21,952
18,451
15,659
10,901
16,784
435,042
.t. The entire two-digit
E
62
97
77
88
79
81
30
75
48
32
79
41
65
81
34
58
Soume: Oficina Central de Estadlstica e Informtica, Encuesta Industrial, 1982.
1. FIrst, Some Basic Facts about Plastics Transformation
The core activity of the plastics manufacturing industry (International Standard
Industrial Code 356) is plastics transformation, i.e. the conversion of resin or polymer
Table IL1
Manf gSecton Venezuela,19
0
MMIMMENNOW
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pellets into batches of plastic parts and components, or continuous plastic shapes (pipes,
sheets, filament), through the application of heat and pressure20
There are many different technical procedures to transform plastics. Injection
molding, for instance, consists of melting resin pellets in a hot chamber and then
injecting the molten material under high pressure into a rmold; most discrete plastic parts
are made through this process. Rotation molding is commonly used in the production
of balls, doll heads, and hollow objects, and it consists of pouring the already melted
material inside a closed, hollow mold and subjecting it to fast-speed centrifugation, so
that the material adopts the form of the intemal surface of the mold. Blow molding-
used in the production of bottles and container-consists of placing a previously
injected "matrix" inside a hollow mold and heating and blowing inside the matrix until it
expands to adopt the shape of the internal surface of the mold. Extrusion, on the other
hand, consists of the continuous processing of molten plastic material by making it pass
through a cast with the required section, so as to produce pipes, sheets, bag strips, etc.
In the Venezuelan plastics industry, injection molding and extrusion were the most
commonly used transformation processes, being present in 38% and 33%, respectively,
of all plastics manufacturing firms in 1987.21 Also, most subcontracting networks
observed in 1987 were engaged in injection molding.
The main input for plastics manufacturing are the resins themselves. The share
of resins in total production costs went from 55% in 1984 to more than 60% in 1988,
indicating that a steady and adequate supply of resins was an important condition for the
good functioning of the plastics manufacturing industry (Ministerio de Fomento,
1991:32). Resins (also called here "polymers") are produced by the secondary
petrochemical industry (Intemational Standard Industrial Code 3513), represented by a
20 Sources for this section include: Billnzycr (1978), and Investigacion y Desarrollo,
INDESCA (1985).
21 Source: Survey of 126 plastics mufcrigfinns, 1987 (see Annex II).
- 45 -
few joint ventures between the state, and international and local private capital. In
Venezuela, the main resins produced and used are the so-called "commodity" resins,
which exhibit a low cost-to-weight ratio and standardized technology. They include
high-density polyethylene (HDPE), low-density polyethylene (LDPE), poly-vinyl
chloride (PVC), polypropylene (PP), and polystyrene (PS). Except for the latter, which
partly depends on imported raw material, all of these polymers have been produced in
Venezuela at prices that, even before subsidies, are competitive with international
market prices. Resins are, in tum, the result of synthesizing simpler products
(monomers, also called "feedstocks") produced by the upstream basic petrochemical
industry. In Venezuela, the state owns the basic petrochemical industry, through a
corporation called PEQUIVEN.
Another crucial factor in plastics manufacturing is the molds. As mentioned
earlier, the molds are the exchangeable piece of the plastics transformation equipment
that gives shape to the product. Access to the right set of molds is crucial for a firm's
success, for several reasons. First, it defines the firm's market, as the mold embodies
the design features of the product-a reason for which very often these molds are
subject to patents, whose access can be difficult and expensive. Access to machine tool
technologies or suppliers can thus allow a plastics manufacturing firm to become self-
sufficient in this crucial aspect. However, mold-making and repairing skills are among
the scarcest in the industry. Second, mold technology can render a firm more efficient;
this technology has evolved markedly over time, with modern molds allowing for more
precise molding, easier release of the molded items, and less waste of material. Third,
because molds are interchangeable, they confer to the bulky plastics transformation
machines (that is, very specialized machines) the quality of "quasi-general purpose"
machines. In other words, by changing molds, a machine can generate a large number
of different objects. The effectiveness of a firm strategy that relies on enhancing the
spectrum of its products (economies of scope) lies on how efficiently it can shift from
one mold to another ("re-tool"). As Chapter IV will show, during the 1980s, difficulty
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in the access to molds was associated with the emergence of some subcontracting
relationships.
In addition to plastics transformation itself, plastics manufacturing firms may
perform other complementary processes such as decorating, labelling, finishing,
assembling and packaging. The general tendency in the industry is toward integrating
different complementary processes through linking and automating different steps in the
process of production. Yet the separation of core plastics transformation from the
complementary processes remains the most often used option for disintegration of the
productive process-i.e. a firm would perform plastics manufacturing and outsource to
other firms or to individual workers the performance of the complementary processes.
The composition of labor in the plastics manufacturing industry varies according
to firm size. In general, machine operation is a low-skill function, but specialized skills
are required for retooling, quality control, and mold making and reptdring. Smaller
firms with less machines obviously need less operators, yet they tend to be owned and
managed by technicians, and often more than one; as a consequence, curiously, they
tend to exhibit a relatively high ratio of semi-skilled or skilled personnel to unskilled
personnel. Large enterprises, in contrast, may have a larger core of skilled technicians
and professionals in absolute terms, yet the fact that they also have numerous machines
managed by low-skill operators leads to a relatively larger share of unskilled labor. The
share of unskilled labor in the industry may tend to decline through the elimination of
"linkage" functions (i.e. feeding the machines, releasing items from molds, conveying
unfinished products from one station to another, trimming and finishing the items) as
these functions, as mentioned above, are being increasingly automated and integrated in
the core plastics transformation equipment. Computerization of the transformation
process is also likely to lead to reduction of labor use and, presumably, a change in the
skills required from operators. Among Venezuelan industries, plastics manufacturing
featured among those which uses labor more extensively, and which pays relatively low
wages on average. This seems to be one of the reasons why labor cost has not been a
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crucial factor in determining firm strategies in ibis industry, as I will discuss in
Chapter In.
In the plastics manufacturing industry, the cost of maintaining inventories or
transporting them is often exacerbated by the fact that plastic parts, components and
containers are usually bulky and feature a very high volume-to-weight ratio. These
features of the products discourage producers either from building inventories-hence
foruing producers to respond very flexibly to demand, which explains in some cases the
seasonal use of temporary labor for complementary unskilled tasks such as finishing and
packaging-or from locating away from markets.
In sum, important features of plastics manufacturing that have a bearing on the
firms' option to subcontract are: (i) the industry's dependence on resins and, hence,
particularly in Venezuela, its dependence on industries that are increasingly
concentrated and state-controlled as one moves upstream in the plastics-petrochemicals
value chain; (ii) the crucial importance of molds, from the marketing and technological
viewpoints; and (iii) the relatively low share of labor in tCe cost structure and, hence, the
risk that it becomes irrelevant to the firm' strategy.
2. FIscal and Productive Linkages
Was oil wealth indeed a sufficient-or even a necessary-condition for the
emergence of plastics manufacturing? My answer is no, based on the international
evidence that I will present below, suggesting thatsuccess in plastics manufacturing
seems to be strongly correlated with the fact of having undertaken an aggressive
industrial strategy to develop capital-intensive petrochemical industries upstream from
plastics; having oil or natural gas in abundance is not enough. Is oil wealth now a
condition for the continued success of plastics manufacturing? In view of my
observations in the plastics manufacturing industry in the 1980s, the answer to this
second question would be more ambivalent. Abundant local supply, of course, would
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benefit the industry by making resins available at lower prices. The down side is,
however, that once the existing plastics manufacturing industry has become dependent
on cheap local resins, as Venezuela's industry did, any disruptions in supply can have
serious detrimental effects. One of my central arguments is that irregular resin supply
was an important reason for subcontracting growth in the 1980s, the subject of this
study.
Consistent with the results of early studies of "patterns of development,"
international evidence suggests that the fiscal linkages associated with oil wealth-that
is, the translation of oil revenues into economic development through public investment
and spending-can actually become fetters on industrial development (Chenery, 1960;
and Chenery and Taylor, 1968). Similarly, oil's potential productive linkages (the
addition of value to the mineral resource locally) would not materialize merely as a
result of the combination of a rich resource base and the free play of market forces,
because of the perverse effects of export revenue inflows upon the exchange rate and
domestic prices. The following brief international comparative review underscores the
importance of public policy (aided by favorable world market conditions) in realizing
such linkages.
The oil shocks of the 1970s were expected to bring about a major intemational
political and economic turnaround in which oil-rich countries, freed from foreign
exchange constraints on investment, would become "newly industrializing countries"
(Turner and Bedore, 1979:1). Oil prices jumped from $3 to $14 per barrel in 1973
alone and from $14 to $33 between 1978 and 1981 (Karl, 1982; Ministerio de Energfa y
Minas, 1982). The equivalent of 2% of global gross domestic product (GDP) was
transferred to oil-exporting countries in each of the two oil shocks (Autry, 1990:3).
Producing countries adopted measures to capture the rent from oil production,
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including the collection of taxes from corporations extracting the mineral, 2
nationalization of extraction and processing, and cartellization to enhance producers'
market power.
Yet the literature documents that economical, social, and institutional
development in these countries progressed much more slowly than the magnitude of the
oil windfalls would have suggested. In the 1980s, oil exporters featured prominently
among the major debtor countries, and the growth rates of middle-income oil exporters
compared poorly with those of other middle-income countries (Heal and Chichilnisky,
1991:113, 96). In an apparent confirmation of the "Dutch disease" argument, oil
countries' productive sectors were crippled by the exchange rate and relative price
effects of large inflows of petrodollars. An overvalued exchange rate and increasing
prices in nontradable sectors (commonly, services and real estate) discourages
investment in local production of tradable products, and encourages imports and,
investment in nontradables (Corden, 1982, 1984; Corden and Neary, 1982; van
Wijnbergen, 1984a and 1984b). Fiscal linkages translating massive oil-related public
revenues into social and productive infrastructure, either failed to materialize because of
inappropriate investment choices, or to perform efficiently because of the lack of
2 A pioneer among these was the 50-50 pfit sharing agreement entered into in 1945
between the Veneauelan government and foreign oil corporations operating in Venezuela
(Karl, 1982:6).
2 Mexico spearheaded the chain of oil sector nationalizations in 1938. Ir Algeria,
conmmercially viable oil reserves were discovered in 1956 and most oil interests were
nationalized by 1971. In Indonesia, commercial production of oil started in 1890, and
the state has been the owner since the beginning, although foreign firms exploit the
deposits by contract Bolivia natinalized Gulf Oil holdings in 1969.
Thereafter, the oil booms brought about a flurry of nationlisin. In Ecuador, large
oil deposits were found in 1967 andl, by 1976, the state oil company hal bought most of
the oil assets. In Iran, oil was discovered in 1908, and by 1973 the national oil company
had taken control of all the operations. In Nigeria, oil was discovered in 1956; in 1979,
some major corporations were nationalized, and public equity share in all operations
reached 60%...,Veoezuela was already the world's second largest oil producer in 1928; it
nationalized its oil industry in 1976(G0dbe ad., 1988:98-1O1; Vernon, 1971:3).
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provision for needed maintenance and operational costs (Gelb et al., 1988; Auty, 1990).
Where labor could benefit from the oil windfall, its gains began to disappear as the oil
price bonanza tapered off in the late 1970s (Bourguignon, 1988: 319). Finally, the
sudden resource wealth has been said to exacerbate corruption and, in some cases, to
help to make decision making, if not outright authoritarian, at least highly exclusionary
(Karl, 1982). In general, then, diversifying the economy and breaking away from
primary export dependence has not proved easy for oil-producing countries (Chenery
and Taylor, 1968; Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin, 1986; Auty, 1994).
The dilemma for resource-rich countries thus seemed to be one of diversifying
the economy despite having a dominant mineral sector. Paradoxically, oil riches make it
possible to turn that dilemma on its head: Why not diversify through far-reaching
forward integration from the extractive activities themselves (Radetzki, 1977:332). But
developing forward productive linkages from mineral extraction is hampered by the fact
that the initial stages of mineral processing are the most difficult to undertake. The
capital investments required at the early processing stages (primary and secondary
petrochemical processing, production of monomers and polymers) are very large and
involve greater scale economies and capital intensity than those at later stages (plastics
manufacturing). In addition, investments required at the very early stages of raw
material processing would be more "alien" technologically and organizationally to a
country entering this industry than those further downstream.U
These early complications in mineral processing are gradually overcome as
forward integration develops further, and positive externalities emerge across
increasingly diversified activities (Radetzki, 1977:333). Also, private sector producers
S Hirschrnan (1977:77-78; 89) suggests that forward linkages from a powerful primary
sector can become developmental handicaps, rather than propeliants, when they are
technologically alien to the environment.
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producers presumably can enter more easily and perform more effectively in less
concentrated markets downstream. In other words,
... the second (refining) stage in resource processing is often the most
demanding in terms of capital investment and represents a "hump" which must
be surmounted to link extraction to the less risky projects downstream. (Auty,
1990:55-57; emphasis added)
3. Oil-Plastics Linkages: International Evidence
International evidence supports the notion that the petrochemical-plastics
productive chain is "humpy." Grouping the world's 25 largest oil producers in 1980
according to whether they also ranked among the world's 25 largest producers of
chemicals or plastics manufactures, or both (Table ll.2)25 shows that:
25 The analysis below is constrained by the natmre of the data available when the study was
undertaken. For example: (i) data are presented for the chemical industry as a whole
(International Standard Industrial Code 351)rather than for the petrochemical industry
(ISIC 3513), because public UNIDO documents do not present data at the four-digit
ISIC level; (ii) classification of a country as a major producer in oil, chemicals, and
plastics does not necessarily imply that the three industries are intricately linked in that
country (primarily because of the presence of multinationals that often are more closely
linked with the country of their headquarters), yet it is not unsafe to assume that, in such
cases, domestic inter-industry linkages may be expected; and (iii) production and value
added figures, although translait into constant dollar figures, mask important
distinctions across countries relating to relative input prices, protection, subsidies, taxes,
and the like; this may detract somewhat from the accuracy of my comparisons.
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Table II.2 Level Uf Development of Chemical and Plastics Industries In
World's 25 Largest Oil Producers, Mid-1980s
World's largest oil producers
Also among largest
Among largest Also among largest chemical and plastics
oil producers only chemical producers producers
Avge. population: 33.4 Avge. population: 14.2 m Avge. population: 179.3 m
m Avge. area: 297,000 km2  Avge. area: 6,703,000 km2
Avge. area: 874,000 km2  Avge. market size: $46 b Avge. market size: $633 b
Avge. market size: $35 b Avge. GNP/cap: $8,185 Avge. GNP/cap: $7,345
Avge. GNP/cap: $7,816
Iraq Norway' Former Soviet Union
Nigeria Malaysia Saudi Arabia
Libya Romania United States
United Arab Emirates Venezuela!
Lndonesia*China"
Iran* Mexico
Kuwait United Kingdom
Algeriad Canada
Egypt Argentina
Quatar Australia
Oman
Brunei"
Note: In each column countries are ordered on the basis of oil production in 1980, with
the largest producer first. Market size is defined as overall GNP. Calculations of
average market sizes exclude data for China, the former Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, and
Romania, which were not availitle in the sources used.
a. Relatively weak petrochemical sector, as compared to other countries in the
groupmg.
b. No data available in either ISIC 356 (plastics nwxufacturing) or ISIC 351 (industrial
chemicals).
c. Although not yet reflected in the UNIDO data, plastics production is these countries
is growing rapidly.
d. Output from heavy petrochemical investments in the late 1970s not yet reflected in
the available data.
Sores,: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Handbook of
IndustrialStaistcs, 1988 and 1990; Oficina Central de Estadfstica e InformAtica,
Encusta Industrial, 1985; World Bank, World Development eport.
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* A number of the world's top 25 oil producers, all of them developing
countries, have been unable to develop their chemical or plastics
manufacturing industries sufficiently to also rank among the world's largest
producers in these two downstream sectors (Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Quatar, and the United Arab Emirates).
This confirms that abundant petroleum resources are not enough to offset
small markets and scarce technical capabilities in overcoming the barriers to
entry to the petrochemical industry.
* The group of top oil producers that have invested significantly in chemicals,
but have not developed their plastics manufacturing capacity
sammensurately, is very small. Large petrochemical investments do not
seem to be conceived primarily for export purposes-indeed, only 10% of
the world's production of petrochemicals is traded (Chapman, 1991:290).
Petrochemical investments usually are linked to domestic plastics
manufacturing.
* Some top oil producers have managed to develop both their chemical and
their plastics manufacturing sectors to the extent that they are also among
the world's 25 largest producers in each of these industries. As expected,
this list includes all the major industrial oil-producing countries (Canada, the
former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia).
But it also includes five developing countries: Argentina, China, Mexico,
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
A picture consistent with these observations emerges when looking at the level
of development of the petrochemical industry among the world's largest plastics
producers, and whether they have oil riches (Table 11.3). Among the top plastics
producers, only two, Hong Kong and Israel-both with unique economic and political
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features-have developed their plastics manufacturing sectors without the support of a
top chemical or oil industry. Countries that have been able to develop both their plastics
and their chemical industries without high levels of oil production are mainly industrial
countries housing the headquarters of powerful chemical and oil companies that have
developed international linkages to oil and gas (see Table 11.4), or newly industrializing
countries, such as Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan.
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Table IU.3 Oil and Chemical Production in World's 25 Largest Plastics
Manufacturers, Mld-1980s
World's largest plastics producers
Also among largest Also among largest Among largest
oil producers chemical producers plastics producers only
Avge. population: 1793 m Avge. population: 43.6 m Avge. population: 4.8 m
Avge. area: 6,703,000 km2 Avge. area: 825,200 km2 Avge. area: 11,000 km2
Avge. market size: $633 b Avge, market size: $288 b Avge. market size: $27 b
Avge. GNP/cap: $7,345 Avge. GNP/cap: $7,788 Avge. GNP/cap: $5,610
United States Japan Hong Kong
United Kingdom Germany Israela
Former Soviet Union France
Canada Taiwan
Australia Italy
Mexico Brazil"
Saudi Arabid Spain
Argentina South Korea
Venezuela" Switzerland
China* Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark'
Poland
Not: In each column countries are ordered on the basis of plastics production in the
mid-1980s, with the largest producer first Market size is defined as overall GNP.
Calculations of average market sizes exclude data for China and the former Soviet
Union, which not available in the sources used.
a. Has petrochemical production but does not rank among largest producers.
b. Has oil production but does not rank among largest producers.
c. No information on plastics manufacturing is available.
d. Relatively weak petrochemical sector compared with other countries in the group.
e. No data available in either ISIC 356 (plastics manufacturing) or ISIC 351 (industrial
chemicals). Ranking assigned assumes large plastics production.
Sowe: Unites1 Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organization, HWndbook of hadustrial
Statstics, 1988 and 1990; Oficina Centrad de Estadistica e Informhtica, Encuata
Industrial, 1985; World Bank, WorldDevelopment Repor.
Leadig Corporate Producers of Petrand Pbses, 1989
a. Production figures refer to chemicals only.
b. Exclude transfers between business segments.
c. Sales figures include fertilizers.
d. Sales figures refer to polymers only.
Source: Chemical Insight, No. 444, 1990; Fortune, July 30,
Chapman (1991:32).
1990, as cited in
The evidence above suggests two preconditions for successful development of
plastics manufacturing: (i) relatively large domestic markets, and (ii) endogenous
chemical capabilities. For oil-rich countries, meeting this second requirement amounts
to overcoming the bulky and costly hump represented by the second stage in resource
processing. But because of this "humpy" nature of the petrochemical-plastics
productive chain, the most critical precondition to creating productive linkages from oil
has been a deliberate strategy by national governments todevlop primary
petrochemical processing.
Table L4
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Sales Company Country Sales Fortsn
Rank (US$millions) rank
I Royal Dutch/Shell'b NetherlandsU.K. 11,075 4
2 Enimont Italy 10,766 100
3 Exxon*'b United States 9,210 3
4 Dow Chemical United States 8,772 53
5 British Petroleum' United Kingdom 5,654 10
6 Union Carbide United States 5,613 144
7 Atochem France 5,398 37
8 NorskHydro**c Norway 5,289 129
9 Huls Germany 5,287 281
10 Occidental Petroleum United States 5,204 46
11 BASF' Germany 5,116 31
12 General Electrica United States 4,896 7
13 ICI United Kingdom 4,844 40
14 M ''b United States 4,274 34
15 Bayer Germany 4,207 38
16 Mobib United States 4,039 8
17 Du Pont United States 3,432 19
18 Chevron United States 3,048 25
19 Petrofina' Belgium 2,964 98
20 Nova! Canada 2,907 325
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4. The Importance of Proactive Policy: Across Countries and Over Time
In this section, I argue that, even though geopolitical factors (wars, international
agreements, major changes in global markets) have certainly driven much of the
development of the petrochemical industry, decisive national policy has been an equally
important factor, particularly for developing countries. As the following account of the
petrochemical industry shows, the industrial countries historically have developed
petrochemicals because of geopolitical factors (such as wars) that stimulated a demand
for research and investments in that industry. This explains , for example, German and
U.S. leadership in petrochemicals at different times. Similarly, amother important
geopolitical factor, the oil boom, created the opportunity for oil-producing developing
countries to undertake major petrochemical investments, by producing inflection points
in the profit cycle of the petrochemical industry. The development of Venezuela's
petrochemical complex, sketched out below, followed this pattern. Yet the account also
shows that endogenous policy decisions, such as import substitution (usually supported
by a strong domestic market), have given rise to world-class petrochemical development
in non-oil-exporting developing countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, and India).
Wars and Product Development: 1910s-1940s. Early experiments in the late
1850s signaled the budding potential of the organic chemical industry (Chapman,
1991: 40). 26 Yet it was this century's world wars that, directly or indirectly, set the
stage for launching the basic chemical and petrochemical industries on a large scale.
The wars created demand for substances to be used directly for combat purposes.27
26 For example, the production of synthetic dyestuff out of coal tar-a by-product of gas
plants-in Germany (Chapman, 1991:40).
27 Isopropyl alcohol, araw material for the production of acetone which, in turn, was an
ingredint in the production of explosives, was discovered by an Amrcan scientist in
1916; at the end of the war, the patent was bought by Standard Oil of New Jersey,
which planned to use it as a gasoline extender and built the first large petrochemical
complex (Stobaugh, 1988: 166).
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And they cut off international trade and forced industrial economies to seek substitutes
for the raw materials that they had imported from developing countries.28 The wars
also dismpted trade and technological exchange within the petrochemical industry,
forcing trade partners to develop independently. In the United States, for example, the
petrochemical indusy benefited from a big push when ties with Germany were severed
first by World War I (Stobaugh, 1988: 166), then by the move toward autarky under
Nazism, and finally by World War H (Chapman, op. cit.: 45). Also important were the
effects of the wars on industrial assets and organizations. A large share of German
industry was destroyed during World War H, and after the war the rest was forced to
downscale and to break up into smaller firms.29 For the victorious allies, in contrast,
particularly the United States, war profits fueled much of the postwar commercial
development.
But from the viewpoint of this study, the key impact of the war periods was the
precedent established of government intervention in the industry. Contrary to a recent
World Bank assessment that petrochemicals have experienced "a lesser degree of
government controls and past market intervention" (Vergara and Brown, 1988:1), a
leading analyst of the industry has said, for example, that
... the preeminence of the chemical industry of the newly unified German state
was not a result of a fortuitous concentration of scientific talent, but rather a
28 For example, the German ammonia industry received its crucial push at the onset of
World War I, when nitrate imports from Chile were blocked (Chapman, op. cit.: 41).
Similarly, World War H accelerated the search for and commercialization of synthetic
products (polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride, polyethylene, and nylon) to substitute for
natua materials.
29 This was the case for the massive 10 Farbienindustrie AG (10 Fatten), a coordinated
federation of a core firm and more than 50 semi-autonomouzs dependents created in
1926. 10 Fatten posed a tremendous competitive threat to other European and
U.S.-based companies and was fily broken into three smaller units after World War
HI(Chapman, op. cit.: 43; Stobaugh, op. cit.: 167).
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consequence of deliberate policies designed to foster and exploit such talent.
(Chapman, op. cit.: 42)
In the United States, government intervention took several forms. Du Pont
diversified away from explosives and into dyestuffs and other organic chemicals because
of a 1913 antitrust decision that split the company into three parts. Du Pont, Dow,
Hercules, and similar companies thrived under government protection during and after
World War II, in a process of import-substituting industrialization aimed at ending
dependence on German synthetic dyestuffs. In parallel to-even in response to-the
German government's incentives to IG Farben to develop synthetic rubber, the U.S.
government established the synthetic rubber program that first encouraged research and
then financed the construction and operation of new plants and the adaptation of plants
of firms that used synthetic rubber, such as Goodyear and Firestone (Chapman, op.
cit.: 70). The government undertook similar efforts for other petrochemical materials
officially classified as strategic, such as tohuene and aviation fuel. Although in the
United States, as well as in other countries, ownership and control of petrochemical and
synthetic rubber complexes reverted to the private sector after World War II,
government sponsorship at this early stage in the product life cycle propelled the U.S.
industry to the dominant position that it maintained for several decades.
A good epilogue to this brief description of the impact of war-time government
intervention on the development of the petrochemical industry is the story of the role
played by the Marshall Plan, implemented under U.S. auspices in 1948-51. The
Marshall Plan indirectly created an opportunity for rapid development and
reconstruction of Europe's petrochemical industry, by financing coal- and oil-refining
projects to relieve the postwar fuel shortage in Europe. Expanding refineries generated
by-products needed for processing petrochemicals (Chapman, op. cit.: 82-83). In sum,
heavy government intervention, often in the form of import substitution measures, was a
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key factor in the development of the petrochemical industry in early industrializers such
as Germany and the United States.
Impo Substitution Proper and Foreign Direct Investment. Although import
substitution industrialization was a common practice among early industrializers, the
term "import substitution industrialization" was not widely used until the 1950s, in the
context of Latin America's attempts to mitigate the effects of declining terms of trade.
It was the large countries (Argentina, Brazil, India), not those with abundant oil or gas
resources, that undertook petrochemical production in the 1950s and 1960s through
ISI.
The pioneering import substitution efforts in the developing world were linked
to a growing tide of foreign direct investment (FDI) from industrial economies. After
expanding throughout the United States and Western Europe, multinational chemical
corporations reached for growing markets in the developing world, seeking to outpace
their competitors. Although these corporations would have preferred to export from
plants in their headquarter countries, national ISI strategies forced them to make direct
investments in order to circumvent tariff barriers. The protection enjoyed by
petrochemical corporations within these markets also was undoubtedly an advantage for
multinational investors-to such an extent that some became lax about costs and found
the diamantling of tariff barriers as inconvenient as did the domestic producers that the
barriers were supposed to protect. Argentina, Brazil, and India undertook their first
petrochemical ventures, in olefins and fertilizers, under ISI (Chapman, op. cit: 155).
The development of petrochemicals in Taiwan and South Korea also relied heavily on
different forms of govenment intervention and "persuasion", and on the establishment
of joint ventures (Enos and Park, 1988; Wade, 19W; Amsden, 1985 and 1989).
Oil Shock: Resource-Based IndustIalization in the Developing World. For
oil-rich countries that did not have the large markets that would have guaranteed the
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success of an import substitution strategy such as that pursued in the 1950s by
Argentina, Brazil, and India, the oil shocks offered the opportunity for developing
petrochemicals. The oil shocks of the 1970s made natural resources into a very
important portion of the cost structure of the petrochemical industry. Being closer to
the natural resources (oil, natural gas) became even more important than in the past. 0
The oil shocks thus had a centripetal effect on multinational corporation investment, as
the driving force for such investment became not the search for growing markets
(although the oil windfalls certainly involved market growth in oil-rich countries), but
the search for cheaper and more secure feedstock sources. At the same time, the oil
shocks also affected the development goals and expectations of oil- and gas-producing
developing countries. Appropriating the oil rent became a central political objective,
and industrialization based on oil and gas was seen as a good way to reach that
objective. Thus, foreign investors now found national governments in the developing
world either far more eager to enter into joint ventures with them or-where
nationalism required it or public resources permitted it-far more likely to crowd them
out.
Another important factor enabled national governments to adopt a more active
role in petrochemical projects. Technologies for the production of the industry's main
intermediate products or applications had become standardized, and competing products
and processes were easy to find on the market, eroding oligopolies and their
innovation-based profits. At this point in the product cycle, it made more economic
sense for innovators to sell the license for the use of the technology that they had
developed than to undertake direct investments, and governments of oil-rich countries
E Oil shocks enhanced the effect that the geographic distribution of these resources had
already exerted, before the 1970s, on the intranational location of industries (as shown,
for example, by the heavy concentration of petrochemical activity around the Gulf of
Mexico and in the Netherlands) and on the production method and type of corporation
that predominated in different regions (naphtha cracking and chemical corporations in
Europe, gas-based operations and heavier presence of oil corporations in the United
States).
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could now gain access to technologies without having to enter into joint ventures with
foreign investors. Many OPEC countries undertook massive investments in
petrochemicals in the mid- and late 1970s, including Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, and
Venezuela, or started developing plans to do so in the 1980s.
5. The Genesis of Petrochemical and Plastla Manufacturing In Venezuela
The driving forces in the development of Venezuela's petrochemical and plastics
industry can be traced, to a great extent, to the global framework outlined above. The
industry's history can be sketched out through several highlights. The Venezuelan
government had tried to launch petrochemical development since the late 1950s,
sometimes with the aim of enhancing and diversifying the sources of export revenues,
but most often to substitute for imports. Yet these efforts did not translate into actual
investments until two conditions were met. First, the increased standardization of the
petrochemical processing technologies made such technologies more accessible.
Second, the sharp increase in revenues during the oil booms of the 1970s provided the
resources needed to undertake massive investments. As soon as the petrochemical
sector became the focus of significant public resources, however, it also became
contested terrain for different political parties and groups of domestic investors. Even
after the dust of political struggle settled, conditions were not ripe for profitable
functioning of the resulting large petrochemical complexes until further state action
created a strong, captive domestic demand for intermediate petrochemical products-
hence import substitution also played an important role in facilitating petrochemical and
plastics investment, even in the context of an oil-rich economy. This section discusses
the early years of the Venezuelan petrochemical industry, elaborating on each of the
themes just sketched; it also links the development of the petrochemical industry to the
growth of Venezuela's plastics manufacturing downstream.
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The Venezuelan Petrochemical Institute (Instituto Venezolano de Petroquimica,
or IVP) was founded in 1956, under the dictatorship of General Pdrez Jimtnez. Its
purpose was to achieve domestic production of fertilizers to substitute for imports.
With the legal status of an autonomous institute of the national government, the IVP
depended on direct public budgetary allocations, and thus congressional approval, for
funding. As a product of the predemocratic system, it did not count on favorable
treatment by the early democratic administrations (Randall, 1987:30). A significant cut
in the IVP's budget by the Betancourt administration at the beginning of the democratic
period, in 1958, heralded two decades of serious administrative and financial problems
for the institute, reflected in repeated reorganizations and protracted delays in
investment and production plans.
The 1965-68 national plan of President Radl Leoni-the second democratic
president and, like Mr. Betancourt, a social democrat-already noted the "exhaustion of
the early stages of the import substitution process." Although the plan still considered
import substitution in intermediate and capital industries, it contemplated promoting an
export orientation in a few key basic and intermediate sectors (industrial chemicals,
petrochemicals, steel, and machinery industries). It discussed the need to encourage
private sector participation and proposed, for the first time, creating public-private joint
ventures, under IVP supervision, for two major polymer projects (CORDIPLAN,
1965). A plant with the capacity to produce 30,000 metric tons of synthetic rubber or
styrene butadiene (SBR) a year, proposed by the government in the 1963-66 national
plan, was promised for 1968 but, according to the annual report of the ministry of
energy and mines, not yet ready by 1977 (Ministerio de Energfa y Minas, 1977). Again,
the government planned to have completed a plant to produce 50,000 metric tons a year
of low-density polyethylene (LDPE), of which 80% was destined for export markets, in
1967, but this plant did not start operating until 1974 (Ministerio de Minas e
Hidrocarburos, 1974). In sum, the administration of President Leoni ended in 1968
with no major achievements in the secondary petrochemical industry.
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In the early 1970s, the Christian Democratic administration of Dr. Rafael
Caldera undertook an intense reorganization of the petrochemical industry. The
1970-74 national plan emphsized the need to "initiate the integrated and effective
utilization of the natural gas now wasted in the State of Zulia,"" and identified two
segments of the industry to be promoted: basic petrochemicals for export markets, and
import-substituting secondary petrochemicals. This dual focus, export-oriented
upstream production and import-substitution-oriented downstream production, was to
be repeated in all subsequent national plans, in a departure from the earlier emphasis on
export orientation for petrochemicals. 2 The IVP, after a major reorganization in 1970,
would receive a government credit of Bs. I billion (about $233 million at the time) to
launch the construction of two major petrochemical complexes: Moron, to produce raw
materials for fertilizers, and El Tablazo, to generate inputs for the production of
polymers, the feedstock for plastics transformation. As these production plans
proceeded, the Caldera administration was considering nationalizing the gas industry, in
view-according to official documents-of the new access to gas processing
technologies and the recognition of the economic value of this by-product of oil
extraction, which had until then been considered "a nuisance"(CORDIPLAN, 1965).
In August 1971, President Caldera presented to Congress the draft Law Reserving to
the Venezuelan State the Natural Gas Industry, which was finally approved on
November 22, 1972 (Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos, 1972:16).
It was less the nationalization of the gas industry, however, than the accelerating
pace of oil production resulting from the Middle East crisis that brought Venezuela's
31 In 1972, the annual report of the ministry of mines and hydrocarbons indicated that 31%
of the gas generated as a by-product of oil extraction in Venezuela was wasted, 45% of
it was used in further oil extraction ("injected"), and only 24% was used as fuel
(Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos, 1972).
*Admittedly, this early export orientation in petrochemicals, reflected in the 1965-68
national plan of the Lconi administration, could be explained by the fact that, at that
timr, only the basic, upstream segments of the petrochemical industry were being
considered, and they yielded products that could mot yet be fully used in the country.
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petrochemical industry to its next threshold, in 1974, already under the social
democratic administration of Carlos Andr6s Pdrez. The oil boom of 1973-74 made
available to the Venezuelan state an unprecedented flow of foreign exchange, as well as
unprecedented amounts of natural gas. Substantial petrodollars were to go to major
petrochemical developments through the Venezuelan Investment Fund (Fondo de
Inversiones de Venezuela, or FIV), created to manage the skyrocketing oil export
revenues. Some joint venture companies, whose startup had been delayed for a few
years, started functioning in 1974 (Polilago, a large low-density polyethylene plant, and
Petroplds, a PVC plant). Other plants, recently opened (Estirenos del Zulia, producing
polystyrene, and Mon6meros ColomboVenezolanos, producing caprolactama), started
reporting profits (Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos, 1974:57).
But as activity in the industry picked up, the absence of a consistent
development strategy for the petrochemical industry and the administrative and financial
limitations of the old IVP became more obvious. In January 1975, the president created
the National Council for the Petrochemical Industry, headed by the minister of mines
and hydrocarbons and formed of professionals with experience in the more developed
petroleum industry, to formulate policy for the petrochemical sector and submit its
recommendations to the president (ibid.:56). At the same time, despite the rapid growth
in production, mismanagement in the VP had led to some of the largest deficits ever
experienced by the institute and to production delays in certain key sectors, such as
fertilizer. This generated the need for heavy subsidization of compensatory imports and
additional allocations of public funds (ibid.:58-59).
A major scandal involving the industry-the PENTACOM case-slowed down
further corrective initiatives, however. The PENTACOM scandal erupted in Congress
in early i975.33 When it subsided, with the defeat of the president's attempt to create a
33 The PENTACOM scandal is discussed in detail in Karl, 1982, Chapter VI. The
so-called PENTACOM docurment, leaked to Congress before it could even be considered
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joint venture enterprise to manage the petrochemical industry, the government faced an
immediate need to address the organizational, financial, and administrative problems
confronting the IVP. In January 1977, the president decreed that the IVP would enter
"a state of reorganization."3 Operations in all industrial complexes reporting to the
IVP were temporarily suspended to facilitate an in-depth auditing and technical review.
The IVP's fertilizer and explosives segments became separate companies, and the IVP
disappeared. In its place, the government created Petroqufinica de Venezuela, Sociedad
An6nima (PEQUIVEN, S.A.). PEQUIVEN's legal identity meant that it would rely
less on public grants and be allowed to raise funds through the issuing of bonds.
Administratively and financially, the change in institutions amounted to the
metamorphosis of an old-style, personalized public entity into a "moder"
bureaucracy. 35
by the government, according to President Prez, proposed the formation of a central,
public-private planning enterprise to identify promising petrochemical projects, subject
them to technical assessments, develop a coherent program of action, and then manage
the implementation of the projects. The enterprise would be formed of a group of
private investors, both Venezuelan and foreign, the IVP, and the FIV. According to the
proponents (a team af private Venezuelan investors), the proposal was a response to the
need for a strategic change in the management of the petrochemical industry, a need
made evident by the IVP crisis. "First priority," said one of the proponents, "is a new
economic development and second follows the cncial theme of the nationalization of
petroleum..."(Karl, 1982:479). Ie proposal did not sit well with many congressional
representatives, who viewed it as a surrender of state control over the industry to foreign
capital (few believed that local capital could undertake such a demanding task) just as
international geopolitical factors were favoring an enhancement of state control.
34 Presidential decree 2004 of January I, 1977.
35 In her book about the political economy of Venezuelan oil, Laura Randall gives a
colorful account of the primitive conditions in which the petrochemical institute had
operated until 1977:
"...An idea of the broad reorganization needed is given by an example of IVP's
operations: there were movements of directors every two years. The director had an
office and a secretary, and one of the ways he was able to guarantee his continuity was
to make himself indispensable by not establishing organization, methods or policies.
Directors in the IVP did not leave more than a smail copy of anything. When a director
left, he took everything, so the IVP had no hir.. .. PDVSA (the newly created oil
corporation] used organizational planning to begin to solve IVP's problems. . .. It took
to IVP a secretary from Lagoven [a well-functioning oil company], who had established
correspondence systems, to set up the whole correspondence systen: format,
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The new institution was placed under the umbrella of the Venezuelan oil
complex (PDVSA) and thus benefited from the technical support of its professionals. A
set of new plants, planned years earlier, stated coming on-stream, including a high-
density polyethylene plant (Plastilago) and an expansion of the PVC plant (Petroplis).
By December 1979, nearly all petrochemical plants were finally operating relatively
satisfactorily. But, curiously, it was not until 1983, when the plastics industry was given
significant protection, that PEQUIVEN made profits-the first time in the history of the
state's involvement with the petrochemical sector.
This improvement in PEQUVEN's performance may have stemmed from the
financial and technical "sanitizing" efforts of the late 1970s. But it may also have
stemmed in large part from the creation of a captive demand for polymers by the severe
import restrictions applied to inputs for plastics manufacturing starting in early 1983. In
fact, because of the difficulties in developing the petrochemical sector upstream in the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, plastics manufacturing had developed largely independent of
local petrochemical supplies. But the problems in the petrochemical sector had not
meant that downstream plastics manufacturing had developed slowly; the strength of
domestic demand ensured relatively fast growth in the industry. While the 1966 official
industrial survey recorded only 7 firms, employing 720 workers, the 1971 survey
reported 129 firms, of which only 9 were classified as large-scale (employing more than
100 workers), and 4,723 workers. By the time the effects of the 1973-74 oil boom
were tapering off, the industry had tripled in size: the 1979 survey listed 359 enterprises
distribution, central file, spelling, chronological order. The professionals thought this
foolish, but it was the whole question of communication.... She produced the manual
and trained the secretaries. It became standard procedure to use the manual in IVP.
The reorganized VP checked whether the norms were being followed, as this was really
quality controL. It established obligatory, written procedures, and left less to the
personahites, so that if the person left, the process would remain. . .. Another
innovation was that, after nationalization, the sequence of improvements needed in1VP
and its facilities was established; a new phase was not begun until the stage preceding it
was entirely completed. . .. "(Randall, 1987:31-32).
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(of which the majority - were small and medium-size), and 17,344 workers. As
argued earlier, it was the changing effect of policies on demand that caused the series of
upsurges experienced by the plastics manufacturing industry since the early 1960s, of
which that of 1983-88 was only the latest (Figure H.1).
Figure L1 Total Employment In the Plastics Manufacturing Industry,166-90
(number of workers and polynomial trendline)
Suw: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informtica, Encuwuta Indusrial, 1966-90.
B. Venezuela's Plastics Manufacturing hn the 1980s: Fast but Skewed Growth
1. Fast Growth
In 1982-88, the plastics manufacturing industry consistently grew at a higher
rate than Venezuelan manufacturing as a whole (7.3% per year, compared with 3% for
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manufacturing3 ) The sector also ranked thid among the country's 15 largest
manufacturing sectors in terms of real annual gross industrial output growth during that
six-year period, following such traditionally consumer-oriented sectors as portions of
food processing, textiles, and paper.
The growth performance of Venezuela's plastics manufacturing industry was
also very good compared with that of its developing-country counterparts. In the
1980s, Venezuela ranked among the largest producers of plastics manufactures in the
developing worL In gross industrial output it ranked sixth among developing-country
producers in 1985, with an output of almost $800 million. Brazil, the largest
developing-country plastics manufacturer, with eight times the population and more
than four times the gross national product of Venezuela produced $3 billion that year
(United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 1990; Oficina Central de
Estadistica e Informitica, various years). Yet Venezuela's production was still oiy
about 2% of that of the world's largest producer (the United States, whose annual
production was about $50 billion in the mid-1980s), underscoring the significant gap
between industrial- and developing-country producers.
In addition, the Venezuelan plastics sector featured one of the world's fastest
rates of output growth in the 1970s. Its output growth averaged almost 20% a year in
real terms, similar only to that experienced by South Korea (and probably Taiwan, for
which the UNIDO source gives no statistics for the 1970s). In the 1980s, however,
Vcnezuela's plastics manufacturing industry, although still growing fast, at 6% per year,
trailed behind those in industrial countries such as Canada (growing at 10% per year)
and the United Kingdom and the United States (7%), as well as the newly industrializing
countries of Southeast Asia (Hong Kong and South Korea, which grew at 13% per
year, and Taiwan, at 12%). The growth of Venezuela's plastics manufacturing,
This growth rate excludes oil and oil refineries.36
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although slowing down in the 1980s, signaled a relatively successful process of
resource-based industrial development.
2. IncreasIng Concentration
As plastics manufacturing grew in the 1980s, employment, output, and
investment in the industry became increasingly concentrated in the largest firms
(Table 1.5). This observation calls for explanations in two respects. First, in the
absence of further details, the observed concentration of production and investment
seems to contradict my initial statement that the 1980s were a period of increasing
vertical disintegration of production and subcontracting. I reconcile these two
apparently contradictory observations (i.e. concentration of production among the
largest firms, yet increase in subcontracting arrangements) by proposing that large firms
were not those participating most actively in subcontracting. I will return to a more
careful elaboration of this proposition later in Chapter III. Second, the fact that the
industry was becoming more concentrated seems to dampen the gains from fast growth
that T was praising in the preceding section. I discuss below how the negative impact of
such a concentration on labor and smaller firms may have been mitigated to some
extent.
According to official statistics, all the gains experienced by the industry in terms
of number of firms, employees, and fixed capital investment took place among
large-scale enterprises-apparently at the expense of all other segments. Real gross
industrial output grew in all industry groups, but value added as a percentage of output
fell significantly, again among medium-scale and small enterprises, indicating an
increasing share of material inputs in the total value of output Although the figures
capture only averages and may hide differences within each segment, an interpretation
that seems consistent with the available data is that a "weeding out" of firms may have
taken place between 1983 and 1988, in which the poorer-performing or more vulnerable
finns in the small-scale segment dropped out and those in the medium-scale segment
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either dropped out or graduated to the large-scale segnent. Firms may have been
driven out of the market, to a great extent, by the increasing burden of material input
costs (especially, the smaller firms, for whom raw materials represented a large share of
total production costs). This would confirm the point made earlier that firms'
dependence on cheap raw material can become a liability in the context of a sudden
supply crisis.
The loss of employment resulting from the weeding out of weaker small and
medium-size firms, although nonnegligible (official figures record the disappearance of
almost a thousand jobs in these segments), may have :en mitigated by growth in
employment elsewhere. Employment grew rapidly in the large-scale segment, which
was relatively labor-intensive and hired workers at all skill levels. In addition, in the
mid- 1980s, unemployment rates in the economy as a whole were declining, thus
improving-although certainly not guaranteeing-mobility to emerging jobs.
Another factor that may have mitigated somewhat the negative impact of
increased concentration upon the smaller firms was that, curiously, profits grew much
faster for surviving small and medium scaL: cnterprises, than for larger ones (Table 1.6).
One way in which one could explain this finding is that competition among large scale
firms may have been fiercer than among small firms, due to more active entry in that
segment of the industry. After the initial purge, then, small scale enterprises seem to
have recovered, possibly because of the natural barriers to entry against small
entrepreneurs represented by lumpy investments. In the absence of more adequate
information to address the issue of the differential behavior of firms according to their
size, this finding is presented only tentatively.
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Table ILS Indicators of Economic Ptrformance In the Plasties Industry by
Fm Size Category,19 and 1988
1982 1988
Fum category a/ (%) (%)
Number of firms
Large 40 10 58 14
Medium-size 175 42 174 43
Small 200 48 172 43
Total industry 415 100 404 100
Number of employees
Large 7,496 41 13,130 57
Medium-size 8,513 46 7,927 34
Small 2,442 13 2,086 9
Total industry 18,451 100 23,143 100
Fixed capital (1984 Bs. millions)
Large 512 33 1,057 63
Medium-size 784 51 495 30
Small 243 16 116 7
Total industry 1,539 100 1,668 100
Gross output (1984 Bs milions)
Large 1,924 43 4,165 61
Medium-size 2,076 46 2,074 30
Small 477 11 607 9
Total industry 4477 100 6,846 100
Value added (1984 Bs. mIllns)
Large 1,064 48 1,719 64
Medium-size 963 43 770 29
Small 204 9 194 7
Total industry 2,230 100 2,682 100
a. Large = more than 100 employees; medium-size = 2 1-100 employees; and small =
5-20 employees.
Source: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informhtica, Eacuwata ladusbial, 1982 and
1988.
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Table IL6 Profts and Productivity In the PlasticsIndusry by FirmSize
Category, 1982 and 1988
Firm category a/ 1982 1988
Profit a a percentage of grois output (%)
Large 9.1 7.6
Medium I 7.3 7.2
Medium 11 0.1 8.6
Small 4.6 9.9
Total industry 6.4 7.9
Average value added per worker (1984 Bs. thouands)
Large 142 131
Medium I 131 97
Medium H 96 97
Small 84 93
Total industry 121 116
a. Large = more than 100 employees; medium 1=51-100 employees; medium U=
21-50 employees; and small=5-20 employees.
Sownc: Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informitica, Encuesta Induwbrial, 1982 and
1988.
C. Subcontracting Trends: The Evidence
This section presents the evidence supporting my initial statement that
subcontracting in the plastics manufacturing industry increased during the period
1983-88, in the context of sectoral growth and increased concentration of output and
investment documented in earlier sections. The section: (i) indicates that, in an
exploratory empirical study such as this one, a broad and loose defiition of
subcontracting networks is better than a narrow one for capturing and encompassing
marked changes in the subcontracting networks over time; (ii) illustrates the ubiquitous
presence of subcontracting in the industry, yet the entrepreneurs' reluctance to declare
themselves "subcontractors" (possibly leading to unerprig) because of the
somewhat negative connotation attached to subcontracting as opposed to independent
operation; and(iii) documents the particularly fast growth of in the
1983-88 period.
L OnDe toM at Change
Iiniiallydefine"subcontractingas a relationship between two productive firms
in which one (the "subcontractor" or "supplier")undertakes certain aspects of the
production process under a specific order from the other (the "client,""core," "parent"
or "customer" firm), which is, or could chose to be, technically able to undertake that
same process in-house. In my study, the subcontractor would be a plastics
manufacturing firm that transforms plastics through different processes (but mainly
injection molding) into plastic parts and containers. The client firm would be another
plastics manufacturer or a manufacturing firm in another industry (toys, personal cam
items, household appliances, automobile, food processing and packaging, office and
school items) using those plastic inputs.
This rather simple definition of subcontracting is consistent with the relatively
neutral concepts of productive decentralizatin or disintegration. Initially, I do not
focus on any specific type of transaction, type of firm, or spatial arrangement to the
exclusion of others; the only conditions that I specify are that the client firm be not
merely a distributor37 and that, following Holmes,
the firm offerinthehe subcxract requests another independent enterprise to
undertake the production or carry out the processing of a material, component,
part or subassembly for it accentig to or plans provided by te
37 In which case, it would be a case ofecam enki ucntatn (Watnh,1983),
which ds not concerm me, as my interest lies in why a firm chooses to cwntract out a
production process that it couldhanane in-house.
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frs offering the mnbcoenwt. Thus subcontract differs from the mere purchase
of ready-made parts and components from suppliers in that there is an actual
contract between the two participating firms setting out th specifications for the
order. (Holmes, 1986:84; emphasis added)
This definition may be seen as overly loose and, consequently, opportunistically
fitting any theoretical framework. In contrast, other research initiatives have devoted
much effort to establishing as tight and specific a definition as possible before beginning.
Often, and probably for good reasons, authors chose to set out with definitions that
have predetermined notions of subordination, independence, and the complexity of
transactions; regrettably often, t literature attributes different meanings to the same
terminology, rendering specific definitions confusing.
A useful point of departure for a brief tour d'horizon of different definitions of
subcontracting arrangements is the distinction between subcontracting relationships that
are based on either horizontal or vertical disintegration of the production process
(Watanabe, 1983). Horizontal disintegration refers to subcontracting relationships
where both firms undertake the production process which is the subject of the
subcontracting transactions-e.g. a plastics injection molder that subcontracts additional
capacity in injection molding from another plastics manufacturer. This is a form of
subcontracting that may lend itself to competition between the two parties involved.
Vertical disintegration of production results, in contrast, in a subcontracting relationship
where the client firm has chosen not to undertake the production process which it is
contracting out from another firm-e.g. a producer of personal care products that
contracts out t injection molding of plastic bottles for its shampoos or deodorants,
while it specializes exclusively in producing the substances for the shampoo or
deodorant tmselves and in assembling t final product. This is a form of
subcontracting where t two parties are technically complementary. ibis basic
distinction underlies many of t stylized C Initions of subcontracting in the literature.
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Kelley and Harrison, for example, in their study of machining subcontracting in
the United States, follow the convention established by the Small and Medium
Enterprise Agency of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI); they
define production subcontracting in terms of whether the client firm also performs the
productive activity that it is subcontracting, and focus on horizontal disintegration of
production. "Subcontracting," according to this definition, occurs when
the firm (or one of its plants or divisions) procures goods, services, or some
productive activity, at least some aspects of which it performs itself
"in-house" . .. If a firm or estahlishment does not generally engage in a
particular productive activity, and conventionally procures this activity from
other firms, then that purchase represents a supplier reladonship, not
subcontracting. (Kelley and Harrison, 1990:1278-1279)
In her study of Mexican subcontracting relationships, Benerfa associates the
distinction between what she calls vertical and horizontal subcontracting with the degree
of customization of orders and with the mechanisms for raw material procurement. She
defines vertical subcontracting relationships as those in which the client firm provides
the raw materials and other inputs and the subcontractor produces orders specific to the
client firm. Horizontal subcontracting relationships, in contrast, are those in which raw
materials are not provided and orders of goods are regularly produced and sold by a
firm (subcontractor) to a variety of clients (Benerfa, 1989:175). Her own study focuses
on vertical subcontracting, reportedly the most common form in Mexico. Underlying
this author's interpretation of the difference between vertical and horizontal
subcontracting is the belief that client provision of inputs implies subcontractors'
surrendering of control over access to inputs, and that reliance of subcontractors on one
or a few customers implies their surrendering of control over the contracts-a view not
shared by more recent writings on the subject, which highlight the benefits of increasing
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interdependence (see, for instance, the edited volumes by Pyke, Becattini, and
Sengenberger, 1990; and Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992; and, for application of a
positive view of firms' interdependence to developing countries, the July 1992 issue of
IDS Bulletin).
Holmes' claSsification of subcontracting 38 follows more closely the distinction
mentioned earlier between horizontal and vertical disintegration of the production
process. Holmes calls the cases of subcontracting based on the horizontal disintegration
of production capacity or cyclical subcontracting (Holmes, op. cit.:86). He also
identifies two forms of subcontracting relying on vertical productive disintegration: in
specialization subcontracting, the process contracted out is not undertaken in-house by
the client firm, which lends some technical independence and clout to the subcontractor.
Supplier subcontracting is a special case of specialization subcontracting where "the
subcontractor is in many respects an independent supplier with full control over the
development, design and fabrication of its product, but is willing to enter into a
subcontracting arrangement to supply a dedicated or proprietary part to the parent firm"
(ibid.).
Another interesting classification of subcontracting arrangements is that
embedded in Brusco and Sabel's analysis of artisan production in Italy (1981, cited in
Holmes, op. cit.:88). They talk about cases of independent decentralization, where the
subcontracting transaction is seen as the locus for resolving a problem, and where the
38 John Holmes' classification of subcontracting is in fact based primarily on the
typologics developed by French authors-Chaillou (1977), Houssiaux (1957), Salez
(1972), Bayle-Ottenheim ea. (1973), Vennin and de Banville (1975), and Waont et a4
(1982)-which "have equivalents in the English language literature" (Holmes, 1986:85-
86). He also quotes Sharpston (1975) and Taylor and'Thrift (1982), who differentiate
across subcontracting relationships according to the technical character of the
subcontracted work, the source of materials, the stability of the relationship, and the
nature and form of the business relationship kHolmcs, op. cit:85).
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distinguishing element between a dependent and an independent relationship is who
poses the question or problem, and who answers or resolves it:
in contrast to the clients of dependent small firms who place precise orders,
often supplying tools, raw materials, special machines and detailed blueprints
themselves, the customer of an epen t, small firm typically comes with a
problem to solve.., he needs, for example, a gear shift for a new kind of small
tractor... even if the customer has a blueprint he is much more likely to pose the
problem than answer it. The job for the small firmis to find some technically
and economically feasible solution to the problem, thus creating a new product
and defining the customer's needs at the same time. (Brusco and Sabel,
1981:106, cited in Holmes, op. cit.:88)
My choice of a simpler, more encompassing definition of subcontracting best fits
my case study for two reasons. The first relates to the nature of the Venezuelan market
for plastic products, and it explains why I do not stress the difference between a
subcontracting relationship and a supplier relationship, in the sense proposed by Kelley
and Harrison or Holmes. Although, in terms of income per capita, the Venezuelan
economy is larger than many jieveloping economies, because of its relatively small
population, skewed income distribution, and inward-oriented production structure, there
is little probability that the market for intermediate inputs will be characterized by large
numbers of either suppliers or buyers and, hence, freely competitive. As a result, the
procurement of specializcd plastics manufacturing services tends to involve few actors
and to become arms-length and customized by default, rendering the separation of a
"supplier subcontracting" category somewhat unnecessary. Because non-customized
services are uncommon, distinguishing between services that are highiy customized and
those that are not adds limte value to the analysis.
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The second reason that I was more lax than usual in defining my research subject
has to do with the fact that my case study spanned a decade in which the nature of
subcontracting changed and became noticeably more varied. Only by adopting a broad
definition could I encompass and explain the changing nature of subcontracting and the
contrast between different modalities-and capture, and learn from the evolution of
particular subcontracting networks that otherwise would not have been considered of
interest. Features often used to distinguish what is considered subcontracting from
what is not varied somewhat between the beginning and the end of the research
period-for example, who contributed the materials and the equipment in the
relationship, how customized (information-rich) the order was, whether or not the client
engaged in the same production process that it subcontracted, how transparent
subcontracting relationships were, how complex the transaction was (whether or not it
involved "interlocking" mechanisms), where the responsibility lay for conception and for
execution, etc. In an intertemporal study, a broad definition is most useful: it
recognizes that subcontracting relationships are dynan , and allows room to explore
their transformation.
2. An Industry of Subcontractors
As I have defined them, subcontracting relationships were not uncommon in
Venezuela's plastics manufacturing industry in the past, but they became increasingly
widespread between 1983 and 1988. Their proliferation was evident when I visited the
industry in 1987. Regrettably, however, official statistics do not record whether a firm
is engaged in a subcontracting relationship. Compounding the difficulties created for
research by lack of official records is firms' frequent reluctance to report their status as
subcontractors. This reluctance reflects both the high value that entrepreneurs ascribe
to maintaining their independence and the reputation of traditional forms of
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subcontracting for substandard quality.39 In a sample of 126 plastics manufacturers that
I visited in 1987,40 only 17 percent of the interviewees were willing to identify
themselves openly as subcontratistas.
A rewording of the question requiring entrepreneurs to indicate their status as
subcontractors yielded a strikingly different result, however. When asked whether they
worked under specific and regular contract or order for other manufacturing firms,
60 percent of my 1987 interviewees responded positively-a clear indication that they
did in fact act as subcontractors, as I have defined the term. And almost 30 percent of
the interviewees reported that they contracted out to other firms some parts of their
production process. In more than half of such cases, the services contracted out were
plastics transformation services. An industry in which roughly three of five firms work
under order for other manufacturing firms (either in that industry itself or in other
manufacturing sectors) and at least one of seven firms regularly uses the transformation
services of other firms in the industry can justifiably be called "an industry of
subcontractors."
39 Examples from different contexts further illustrate this point Toshihiro Nishiguchi, in
his PhD thesis on subcontracting relationships in Japan (1989), documents that
subcontracting was often associated with "social dumping" in early decades of this
century; finns engaged in subcontracting preferred to be called "cooperation
enterprises." Piore and Sabel's account of the rationalization of Nissan's subcontracting
networks (from "shita-uke" to "gaichu-kigyo") also conveys that flavor (1984:224).
Olga Lucia Cobo de Morales, Vice-President of Planning and Development of the.
Colombia Federation of Machine Tool Producers, indicated in an interview that
subcontractors in Colombia often refuse to identify themselves as such. In the same
vein, Amsden has suggested that one of many causes for the persistent vertical
integration in the Taiwanese machine tool industry in the l970s may have been the fact
that ". .. Chinese culture values independence in business highly. Integration carries a
favourable connotation . .." (1977: 222).
40 This sample represented a third olthe total number of firms officiaily recorded by the
Venezuelan Central Statistical Office (OCEI) in its industrial survey of 1987. The
characteristics of the sample are presented in Annex U.
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Subcontracting occurred among firms of all sizes, despite the fact that up to
three-fourths of both the subcontractors and the clients identified in the 1987 sample
were small or medium scale enterprises (defined as firms with 5-100 employees), as
compared to 68.6% for the sample as a whole. There was a 20% chance that a small
scale enterprise would be a client firm in a subcontracting relationship, but a 60%
chance that it would be a subcontractor. Among medium scale enterprises, the chance
of being a client firm went up to 33% and the chance of being a subcontractor remained
at 60%. Among the large scale enterprises (more than 100 employees), the chances
were 21% and 44%, respectively (i.e. still a pretty high probability of acting as a
subcontractor, despite the large size).
Subcontractors were most likely to have injection molding equipment (41% of
all subcontractors identified in the 1987 sample). The percentage of subcontractors
undertaking extrusion was still significant (26%) but lower than for the sample as a
whole (33%). Also, most subcontractors identified themselves as belonging to the
subsectors of containers (24%), intermediate goods for construction (13%),
miscellaneous intermediate goods (11%), and parts for capital goods and equipment
(9%).
Evidence also indicates that "supplier relationships" (as defined by Kelley and
Harrison, and Holmes) or "specialization subcontracting," as I prefer to call it, were the
most common in the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry in the 1980s. For
instance, among the plastics manufacturers covered by the 1987 survey, only 16%
declared that they subcontracted plastics manufacturing services from other fellow
plastics manufacturers. That is, only about 16% of all firms in the sample were engaged
in capacity or cyclical subcontracting-i.e. horizontal disintegration of the process of
plastics transformation-as client firms. Among those acting as subcontractors, 75%
belonged to subsectors of plastics manufacturing producing intermediate goods oriented
to other industrial sectors (i.e. three-fourths of the subcontractors participated in
specialization subcontracting). The fact that specialization subcontracting prevailed in
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the industry is significant, as it points to the possibility that subcontracting may have
been undertaken in order to gain access to complementary skils, rather than merely to
enhance capacity at times of demand upswings-hypotheses to which I will return in
Chapters III and IV.
3. IntensificatIon ad Diversification ofSubnt RelatIonshIps
Subcontracting relationships not only were frequent among plastics
manufacturers; they also seemed to be increasing throughout the 1980s. Neither official
statistics nor the 1987 survey of 126 firms can be used directly to ascertain long-run
trends: the first, as mentioned earlier, does not document subcontracting, and the
second was a one-time look at the industry. My clear impression of a growing trend of
subcontracting in the 1980s derives instead from informal conversations with officials in
organizations that had not measured the phenomenon systematicaly 1 and, especially,
from a detailed study of five subcontracting networks undertaken also in 1987.42 In
each case study, the instances of subcontracting linkages in injection molding had tended
to increase. Although these five networks constituted a very limited sample (it included
17 plastics manufacturers, that is, 13% of the 1987 sectorwide sample and only nearly
5% of the universe of firms considered by the Central Startistical Office), they
exemplified common situations in the industry's injection molding subsector and could
thus be assumed to offer sensible clues to identifying broader trends.
One such clue is the statement by several of my interviewees in 1987 that
plastics transformation services had become increasingly expensive in the 1980s,
indicating that demand for such services probably grew faster than supply. Since
general sector statistics indicate a dynamic supply response in the sector, as explained
later in this chapter, one might conclude that demand for subcontracting services had
41 For example, the Venezuelan Association of Plastics Manufacturers, AVIPLA.
42 Annex III discusses the five case studies in detail.
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boomed. This represents, however, weak evidence for the growth of subcontracting,
because the higher price for transformation services also lends itself to many other
interpretations. For example, prices may have been driven up by increasing raw material
costs (my study revealed that cases where the subcontractor would "put" the raw
material and add its cost in the calculation of the rate for subcontracting services were
not uncommon).
A second and more reliable clue to general trends in subcontracting in the
plastics industry is offered by the responses by firms in my five subcontracting networks
to the question "When did you engage in subcontracting for the first time?" Among the
clients, only two firms-coincidentally, subsidiaries of transnational corporations-
reported having started subcontracting before the 1980s. The three client firms in the
remaining three networks, all domestic producers, reported having started contracting
out after 1983. The vast majority of the suppliers reported that they had started offering
transformation services in the 1980s, although most of them existed prior to 1983.
A third clue about the increasing importance of subcontracting relationships
relates to their observed intensity. The client firms for two of the five the
subcontracting networks analyzed maintained the same number of subcontractors
throughout the 1980s, but increased the volumes of product contracted out. The three
remaining client firms (two subsidiaries of transnational corporations and a large toy
manufacturer), however, reported having increased the number of subcontractors hired,
along with the volume of product and number of plastic parts or components contracted
out. They tended to have only one subcontractor in the 1970s; by 1987, each had three
to five subcontractors or suppliers.
Although findings from such a limited sample cannot be flawlessly extrapolated
to the industry as a whole, the available evidence supports the impression that
subcontracting relationships became more frequent and more intense in important parts
of Venezuela's plastics manufacturing industry during the 1980s.
-84 -
D. Growing Subcontractng Linkages under Protection: A Paradox?
To the preceding characterization of the context for subcontracting growth in
the 1980s-overall plastics manufacturing growth, yet concentration of output and
investment-I now add a crucial ingredient: policy. Plastics manufacturing
subcontracting grew when a heavy trade protection scheme was being put in place. This
trade protection scheme benefited plastics manufacturing significantly, as it targeted
final consumer markets deemed to address "non-basic needs" (i.e. industries producing
goods other than food and health-related items). In principle, the presence of a heavy
protectionist scheme would be consistent with sectoral growth, as it creates a captive
demand. Moreover, conventional trade theories indicate that protectionism is also
consistent with the observed erosion of competitiveness, as it reduces the incentives to
cut costs and increase efficiency (although this argument is contested by several authors,
as footnoted later in this section). However, that subcontracting coincided with
protectionism may come as a surprise, if subcontracting is seen merely as a mechanism
to cut costs, and protection as a policy framework that diminishes pressures to cut
costs. In this section, I discuss the assumptions underlying the apparent paradox of
subcontracting under protection.
1. Protection and cost-cutfting pressures
The period 1983-88 was a period in which the Venezuelan economy grew
increasingly protected; trade restrictions in many sectors (and particularly in plastics)
were high. Mainstream economic policy analysts believe that free trade, by exposing
domestic firms to the pressures of international competition, increases the incentives to
pursue productive efficiency-hence to reduce costs. In the 1980s, the World Bank
conveyed an unequivocal message in this regard to developing country policy makers:
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Trade policy reform is a top priority. The fundamental goal should be to
increase competitiveness in world markets. ... [Tihe countries which adopted
outward-oriented trade strategies have outperformed those that followed
inward-oriented trade strategies-in income growth, export growth,
employment and savings. An outward-oriented trade strategy means lowering
trade barriers, replacing quantitative restrictions with tariffs, and adopting
realistic exchange rates. The objectives are to improve resource allocation, to
force domatic fims to become more efficient by having to compete with
foreign firma, and to open the economy to new opportunities... (World Bank,
1987:169, emphasis added.. .. Outward orientation encourages efficient
firms and discourages inefficient ones ... (ibid.:91, emphasis added).
By implication, protection meant inefficiency, as reiterated more recently by
some economic analysts:
Development economists routinely argue that trade protection reduces industrial
sector efficiency. First, in markets characterized by entry barriers, the absence
of foreign competition allows domestic producers to enjoy monopoly power and
excess profits. Consequently, these firms may fail to produce at minimum
efficient scale (achieve 'scale efficiency') and/or to get the maximum possible
output from their input bundles (achieve 'technical efficiency' or 'X-efficiency').
Second, . . . trade protection may attract inefficiently small producers, causing
similar increases in average production costs. (Tybout et aL, 1991:231-232).43
If the main impact of protection upon firms was to be the reduction of incentives
to pursue cost-efficiency, then available theories of vertical disintegration, segmentation,
4~3 For arguments and models on the positive linkage between trade protection and
X-inefflciency or managerial slack, see also: Bergsman, 1974; Balassa, 1975; Martia
and Page, 1983; Vousden and Campbell, 1994. For the definition of X-efflciency, see
Leibenstein, 1966; Stigler, 1976; Martin and Page, op. cit.
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and subcontracting seemed largely unhelpful in explaining the observed change in the
industrial organization of Venezuelan plastics manufacturing in the 1980s. All those
theories-whether the early theories of vertical disintegration and inter-industry
specialization (Stigler, 1951), the early product market segmentation theories (Piore,
1980a, 1980b; Sabel, 1982), or the "informal sector" theories (Moser, 1978; Tokman,
1978; Castells and Portes, 1989, among other relevant summary articles)-were based
on the premise that cost-cutting attempts of one type or another drove productive
disintegration and segmentation. In Stigler's 1951 model, vertical disintegration
resulted from efforts to maintain marginal unit costs at their lowest in firms conceived as
clusters of processes with differing cost schedules. In the informal sector models of the
1970s and early 1980s, the core firm aimed to minimize the burden of fixed costs upon
average production costs over time, either by keeping the fixed costs of equipment or
the quasi-fixed costs of a stable labor pool to a minimum.
Viewed from such a narrow perspective, then, a paradox seemed to emerge from
my observation of the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry in the 1980s: Why
would subcontracting-if a cost-cutting mechanism-intensify precisely when the
establishment of a protectionist scheme presumably mitigated competitive pressures to
cut costs?
2. Protection and demand upsurges
The expected effect of protection upon domestic firms is not only to shelter
them from external competitive pressures; it also diverts demand for plastics
manufactures from imported to domestic markets, creating a captive, and apparently
increasing, demand for domestic plastics manufactures. As I demonstrate later, this was
the case in Venezuela during most of the 1980s: domestic plastics manufacr,
particularly those in the subsectors where significant changes in tariff and nontariff
barriers were established, perceived rapid growth in the demand facing them in the
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period 1983-88. My observations of the 1980s thus indicated that the observed increase
in subcontracting relationships was also associated empirically to an increase in demand.
This positive correlation was not surprising; it did seem to fit the predictions of
most available theories of vertical disintegration and product market segmentationA4
For instance4 a larger market, Stigler argued, made it feasible and economically
attractive to separate parts of the production process exhibiting increasing returns to
scale from other, small-scale operations with increasing marginal costs; a larger firm
embodying the increasing-returns process (e.g. plastics injection molding or extrusion)
could act as supplier for several firms executing processes with decreasing returns (e.g.
manual assembly), ensuring that each productive unit could operate at their minimum
average cost (Stigler, 1951). Similarly, product market segmentation theories focusing
on the impact of demand uncertainty upon investment behavior also indicated that
subcontracting arrangements would proliferate during upturns, although for very
different reasons: entrepreneurs would view such demand upswings as temporary and
uncertain, and presumably would prefer to subcontract capacity from other firms instead
of locking themselves into irreversible capital investments at the time of the upswing
(Piore, 1980a).
The perplexing issue this time around was that these two models, based on the
same classical assumptions regarding the division of labor, led to diametrically opposed
interpretations regarding the distributional and the efficiency implications of increased
subcontracting. According to Stigler's 1951 model, vertical disintegration would lead
'4 An exception would be informas sector approaches conceiving infonnal sector fims as
"residual" or "marginal," or maintaining a subordinated relationship to formal finns (for
definitions, see Tokman, 1978). Under these characterizations, the core or formal firms
would integrate productive processes in-house as long as demand and the rate of profit
were high and stable; when a dernand downturn would hurt the profit rate, the core firm
would tend to shed workers and production processes held in-house until then, and to
outsource these services when required. ft would seem, however, that a preconditionfor
such a model to hold would be that the processes shed and subsequently subcontracted
be relatively labor intensive-not necessarily applicable to the industry analyzed here.
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to all firms producing at the scale where average unit costs could be minimi-d Given
their respective technical capabilities and the relative prices facing them, all firms would
operate optimally-procuring their components and/or offering their own products at
the lowest possible cost. In contrast, Piore's 1980 model predicted an increasing
polarization between a technically sophisticated and wealthy core of large firms
operating at close to full capacity, and a periphery of micro- and small scale firms
battling against economic uncertainty.45 Whether reality was best described by one or
the other model was more than a matter of academic interest: the response to this
question could lead to different assessments of the impact of subcontracting upon
industrial development and thus to diverging policy prescriptions.
Resolving these apparent paradoxes and contradictions required a more in-depth
look at the events. On the one hand, the protectionist scheme of the 1980s may in fact
not have resulted in a further relaxation of competitive pressures to maintain cost-
efficiency.46 In fact, evidence of how profit rates for larger firms suffered more under
protection than those for smaller firms, presented earlier, suggests that the protectionist
scheme may have influenced the competitive environment for different firms in different
ways-including, in some cases, actually increasing competitive pressures among local
firms. On the other hand, maybe subcontracting did not operate, in this particular case
or sector, as a cost-cutting arrangement. Later chapters address this possibility, by
analyzing in detail the workings of subcontracting in Venezuela's plastics
manufacturing.
45 In this stylized presentation of these two models, I exclude the consideration of nuances
such as the friction imposed by transactions costs in a vertically disintegrated firm
(Williamson, 1975; 1985). This topic, relevant to the analysis of subcontracting, is
introduced later in the study.
46 Indeed, despite the referernces quoted earlier, there is very poor theoretical or empirical
evidence that trade liberalization by itself leads to increased productive efficiency or
faster technological progress (Corden, 1974; Stigler, 1976; Marlin, 1978; Hart, 1983;
Scharfstein, 1988; Rodrik, 1990; Vousden, 1993).
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K The Macroeconomic Context for Subcontracting Growth: Varieties of
Demand "Boom"
Most of this study (Chapters III to V) focuses on 1983-88, a period of
Venezuela's recent democratic history in which local producers faced an upsurge in
domestic demand for their output. A contentious issue among policy makers in the past
decade has been whether episodes of significant domestic demand and output growth
can and should be induced by supply-side mechanisms (i.e. tax reductions) or fueled
directly by demand-oriented government interventions (e.g. fiscal expansion and import
substitution industrialization, or ISI) (Krugman, 1994). Venezuela's upsurge in demand
of the 1980s was undoubtedly the result of demand-side interventions: in 1983, the
national government had introduced a set of measures reminiscent of an import
substitution industrialization scheme, and later, in anticipation of the 1988 elections, had
launched a fiscal expansion program. The two other major upsurges in demand
experienced by Venezuela since its return to democracy in 1958 also had been driven
primarily by demand-oriented policies. Yet these three demand boom episodes had very
different profiles, stemming not only from the combinations of instruments in each case,
but also from differences in the goals driving decision makers, that is, the underlying
political economy. As expressed in Hirschman's stylized representation of import
substitution modes in Latin America:
It is useful to keep in mind [the] distinct origins of ISI-wars, balance of
payments difficulties, growth of the domestic market (as a result of export
growth) and official development policy-in focusing on the distinctive
characteristics of the process... An industrialization that takes place in the midst
and as a result of export growth has a wholily different Gestalt from one that
feeds on foreign exchange deprivation... [The] tendency to give importance to
what is unimportant will be present only when the primary impulse to
industrialization arises out of unexpected balance of payments difficulties which
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are fought routinely by the imposition of quantitative import controls...
(Hirschman, 1971:90-91).
As I illustrate below, the first demand upsurge associated with an import
substitution episode (1960-65) was the result of deliberate official development policy
to "sow the oil."47 The second (1974-78) was the result of fast growth in the domestic
market owing to the first oil boom of the 1970s. The one which concerns this study
(1983-88), in contrast, was a response to balance of payments difficulties. Following
Hirschman, I will argue that it was this distinct-and troublesome-origin of the
protectionist scheme that determined the conditions leading to the industrial
organization outcomes that are the subject of subsequent chapters in this study.
1. FIrst Demand 'ioom"(1960-65): The Return to Democracy and
"Deliberate" Import Substitution Industrialization
At the end of the 1950s, the hopeful return to democracy and the
implementation of a novel political agenda focused on social programs and ISI fueled
the demand pull that caused gross national product (GNP) to grow at an average 7
percant per year (3.3 percent per year in per capita terms) for almost a decade.
Under the early democratic administrations, economic management was
conservative, combining fiscal discipline and a cautious monetary policy. The Social
Democratic administration of R6mulo Betancourt (1958-63) launched an ISI program
that Radl Leoni (1964-69), another Social Democrat, continued. In principle, this
program followed, though with a lag, the model prescribed by the United Nations
47 To "sow the oil" is now a legendary expression coined by President Romnulo Betancourt
(1958-63), referring to the need for transforming the wealth generated by massive oil
revenues into long term agricultural and industrial development for the benefit of all
Venezulans.
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Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).48 But in practice, it deviated from
the ECLA model (as Mexico did), using quantitative restrictions or quotas rather than
the tariffs recommended by the ECLA. The main reason for that "choice" was the
reciprocal trade agreement between Venezuela and the United States. This agreement
granted Venezuelan oil preferential access to U.S. markets, but it also obliged the
Venezuelan government, in exchange, to forgo placing tariffs on imports from the
United States (Venezuela's largest trading partner at the time). The resulting quota
system, relying on case-by-case negotiations between producers and government
officials, reproduced a problem that had characterized other ISI experiences in Latin
America: it helped sustain monopolies or oligopolies, which were better equipped to
influence a bureaucracy torn by competing claims on public resources (Karl, 1982:
127-32). Consequently, even though the composition of imports shifted, as planned,
toward capital goods,4 9 industrial concentration increased5 and the distribution of
income did not improve noticeably.5 1 Yet during the early years of its ISI stage,
48 See: Prebisch, Radl (1962): "El Desarrollo Econ6mico de Amrica Latina y Algunos
de sus Principales Problemas," en DOlWt &Econdueico de la Amhrica Ladna, Vol.7,
No. 1, February 1962, pp. 1-24; and (1973): "Problemas Te6ricos y Pricticos del
Crecimiento Econ6mico," en Interpretacidn del Poc.eso de Desarrilo
Lainoamericano en 1949, serie conmemorativa del XXV aniversario de la CEPAL.
Santiago de Chile, 1973. A collection of Prebisch's articles summarizing his ideas on
development, technological transfer, industrialization, declining terms of trade, and
import substitution industrialization can be found in Gurrieri (1982).
49 The share of consumer products in total imports declined from 27.6% in 1963 to 20.4%
in 1970 and 14.9% in 1974 (Max Nolf, 1978: "Notas sobre el Desarrollo Industrial de
Venezuela," version preliminar, Caracas, p. 59, cited in Karl, 1982:138).
50 In 1961, large enterprises (defined as those with more than 100 workers) accounted for
37.2% of manufacturing employment and 62.2% of manufacturing output, and in 1975,
for 58.6% and 75% (CORDIPLAN, Encuesta IndustrialI, ii, I; Oficina Central de
Estadfstica e Informhuica, Encuesta industrial 1975). For Venezuela, characterized by
a highly urbanized population, growth of employment in large firms may well have
implied that workers gained access for the first time to stable and relatively protected
sources of income.
51Between 1957 and 1970, the income of the richest 5% of the population declined from
25% to 22% of total income. The income share of the middle class grew only slightly,
from 56% to 58%, and that of the poorest 50% of the population improved only
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Venezuela enjoyed rapid growth in GNP, in manufacturing, and in personal income at
all levels, in the context of external balance and negligible inflation.
It was in this early democratic period (1958-69) that the Venezuelan plastics
industry started to take shape, aided by official protection of consumer goods
manufacturing. Before the democratic period, only a handful of plastics manufacturers
had been in operation, most of them subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations and,
according to the information available, primarily in the business of injection molding
inexpensive household items (budding versions of the United States' Rubbermaid):
Laws requiring an increase in local content forced assemblers and distributors of
traditionally imported products to procure certain parts and components locally,
generating demand for further injection molding, casting, and extrusion of plastics in the
country. Yet, as recently as 1966, the Central Statistical Office documented the
existence of only 7 firms employing 720 workers in the plastics manufacturing sector, a
sign of either underreporting of smaller firms, or of the fact that plastics manufacturing
may have been taking place within firms classified under other industrial sectors (i.e. an
early predominance of in-house plastics manufacturing rather than outsourcing to
dedicated plastics manufacturers, as mentioned at the outset). At that time, all plastics
manufacturers relied on imported raw material (resins or polymers, additives) and
equipment. The fixed exchange rate and the plentiful foreign currency from oil exports
made these imports affordable.
2. Second Demand Boom (197478): Oil as "Development Fuel"
The second demand "boom" coincided with most of the first administration of
Carlos Andr6s Pdrez (1974-79). Different from the demand upsurge of the early 1960s,
it resulted from the oil shock of 1973-74 and lasted only four years. Yet during that
' marginally, from 19% to 20% (Miguel Chossudovsky, 1977, La Mimeic en Venezuela,
Valencia: Vadeil Hermanos, p. 227, cited in Karl, 1982:143).
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orief period, the administration, which received more fiscal revenues than all preceding
adminiqstratIons,52 opted for an ambitious development plan that channeled massive
resource flows into the domestic economy. Consequently, during 1974-77, Venezuela's
GNP again grew at an average annual real rate of nearly 7 percent (or 3.6 percent in per
capita terms). But the ambitious public investment program sowed the seeds of the
subsequent debt crisis.
In 1974, real per capita oil revenues increased by more than 120 percent.
Venezuelan's oil windfall may have averaged up to 20 percent of gross domestic
product between 1974 and 1978 (Bourguignon, 1988: 295). Monetary authorities tried
to "sterilize" much of this windfall through the creation of an investment fund, the
Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela, to administer the public saving of oil revenue. The
strategy worked for a while: by 1975, the government had used only 25 percent of its
extraordinary oil revenue, preventing inflationary pressures and major exchange rate
distortions. But in 1976, the Fifth National Plan-which purported to be building the
basis for the "Gran Venezuela," a country that would use its oil revenues aggressively
for social and development purposes-called for heavy investment to establish large
public enterprises and programs (Karl, 1982:194). These investments and expenditures
monetized a large share of the windfall within the domestic economy. Before the
investments could bear fruit, the economy rapidly neared full capacity and supply-side
bottlenecks emerged as a result of the massive inflow of resources.
The economy did not adjust fully to the expansionary fiscal and monetary trends
through price increases-prevented in part by price controls and subsidies. Instead,
import constraints were deliberately reduced (the earlier, systematic ISI efforts
52 Citing central bank reports and the 1979 budget law, Terry L. Karl makes an
astonishing comparison of government revenues in Venezuela (in constant 1973
bolfvars): between 1917 and 1973, fiscal revenues added up to Bs. 148.6 billion, or a
yearly average of Bs. 2.7 billion. During 1974-78, the admninistration of Carlos Audits
Pdrez received Bs. 228.8 billion, or a yearly average of Bs. 45.8 billion (Karl, 1982:17).
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abandoned) and the adjustment came in the form of a massive inflow of imports, leading
to the deterioration of the current account of the balance of payments to a critical level
in 1978 (Rodriguez, 1983: 14). In the meantime, public companies and some
decentralized state-owned enterprises, hindered in long-term borrowing by the Credit
Law of 1976, which required congressional approval of all public sector borrowing
except for short-term working capital, incurred massive short-term debt (Bourguignon,
1988: 301). As international interest rates rose in the late 1970s and 1980s, it became
increasingly difficult for public debtors to service and, later, to repay their debt. In sum,
the second demand boom in Venezuela's democratic history spun out of the control of
economic managers, producing a severe short-term debt crisis.
In 1974-78, manufacturing growth approached the fast rates of the early 1960s,
averaging almost 9% a year in real terms. Plastics manufacturing grew even faster,
doubling its employment between 1971 and 1974, from 4,700 to 9,400 workers, and
adding 6,000 more workers between 1974 and 1978. This growth was fueled as much
by supply-side policies as by the creation of a captive demand. One of the mechanisms
the government used to recycle the petrodollars earned during the oil boom was to set
up a number of state-owned enterprises and joint ventures between public and private
(local or foreign) capital in several strategic sectors. One of those was petrochemicals.
Rapid extraction of oil generated abundant natural gas as a by-product. Producing
natural-gas-based petrochemicals, with the aid of the foreign exchange also generated
by oil production and exports, seemed a reasonable way to take advantage of this other
windfall from the oil boom. The resins and polymers now produced in Venezuela were
cheaper than equivalent imports-because of the abundant and cheap raw material,
cheap energy, and subsidies on capital and imported equipment-and made plastics
manufacturing even more profitable. Consequently, the industry not only thrived during
the oil boom but maintained a reasonable rate of output growth even after the demand
boom subsided in 1977-78.
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3. Third Demand Boom (1983-88): Reacting to the Debt Crisis
Paradoxically, the third demand boom in Venezuela's democratic period, the one
on which most of the chapters of this study focus, coincided with the onset of the debt
crisis. The set of policies that unleashed this demand boom was reminiscent of an
import substitution industrialization scheme. But it lacked three ingredients that had
featured in the previous demand booms (and ISI experiments): optimism about the
future, a long-term national vision backed by a clear development program, and growing
or stable per capita oil revenues. The set of measures implemented in 1983-88 was not
an explicit industrial strategy, but a hasty response to the debt crisis.
Prelude to the Crisis. Before introducing the de facto import substitution
program of 1983-88, the Christian Democratic government of Luis Herrera Campins
(1979-83) confronted the debt situation inherited from the first Pdrez administration
with a mixed package of macroeconomic stabilization measures. It implemented fiscal
cuts, achieving the expected effect of an overall decline in aggregate demand (a
10 percent decline in public demand and a 20 percent fall in private investment). It
freed domestic prices, unleashing the previously repressed inflation and fueling
inflationary expectations and the overvaluation of the exchange rate (which had been
fixed). It lowered import tariffs further. And in the wake of rapid increases in
intemational interest rates, it fixed domestic rates at very low levels, which, given the
lack of restraints on capital movements, encouraged capital flight.53 Even the
providential second oil shock (1978-79) could not prevent stagflation (demand
stagnation together with a doubling of the inflation rate, from an average of 8.2% in
1975-78 to 16.5% in 1979-82), a rise in the official unemployment rate to more than
10% in 1983, and a fall in manufacturing output to its lowest level in many decades.
53 Initially, capital flight was not seen as a negative phenomenon, but as a way to slow
down an "overheated" econorny. Rodriguez (1983:23-24) cites declarations to this
effect by the president of the Central Bank, published in the Venezuelan newspaper El
Nacional.
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Real wages and income distribution also suffered substantially, an effect that showed up
in increased social and labor unrest.
This was the situation that Venezuela faced as it arrived at the threshold of the
third demand boom, initiated by the package of economic measures introduced by
Herrera Campfns in early 1983. The country had a much more developed industrial
infrastructure than 10 years earlier, but it also carried the burden of unfulfilled
expectations created by the oil booms of the 1970s, with no new oil "miracles" on the
horizon.
A Scramble of Emergency Measures. On February 20, 1983, through
Presidential decree 1840, the Venezuelan government suspended all sales of foreign
currency over the next two days. Central Bank resolutions that followed prohibited
exchange transactions for two or three days at a time until, on February 27, another
presidential decree established a new exchange regime. The regime-a three-tier
exchange rate system that favored selected activities and transactions through cheaper
dollarsM4-was to be administered by a new office within the ministry of industry and
development (Ministerio de Fomento): the Advisory Commission for the Preferential
Exchange Regime, or RECADI. RECADI was thus charged with distributing dollar
quotas among many industries, firms, and individuals accustomed to importing
intermediate inputs and final goods at an overvalued exchange rate and with no
restrictions.
54 Presidential decrees 1851 and 1855, of February 27 and 28, 1983, established a
preferential exchange rate of Bs. 4.30/dollar for current public sector expenditures
abroad, funds sent to students abroad, "essential" imports, and the external public and
private debt. It also set a rate of Bs. 6/dollar for "nonessential" imports. The floating,
market rate applied for luxury imports, tourism expenses, and private capital transfers.
Until February 20, 1983, the exchange rate had been maintained at Bs. 4.30/dollar; by
the end of 1983, the floating rate had risen to over Bs. 12/dollar.
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Shortly after the suspension of foreign exchange transactions, the ministry of
finance (Ministerio de Hacienda) imposed sweeping quantitative restrictions on imports.
Resolution 1640 of March 24 prohibited imports of such varied plastic products
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) bags, hot-water bottles, cannulas, curtains, telephones,
furniture, hair care items, dolls, toys, games, handbags and briefcases, shoes and
polyurethane soles, artificial flowers and fruits, and household goods and their
components. On the input side of the industry, the government reserved the production,
import, and distribution of polymers and resins to the joint venture petrochemical
companies--Polilago (producer of low-density polyethylene, or LDPE), Plastilago
(high-density polyethylene, or HDPE), Qufmica Venoco (polypropylene tetramer, or
PP), and Estizulia (polystyrene, or PS). The explicit purpose of this measure may have
been to avoid the trickling out of foreign currency through trade deals; however, as the
Venezuelan petrochemical industry became profitable for the first time ever under this
protectionist scheme, the government may have taken this measure in order to
strengthen the strategic petrochemical industries at the same time.
To prevent the price increases that would result from import restrictions and
from a more expensive dollar, the president decreed a two-month freeze on all prices on
February 27, 1983. The measure apparently proved untenable, however, because it was
followed in March by a set of resolutions by the minister of finance establishing groups
of "basic goods" that would in fact be subject to strict price controls (Resolutions 1616
and 1617). Among these were many inputs to the plastics industry produced by the
joint venture companies, including PVC, HDPE, LDPE, PP, and some intermediate and
basic petrochemical products. Finally, in mid-April, decree 1971 created the new
institutional setting and mechanism for price controls: the Administered Price System
(SAP). Under the SAP, any firm wanting to increase the prices of its products had to
request authorization from the Prices Division of Fomento and to justify the increase on
the basis of costs. Fomento was obliged to respond to such requests within 90 days.
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In sum, a scramble of incremental emergency trade, price, and exchange rate
measures evolved, in a matter of days or weeks, into a new regulatory system with its
own institutional apparatus, but nestled within the preexisting government institutional
structure. The trade protection scheme alone included a complicated combination of
tariffs and approval procedures targeting narrowly defined product categories
(Table 11.7). The system was to undergo many changes before its dismantling six years
later, in February 1989."
The changes in the regulatory system and measures include the following. (i) The SAP
was replaced by the Commission for Costs, Prices, and Salaries (CONACOPRESA) in
June 1984. CONACOPRESA, made up of representatives of many ministries, was
charged with advising the president and his cabinet on price changes; ministries other
than Fomento were thus allowed to influence price increases. (ii) The list of "basic
goods," those whose prices were controlled but that also benefited from cheaper dollars,
was modified at least nine times; it successively included resins, medical products made
of plastics, garbage bags, school shoes with plastics soles or uppers, toothbrushes,
construction traceries, sports articles, hoses, and cases for automobile batteries. (iii) A
second price freeze for basic goods between April and July 1987 was decreed. (iv) The
mechanisms for defining the products that benefited from cheaper dollars, and the lists
of products themselves, were modified at least 30 times. (v) Rules and rnechanisms
regulating the purchase of dollars to pay private external debt (including quotas and
exchange rates) were modified at least nine times until, in July 1986, all dollar
purchases for payment of private external debt were suspended. (vi) The Law of Export
Incentives, which established the criteria for allocating export bonuses (on the basis of
the percentage of value added over the total value of the product to be exported), tax
incentives, and institutional mechanisms, was amended several tints. (vii) Several
salary increases and compensatory bonuses to be pai to workers by their employers
were decreed, and a freeze on layoffs was decreed between April and August 1987. A
detailed description of these rmeasures and their legislative or executive sources is
presented in Montoliu (1987a and 198Th).
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Table I.7 Trade Regime Applicable to Plastic Product Categories and Share
of Categories in Total Plastics Manufacturing Output, 1988
Trade ree applicable
Share in Trade
ISIC total regime
code Product category oput (%) Product sub-category Tariff a/
35601 House and 11.4 Household items and 45% + Bs.15/kg I
kitchenware, kitchenware
containers, glasses
and plates
35602 Laminated sheets, 20.8 Pipes, connections, 100% H
pipes, construction profiles
items Extruded sheets and 80% + Bs. 15/kg U
bands
35603 Bags, industrial 39.3 Containers, bags 100% ___
containers, bottles Polycarbonate bottles 80% I
Containers (5 or more 75% + Bs. 50/kg
gallons)
35604 Shoes 4.7 Shoes with plastic or 55% + Bs. 40/kg I
rubber soles or
uppers
35605 Toys, ftuits, 3.7 Dolls 100%+ Bs.50/kg I
flowers Cars and other toys 60% 1
35607 Plastic cloth, 5.9 Polypropylene sacks 35% + Bs. 7C/g I
thread, weavings Plasticized cloths 35% + Bs. 75/kg I
35609 Miscellaneous 14.2 Syringes 80% + Bs.lO&kg H
Telephones 60% I
Thermal containers 35% + Bs. 20/kg I
ISIC: International Standard Industrial Classification.
a. Lega trade regime: I=unrestricted quantities, but subject to the relevant tariff;
II= importation restricted to, or subject to approval of, the national government and its
enterprises.
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (1991), Estudie de la Cadena de Resinsy P1dsices.
Caracas: Ministerio de Fomento.
Entrepreneur Associations as Intermediaries. With the implementation of the
new regulatory system, a more complex relationship emerged among different public
offices, and between public offices and entrepreneurs. It can be argued that this was
both a cause and an outcome of the style of economic management prevailing in
1983-88. The preceding demand booms had nurtured a growing class of industrialists
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that policy makers could no longer ignore, as they were becoming not only more
numerous, but increasingly organized. The entrepreneur associations created by these
industrialists had achieved different levels of development (the associations of chemical
and mechanic industries being the most developed, followed, at a distance, by the
association of plastics manufacturers) and were allied in the influential Federation of
Chambers of Industrialists, FEDECAMARAS. The government was under pressure to
devise a decision making model that incorporated negotiations with the associations.
The role of entrepreneur organizations as brokers of government favors for their
constituencies thus strengthened and broadened in 1983-88 virtually by government
decree. The assignment of price increases, import tariffs, and quotas for raw materials
and dollars at the preferential exchange rate, governed by tightly administered and
multitiered systems, required case-by-case analysis and approval and created an
administrative nightmare for the institutions involved. To ease the burden, different
transactions were first concentrated in fewer institutions (primarily Fomento and
Instituto de Comercio Exterior, or ICE, the foreign trade institute), and ad hoc tripartite
committees were established to discuss the measures and advise on policy design and
the provision of economic exemptions and favors. The tripartite committees, called
Grupos Programadores (programming groups), were composed of representatives of
labor (formal unions), entrepreneurs (the official entrepreneur associations), and an
official of the ministry of industry, and they were sector-specific. Through this channel,
and with the explicit endorsement of policy makers, entrepreneur associations attained a
voice in policy. For the crucial "preferential" dollars and raw materials, the Venezuelan
Association of Plastics Industries (AVIPLA) and its fellow entrepreneur associations in
the plastics sector were assigned the role of centralizing and channeling all sectoral
transactions with RECADI and the joint venture petrochemical corporations. Being a
member of AVIPLA thus implied easier and faster access to these scarce factors of
production.
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Once such a decision-making and resource allocation model was in place, a
strong feedback effect developed, in that entrepreneurs seeking further privileges were
attracted to associations. Not surprisingly, the membership of AVIPLA and that of
other entrepreneur associations, such as the Venezuelan Chamber of Toy Producers
(CAVEFAJ), grew at unprecedented rates during 1983-88. Founded in 1965 by a
group of small and medium scale entrepreneurs, AVIPLA had a core of some 100
members until the early 1980s. As of February of 1987, it had reached 294 members, of
which 262 were plastics manufacturers and the rest included large petrochemical
corporations and distributors; the number grew to close to 350 firms by end-1988.56
CAVEFAJ started in 1975 with only 10 members; it stagnated during the late 1970s due
to competition by imported toys, but reactivated again in 1984. By 1985, it had 50
members, a number that grew to 84 in 1986 and reached 110 members by March
1987.57
As will be discussed in later chapters, entrepreneur associations were but one of
various lobbying and brokerage mechanisms used by firms affected by policy
interventions in 1983-88--although an important and influential one. A question for
future study is how the effectiveness of such a mechanism compares with that of others
(e.g. direct, individual lobbying), and how flexible the role of these associations has
proven to be, in light of subsequent changes in the macroeconomic framework.
4. Conclusion: Idiosyncrasies of the 198348 Protection Scheme and Its
Impact on Plastics Manufacturing
As international evidence suggests, relatively large domestic markets and
endogenous petrochemical capabilities are the main preconditions for successful
development of plastics manufacturing. What may distinguish an oil-rich country is
56 Interview with Economist Floralba P~rez, AVIPLA, Caracas, on March 23, 1992.
57 Interview with Ms. Tibisay Reyes, CAVEFAJ, Caracas, on March 23, 1987.
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that, once a plastics manufacturing sector has emerged, its competitiveness might
become more dependent on the availability of cheap resin inputs than it would be the
case for a non-oil rich country.
Venezuela does not have a large market, by international standards; yet the
imposition of trade controls in the 1980s created a secure market for local plastics
manufactures, as it made Venezuelan consumers captive to local industry. Relatively
strong high- and middle-income gwups accustomed to sophisticated plastic impozts
would be calling for high quality production (elements of a "type A" market, according
to the classification developed by Amsden's in her 1970s study of Taiwanese industry),
while the demand for low-end simple plastic items ("type B" market) would also be
guaranteed (Amsden, 1977). At the same time, Venezuela has relatively strong
petrochemical capabilities, yielding inputs to the local plastics industry at intemationally
competitive prices. It was no surprise, then, that plastics manufacturing would
experience significant growth over the 1980s.
Overall, Venezuela's gross industrial output increased in real terms at an average
annual rate of only 2% in 1984-85, which nevertheless represented a significant
improvement over the nearly 2% decline during t recession of 1979-82. In 1986-88,
however, pre-electoral expansionary fiscal policies raised manufacturing output growth
to an annual average of almost 6%. The result was a sustained annual rate of gross
industrial output growth of 3% in real terms during 1982-88. Plastics manufacturing
more than doubled that rate, by reaching 7.3% per year in real terms over the same
period.
A comparison of the industry's performance with other large international
producers of plastics manufactures indicates that its international competitiveness may
have also been affected by protection. In 1985, average wages in Venezuela's plastics
manufacturing sector were more than twice the average for major developing-country
plastics manufacturers. At that point, the higher wages seemed somewhat justified by
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the relatively high average value added per worker (a likely result of distortions
traceable to the overvaluation of the bolivar). By 1987, however, the industry's
competitiveness started eroding: although wages declined in dollar terms, value added
per worker fell even faster and deteriorated significantly relative to that of other major
developing-country plastics producers (no comparable data by firm size is available).
The orthodoxy of the 1980s says that protection-hence lack of international
competition-makes growth vulnerable, due to the tendency for technical and economic
inefficiencies to increase, and possibly results in negative distributional effects.
Consistent with findings of several other authors (Amsden, Corden, Rodrik), in the
Venezuelan case it was rather the type of protection scheme that led to vulnerability and
lack of competitiveness in industrial development For instance, there was no
mechanism to link performance to the eligibility for protection privileges, a factor that
has been tied to the success of East Asian late industrializers in improving industrial
competitiveness through official market intervention (Amsden, 1989:323).58
In contrast with previous experiences of import substitution, other characteristic
features of the protectionist scheme imposed in Venezuela in 1983-88 were: (i) the
imposition of sweeping regulations upon market transactions-e.g. protection applied
to many final goods, particularly luxury ones, but also to intermediate goods and other
crucial inputs, without a systematic sequencing or targeting pattern that would prevent
the emergence of interindustry bottlenecks; yet (ii) the application of such sweeping
regulations was subject to a product-by-product or even firm-by-firm negotiation that
created an administrative nightmare for public institutions; thus resulting in
(iii) increased incentives for developing mechanisms for brokerage and bargaining with
the relevant official institutions; and exacerbated by (iv) increasing constraints on the
58 Later in the study I argue, however, that multinational cerporations rmay have been
fulfilling a role (although limited) in imposing delivery and quality standards upon local
plastics manufacturers. See Chapters VI and VII.
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capability of the government to fNfill a role in resolving technical and financial
bottlenecks, owing to the ongoing debt crisis. Subsequent chapters will discuss how
these features of the protection scheme of the 1980s were linked to the acceleration of
subcontracting in Venezuela's plastics manufacturing.
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HI. SUBCONTRACTING AND LABOR COSTS IN THE VENEZUELAN
PLASTICS INDUSTRY OF THE 1980s
A. Subcontracting as a Strategy to Cut Labor Costs
This chapter addresses the hypothesis, so common in the informal sector
literature of the 1970s and early 1980s and recently reformulated by economic
geographers and labor economists, that subcontracting is largely a strategy to cut labor
costs. After a brief review of the main approaches in the literature, I discuss
methodological issues and my choice of a set of qualitative surrogate indicators of labor
cost differentials across firms. The observation of such indicators did not confirm the
hypothesis, yet it hinted at an alternative and, I would argue, more interesting model of
what subcontracting networks may have been about in the 1980s: one where
subcontractors were offering their clients more than "cheap"labor, and from which they
could benefit possibly as much as their clients.
1. The Subcontracting Relationship as a Terrain for Contest: Approaches of
the 1970s and 1980s
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the idea that firms' strategic decisions were driven
by the intent to cut labor costs or to ease labor management and control pervaded much
of academic thinking about industrial subcontracting and vertical disintegration of
production. Whether vertical disintegration resulted in a lower scale of operation,
enhanced functional flexibility, or a different pattern of spatial organization, it was
perceived as aiming to address what was often seen as the cornerstone of
profit-maximizing strategies: managing capital-labor relations. This interpretation made
a lot of sense in view of the increasing trends toward disintegration, disinvestment, and
"de-industrialization" in industrial economies, where "management found that it could
no longer afford the social contract and maintain its accustomed level of profit"
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(Bluestone and Harrison, 1982:17). It was also consistent with the evidence gathered
by analysts of Third World development, who observed that "informal arrangements
seem to be growing rapidly'; that "there is a tendency for the informal economy to rely
predominantly on networks, and its connection to the formal economy, through
subcontracting, is also network-based"; and that "the best-known effect of the
informalizatin process is to reduce the costs of labor substantially" (Castells and
Portes, 1989:29-30).
That subcontracting would be undertaken deliberately to cut labor cost-an idea
seemingly obvious in the 1970s and 1980s-had not been central to earlier analyses of
subcontracting and similar phenomena. For instance, George Stigler (1951), a pioneer
in the literature on vertical disintegration of production, characterized subcontracting as
an efficient organizational possibility opened by growing markets, on the one hand, and
technological advances, on the other. He described the firm as a composite of
subprocesses producing different components of a product and facing different cost
curves. Expansion of the market would allow alternative suppliers to engage in the
production of those components in which increasing returns to scale could be achieved;
it would then be reasonable for the original, multi-process firm(the "core" or "client"
firm) to shed the increasing-returns portions of the production process by contracting
them out to the emerging lower-cost firms (the "subcontractors"). 59 In Stigler's
59 More recent models, such as Michael Piore's 1980 model of product market
segmentation, assume instead that core firms would prefer to hold on to the increasing-
returns process and to shed the decreasing-returns process. The latter is characterized
as more "traditional." The distinction between the formulations in these two models is
interesting as it reflects Stigler's assumption that the vertical disintegration of the
production process benefits both firms-hence, the small firm can be as much in control
of the situation and take the initiative of "shedding" the capital intensive, increasing--
returns portion to newcomers. Piore's early model, in contrast, assumes that the firm
that controls the increasing-returns portion of the production process has a stronger
bargaining power, capital base, and control of the market, and that the smaller one-
weak, labor intensive-bears the burdens of the increasing-returns firm's decisions. My
initial hypothesis in this chapter fits this latter interpretation, also consistent with the
"informal sector" literature.
-107-
explanation, centering on the technical aspects of production, both parties would gain
from disintegration.
In contrast, the literature on market segmentation and the "informal sector" of
the 1970s and early 1980s viewed subcontracting relationships as a terrain for contest
between client firms and subcontractors, as well as between capital and labor.
Subcontracting relationships, it was argued, would enable firms to cut labor costs by
allowing them to take advantage of the cost differentials associated with the
segmentation of product and labor markets:
If labor supply is not homogeneous and if variable capital can be purchased at
different prices then subcontracting can be used as a means to exploit supplies of
the cheapest labor... (Holmes, 1986:92; cites Rubery and Wilkinson,
1981:123)
Thus, in this view, "core" or "client" firms would seek subcontractors who could
get access to the cheapest labor because of their location, technical and organizational
features, or situation vis-A-vis institutions. Alternatively, they would impose cost
discipline by setting potential subcontractors in fierce competition against one another,
thereby forcing them to cut costs, among other ways, by paying the lowest possible
wages. The subcontracting relationship was thus widely perceived as part of a zero-sum
game in which the core firm stood to gain at the expense of the smaller subcontractors
and workers would gain least of all:
the overwhelming consensus is that usually the relationship is a very unequal
one and that the relatively strong position of parent firms enables them to benefit
at the expense of their subcontractors .. . (Subcontractingi has a two-fold
effect on rates of profit in that it increases the average rate of surplus value
through a higher rate of exploitation of the workers employed by the
subcontractor, and it creates the potential for a transfer of surplus revenue from
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the subcontractor to the parent firm through the low regulated price imposed by
the latter on the former. (Holmes, 1986:88,93; Gouverneur, 1982)
It was in the context of this perception of stark confrontation between economic
actors-unions and employers, capital and labor, client and subcontractor firms-that I
initiated my study of subcontracting relationships in the Venezuelan plastics industry in
1987. Under the influence of this early literature on subcontracting, I harbored the
assumption that subcontracting was, above all, a strategy for cutting labor costs.
This assumption seemed consistent with the observation that, at the same time
that subcontracting in the plastics manufacturing sector grew significantly, the average
yearly wage earnings or employees in the industry plummeted by 23% in real terms
between 1982 and 1988, and the total yearly remuneration per employee (including
nonwage payments) declined by 15% over the same period60 In contrast, the
purchasing power of average yearly wage earnings in the economy at large in 1982-88
fell by only 3%. Could the relatively sharper decline in workers' average earnings in
plastics manufacturing be linked to a change in the industry's organization?
In fact, the information I gathered in 1987-including through interviews with
entrepreneurs and managers in "core" or "client" firms as well as with subcontractors,
and a survey of a representative sample of firms in the industry-did not reveal labor
costs as the main concern in the decision to subcontract This chapter develops the
argument that, although the general institutional and economic context in Venezuela
points to labor cost cutting as a credible rationale for subcontracting, a number of
indicators suggest that it was not the rationale in the plastics manufacturing industry in
1987. Indeed, the 1987 evidence points to a pattern of subcontracting relationships
60 Data on yearly wage and nonwage earnings of workers and employees in the plastics
industry come from the yearly national industrial surveys by the Central Statistics
Office (OCES) and are inflated to reflect 1991 prices.
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different from that deriving from the labor-cost-cutting hypothesis-one in which
conflict and subordination of subcontractor to client is not central to the relationship.
The failure to confirm my original hypothesis led me to seek alternative explanations,
discussed in later chapters.
2. Cutfng Labor Costs through Subcontracting: Assumptions
Two conditions are needed to make subcontracting a viable labor-cost-cutting
strategy. First, the client firm must be technically able to divide the production process
into portions that can then be assigned to firms associated with different segments of the
market. Second, there must exist the institutional conditions necessary for the
development and persistence of a wage differential across different segments of the
labor market These two conditions, and how they manifested themselves in the
Venezuelan plastics industry in 1987, are described in turn below.
Technical Constraint and Possibiliies. Disintegration of production into
different subprocesses that can be undertaken in different locations and under different
ownership is somewhat constrained in plastics manufacturing by the technological
nature of the process. Essentially, plastics manufacturing transforms a load of raw
material-normally pellets of some petrochemical product, or polymer, mixed with
colorants and other additives-into plastic film, thread, pipe, and sheets or into (in the
case of injection molding) discrete objects. Much of the basic technological
improvement that has been incorporated in shop-level manufacturing processes has
served to integrate the different steps of transformation (mixing of ingredients,
measuring and loading, the actual processing, and repetitive finishing processes such as
cutting, sealing, trimming, painting, and labeling) into a single automated production
line that requires minimal humau manipulation between steps. This makes disintegration
of the plastics transformation process difficult. Nevertheless, there are at least three
ways in which vertical disintegration can take place in the plastics manufacturing
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industry: (i) among plastics manufacturers, when one firm distributes molds across
suppliers; (ii) when a plastics manufacturing firm delegates the pursuit of
complementary processes to service firms or homeworkers; and (iii) when a firmin
another sector outsources plastics manufacturing to a dedicated plastics transformation
firm. The first two modalities of vertical disintegration are usually the subjects of the
informal sector literature.
The first possibility for disintegrating the plastics production process arises
because, unlike in many other production processes, in injection molding there is an
important component that can migrate across machines: the mold. A client firm can
distribute its mold for producing an object to subcontractors, which can, in turn, mount
the mold in their machines and produce the object for the original firm. This is an
example of classical "capacity subcontracting." The original firm could have produced
the object in its shop because it has the machine with the required specifications
(weight, capacity). Yet, because insufficient productive capacity (and unwillingness to
invest in the capacity needed), the client firm opts to contract out the "injection" of the
mold. A representative survey of 126 plastics manufacturers revealed that only 16% of
all firms that participated in subcontracting networks as clients and 25% of those which
participated as subcontractors engaged in capacity subcontracting in 1987.61
The second possibility for disintegration of the process of production of plastic
manufactures occurs between plastics transformation per se and subsequent,
complementary processes, such as assembly (of toys and household appliances, for
example), customized painting or decorating (doll faces), and wrapping and packaging.
These processes can be very labor-intensive and, because of the low level of technology
involved, can often be carried out at home or at other sites with relatively little
61 A discussion of types of subcontracting relationships, including "capacity" and
"specialization" subcontracting, rnentioned in this section, and statistics on their
incidence in plastics manufacturing, appear at Chapter II.
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equipment and preparation. For these reasons, and because of the large space
requirements of these complementary processes, client firms often prefer to contract
them out. During the 1987 sample survey, about 15% of all plastics manufacturers
declared that they subcontracted complementary processes from other firms, while
nearly 30% used casual labor to pursue these processes.
More common than the practices just mentioned is subcontracting of plastics
transformation from outide the industry, in what could be called "specialization
subcontracting." Firms in other industries (electrical appliances, automobiles, food
processing, personal care items) contract out to plastics manufacturers the production
of parts, components, and containers that they later assemble and finish in-house.
About three-fourths of all plastics manufacturers identified as subcontractors during the
1987 sample survey participated in specialization subcontracting.
Insdtuional Condidons for Segmentadon. Among the institutional factors
favoring segmentation of product and labor markets, the literature usually singles out
two: governments and unions (Brusco, 1982; Sabel, 1982; Castells and Portes, 1989;
Kelley and Harrison, 1989, among others). Government regulations target, or manage
to reach, only certain areas of the market and not others. Similarly, unions may target,
or gain access to, certain locations and certain portions of the workforce and not others
and therefore affect differentially the way in which government regulations are enforced
in plants. Thus, these institutions can result in the segmentation of labor and product
markets into portions across which the ability to hire and fire, to enforce patterns of
work behavior through which more product can be obtained from the worker's time, or
to push for lower wages can diverge significantly. Productive units in the protected
(primary) and unprotected (secondary) sectors face different relative factor prices and
hence choose different ways to organize their production.
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In principle, these two institutional forces could be expected to have been at
work in the Venezuelan plastics industry in the 1980s. Venezuela has been recorded
among the Latin American countries imposing higher costs on firms seeking to acquire
legal status, that is, taking the steps necessary to comply with registration requirements
relating to physical facilities, health and social security, taxes, and labor regulations. A
small manufacturing enterprise reportedly must undertake twenty-eight steps to achieve
legal status in Venezuela, including five steps related to labor regulations: statistical
registration at the ministry of labor, registration with the local labor inspectorate,
certification of safety and hygiene conditions, and registration with the social security
institute and with the national professional training institute (Cartaya, 1992:148). This
administrative burden compares unfavorably with that in Bolivia (5 steps needed),
Uruguay (16), Mexico (21), Brazil (22), and Chile (23); Ecuador, where 60 steps are
required to achieve legal status, is an extreme case (Tokman, 1992:12). The financial
costs of acquiring legal status are also particularly onerous in Venezuela: in 1988, it
was calculated that a small plastics manufacturing firm needed to spend about 24% of
its yearly profits on the necessary paperwork to become legal; for the firm studied by
Cartaya (1992), up to 182% of yearly profits would have been required because of the
firm's additional need to modify its building and equipment to comply with safety and
hygiene regulations (ibid.:9). In this highly regulated environment, segmentation is
likely to emerge and to persist. This notion that segmentation is a result of regulation is
the cornerstone of much of the informal sector literature to which I have made reference
earlier. As asserted elsewhere, "the more a society institutionalizes its economic
activities, [.. .] the sharper the divide between the two [formal and informal] sectors"
(Castells and Porter, op. cit.: 13).
The effect of unions is less clear-cut. In the mid- 1980s, union presence in the
plastics industry was pervasive-but it was not consistently strong across regions or
industries. Venezuelan labor law allowed then for the establishmwnt of two types of
unions: firm-specific or "enterprise" unions, and "regional" or "professional" unions.
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The latter gathered workers from different firms in a specific region or industrial sector,
and were generally perceived by management as more confrontational than enterprise
unions (later in this chapter, I elaborate further on this distinction). Some union leaders
in the Capital and Central regions declared that unions, in general, reached 90% of all
plastics firms-my inquiry in 1987 revealed something closer to 65%, still a high
percentage. 62 Yet union representation was fragmented along national party lines
(primarily social democrats, Christian democrats, and communists) and, within unions of
the same party, it was often atomized and concentrated around traditional leaders. A
national professional federation uniting the unions' efforts (FENTRAPLAST) did not
take firm shape until the mid-1980s, and even then it had a rather tumultuous and brief
life, disintegrating in 1993.
Multiplicity in union representation, which is permitted and even encouraged by
Venezuelan labor law, could have been a healthy sign of democracy in the labor force.
Representatives of regional or local unions, being closer to their constituencies, are
likely to be more responsive to their needs than the often bureaucratic and partidized
federations and national unions. But because of the tradition of individual charismatic
leadership at the local level and the fact that divisions along party lines often permeated
local union representation, such union multiplicity evolved into one more way to
atomize and, apparently, weaken the labor movement in the industry.
62 Here, I measure the "incidence" of unionization in terms of the percentage of all plastics
manufacturing firms whose workers have signed a collective contract, enterprise-,
industry-, or region-based, or have chosen to have an industry- or region-based union
represent their interests vis-&-vis management. By law, however, any collective contract
signed by a regional or professional union applies automatically to all workers in that
region or profession, even if a firm's manager may not recognize it or the firm's workers
may have never seen the contract. The discrepancy between my record on the incidence
of unionization in the industry (65%, based on the 126-firm survey undertaken in 1987
and mentioned earlier in this section) and the labor leader's declared 90% may lie on the
fact that the latter may have comprehended all workers covered in principle by a
collective contract.
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The impact of unions in the plastics manufacturing industry thus tended to be
uneven, varying significantly from region to region, from union to union, and even from
firm to firm. In some regions or industries, the weight of union influence was heavily
felt. The regional unions for the Guarenas-Guatire area in the Capital region, about
30 kilometers east of Caracas, were feared by employers because of their power to
disrupt production in a heavily industrialized and urbanized area. So were the regional
unions in the Valles del Tuy, some 50 kilometers southwest of Caracas, also in the
Capital region, located in an area that had received a significant inflow of industry in the
1970s as a result of industrial deconcentration policies pursued by the government. In
those two regions, it was not unusual to hear of work stoppages resulting from
deadlocked negotiations between unionized workers and management, or of frantic
efforts by management to form "enterprise unions" and sign a labor contract agreed on
behind closed doors between a few labor leaders and management. In some cases-for
example, that of a medium-size firms, employing primarily women, in the Valles del Tuy
area-an enterprise union has been able to negotiate improvements in the labor contract
by threatening to "let the regional union in." (In that example, the threat was just a
negotiating device, since the entry of the regional union would have meant, as it did
later, the loss of control over the process by the female leaders of the firm's enterprise
union to the male-dominated regional union.) In other areas of the country, regional
unions were rather silent.
It could thus be inferred that unions, thanks to their fragmentation, were not
very effective at reaching national agreements and pursuing vindicative measures on
behalf of all workers in the industry. But because of their power in certain instances,
they may have constituted a threat to at least some employers, which the employers
might have wanted to avoid through subcontracting arrangements. As I will elaborate
later, however, this hypothesis was not supported by the specific sector information
gathered in 1987.
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3. ApproachIng Fieldwork: Cases and Samples
If, as suggested in the preceding section, government regulations and union
presence seemed to provide the medium for cultivating segmentation in labor and
product markets, could the observed rapid growth in subcontracting be explained by
such institutional factors? Could subcontracting, then, be blamed for the obvious
decline in real remuneration to workers in the industry? If so, what were the
mechanisms through which this phenomenon materialized? What was specific to the
plastics industry and what can be generalized to other sectors?
In addressing questions regarding industrial organization and firm strategy,
which, one assumes, bear a relationship to macroeconomic trends, one faces a
methodological dilemma-exacerbated, in turn, by constraints on the researcher's time
and resources. Should one analyze specific case studies, or surveys of samples that
could be representative of the industry's universe? Specific case studies are the most
appropriata tool for the analysis of subcontracting networks because they allow the
researcher to match up pairs of clients and subconsactors. On the other hand, surveys
of representative industrial samples allow the researcher to test simple hypotheses about
the relationship between industrial organization and broader economic and political
variables in a way that makes the conclusions generalizable. Survey studies also offer
benchmarks to which specific case studies can be referred back. During my two-period
field research in Venezuela (in 1987 and 1992),63 I tried both methods. Another
important dilemma in research methodology-whether to interview managers or
workers or both-was resolved in a less ideal way. Resource and institutional
constraints forced me to rely primarily on interviews with firms' managers or owners
63 This field research was supported by several Venezuelan institutions, including the
Planning Direction of the Ministry of Industry, or Ministerio 4e Fomente (1987); the
Latin American Institute for Social Research, associated with the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation (ILDIS, in 1987, 1988, and 1992); and the Institute for High-Level Studies
in Adrministration or Ihstituto 4e Estadios Superiors de Adminiztmcidn, IBSA
(1992).
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and union representatives and to bypass direct interviews with workers on the shop
floor.
My first approach to understanding the behavior of subcontracting relationships
in the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry was through the sample survey
mentioned earlier in this section. In 1987,1 participated in the development,
application, and analysis of a survey of a representative sample of 126 enterprises
undertaken by the Ministry of Industry. The survey included questions on whether the
plastics firms acted as subcontractors or client firms, on the portions of the production
process that were subcontracted, and on the firms' labor practices, capital investment
trends, and organizational choices (see Annex II). On the basis of this survey, I first
identified the firms in the sample that had characterized themselves as subcontractors
and those that declared that they subcontracted plastics transformation services to
others. Each of these constituted a subsample: "subcontractors," including 76 firms,
and "clients," including 35 firms.M I then compared the characteristics of the two
subsamples, through simple tests of independence (chi-square), to find out whether the
subsamples differed significantly with respect to the chosen variables, and thus whether
"segmentation" was present along the subcontractor-client divide. Outcomes of the
survey relating to my labor hypothesis are discussed below; relevant references to the
survey are also made in Chapters IV and V.
My second approach to the analysis of subcontracting was through case studies
of five subcontracting networks selected from the survey sample. I visited most of the
client and subcontractor firms in each network twice, in 1987 and in 1992, asking them
detailed questions on the history, motivation, and performance of each network.
TM Those firms, among the 126 in the overall sample, that were neither in the subcontractor
nor the client susmlswere those that did not participate in any subcontracting
relationship. I must note, however, that there was soar overlap between the two
subsamples, as 5 firms declared that they worked by order from, as well as outeourced
to, other firins.
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Relevant findings that either support or put into question different aspects of my labor
hypothesis and my survey findings are scattered in the sections that follow.
4. DevelopIng Surrogate Indicators for Wage Differentials
The survey variable that would have provided the best test for the hypothesis
that subcontracting is a labor-cost-cutting strategy is, obviously, labor cost. Successful
comparisons of labor cost across formal-informal boundaries have been made based on
the basis of nationwide or regionwide household surveys-confirming, in most cases,
the lower cost of informal labor65-but they prove somewhat harder to pursue at the
firm level. The response of firm managers to my questions on labor cost was formal and
cryptic: they invariably said that low-skill workers were paid the minimum salary plus
bonuses imposed by the government to compensate for inflation. Managers neither
favored nor facilitated my pursuit of a survey of their employees, and they were not
forthcoming when asked for information on salaries paid to high-skill workers,
technicians, and engineers.
My interviewees'refusal to provide me with detailed information on labor costs,
and the ambiguity of nationwide data, led me to seek surrogate indicators of labor costs
to make a broader assessment of market segmentation along the client-subcontractor
divide. For reasons described later for the Venezuelan case, and relying on a rich
literature on labor organization to which I will refer throughout the discussion that
65 For instance, Roberts (1989:5 1) found that informal sector wages in Guadalajara were
16% lower than what would have been expected from the workers' education and job
characteristics. For Venezuela, household survey data analyzed by Mhrquez reveals
that, an average, informal sector wages eroded in real terms much more rapidly than
forrmal sector wages during the 1980s. In 1981, they were 22% below formal sector
wages; by 1991, they were reported as 61% below average formal sector wages
(personal communication at IBSA, Caracas, 1992).
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follows,66 I adopted firms' size, location, and level and type of unioniztion as three
good surrogate indicators of labor costs. According to the surrogate indicators
observed, there did not apear to be clear segmentation between client and
subcontractor firms in the sample with respect to labor costs and management
(Table IL1).
Table 111.1 EvIdence of Segmentation between CHents and Sn
LaborRelated Variables,1967
(as a percentage of firms in each subsample)
Clients Subcontractors All firms a/
A. Firm size b/
Large-scale (more than 100 employees) 24 25 32
Medium-scale (21-100 employees) 61 53 48
Small-scale (5-20 employees) 15 22 20
B. Location of main plant b/
Capital Region 41 43 39
Central Region 29 40 39
Other regions 30 17 22
C. Fms unionized 65 64 66
D. Firms using temporary labor 47 27 29
E. Fms where interviewee expressed
satisfaction with labor market 19 32 30
a. There were 126 firms in the sample. Of these, 76 declared that they produced by
order for other firms (these are here called "subcontractors"), and 35 declared that they
used the plastics transformation services of other firms in the industry (these are here
called "clients").
b. According to a simple chi-square statistical test, a firm's size and regional location
were statistically independent of whether it was a client or a subcontractor (at 5% level
of confidence).
Sorce: 1987 survey.
Two imptant sources of de typeof reearh cited below Me the collectionsof articles
in Scott and Storper (1986)and Ihires, Castells, and Berntn(1989).
66
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Wage and Nonwage Labor Costs. Before going on to discussing the surrogate
indicators, I would like to comment on the information on labor costs that I did have.
This information suggests, for instance, that the firm managers' reports that they paid at
least the minimum wage to unskilled workers may have well been true, since evidence
that the minimum wage constrained market clearing and generated unemployment was,
at best, ambiguous. 67 Between 1985 and 1987, a number of measures were taken to
adjust the minimum wage, including a decree in February 1985 that increased the
minimum salary to Bs. 1,500 per month (about $103 per month at the going market
exchange rate) and another in December 1985 that increased it to Bs. 2,010, or some
$132 per month. Data from the official National Household Survey indicate that
salaries for medium- and low-skill workers in the formal sector averaged Bs. 3,084 at
the end of 1985, and that salaries for workers in the informal sector averaged Bs. 2,237
(Bs. 2,070 for the self-employed, Bs. 5,074 for microenterprise owners, and Bs. 1,509
for workers in microenterprises, often family labor). Thus, minimum wage legislation
would have affected employment for only the very lowest-skill workers in the informal
sector. But the difference between the official minimum wage and the average salary
did shrink in the mid-1980s: after allowing real minimum salaries to lag behind inflation
for a protracted period, legislation increased them by about 24% in real terms in 1985;
in the same year, average real wages for all workers and for informal sector workers
eroded at rates of about 9% and 14%, respectively. These trends made minimum wage
legislation increasingly threatening to employers.
At the same time, nonwage payments to workers were becoming an increasing
burden for formal sector firms. The growing nonwage compensation could be expected
to lead managers to seek informal arrangements, and thus to increase segmentation in
the labor market The study of a plastics manufacturing microenterprise whose owners
were considering legalization, or "formalization," in 1987 revealed that it would have
67 Freeman cites similar conclusions from several studies of minimum wage legislation in
developing countries (Freeman, 1992:9-11).
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increased annual labor costs by about 27%, including mandated payments for social
security, special compensatory bonuses, holidays, pension, and overtime (Caztaya,
1992:158).68
A significant share of the nonwage costs observed in 1987 resulted from
compensatory measures implemented during the mid-1980s. After 1983, when the
government responded to the eruption of the Venezuelan debt crisis by imposing
exchange and trade restrictions that created inflationary pressures such as had never
been seen in the economy before, it issued a succession of decrees and laws designed to
compensate salaried workers for the rapid erosion of the purchasing power of their
incomes. In June 1984, by presidential decree, employers were asked topay a monthly
transportation bonus of Bs. 100 to every worker with a monthly salary of less than
Bs. 3,000 (this decree was modified two years later to include workers earing exactly
Bs. 3,000; as already mentioned, the minimum monthly salary in 1984 was Bs. 1,500).
Also in June 1984, the president decreed an increase in employment of 10% for all firms
with ten or more workers. In August 1984, another decree required firms to pay each
worker earning less than Bs. 3,000 about Bs. 12 daily for lunch. In December 1985, in
addition to the minimum wage increase, employers were required to increase all wages
(including those paid to temporary workers) by 10-20%. In April 1987, the president
decreed the "Compensatory Bonus," a monthly voucher equivalent to 20%, 25%, or
30% of the monthly salary, depending on the original salary level, to be paid to all
workers.W
M Cartayas reported 27% increase inlabor costs due to
towards the low end of the range, possibly due to the fact that the firm that she analyzed
was a micrmntcrprise with a labor force consisting of theowners themselves and a very
few unskillerd workers. For the purpose of comparison, the manager of a medlium-scale
firm that declared bankruptcy after the adjustment program established in 1989
complained that, in the case of his firm, nonwage labor costs represented practically as
rmnch as wage costs (nterview, May 1992).
69In an attnmp to prevent these mueasures from reducing employntent opportunities, the
government also prohibited all layoff& Mntay, andlup to four months after the
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In theory, as a result of all these nonwage payments, a worker eaming the
minimum wage in 1983 would cost her employer, four years later, nearly twice her
original salary (or about 30% more in real terms). Yet a significant piece of evidence
suggesting that, in practice, labor regulations may not have had a significant negative
impact on employment is the fall in the general unemployment rate from 13.4% in 1984
to 12.1% in 1985 and to a low of 6.9% in 1988. The question relevant to my research
remains open, however what share of the new employment created benefited from
regulations and what share did not? And what role did subcontracting, as a firm
strategy, play in allowing firms to avoid labor regulations?
B. Searching for Clues onthe Labor Cost Factor
1. Ffrm Size: Are Subcontractors Always Smaller?
Venezuela's laws and regulations often exclude smaller enterprises, either to
avoid excessive burdens of less powerful entrepreneurs, or in recognition of the
problems of enforcing such regulations on firms that are not often "visible." Unions
also may have problems, or show little interest in, getting access to smaller firms. If
vertical disintegration had emerged as a response to increasing labor costs and if
increasing labor costs were actually correlated to the fact of being reachable by
government regulation and union activity (as I suggest in the following paragraphs),
then one would expect subcontracting relationships to form between relatively large
client firms and relatively small subcontractors. 70 This pattern, however, did not
emerge from the 1987 survey data, as shown in Table Il1 above.
decree on the Compensatory Bonus became effective, except in the case of temporary
workers and personnel of confidence.
70 In a case study of subcontracting in Mexico, Benerfa (1989:179-80) describes
outsourcing to small finns as a means to avoid labor conflict and reduce labor costs.
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Firm size can be assumed to be an easily measurable, indirect indicator of
whether a firm belongs to one segment of the market (the protected, or primary,
segment) or another (the unprotected, or secondary, segment). This is not so much
because of the alleged technical or organizational implications of firm size (as in the
early concept of "traditional" or informal industry), but because size indicates whether a
firm is directly affected by the institutional action seen as the source of market
segmentation (government regulation, union intervention). Certainly, regardless of what
legislation may say, a firm of any size can circumvent the rules. But then again, small
size may particularly facilitate circumvention; I could thus use it also as a surrogate
indicator for possible noncompliance. In addition, larger firms, because of their
visibility, potential for conflict, better prospects for fee collection, and their workforce's
size and interests, tend to be targeted and reached by unions more often than smaller
ones; unionization, in turn, implies higher chances that a firm will be forced to comply
with labor regulations.
Venezuelan legislation would seem to fit this conventional wisdom. Some
pieces of labor legislation in Venezuela apply only to firms with more than a certain
number of workers (usually ten). The Labor Law in force in 198771 established that, to
form an enterprise union-that is, a union representing the employees of a specific
firm-a minimum of twenty members was required. One of the most controversial labor
laws in recent decades, the Law on Unjustified Layoffs,72 established that employers
dismissing a worker without due cause were obliged to compensate the worker by
paying her twice her monthly salary; the law applied only to firms with ten workers or
more. Similarly, a number of ad hoc measures taken in 1983-87 to mitigate the effect
on labor of broader economic changes did not apply to small and micro-enterprises-for
instance, the June 29, 1984, presidential decree requiring all firms with ten or more
71 (Gaceta Official 3219, Extraordinario, July 12, 1983.
72 Gaceta Official 30468, August 8, 1974.
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workers to increase their employees by 10%, and the August 1,1984, decree
compelling firms with ten or more workers to provide all workers with one meal a day.
Even in the case of universally applicable labor laws, one might expect small
firms to fare worse in terms of coverage and compliance than large ones. For example,
an old decree73 established that the benefits included in collective contracts signed by
the unions of a given region were automatically extended to all workers in the region in
that branch of industry. Although the purpose of the decree was precisely to make any
worker, unionized or not, a beneficiary of any improvements in labor conditions, the
absence of union representation in smaller firms made it unlikely that their workers
would get the appropriate information and thus benefit from collective contracting or
broad labor regulation. Legislation with universal application, such as the
Transportation Bonus, the general salary increase decreed on December 26, 1985, the
subsequent minimum wage decree of December 6,1986, and the Compensatory Bonus,
would probably take much longer to reach those workers who could not articulate their
demands through a union. In sum, the disintegration of the productive process and the
reliance of a client firm on smaller productive units (subcontractors) may offer a means
to escape regulation.
Contrary to this expectation, in the 1987 survey the variable "firm size" proved
statistically independent of whether the firm was a client or a subcontractor. Hence, at
the sample-wide level, one could not assert that clients were, on average, relatively
larger than subcontractors. Comparison with the overall sample indicated that firms that
entered into subcontracting relationships, as clients or subcontractors, tended to be
medium-size (21-100 workers), with large firms (more than 100 workers)
underrepresented among those that participate in subcontracting and small firms
(5-20 workers) slightly underrepresented among client firms. Restricting the statistical
73 Decree 440, dated Novermber 21, 1958, relating to collective contracting by branch of
inutr.
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test to those firms that seem to engage most often in subcontracting (medium-size and
small firms) yielded the same result even among these firms, size appeared to be
independent of whether a firm engages in subcontracting as a client or a subcontractor.
The sample-wide statistical study of firm size seems to hide patterns that can be
observed at the micro level, however. In three of the five subcontracting networks that
I constructed from the sample of 126 plastics firms, the client firm was the largest
among all the participants in the network (see Table I1IL2 below). The client firms
included a medium-size toy manufacturer contracting parts out to a small plastics
manufacturer, a large multinational corporation that produces household items and
contracts components and containers out to several medium-size and large plastics
manufacturers, and large car assemblers buying parts from a medium-size plastic parts
supplier. The subcontractors in each of these three networks, however, seemed large
and organized enough so that no major distinctions in labor cost differentials or
compliance with labor standards could explain their relationship to their client In one
of the two remaining networks, a large toy producer was subcontracting toy parts from
medium-size plastics molders, and wrapping film and other standardized products from
two very large plastics extruders and molders; and in the other, a subsidiary of a
multinational corporation producing school supplies contracted containers and caps out
to diverse suppliers, some of which were larger and some smaller than itself. In sum,
even if the detailed case studies suggested that the aggregate sample survey data were
less robust than they initially seemed to be, the general conclusion that subcontracting
networks in the industry did not follow a pattern where large firms always subcontract
small ones still holds.
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Table I. Size of Firms in the Five Subcontractg wr 197
Size
Network Finm a/ (eyloyees) hi Product
Client 1
Sub IA
Client 2
Sub 2A
Sub 2B
Sub 2C
Sub 2D
Sub 2E
Client 3
Sub 3A
Sub 3B
Sub 3C
Sub 3D
Client 4
Sub 4A
Sub 4B
Sub 4C
Sub 4D
Sub 4E
Client 5
Sub 5A
(Diver)
Carplast
31
10
.Minitoys
Msclpast
Transtoys
Fhnplast
Heelplast
Cosmrplast
Packingplast
Microplast
Multinac
Justinplat
Gemuplast
Colomplast
Belgplast
Transchool
Blowplast
Hispalast
Belgplast
Techplast
Mokiplast
Plastic toys
Ijcted parts
Plastic toys
Injected parts, extruded film
Toy parts, heels
Toy parts, househoki items
Injected parts, extruded film
Icted parts
Househoki items
Injeted items and fhi parts
Containers
Bottles, caps
Ballpoint pen compon.
School items
Containers, parts
Containers, parts
Containers, parts
Containers
Toys, parts
453
290
40
50
([SE)
(MSE)
368
90
(MSE)
(LSE)
35
110
42
140
35
(LSE)
14
(LSE)
61
a. Names are fictitious; proposed as mnemonic devices.
b. Where employment figures have not been confirmed, LSE=large-scale enterprise
(101 or more employees), MCE=medium-scale enterprise (21-100 employees).
Seame: 1987 interviews with firm ana
2. FIrm Location: Do Tend to Be on thePeriphery?
Labor cost differentials could also be associated with location. In remote areas,
the high costs of law enforcement may allow firms to evade regulation and thus to
Cars
Automotive parts
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impose lower wages on their workers. In areas with a poor history of labor
organization, the influence of regulations and unions is bound to be weaker, also making
it easier for firms to pay lower wages. Finally, for various economic reasons, some
regions might have lower costs of living than average and hence exhibit lower wage
rates. If a client firm selected subcontractors on the basis of their ability to offer
low-cost services, one would thus expect subcontractors to be located in regions
characterized by less union presence and relatively lower living standards74
In Venezuela, the regional distribution of activity is clearly skewed toward a few
cities and regions (see Figure I.1). In colonial times, most of the population and
economic activity were concentrated in the mountainous coastal area (the "Capital" and
"Central" regions of the country, located toward the north and along the Caribbean
coast) and, to a lesser extent, in the Andean portion of the country. This pattern of
concentration arose as a result of colonial patterns of maritime trade, the temperate
climate in high valleys of the coastal mountains, and favorable conditions for the
cultivation of coffee in the higher elevations and for sugar and cocoa in the low-lying
valleys closer to the coast. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries,
nascent industrial and mercantile activity was centered in the Capital and Central
regions, while other regions remained basically undeveloped. The plains region, or
"Llanos," a vast pampa-like area at the heart of the country that suffers from floods in
the tropical winter and extreme drought in the tropical summer, was used mainly for
74 International evidence in the 1980s supported this expectation. Scott and Storper
conclude that activities where "the scale and standardiztion of production units are
increasing... [would] .a . have many positive inducements to locate themselves in
peripheral areas where their production costs are likely to be low, and where they can
find abundant resources of unskilled and inexperienced .abo. .."(1986:305).
Regarding specific cases of innr-national dispersion of production, Dunford (1986:236)
dsussthe decentralization of automobile production (particularly, the example of
Flat) towards southern Italy, seeking to avoid union activity in the North; Grossman
discusses the tendency for the share of "informal income" in the Soviet Union to
increase "..,. as one moves from north to south, from east to west, and from major
urban centers to smaller cities and the countryside. .." (1989:152).
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low-intensity cattle ranching. Regions such as Zulia, in the far west, Nor-Oriental, in
the far east, and Guayana, in the south, were either inhospitable or considerably harder
to reach.
Figure III.1 Venezuela's Regions
With the discovery and subsequent development of the country's oil riches on
Lake Maracaibo at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Zulia region started
attracting more activity and population, draining many agricultural areas (particularly
those in the Andean region and some smaller, peripheral towns in the Central region).
Because of the persistent concentration of political power in the largest cities of the
Capital and Central regions, however, much of the oil wealth still flowed to Caracas,
Caribbean Sea
S' * Insular
Caracas
& Sapital Am
Guyana
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Valencia, and Maracay, reinforcing old colonial location patterns. Much later, in the
1960s, an explicit effort to create a growth pole in Guayana's southeastern region, based
on its hydroelectric potential and mineral wealth, resulted in the concentration of
large-scale state-owned enterprises around the newly planned Ciudad Guayana and in a
significant, though intermittent, flow of population to that region.
As a whole, the plastics industry exhibits the location pattern that one would
expect based on the historical patterns of industrial location: it is concentrated in the
Capital and Central regions of the country. According to the 1987 national industrial
survey by the Venezuelan Central Statistical Office (OCEI), more than 58% of plastics
manufacturing firms were located in the Capital region, 23% were located in the Central
region, and the remaining 19% were located in the Centro-Occidental (6%), Zulia (5%),
Andean (4%), Llanos (2%), and Nor-Oriental (2%) regions. The records of the Labor
Ministry reflect a similarly concentrated pattern, reporting in 1984 that 80% of
registered plastics firms were in the Capital and Central regions. The industrial property
registry of the Ministry of Industry (Fomento) shows an even higher concentration, with
85% of all plastics manufacturing firms recorded in 1987 located in the Capital and
Central regions, and 11% in the Centro-Occidental and Zulia regions (also a sign of the
higher rate of legal compliance in central regions than in peripheral ones). The sample
on which my 1987 survey study was based reproduced this pattern of concentration in
the Capital and Central regions, but in an attempt to reach out to, and understand a bit
better, the peripheral regions, it included a slightly higher percentage of firms in regions
other than the Capital and the Central regions (22%, compared with the 19% in the
OCEI survey).
Regional labor market conditions can be clearly linked to Venezuelas historical
pattern of location of economic activity. According to the 1990 national census, the
Capital and Cer tral regions contained 37% of the country's total population (although
only 4% of the national territory) and exhibited the highest population densities and
highest urban concentrations in the country (Table III.3). They also had 67% of all
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manuftturing employmnt, concentrated in the cities of Cazwas, Valencia, and
Maracay. As a result of their large share of relatively higher paying employment
(particularly in services and manufacturing) and their level of urhanization, these regions
had the highest consumer p indexes.
Table 3 Sooecono CharaerI of VenemmIa's RegIons,199W
Population Uiban Manufacturing 1993 Cons.
Population density population employment price index
Region (miflions) (imhabAn2) (pent) (thousands) (1990= 100)
Capital 4.27 432 96 170.8 242
Central 2.95 111 95 150.3 240
C.-Occidental 2.95 44 73 42A 237
Zulia 2.44 39 87 34.5 231
Andes 2.45 38 68 19.8 240
Nor-Oriental 2.16 26 78 22.1 234
Guayana 1.16 3 81 36A 235
Llanos 0.83 6 68 3.0 238
Insular 0.28 224 94 0.9 234
Venezuela 1949 21 84 480.2 239
Somre: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informitica, Anuarlo Eatadiutico 1993, and
Indicadores del la Fuerza de Tiibajo, Segundo Semesre 1990.
The consequences of these factors for labor relations and the labor market seem
clear (Table III.4). During times of heightened economic activity (as in 1987) the
Capital and Central regions exhibited the tightest labor markets and lowest
unemployment rates; yet because of the high concentration of economically active
popuaiowhich could not always be gainfully employed during slower periods, these
regions also reached the highest unemployment levels. The Capital and Central regions
have a high average cost per worker; the highest level of unionization among plastics
manufacturipg firms; and, in general, thhighest level f labor union activity in the
country, nransid in terms of the numberlof new unions officiay established and the
instances of labor conflict reported to the Ministry Of Labor. One would thus expect
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that, if plastics manufacturing firms sought subcontractors with the aim of minimizing
their labor-related costs, a pattern would crge in which subcontractors would be
most likely to be located in regions oder than the Capital and Central regions.
Table 111.4 labor Indicators in Venezuela's Regions
Region
Capital
Central
C.-Occidenta
Zulia
Andes
Nor-Oriental
Guayana
U1anos
Insular
Venezuela
Average
cost/worker
1985
(Bs. thousands)
40.11
44.89
d 40.72
39.43
26.4
37.02
46.68
28.23
26.94
41.11
Unemployment
rate
1985 1987
14.3 8.0
15.5 9.7
14.0 10.6
12.3 11.3
9.9 8.2
14.5 9.9
11.9 7.2
19.1 10.4
n.a. n.a.
12.1 9.9
Unionized
plastics
firms 1987
(percnt)
71
74
29
67
n.a.
60
n.a.
60
n.a.
66
New
unions
established
1980-84
93
139
86
49
103
50
33
44
6
603
Instances of
labor conflict
reported
1980-84
108
36
17
24
19
73
47
11
0
335
Sowe: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informitica,Amuarie Eutadifdce de
Venezuela 1995 and Indicaderes de la Faerza de rbajo 1985-fl; Ministerio del
Trabajo, Memoria y Cuenta, 1980,1982,1984.
The results of the 1987 survey showed that clients and subcontractors were not
distributed regionally as my stylized formulation of the labor-cost-cutting hypothesis
would predict, however. In other words, on average, for the 126-firm sample,
subcontractors did not seem to be located in more remote locations than client firms.
As indicated in Table IIL1 above, in 1987 the regional location of a firm's plant75 was
statistically independent of whether that firm was a client or a subcontractor.
75 'he firms in the plastics manufacturing sample were usually single-plant firms.
Specifically, 92% of the 126 firms in the sample had only one p and, for 80% of all
firms, the plant was located in the M placeas the adminisrative and managerial
offices.
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Moreover, a comparison of the sample of firms in subcontracting relationships with the
overall sample of plastics manufacturers surveyed showed that those engaged in
subcontracting had a stronger tendency to be located in central areas. Paradoxically,
subcontractors were particularly unlikely to be found in more remote areas of the
country.
Similarly, the location patterns exhibited in the five detailed case studies refuted
te original hypothesis. As shown in Table IlL. below, in all but one of the networks,
the subcontractors were located in regions that are more "central" (that is, closer to the
capital) than that in which the client firm was located. Indeed, most of the
subcontractors were located in the Capital region and in the capital city itself. Because
real wages in the capital city tend to be higher, on average, than those in secondary
cities,the case study evidence contradicted te idea tat client fins sought
subcontnators whose locadon in remote areas would allow them to reduce labor
casgs.76
76 Here I should introduce the obvious caveat that, even within the more central and
urbanied -ars of the country, there can be pockets of low wage and unregulated
activity. The New York case studies of Sassen-Koob (1989:70-73) are a prime example
of how informal("sweatAhop"type) activity connected to formal production through
tirelationships can find niches in decaying or rapidly changing areas in
very large urban centers. If this is true in industrial countries, it is even me so in the
developing world, as illustrated by the rich empirical literature on the informal sector of
the 1970s and 1980s. The evidence that I have presented in this section, although robust
in dmstaigthat there are no centrifugal tendencies for sucnrciglocation
nationwie, casnt addrcss the issue of whether low-wage locations are being sought
withinaq tsir cider. My specific case saties sugest that this might be true for plastics
in som intnces (see, in pauticular, Case Study No.1I in Annex Ill). A dsuso of
the advantages of central location is presented later in this chapter.
~
,
.
1*
1
El -
.Ur
-
ta
p
LA
 
p 
S 
Ut
S
~
8~
 I
~
iH
~
 I
:
LA
to
Iii
s 
q,
2
02 F, Jr If. r 'II
I I as
7
j I
A
N
?
i0
44 t4%
I B
- 133 -
3. Unnadotn:DO SbotrcosAbhor Union?
A third piece of survey evidence, the incidence of unionization among workers
in plastics manufacturing firms, would seem to cast further doubt on the hypothesis that
subcontracting is undertaken to lower labor costs.
Before looking at how this variable related to the 1987 data on subcontracting,
however, it is useful to observe patterns at the level of the industry-wide sample. In
plastics manufacturing as a whole, two-thirds of all firms surveyed were "unionized"-
that is, workers had collectively agreed to representation by a labor organization and
had negotiated a collective labor contract with management. As could be expected
given ease of access by unions and potential for union fee raising, the incidence of
unionization diminished as firm size diminished. Among large finns (more than 100
employees), only 11% were not unionized, compared with 76% of the small-scale
enterprises (5-20 employees) (Table 111.6).
According to the labor law prevailing at the time, as mentioned earlier, an
organization representing workers could be firm-based (an "enterprise union") or
external to the firm and based on a trade, industry, or region (a "professional" or "trade"
union). Professional or trade unions (which, in Venezuela, are usually linked to a
political party and perceived as highly confrontational) were more common among
smaller firms than larger ones: they were the form of worker representation for 77% of
all small and medium-size enterprises that had a union, but for only half of all large firms
that were unionized. Conversely, enterprise unions (perceived as more "cooptable" by
management than trade unions) were far more common among larg enterprises; 51%
of the large firms that were unionized had an enterprise union, compared with only 33%
of the unionized small1-scale enterprises. This is not surprising since, by law, a minmmn
of 20 workers (the upper limit in Venezuela's definition of small-scale) are needed to
form an enterprise union. Among medium-size plastics manufacturing firnns-the
stratum to which most client firms and subcontractors belong-the 1987 sample
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revealed a relatively high level of unionization (70% of firms), with a relatively small
presence of enterprise unions (21% of all unionized firms).
Table IL6 Incdence of Unoniatin among Plastic Manufacturers, 1987
unionized Enterprise union Trade union Total a/
No. % No. % No. % No. %
42 33.9 28 22.6 54 43.5 124 100.0All firms
By size
Large-scale
(more than 100 employees)
Medium scale
(21-100 employees)
Small-scale
(5-20 employees)
By region
Capital region
Central region
C.-Occidental region
Zulia region
Nor-Oriental region
Firms with more than 50% of
female workers
4 10.8
18 30.0
19 76.0
14
13
10
3
2
28.6
26.5
71.4
33.3
40.0
16 43.2 17 45.9 37 100.0
9 15.0 33 55.0 60 100.0
2 8.0
5
18
2
2
1
5 20.0
10.2
36.7
14.3
22.2
20.0
4 16.0 25 100.0
30
16
2
4
2
61.2
32.7
14.3
44.4
40.0
49 100.0
47 100.0
14 100.0
9 100.0
5 100.0
6 24.0 14 56.0 25 100.0
In networks
Clients
Subcontractors
12 35.3
27 36.0
12
15
35.3
20.0
10 29A 34 100.0
33 44.0 75 100.0
a. Percentages are calculated on the total of actual respondents. The rate of response
was for all firms, 98%; large-scale, 95%; medium-scale, 100%; smalf-scale, 100%;
Capital, 100%; Central, 96%; Centre-Occidental, Zulia, and Nor-Oriental 100%; more
than 50% female, 100%; clients, 97%; subcontractors, 99%.
Somue: 1987 survey of 126 enterprises.
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If the level of unioniztion is an indication of moe cumbersome management
and a higher-cost operation, and labor costs and management arm a njor concern for
client firms, one would expect them to seek subcontractors that are free of union
influence. And, consistent with the sample-wide evidence just presented, one would
expect client firms to seek small-scale subcontractors. Yet, as discussed earlier, the
1987 sample survey revealed no clear association between a firm's size and the
likelihood of its being a client firm or a subcontractor. Similarly, no clear association
could be found in the survey sample between a firm's having a union and the likelihood
of it being a client or a subcontractor (Table III.1). The percentage of firms in the
overall sample whose workers belonged to a union did not vary markedly between the
subsample of client firms and the subsample of subcontractors-about two-thirds of the
firms in each group were unionized. This level of unionization was similar to that in the
industry-wide sample but, curiously, slightly lower than that for medium-size firms in
general. Yet the difference (64% for those engaged in subcontracting compared with
70% for all medium-size firms) may not be sufficiently large to establish a relationship
between unionization and subcontracting.
A closer look at subcontracting networks reveals a more ambiguous, though
rich, relationship between unionization and the quality of industrial relations than the
sample-wide analysis in the preceding paragraphs suggests. While the survey sample
offers a representative perspective of the industry at large and of the characteristics of
an average subcontractor or an average client firm, it does not allow for matching up
each client with its own subcontractors. Case studies do match them up, hence reveal
features of the networks that the analysis of the overall survey sample cannot. In the
five detailed case studies, the percentage of firms whose workers enjoyed formal union
representation was higher than in the sample at large (80% as opposed to 64%),
possibly revealing a selection bias. The pattern of unionization was not uniform among
the networks, however, although some features seemed to repeat themselves (see
Table III.7 below). Somewhat in contradiction with the sample evidence, which
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suggested no association between unionization and status in a network, but consistent
with my initial expectation, the two firms with no formal mechanism for worker
repMsentation were both subcontractors and were relatively small in terms of
employees. Yet, curiously enough, these non-unionized firms stood out because of their
technical excellence. Both were founded and headed by engineers or experienced
technicians with good managerial instincts. Both had been able to combine
mold-making skills with plastics transformation skills-as discussed inChapter IV, a
winning combination in the plastics industry. And both were located in very central and
accessible areas of the Capital region, in working-class neighborhoods. The absence of
unions in these enterprises seemed to be associated with a blurred boundary between
"management" and "labor" and a close relationship among members of the firm,
reflected in co-management among senior members and apprenticeship with respect to
junior members. In such tightly knit firms, there seemed to be little room for external
unions. Although I would not venture to assert that this type of labor-management
relations was common in the industry, the industrial relations exemplified by these two
firms appeared to be associated with good performance in smaller firms.
More often than not, client firms had enterprise unions (i.e. according to the
classification in Venezuelan labor law, firm-specific, as opposed to region- or
industry-wide, unions), while subcontractors were most likely to have trade unions.
This observation would seem to counter the labor-cost-cutting hypothesis, in the sense
that trade unions, as mentioned earlier, are usually known for their tendency to engage
management in confrontation. Yet it may also reveal a fact that became much more
evident in the 1990s, under the pressures of structural adjustment: trade unions
represented less of a threat in the plastics manufacturing industry than their reputation
would lead one to believe.
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Table IL7 The Five Subcomtractig Networks: U,197
I-Fum a/
Network
Sub 1A
Client 2
Sub 2A
Sub 2B
Sub 2C
Sub 2D
Sub 2E
Client 3
Sub 3A
Sub 3B
Sub 3C
Sub 3D
client 4
Sub 4A
Sub 4B
Sub 4C
Sub 4D
Sub 4E
client 5
Sub5A
stratumWbf
MSE
SSE
LSBE
LSE
MSE
MSE
LSE
MSE
[SE
MSE
MSE
LSE
MSE
[SE
MSE
[SE
MSE
LSE
SSE
[SE
MSE
Ine"W- 
-
Central
Capital
C-Occidental
Capa
Capital
Central
Central
Transtoys
Milinnac
Jusiat
Germat
Colmplast
Belgplast
Transchool
Blowplast
Hispaplast
Belgplast
Techplast
Moldplast
(Dvrs)
C -rpat
Enterprise Trade
unimn union None
x
x
x
x
x
x
na.
na.
x
x
fit
x
x
x
x
n.a.
x
x
x
x
a. Names are fictitious; prwpos as mnemonic devices.
b. Firm strt LSE.large-scale enterprise (101cr orebyloyces), MSE
medium-scale enterprise (21-100 employees), SSE=nmali-scale enterprise
(5-20 employees).
Source: 1987 interviews with firm
Capital
Capital
Capital
na.
Capital
Capital
Capital
Capital
Capital
n.a._
Capital
Central
Capit
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C. Emerging Patterns: Features of a Different Subcontracting Model
The evidence from the 1987 sample survey indicates, in sum, that theft was no
clear or statistically significant relation between a firm's status in a subcontracting
relationship (as client or subcontractor) and any of the three variables observed-firm
size, rgional location, and incidence of unionizatin. Invoking the original hypothesis,
then, one could not assert that client firms were seeking to achieve lower labor costs by
subcontracting to smaller firms, subcontracting to firms in more remote areas, or
subcontracting to non-unionized firms. But the data can be of more use than for
confirming or refuting the original argument If the data do not confirma the hypothesis,
what patterns do they reveal? if subcontracting is not a strategy to cut labor costs, does
this mean that labor considerations are absent from the decision to subcontract? Or, if
labor costs are a constraint but subcontracting is not a strategy for addressing that
constraint, are there other cost-cutting strategies that are deemed more appropriate?
The rest of the chapter addresses each of these three questions in turn.
1. It Is Medium-Size Firms that Engage In Subcontracting
Firms engaged in subcontracting, as clients or subcontractors, tended to be in
the medium-size range (defined in Venezuelan industrial statistics as those with between
21 and 100 workers). Firms lying at either end of the size spectrum tended to work
independently, rather than forming subcontracting networks. This observation thus
differed, as was stressed earlier, from the conclusions of the related literature on the
informal sector, which focuses on labor costs and would indicate a tendency for
subcontractors to be rather small and "invisible." But it also differed from other cases
reported in the scant literature on subcontracting (e.g., the case of machining in the
U.S., as described by Kelley and Harrison, 1989), where it was found that client firms
tended to be very large. According to the Keiley-Harrison study, larger firms were
more likely than others to subcontract because "the planning and information resources
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associated with large corporate size... increase the likelihood of subcontracting for any
operation" (op. cit.:15). These authors, in other words, focused on the importance of
appropriate information as a factor in the decision to subcontract. This suggests the
implicit premise that subcontracting was conceived as the technically optimal solution,
constrained only by the transactions costs involved in ensuring compliance with
contracts and specifications-a premise that probably applies well to batch production
processes, where returns to scale do not increase limitlessly.
Plastics manufacturing (and, particularly, injection molding) is different It can
be described as lying between mass production, continuous flow processes and discrete
batch processes, because it involves both the continuous transformation of resin pellets
into a malleable plastic mass and, at the same time, the shaping of discrete objects, one
by one and in series. This hybrid technical nature of plastics manufacturing supports an
assumption that medium-scale enterprises in industry would be most likely to
engage in subcontracting, and that large firms would be much less likely to do so. The
increasing returns to scale associated with continuous flow processing makes large-scale
production relatively advantageous. The access to information that a larger firm tends
to have supports attempts to concentrate production in-house, rather than disintegrate it
in a subcontracting network, by allowing a firm to scan input and output markets (and
not necessarily the supplies of subcontractors, as indicated in the U.S. machining case)
and to reach out to a larger clientele capable of supporting its massive operation.
This was the style of production, for example, of a large-scale Venezuelan
manufacturer of simple household items, akin to U.S. Rubbermaid. This firm, located
on the outskirts of Caracas, thrived on the strong consumption growth of the 1970s, as
the number of urban middle-class households increased and their incomes grew with the
oil booms. Because it was established first as the subsidiary of a large multinational
company, it avoided the effect of competition from imports that so often eliminated
smail local initiatives. Once it had established its capital base and driven its production
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costs as low as needed to keep potential local competitors out of the market, it
reinforced its position in the further protected market of the early and mid- 1980s.
There is no imaginable reason why a large producer like this, with control of massive
consumer markets and a vested interest in maintaining its low retooling rate and its large
runs, would ever consider injecting items for other firm. And, apparently, it had never
found itself in eed of subcontracting capacity from other firms, nor bad it found
subcontractors that could offer injection molding at lower unit costs than the firm could
achieve by producing in-house.
Another large plastics firm also illustrates the way that the technological factor
compounds the trend toward concentration and diversification of production in single
firms-as well as how this trend is further reinforced by the concentration of capital and
ownership in Venezuela. This firm, one of the largest and most modem plastics
manufacturing plants that I visited in 1987 is the bottle producer for the leading soft
drink maker in Venezuela. The soft drink maker-again, the licensee of a leading
multinational producer-is owned by one of the most powerful economic groups in
Venezuela. The bottle producer is owned by the same group, an ownership structure
that allows the conglomerate to play with transfer pricing, as well as to control quality
and delivery at minimum cost A single, gigantic production line mixes, measures and
feeds into the machine the petrochemical material; melts and shapes the bottle
"matrices" in high-capacity injection molders; places the matrices in blow-molding
machines and blows them into their final shape; and adds some of the trimmings and
labels. That this firm would ever have any interest in subcontracting any portion of its
production process is equally hard to believe, not only because of the high degree of
technological integration and the absence of portions of the production process with
decreasing returns to scale, but also because of the concentration of capital and the
associated monopolistic nature of the business.
In most cases, then, large plastics manufacturing firms would do all the injection
molding work in-house, a fact largely explained by increasing returns to scale, high
capital and ownership concentration, and near-monopolistic output markets. But I also
identified exceptions-large enterprises catering to markets that, because of the nature
of the product, were somewhat more competitive andin which subcontracting did take
plae. This was the case for the toy industry, from which I drew two of my five case
studies.
At the other end of the spectrum, the attractiveness of small-scale enterprises as
subcontractors might be affected by their disadvantageous position in an industry in
which the core production process is characterized by increasing returns. Whether the
unit cost disadvantage can be overcome by relying on low-paid labor could not be
confirmed by the data available to this study. It is a doubtful proposition, however:
because fixed capital costs would remain the heaviest burden on unit costs, a small firm
could only become competitive not only by paying very low wages, but also by using
very depreciated (old) equipment For such a firm, it would be technological
backwardness, and not just relatively high unit costs, that would reduce its
attractiveness as a potential subcontractor. Although it would have been interesting to
record cases of small-scale plastics manufacturing firms that, through reengineering and
creative use of outmoded machinery, could show a unit cost advantage, I could identify
no such cases in my industry sample. Thus, I would assert that small enterprises either
restrict themselves to operatingd inin market niches where unit cost or
technological disadvantage are less important, or serve as subcontractors thanks to
other, non-cost-related advantages that they can offer.
Examples of smail-scale firms that found market niches through means other
tha unt cstadvntaesin plastics transformation abounded in my sample. At the
lower end of the technological spectrum, for example, there was a very small
manufacturer of plastic and rubber slippers located in Barquisimeto, a medium-size city
in the interior of the country, In a ersoWelocation and on substandard facilities. The
firm benefited,aertainly, frm the fact that the three partners were members of the same
family ad, at thsamn time, three of the only four workers in the fl but its "strategy"i
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went beyond procuring cheap and flexible labor. It was supplying an inferior product,
plastic slippers-that is, a product for which the lower the income, the higher the
demand. It relied on informal marketing networks capable of reaching into poor
neighborhoods, and based on friendships and sometimes even exchanges of "favors."
The molds required for producing the slippers were simple; fashion and reputation (both
because of the nature of the good and because of the demand to which it catered) were
not crucial-hence the lack of need to constantly acquir or reengineer expensive
molds. Slippers could also be produced with recycled material. In Venezuela, because
institutionalized mechanisms for recycling by end-users remain undeveloped, recyclable
materials must be collected directly from garbage disposal areas. And, as has been
illustrated in previous studies (Birbeck, 1979)-and as I found in more than one city in
Venezuela-collecting recyclable materials (or "scavenging") is usually done by
relatively organized gatherers, access to whom is facilitated through informal networks.
Hence, through the firm's choice, systematic and deliberate or not, of a certain type of
market (inferior goods), segment of the demand (poor, hard-to-reach communities),
type of product (simple, not subject to fashion trends), and type of input (mostly
recycled materials), and through its adjustment of its features to such conditions
(location, depreciated capital, family labor, informal networks with suppliers and
purchasers), the firm created a niche for itself. This type of firm, however, is not a good
candidate for subcontracting relationships, because of the rigidities of the strategy on
which its subsistence was based.
Examples of firms that rely on non-cost-related advantages will be discussed at
length in other chapters, and indeed constitute the backbone of this thesis. Yet another
case of a small plastics manufacturer that made labor its magnet for clients, although not
because of its low cost, is relevant here. This other small firm, which I have called
"Moldplast," performed injection molding in general (i.e. it did not specialize in a
particular product), and it was at a more advanced point along the technological
spectrum than the slipper producer mentioned earlier. The 14-worker firm was acting
as a subcontractor for "Transchool," a producer of school and office items, in the
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subcontracting networkthat constitutes my fourth case tudy. In contrast to the slipper
producer, Molplast was locatedin the capital city, although also in a small industrial
zone in a low-income area.
When I interviewed the owner and the main technician in 1987, the firn had
been operating for only one year. Consequently, the facilities and machinery weM new
and well maintained. The plastics on unit was the outcome of the
dissolution of a machiningeder the same manag andonh
that produced molds for injection molding; metalworking equipment had been kept in
the plant Earlier in the 1980s, these metalworking technicians of European background
and training had decided that they preferred the independence of producing directly to
the market to the dependence implied y machining molds for large enterprises that
operated, in many cases, as monopsonists. They thus decided to buy two second-hand
Italian injection-molding shines and to import, also from Italy, another
injection-molding machine and some supplementary equipment; they licensed or copied
the molds required to produce a couple of consumer items (a toy and a small coin
dispenser) and entered the market o injection molding of final consumer products. As a
transition strategy, they decided to accept injection-molding business from a few all
producers or distributors of consumer products ("designer" plastic drinking glasses,
toys), for which they also made and maintained the injection molds. They also accepted
orders from a medium-size of a multinationalenterprise ("Tranachool");
Transchool provided the molds, but Moldplast had substantial responsibility for
maintaining thm d reolvingtheir eninering prolms.
My visit to Moldplast took place in the fall of 1987, a year after the picpl
had gone into the plastics transformation business. At that point, they had not yet been
able to bring to the market the final goods that they had wanted to produce. They had
encuntredtehnical problems: because the toy they had chosen to producecossd
of bidng blocks, prccision hadlo be very high, but problems with dhe quality and
of pasti -bhd prvente d emfrmpouig-wtnde
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adequate level of tolerance. What was supposed to have been their "transitional"
strategy-injection-molding by order for others-had remained their main business.
But their injection molding for other firms was invariably accompanied by a critical
responsibility for making, maintaining, or reengineering injection molds-and not only
the ones they injected themselves, but also other molds that the client firm used
elsewhere. When asked what the advantage was of subcontracting injection molding to
Moldplast, the interviewee in the largest client firm, Transchool, answered without
hesitation: It was Moldplast's ability to make, repair, and handle molds skillfully that led
Transchool to maintain its subcontracting link with Moldplast, even if it could perform
injection molding at a lower unit cost in-house. The subcontractors highly skilled labor,
scarce elsewhere, was thus its comparative advantage and one of the main reasons that
its clients opted for subcontracting.
These two stories illustrate the argument that small enterprises would not tend
to act as cost-cutting subcontractors, mainly as a result of the characteristics of the
technology of the industry and its cost structure. Thus, at one end we find the slipper
producer, unable to offer subcontracting services of any acceptable technical quality, but
successful, at least in the medium term, at carving out a niche in the low-income market
At the other end we find Moldplast, able to make its injection molding services
particularly attractive through the provision of another, very scarce and highly
appreciated service: mold making and repairing.7
This brings us back to my original statement: Although specific cases may differ
somewha4 according to the 1987 industry sample it is MedNM-SieJfrFS that tend to
engage in subcontcting, both as clients andas ubconbrctors. Again, looking at
the technological argument, medium-scale enterprises are better able to benefit from
increasing returns to scale than are small enterprises. They can achieve better unit
77 The example of Moldplast is thus relevant to the discussion of "interlinked tranations"
presented in Chapter V.
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production costs, not at the expense of labor standards but, by definition, because of
their ability to work at a larger scale than small enterprises can. Hence, on the basis of
unit cost and technological advantages, they would be more attractive as subcontractors
than the smaller firms. At the same time, medium-scale enterprises would be more
likely than larger enterprises to contract out work because they tend to face capacity
constraints sooner than large enterprises and they would be more vulnerable to the risks
involved in making substantial capital investments.
2. Subcontractors Concentrate Geogrphcafy toward the Center
Another pattern identified through the analysis of the 1987 industry sample is
that firms acting as subcontractors tended to concentrate geographically toward the
Central regions. The advantages of being in Central regions thus clearly outweighed the
potential disadvantages (presumably, higher labor costs, stronger union influence, higher
cost of land and facilities). On hindsight, this finding was surprising only because of the
original assumption that subcontracting was a labor-cost-cutting strategy that would
lead client firms to search for subcontractors in areas with cheaper labor. But once this
premise was abandoned, the reasons for concentration seemed obvious.
The advantages of being in a central location are indeed numerous, and many of
them are institutional. First, in Venezuela's highly regulated economy, where almost
thirty transactions are required to legalize a firm and government institutions tend to be
highly centralized, there is an incentive for firms (and, especially, for smaller and weaker
firms) to locate close to the center of power. Ilegality is, of course, always an option-
for example, for the slipper producer, which relied on highly depreciated capital
available in local markets and on recycled material. But it is a much less attractive
option for firms that would rather occupy a more prominent and dynamic place in utban
markets, and to succeed in an industry in which the minimum capital investments
required for a well-performing operation are relatively high and material inputs must be
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obtained either from state-owned or tightly controlled local suppliers or from the
interational market.
Second, there are traditional economic advantages to concentration:
externalities and economies of agglomeration. Venezuela's transport, communications,
and service infrastructure is more developed than that in the "average" developing
country, but there are still significant frictions associated with access to the central
geographical locations where economic activity is concentrated, and significant
advantages to locating at the nodes of infrastructure. Although many urban centers
have long since reached the limits of their service infrastructure (power outages and
water rationing are probably as frequent in Caracas as in some secondary Venezuelan
cities), those at the center can more easily find help to overcome service gaps. Also, in
a country with no mass freight transport system(Venezuela still lacks a railroad system
despite many attempts to establish one), even the advantages of highly subsidized
gasoline can be offset by the costs of untimely delivery due to irregular transport or the
costs of maintaining trucks.
Third, in the plastics industry the nature of the products themselves acts as a
centripetal factor. Plastics products are usually bulky and fetch a relatively low price
per unit of volume, hence location close to the place of use or consumption is
economically advantageous.
For this combination of reasons, it is thus not surprising to find, for instance,
that in one of the regions in Venezuela where industrial location would seem most
favored-in the Guayana region-very little development of the plastics industry has
taken place. The main urban center in the Guayana region, Ciudad Guayana, is in an
area rich in energy and water resources and with no constraints on physical expansion.
The industrial infrastructure is good, and housing opportunities are plentiful. Yet the
narrowness of its market and the remoteness of its location have clearly detracted from
its convenience as a location for plastics manufactuzrs-as well as other types of
enterprises oriented toward final markets
These centripetal and centrifugal forces act on any type of enterprise, not only
subcontractors. To gain a better understanding of the pattern of location associated
with subcontracting, we need to look at specific subcontracting networks. First and
foremost, one would tend to believe that, for subconractors, access to potential users
of their intermeditee products would be important For client firms, proximity to the
subcontractor would help minimize transactions costs and delivery problems. Hence
one would expect to observe a tendency among subcontractors to cluster not just
around final markets, but particularly around clientfirms. Yet this presumption has not
always been supported in the scanty literature addressing the issue of location and
subcontracting. In his 1986 review of the literature on subcontracting, Holmes
concluded that" .. . the actual spatial configuration of subcontracting linkages is highly
dependent upon a host of contingent relt ... "and that it ws"... difficult, if
not impossible, to geperalize about such configurations ..." (1986:98-99). The
literature seems to support both the notion that some subcontracting systems would
tend to be tightly clustered (as in Sheani's 1983 description of the Japanese kanlan
system and Pyke, Becattini and Sengenberger's 1990 and Pyke and Sengenberger's 1992
accounts on industrial districts, among other examples) and, conversely, the notion that
transport and telecommunications technologies would minimize the impact of distance
in the choice of subcontractors (Lafont a 1982). Hence the question is how these
factors played themselves out in Venezuelan plastics manufacturing subcontracting
networks.
The five 1987 case studies suggest that diversity in the spatial configuration of
subcontracting networks was just as characteristic of the Venezuelan plastics industry as
it is of the different cases cited in the literature. In three of te five case studies, the
client firm and the subcotrts we loated2in Heaebrdn si area or
separated by very short distances (less than 50 kilometers in two of the cases, and
90 kilometers in the other). In the other two cases distances exceeded 300 kilometers.
Observation of the three "clustered" cases and of one of the two "dispersed"
cases suggests that tighter technical and economic relationships and spatial clustering go
together, regardless of the size of the finm or its level of sophistication. One of the
clustered caes involved a small toy producer ("Minitoys") that had a single
subcontractor on which it had relied since its foundation. The other two clustered cases
involved two large subsidiaries of multinational corporations ("Multinac" and
"Transchool") contracting out to relatively high-quality suppliers, most located very
close to the capital, with which they generally had had relatively long relationships. In
contrast, in the first of the two "dispersed" networks, the client, a large toy producer
('Transtoys") working under a license from a leading multinational corporation,
maintained less permanent relationships and tended to hire firms located up to
320 kilometers away to produce relatively simple components. For Transtoys, cost
cutting or capacity enhancement seemed to be the main reasons for subcontracting; the
subcontractor's technological advancement was not crucial to its choice.
The conclusion that tighter relationships and spatial clustering go together
appeals strongly to intuition, particularly after the profuse literature on industrial
districts of the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, atthe same time, the evidence from the four case
studies mentioned above seems to contradict economic rationality in at least one
respect One would expect firms to it willing to pay highettransport costs to obtain a
mor complex product or very special services from a supplier. Conversely, one would
expect firms to be less willing to seek faraway subcontractors to contract out rather
sip- and low-cost services.
The four case studies just referred to indicate, then, that it is not a mere
calculation of total unit cost that drives the decision regarding how far to go to reacha
subcontractor, or a client. To confirm this rule, however, my case studies also included
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a couple of exceptions, as well as stories that showed that spatial strategies do not
remain the same, but change over time. Belgplast, for instance, maintained an active
relationship with both Multinac (located in the same general area of the capital) and
Transchool (located only 40 kilometers away from Belgplast). As Belgplast's
reputation improved and spread, its power to discriminate among clients and its area of
influence increased. In the early 1990s, it nearly severed its ties with Transchool while
strengthening its links with other transnational subsidiaries up to 400 kilometers away.
Quality and reliability, in this case, outweighed distance and transport costs.
Another exception to the rule of "tightness and clustering" mentioned earlier,
and thus an example of the irrelevance of distance in the face of other advantages, is
provided by the fifth case study, which looked at an automotive supplier ("Carplast")
that served several automobile assemblers. Carplast, located some 200 kilometers from
the industrial area in which automobile factories tend to cluster in Venezuela, supplied
its client firms bulky plastic components, the kind of product that firms presumably
would prefer to subcontract from firms nearby. Yet Carplast remained one of the most
active suppliers. More important than the quality of its product or its services was that
Carplast belonged to a conglomerate that produced different automotive components
and which benefited greatly from specific import protection. Because of its
quasi-monopolistic position in the market, and the linkage established between the
provision of different automotive components, Carplast was, in practice, offering the
automobile assemblers a product and a service that nobody else could supply them with.
Clients were willing to reach out to a relatively distant supplier because they were, to a
great extent, captive buyers. And because of the protection of the automobile industry,
they could afford it.
In sum, in addition to the survey's revelation that subcontracting networks did
not follow a "center-periphery" configuration, a varied set of location patterns emerged
from the observation of my detailed case studies. In some cases, closeness and
clustering between clients and subcontracnos followed from tightly knit relationships in
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which quality and delivery were given high priority. Conversely, a looser spatial
configuration was associated, in other cases, with relationships that were more casual
and where attaining a low production cost, rather than quality, was the factor driving
the client's choice of subcontractors. Yet, in the cases of some high-quality
subcontractors or subcontractors enjoying monopoly power of some sort, distance from
the clients seemed to lose relevance. As stated by Holmes,
very few, if any, non-trivial generl theoretical tendencies concerning the
spatial configuration of subcontracting relationships can be identified. It appears
that, in most cases, the actual spatial configuration of subcontracting linkages is
highly dependent upon a host of contingent relationships which can only be
uncovered and understood through concrete empirical research. (Holmes,
1986:98)
More detailed empirical analysis of the spatial features of Venezuelan
subcontracting, such as that proposed by Holmes would be an interesting spin-off of the
present study.
3. Aternative Cost-Cutting Strategies
Finally, I restate two unresolved questions posed earlier If subcontracting was
not a strategy to cut labor costs, does that mean that labor considerations were of little
relevance to firm strategy in 1987? And if labor costs were a constraint, but
subcontracting was not the strategy through which firms addressed that constraint,
which other labor-cost-cutting strategies were deemed more appropriate and why?
When I asked managers whether they engaged in subcontracting in order to
minimize labor costs, few declared that they were concerned about labor cost or labor
management issues. Yet, as discussed earlier, costs associated with labor regulations
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had been increasing in absolute terms throughout the 1980s. A glance at the evolution
of plastics firms' cost structures revealed an even more worrying item: raw material.
Under the unprecedented inflation of the 1980s and in the absence of indexation, the
weight of labor costs was declining while the weight of the cost of resins was
skyrocketing (Table IM.8). By 1988 the cost of raw materials had reached 54% of the
total value of the industry's output. My interviewees thus were probably focusing on
that much more onerous cost component.
Table 111.8 Labor and Raw Material Costs as a Percentage of Gross Output In
the Plastics Industry, a/ 1982-89
Costs of raw
Year Labor costs Material cnue
1982 20.1 12.7
1983 20.9 46.2
1984 17.0 48.9
1985 17.9 48.5
1986 16.7 50.0
1987 14.6 52.5
1988 13.8 54.4
1989 13.8 54.0
a. All measured in nominal terms.
Some: Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informatica, Encet Psdustfl4 1982-89.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that, unable to reduce costs on the raw material
side, managers would find it necessary to minimiz labor costs. That the evidence
presented in previous sections has been used to discard the hypothesis that
subcontracting was a labor-cost-cutting strategy does not mean that the firms had no
labor-cost-cutting strategy. Indeed, many plastics firms hired casual labor in order to
cut labor costs. About a third of firms in the 1987 sample survey declared that they
used temporary workers-workers hired individually by the day or for periods of less
than three months. Interviewees admitted that, in doing so, firms avoided the costs
associated with the rights that, by law, workers acquire after three months of
152- -. .. .....
employment This would explainin part, why the share oflabor ts in totalval
tie (Table III9) and that of nouwage labor costs (Table 11.10) declined
the 1980s while, as discussed eadlier in this chapter, regulations were makl abor
inceasngly cotl.
T IC a e f Total Value Addd192
Year P~~lasticsinutyAlmufcri
1982 41.1 34.5
1983 43.2 33.9
1984 38.5 27.7
1985 40.0 27.3
1986 38.5 28.5
1987 35.9 27.1
1988 35.1 29.7
1989 35.3 22.2
Some: Oficina Central de die Informdtica, Eueutad 19*2
Table 11I.10 AnnalNon-Salary Labor Custs W/ -s ae nag of Total Annual
ABor8319.
All manufacturing 7269
-Plasssectr
AU fimns .6A6.
Large-scale (more than 100employees) 6.0 6
Mediam-scaleI1(51-100 employees) 6.9 5.3
Medium-scale I (21.50anployees) 6.1 49
Small-scale (S-20aemployees) 7.2 6.1
a. Social scrtnional triin ntiUte fees, pensi nirmnt, family sbiis
and other benefits
Sen: Oficina Central 4. Estadfstica e Informttica, Enesema Iaasut419898
TaIn ne M10,thecisinis large-scale plasticsnwhe
ular costs medprobaby alrgersham or-regsar lar
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In my 1987 sample survey, of the firms that admitted using temporary workers,
60% had never hired them in numbers exceeding a fourth of the firm's permanent labor
force; yet some interviewees (10%)reported having doubled their labor force at
particular points in time through the hiring of temporary workers (especially, toy
manufacturers). Generally, temporary workers were hired irregularly at times of
unexpected peaks in demand-for example, when sales and promotions generated
unusual activity. Nevertheless, several firms did it regularly during certain seasons-for
instance, at Christmas time, Mothees Day, or right before the beginning of the school
year-and other firms made continuous use of temporary labor. Although I have no
other evidence to prove that temporary labor was used more frequently or extensively in
the plastics industry than in other industries, I would submit that the use of temporary
labor may have been one reason why the industry's nonwage costs per worker were so
low relative to the average in Venezuelan manufacturing industries.
More interesting and relevant to my concern with subcontracting is the
observation that temporary and casual labor arrangements were far more common in
client firms than in firms acting as subcontractors. In the subsample of client firms
drawn from the sample of 126 firms surveyed in 1987,47% of the respondents reported
that they used temporary or casual labor. Among the subcontractors, only 27%
reported that they did (see Table III.11). This finding again contradicts my original
hypothesis, according to which I would have expected subcontractors to rely more on
such informal arrangemnts to maintain their cost-competitiveness, and client firms to
rely more on subcontracting as a cost-cutting strategy.
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Table 11.11 Use of Caual Labor among Plast s,1987
Clients Subcontractors All firms
Use of casuallabor a/ No. % b( No. %cI No. % d/
Casual labor used 16 45.7 19 25.0 36 28.6
In plastics transformation 1 2.9 1 1.3 2 1.6
In complementary tasks 10 28.6 11 14.5 18 14.3
In both 1 2.9 0 0.0 0 0.0
Use not specifled 4 11.4 7 9.2 16 12.7
Does not use casual labor 19 54.3 57 75.0 90 714
Total 35 100.0 76 100.0 126 100.0
a. Casual labor is defined as workers hired for less than three consecutive months.
b. As a percentage of all client firms in the 1987 sample (35)
c. As a percentage of all subcontractors in the 1987 sample (76).
d. As a percentage of all plastic firms in the 1987 sample (126)-i.e. including those
not engaged in subcontracting.
Source: 1987 sample survey.
Why this unexpected difference in the labor hiring patterns of client firms and
subcontractors? A good explanation lies in the product mix of each of these types of
firms and the specific use to which temporary labor was assigned in t plastics industry.
While firms acting as subcontractors in 1987 tended to focus exclusively on
transforming plastics, client firms catered to final markets and produced items that
required diverse processes. For instance, in my first case study, the client firm,
Minitoys, not only injected plastic pieces and contracted out further plastics
transformation, but also assembled, trimmed, and decorated the toys, decorated the
wrapping material, and wrapped and boxed the toys for final consumption. The client
firm in my second case study, Transtoys, had an even more complicated production and
assembly system, which included painting doll faces, applying hair, and contracting out
production of doll dresses. Multinac, t client firm in my third network, and
Transchool, in the fourth, assembled household, school, and office products involving
chemical substances, plastic containers, caps and other components, paper, and
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cardboard preparation. Finally, the client firms associated with my fifth and last
network were automobile assemer.
Temporary and casual labor was not normally hired to help with plastics
transformation proesses themselves (see Table II.11 above). Of the client firms using
temporary labor,70% assigned these workers to phases of the production process
complementary to plastics tr I most often involving such simple tasks as
assembling, cleaning, wrapping, and boxing the final products, while only one (or 6% of
the client firms) assigned casual workers exclusively for plastics transformation. In the
case of the doll factories, homeworkers (women) were hired by the piece, sometimes
through elaborate and widespread networks of intermediaries, to cut and sew doll
dresses. In contrast, for tending to the plastics transformation sahines, most firms
seemed to prefer regular, even if low-paid, workers. Considering, then, that client firms
exhibited a product mix that more often than not implied multiple production processes,
it now seems less surprising that precisely those firms relied most heavily on casual
labor.
In sum, as labor's share in total production costs was declining precipitously in
the 1980s, it is no surprise that cutting labor costs did not emerge as the prime reason
driving subcontracting. Still, firms may have sought to lower or at least keep their labor
costs in check because as the cost for raw materials, the predominant factor in the firms'
cost structure, was rather rigid. My observations indicate that to keep labor costs in
check, firms did ni use subcontracting but the individual hiring of casual laborers.
Furthermore, against expectations, the use of temporary labor was more common
among client firms than among subcontractors. My explanation to this unexpected
finding is based on the technical characteristics of clients and subcontractors: the
former have a diversity of production process besides plastics transformation, hence
they can easily fragment the production process and assign decreasing-returns, labor-
intensive complementary tasks to temporary laborers. Subcontractors, being very often
dedicated plastics manufacturers, are more limited in their options to fragment the labor
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case, for instance, of the garment industry, furiture making, shoe making, the toy
industry, and food processing, among other industries.
The second caveat refers to the current state of the debate on the informal sector
and industrial restructuring. In my discussion of subcontracting as a potential
labor-cost-cutting strategy, I have drawn on the developing-country literature on the
informal sector, as well as on the works of economic geographers and labor economists
of the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on the subordinating nature of subcontracting. In the
late 1980s and 1990s, an alternative approach has gained ground which claims that
some forms of subcontracting and organization of production-flexible specialization
and industrial districts-may actually offer better possibilities for prosperity than
traditional mass production with its underpinnings in market segmentation and labor
cost cutting. I discuss this recent, alternative approach elsewhere in this study
(Chapters I, VI and Vii). Nevertheless, the literature on the organization of production
of the 1990s is not devoid of debate on whether cost cutting is or not a driving force in
industrial organization decisions-and exploitation and subordination their result.
Authors such as Harrison (1994) and Amin and Robins (1990) are questioning the
autonomy of industrial districts and the benign nature of flexible specialization methods,
for reasons that go beyond the simple cost cutting argument discussed in this chapter.
Industrial districts and the apparent proliferation of small firms engaged in flexible
specialization may be (or may become) nothing morn than spill-over effects of the
decentralization decisions of large corporations, i.e. "concentration without
centralizatin"(Harrison, 1994:8-12). As these authors warn, the significant inequality
among workers within the industrial districts themselves, or the productive linkages
between upscale districts and distant urban ghettos (e.g. the case of home workers in
Los Angeles assembling products for firms in Silicon Valley; Harrison, op.cit:26) may
go unreported in the flexible specialization literature. Despite the fact that my study is
far from dealing with "pore" cases of industrial districts or flexible specialization,
Harrison's warning may apply to my rather upbeat conclusions regarding the
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relationship between subcontracting decisions and labor costs in Venezuela's plastics
manufacturing. Subcontracting in that industry, as I argue, may not have conformed to
the typical model of a subordinating cost-cutting relationship. Yet, it was dependent, in
many cases, on the decisions of a few subsidiaries of multinational corporations, and it
was accompanied, as I discussed in the preceding section, by other labor-cost-cutting
strategies such as informal labor arrangements and home work. An assessment of the
economic performance of this industry should thus encompass all such ingredients.
With these caveats in mind, Inow recapitulate. In this chapter, I have argued
that, in the mid-1980s, subcontracting was not used in the Venezuelan plastics
manufacturing industry as a labor-cost-cutting strategy. I have shown that, even if some
aggregate indicators of the performance of markets and institutions would lead us to
believe that the increase in subcontracting relationships in the 1980s was associated with
client firms' attempts to cut labor costs, indicators coming out of a survey of a
representative sample of plastics manufacturing firms and five case studies lend little
support to that hypothesis. Granted, the lack of a dependable record of actual labor
costs forced me to rely on surrogate indicators and several assumptions regarding the
association between such indicators and actual labor costs. Yet I found that careful
observation of such surrogate indicators revealed an alternative pattern of
subcontracting networks in the Venezuelan plastics industry of the 1980s: one in which
the firms involved were mainly medium-size, in which subcontractors tended to cluster
and to concentrate in Central regions, and in which client firms used cost-cutting
strategies different from subcontracting (i.e. casual labor hiring), if in need. This finding
suggests a departure from the conventional zero-sum theories of the 1970s and 1980s,
which viewed subcontracting primarily as a terrain for contest between clients and
subcontractors, based on the exploitation of the latter's low-wage labor.
That client firms tended to cut labor costs through casual hiring of individual
workers, rather than through subcontracting other firms, lends further support to my
conclusion that using subcontracted sweatshops was not a preferred labor-cost-cutting
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strategy. On the one band, casual labor lends itself better to the type of processes for
which the client firms were willing to maintain unstable hiring arrangements-i.e. labor
intensive tasks complementary, and not technically linked, to plastics transformation
itself. On the other band, subcontracting firms offered much more than just cheaper
labor. They offered, in some cases, scarce skills in making molds and in fine-tuning and
repairing machines. They also offered a pool of capital and equipment on which to
draw in cases of sudden demand peaks. It seemed to be these features of plastics
manufacturing subcontracting that explained why, in 1987, the market for subcontracted
plastics transformation services appeared to be a sellers' market. And it is these features
that prompted me to discard the labor-cost-cutting strategy and to pursue alternative
explanations for the behavior of subcontracting networks in 1987, based on the
subcontractors' ability to offer client firms an untapped source of available information,
skills,rawmaterial,andequipment, whichIaddressalso inChaptersIVand V.
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IV. INDUSTRIALORGANIZATION IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY:
THE ROLE OF SUBCONTRACTING
This chapter addresses the question of whether Venezulan plastics firms
adopted subcontracting as a strategy to deal with uncertain demand in the 1980s. If
they had done so, one would expect to find that the subcontracting link transferred the
costs of fluctuating demand from the client firm to its subcontractors and hence led to
an increasingly segmented product market, with marked differentiation in productivity,
investment, size, and technological development between firms acting as clients and
firms acting as subcontractors. Subcontracting links, as conduits for risk, could then be
considered worthy targets for policy intervention.
Uncertainty was an issue for the plastics manufacturing industry in the 1980s-
on the demand side, on the supply side, and with regard to policy (Section IV.A) and it
was reflected in fluctuations in the industry's output (Section VE). While
microeconomic models talk about the tendency of firms to integrate production when
the uncertainty they face relates to the behavior of their partners (suppliers or clients),
models concerned with macroeconomic uncertainty predict a tendency to delay
investment, because of its irreversibility. Yet only one of these models has extended the
argument to postulate, explicitly, that uncertainty in aggregate demand would lead not
only to delayed investment but also, in cases of fluctuation in demand, to vertical
disintegration-that is, subcontracting (Piore, 1980a,b) (Section IV.C).
Inspired by Piore's 1980 model of market segmentation under fluctuating and
uncertain demand, I set out to check the validity of its assumptions and predictions for
the Venezuelan plastics industry in 1987. I found, as the model would suggest, that
subcontracting seemed to be associated with increasing uncertainty in demand in the
1980s. But the similarities between the model and the reality in the plastics industry
stopped there. The model's basic assumptions about investment patterns did not fit the
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features of the plastics industry in 1987. Also, mirroring the conclusions of Chapter III,
the expected segmentation between clients and subcontractors did not materialize
(Section IV.D). Toward the end of this chapter I seek to develop an alternative
explanation: that, despite the presence of demand uncertainty, it was supply uncertainty
that dominated entrepreneurs'concerns. And when subcontracting is used, as it was in
the Venezuelan plastics industry, to cope with uncertainty relating to supply factors
(such as access to molds and exchange rate variations; Section IV.E), its political
economy implications might be more favorable to subcontractors than they otherwise
would be (Section IVY). Variations of this argument are explored in Chapter V.
A. Documenting Uncertainty
In 1983, a protracted period of economic uncertainty and instability began in
Venezuela, marked by successive policy reversals and poor economic performance. On
February 20, 1983, through presidential decree 1840, the Venezuelan government shut
down foreign exchange markets for the first time in twenty years. Through this
measure-traumatic in a relatively young country where consumers and producers at all
levels had grown accustomed to sustained inflows of petro-dollars-government
officials openly acknowledged that Venezuela was deep into its own debt crisis. By
1983, Venezuela's extenal debt had climbed to a historic record of $38.3 billion-49%
of that year's gross national product, or 2.6 times the value of exports-placing the
country third among the developing world's largest debtors, after Brazil and Mexico.
Economic uncertainty manifested itself in many ways. Domestic income and
demand fell. Real per capita oil exports, which by 1983 had fallen to little more than
half what they had been during the oil boom of 1979-80 ($350, in 1970 dollars,
compared with $600 in 1979-80), continued their steep descent. By 1986, they were far
below their pre-oil-boom levels ($150, compared with about $225 in 1970-72). Open
unemployment, which had remained relatively low during the 1970s and early 1980s (at
4.5% in 1978 and 7.2% in 1982), soared to double digits in the mid- 1980s, reaching
-i,. vi-
IM1627 AM
13.4%in 1984. Annual real wage growth was negative throughout much of the 1980s,
with wages in 1988 representing 90% of their 1981 real value in bolfvares-orless than
30% in U.S. dollars. Other things being equal, for the manufacturing sector, these
trends foretold a shrinking domestic market.
Yet, as so often happens, other things were n equaL Demandin some
industries shot up in the 1980s. In their attempt to manage the debt crisis-by
controlling the outflow of financial wsouwes-not only did govcrnnrnt officials impose
restrctions on capital flows, but they also implemented severe and extensive impot
controls. Manufacturing sectors that, until then, had been at a disadvantage in
competing with imports (thanks to Venezuela's relatively high labor costs and
overvalued exchange rate, among other factors) found themselves facing a massive,
captive domestic demand. Most consumer-oriented subsectors in the plastics
manufacturing industiy (toys, containers, household andschool items) faced
dramatically increased demand after 1983 as imports of such plastic goods as film and
bands, table items, PVC bagscases, furniture, dolls and toys, and thermal containers
declined sharply(Table IV.).
f Ie st I tethKSelected Yea!rs<nem
(tons)-
item 1979 1982 1983 1985 1988
Bands and extrded strips 1235 2,256 720 691 448
Cellophane fim 855 13,774 7,639 3,180 776
Taleadhouehold uten l 1,160 805 173 23 64
PVC bags 132 433 37 1 46
Briefcases 0 66111 12 9
Furniture 1,231 1,908 390 6 17
Dolls and other toys 1,597 3,851 336 62 21
Thermal containers 1,178 397 69 0 0
AUl plasuics = nfnes30,862 35,930 2O0834 74W0 5,541
Somne: Instituto de Comecio Exterior,Anuarlos de Cemeno Exterior.
On the other band, the new import controls did not benefit plastics frms
producing intermediate inputs for sectors that had traditionally benefited from
protection (the automotive industry, sonr portions of the beverage and food processing
industries) or that had developed some comparative advantage over time because of
specific local skills or difficulty in trading a certain type of product(the shoe industry,
some other portions of the beverage and food processing industries). In addition, these
firms felt directly and most strongly the impact of economic uncertainty. In fact, the
food processing, beverage, shoe, and automotive indIstries all showed both fluctuating
and flat gross output trends between 1983 and 1988, affecting the demand for
coctainers and diverse plastic parts and cmont. In sum, the effect of import
controls on plastics manufacturing varied greatly among subsectcws.
The effect of import controls on the -nu side, however, was unambiguously
negative. Between 1983 and 1989, the gwnntimposed restrictions on direct
imports of polymers Qhigh- and low-density polysthylenes, polyprpylmn, polyvinyl
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chloride, and polystyrene) produced by the joint-venture enterprises of the "Grupo
Zuliano." Only the Grupo 7liano firms could engage in transactions with foreign
suppliers, and only when their local production proved inadequate to satisfy the demand
of local plastics manufacturers. Tight foreign exchange controls hampered access even
to the imported intermediate products and capital goods that had not been targeted by
import restrictions.
Accompanying the impoirt controls was a complex exchange rate system. A
week after shutting down the foreign exchange markets, on February 27, 1983, the
government established a three-tier exchange rate system that provided cheaper dollars
(under a "preferential" exchange rate) to some activities and transactions than to
others.79 Embedded in the new regime was an average devaluation of the bolfvar with
respect to the U.S. dollar of about 30%. This multi-tier regime was to be administered
by a new office in the ministry of industry and development (Ministerio de Fomento,
hereafter "Fomento"): the Advisory Commission for the Preferential Exchange Regime,
or RECADI. RECADI was thus charged with allocating dollar quotas at differential
rates among industries, firms, and individuals accustomed to importing large amounts of
intermediate inputs and final goods at an overvalued exchange rate and without any
restrictions.
Also associated with the exchange rate and import controls were price controls.
Average annual inflation, which had been less than 2% in Venezuela's first fifteen years
of democracy (1958-73), increased to only 8.2% during the years after the first oil
79 Presidential decrees 1851 and 1855, of February 27 and 28, 1983, established that for
current public sector expenditures abroad, funds sent to students abroad, "essential"
imports, and the external public and private debt, the exchange rate would be
Bs.4.3Ofdollar; for "nonessential" imports, it would be Bs.&6dollar; and for luxury
imports, tourism expenses, and private capital transfers, it would be the floating mmrket
rat. Until February 20, 1983, the exchange rate had been maintained at
Bs. 4.3Wdollar; by the end of 1983, the floating rate had risen to mere than
Es. 12/dollar.
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boom, owing to a certain degree of import liberalization and the general price controls
imposed during Carlos Andrds Pdrez's first administration (1974-78). The succeeding
administration, that of Luis Herrera-Campfns, liberalized prices in the context of the
second oil boom and, as a result, presided over a marked jump in the infation rate, to an
annual average of 16.5% in 1979-82. The deceleration of inflation to 7% during 1983,
the last year of the Herrera-Campfns administration and the "crisis" year to which I refer
in this chapter, was one indication of the severity and effectiveness of price controls.
Price controls aimed not only at restraining the erosion of real wages-which
nevertheless declined by 4.5% in 1983-but also at capturing some of the rent that
other government measures had created for some producers and at preventing
speculative behavior. For example, importers benefiting from preferential exchange
rates for the purchase of imported inputs were not allowed to raise the prices of their
final products commensurate with the bolfvar's average rate of devaluation because they
did not bear the direct cost of the devaluation. This restriction applied, for example, to
such medical and health-related plastic items as catheters, special containers, and
prostheses. Producers benefiting from the monopolies created by import controls on
their line of production were also forced, in principle, to keep their prices in check; this
was the case for the producers of several types of polymers (the main inputs for plastics
manufacturing) and of many consumer and intermediate goods, such as children's shoes,
garbage bags, toothbrushes, pipes and hoses, and shells for car batteries.
Price controls tend to discourage production, but they did not seem to have this
effect in the plastics industry. Although some subsectors, such as toy and doll
production, faced controlled prices, at the same time demand skyrocketed thanks to the
total prohibition of imports. The import ban not only created a captive demand for
existing producers, but also causedl many entrepreneurs formerly in the business of
trading toys and dolls to shift to actual production. Although some producers may have
circumvented price restrictions through product diversification (producing novel toys
not clearly identified in the price control decrees) or through underground transactions
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(underinvoicing,underecodig of volume transacted), in general producers were
willing to produce at the prevailing fixed prices, which may suggest that prices were
fixed at a relatively high leveL In any case, with fixed prices, maintaining low costs was
crucial for maintaining profit rates. Indeed, profit rates did not suffer during the period
(Table IV.2)
Table IV. Grs Prat,198248
(percentage)
As percentage of value added As percentage of gross output
All LSE Industry All LSE Industry
Year plastics in plastics average plastics in plastics average
1982 7.9 11.0 21.9 6.4 9.1 10.1
1983 12.9 16A 21.9 3.8 5.6 10.3
1984 13.6 18.9 28.1 6.0 9.1 13.3
1985 14.0 15.7 30.4 6.2 7.6 14.1
1986 16.6 15.2 28.1 7.2 6.9 12.6
1987 19.2 19.2 32.6 7.8 8.2 14.2
1988 20.3 18.5 26.4 7.9 7.6 10.5
Source: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informhtica, Encuesta Industrial.
The sudden shift in exchange rate, trade, and price policy created an
environmnt of unprecedented flux compounded by faltering macroeconomic
performance-negative non-oil GDP growth in 1983-84, rising inflation and
deteriorating public accounts after 1984, growing unemployment, and declining wages.
But for the suppliers, the most unsettling feature of the economic policy environment
was not the measures themselves, but their variability and their ad hoc nature. In
Chapter II,1 discussed t many labor policy measures taken in 1983-87 to mitigate the
social costs of economic slowdown and devaluation, including two minimum wage
increases, two general salary increases, the establishment of several new nonwage
benefits or "bonuses," constraints on layoffs, and compulsory hiring. In t same
period, the ministry of industry revised the list of "essential goods" subject to price
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controls nine times (always to enlarge it). The ministry of finance and, later, the
ministry of industry (and in some cases even the president,by decree) changed the list of
sectors benefiting from the prefrential exchange rateat least thirty times Export
incentive regulations were modified at least nine times-to change the a ol
infrastnuctare for administering the regulations, to alter the list of goods eligible for
different levels of export incentive, and to modify the exchange rate at which exporters
could sell to the Central Bank their foreign exchange earnings. Because the variability
of the measures depended to a great extent on the ability of different interest groups to
influence dcisionmaking, scarce managerial skills and time were diverted to lobbying
for privileges.
In sum, despite the imposition of a trade protection regime in 1983, Venezuelan
industry faced unprecedented uncertainty in 1983-88. This was not only the result of
the external debt buildup, which undoubtedly eroded investors' confidence. Shifting
and contradictory government policies aimed to cope with the impact of the debt crisis,
often responsive to conflicting constituency demands, added to the sense of incertitude
and flux.
B. The Plastics Manufacturing Industry: FlUCtUatIng Growth
The poor macroeconomic performance and volatile policy environment during
the 1980s resulted in fluctuating growth in output and demand in the plastics industry.
There was significant growth in production. The growth rate of the Venezuelan
plastics sector had consistently been higher than that of the Venezuelan manufacturing
sector as a whole, and the margin widened in the mid-1980s. During 1982-88, the
output of the plastics manufacturing sector doubled in real terms, while that of
manufacturing as a whole (excluding oil and coal) rose by 20%. Compared with the
nearly 20% annual growth during the oil boom of the 1970s, when the Venezuelan
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plastics sector was outpacing most of the world's largest producers, the recovery of the
mid- 1980s may seem weak. But a comparison of the 1970s and 1980s must be qualified
by the fact that, in the 1970s, the Venezuelan plastics sector was growing from a very
small base and was benefiting, like most other manufacturing sectors, from a general
economic bonanza that did not persist in the following decade. Compared with other
major plastics producers, Venezuela still featured relatively high average growth during
1982-88, although it was surpassed by North American producers (the United States
and Canada) and by the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia (Hong Kong,
South Korea, and Taiwan; see Table IV.3).80
80 Data on the plastics mauatrn etr presented in this document refers to
International Standaid Industrial Code 356 (ISIC 336).
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Table I. Average Anima Rate of Growth oftPlsdes Producton by Selected
Produce 1970-7
(percent constant 1980 prices)
Country 1970-80 1980-87
United States 9.8 7.1
Japan 3.0 3.5
Germany, Federal Republic of 6.7 4.3
France 3.6 5.3
United Kingdom 3.8 7.0
Italy 8.8 1.3
Canada 8.9 9.7
Spain 5.6 1.8
South Africa 3.5 3.2
Brazil 7.9 3.5
Hong Kong 5.5 13.4
Korea, Republic of 19.7 12.7
Mexico 5.1 2.6
Yugoslavia 12.6 -1.6
Venezuela a/ 19.4 6.2
Iran 12.6 9.2
Colombia 9.6 1.1
Taiwan a l12.A
n.a. Not available.
a. Data for Venezuela were not available in the UNIDO source. The data in the table
were therefore calculated on the basis of gross production data corresponding o the
periods 1971-81 (in constant 1968 bolivares) and 1982-87 (in constant 1984 bolIvares).
Sorce: United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Handbook ofIndstrfal
Stabiles 1990; and Oficina Central de EsatCa e Informhtica, Encunsta Indaust fa
(various years).
The industry's growth in the 1980s was nevertheless choppy, with mini-booms
and busts occurring nearly every year (Table IV.4). It is safe to propose that te
fluctuations in output reflected firms' responses to t changing and uncertain business
environment created by t continual fine-tuning of policy.
Table IA Res Anmal Growth InOutput In PlasticsI andin
AI n Vmezinla, 19834
Allmarmfacnnoing
Year Plastics manufactuing (except oiland coal)
1983 2.4 -22
1984 12.1 2.5
1985 -0.5 1.1
1986 16.8 3.6
1987 1.2 4.6
1988 13.3 9.3
Source: Oficina Central de Ftatica e Informttica, Rnests Industrial(various
years); -pce deflatrs published by tim Venezelan Central Bank.
Taking tim analysis of output fluctuations oe step further to discriminate, based
on the reate industrial data, btween demand-side and supply-side factors driving
output trends is somewbatharder, however. Among the supply-side factors, the
devaluation of thm bolfvar seems to have hM the positive impul on plastics exports that
would be expected. More important in the context of the complicated multi-tier
exchange rate system, tim positive diferential between th exchange rate at which
exporters were allowed to exchange their export earnings at the Central Bank and the
rates at which they could impmt their inputs fueled the significant export growth of
1983-86. In 1983, Venezuela exported 846nmtric tons of plastics manufactres; in
1986, it exported 8,838 metric tons, representing a amo than tenfolincrease in three
rears in the voluam exported. Yet the value of tlmse exports was so small relative to
tim industry's totl output that the striking increase had a negligible effect on output
trends (Figure JIV.l). Moreover, as further changes in tim exchange rate system eroded
this exchange-rate-related subsidy to exports, thm rate of growth of plastics exports
slowed and becam an even less inportant driving forc for output growth.
* 9%ft A I JItC
Sowre: Oficina Central de Estadisticae lnfcnttia Kieanss Iadssafal(various
years); Instituto de Comercio Exterior,AManfte dCement. Exterter (various years).
In the previous section, Isuggested that most subsectors in the plastics industry
benefited fron the captive demand created by import controls. Yet I also argued that
the weakening in th underlying aggregate demand created a sse of uncertainty that
may have afected the industry's behavior. Based on available data, demand
for plastics manu has been defined as output plus imports, minus exports and
inventry acc mulaionTe teds i agrgted ad cng the patc
iMUftingindustry in 198248 sn tat, itbwugh in agencraily upward direction,
this variable also experienced sour fluctuation during 1982-88(Figure IV.2).
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years); Instituto de Comercio Exterior, Anuwie de Ceare Exterior (various years).
C. VariedRspIe to Uncertainty-Varied Concepts of Uncertainty
It was in the context of this uncertainty and flux that I observed an increase in
the scope and intensity of subcontracting relationships in several subsectors of the
plastics manufacturing indunsay. As discased in Chapter II, a significant share of the
firms acting as subcontractors in 1987 hM cour into existence after 1983. And most of
the subcontractors in the five subcontracting networks studied in 1987 and 1992
reported having started working as subcontractors after 1983. Moreover, client firms in
the five subcontracting networks reported having increased the volume of production
contracted out or the number of subcontractors hired, or both, after 1983. An obvious
question emerges: Was the apparent increase in subcontracting arrangements a direct
consequence of the fluctuation and uncertainty in the economy during 19834887
The literature on industrial organization and firm strategy has sometimes
acknowledged and sometimes denied that there is an association between economic
uncertainty and firms' choosing to subcontract. One reason for this dilemma may be the
discnnet btw n mcroconmicand macroeconomic analysis: conclusions reached
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fromO a ireooi esetv ih otaitthose mslting from
canalysis. Anotherr-omay be that different authors and diFerent
theories define uncertainty in diferent tm, as shown in Table IV.5.
Table IV.5 Theoriesem teRenin ewenEcn nic Unrsty * A
Part I
Newinsatttnna
Feature costs econmics AhM iveinstitutional apmhes
Level of analysis Micro Mlcrr/macro-constraints
Unit of analysis The transaction The transaction
Locus of SupplyI&mand: the Supply/demand: the behavior of
uncertainty behavior of individual partners; innovation drive;macro-
partnersto market institutions
transactions (suppliers,
buyers)
Hypotheses Uncertainty with regard to When driven by need to innovate,
suppliers' behavior inMs SEEK the uncertainty of less-
-> Backward integration than-fullintegration (i.e., strategic
alliane)
Uncertainty with regard to In developing countries,
buyers' behavior institutional conditions prevent full
-> Forward integration integration in the context of
uncertainty
Conclusion Uncertainty is associated Uncertainty is associated with
with vertical integration incomplete vertical integration
Authors WIlliamson (1986, etc.) Mody (1991)
Nafm (1984)
bTrn Uncetalatyaa
Pat H
Feature
Level of analysis
Unit of analysis
LAcusof
Hyprtaty
Hypotheses
Investmt behavior (unicit)
Macwo
Aggregate ccomnc indicators
AggregteId&mnd
Supply factors: exchange rates,
~an rates
Because of investnrnt's
irreversibility
uncertainty fl asa disincentive
to investnnt (if vertical
integration is associated with
investmn, then possible trend
toward disintegration)
Mattsegmentation
Macro/lM c Tchtnlogical
Aggregat enindsr
Ag and
Under lctatin emndan
unctinty, -age Enrs fain
inreas igturns avoidi
invetnnts in expansion of own
capacity and tend to subcontract
(hoizoa disinegration) at
demand peaks
Expectations of change may bad
to nrosivsmn eiin
unrelated to actual price behavior
Uncertiny is associatedwith
stalled invcstuent (mlicit:
dSintegratio?
Pindyck (1988)
Bertola (1989)
Krugman (1988)
Dornbusch (1988)
Serven and Soinm (1989)
Unrtainty is wih
disntgrtin
Pinr (1980)
1. GOOOGI M'rMoascAprahs h New -- Econommics
buwascteas Cat Eceamict Authors in the tradition of the new institutional
ernics-in firisue of taintyaion stroia - aTh foconmic
persectivecon ftheissueof iunceIArtny adindnarau raiain hyfcso h
Conclusion
Authors
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problems for a firm of incomplete information on the behavior of its partners-its
suppliers and its client firms-in market relationships. Incomplete information results in
incomplete contracts that cannot take all contingencies into account, which then
becomes the definition of "uncertainty." As I elaboratc below, these microeconomic
arguments conclude that, under conditions of imperfect information, the firm, whether
dealing with suppliers or clients, would prefer a strategy of moving toward vertical
integration rather than toward disintegration.
Oliver Williamsn proposes that uncertainty in a firm's relationship to its
suppliers leads to backward integration. He illustrates this point in his discussion of the
implications of the choice of contract (Williamsn, 1986:92-93). A firm's decision to
enter into fixed-price contracts with its suppliers shifts the cost-related risk to the
suppliers, yet the purchasing firm still bears the cost of ensuring that the suppliers do a
good job. In contrast, if the firm enters into cost-plus contracts with its suppliers, it
bears the risk of chaages in cost, and it must also monitor its suppliers to ensure that
they execute the contracts at the lowest possible cost. The costs to the firm of obtaining
the information required to ensure a good-quality or lowest-cost outcome can become
particularly onerous, encouraging the firm to integrate backward into the supply
sector-that is, to start producing the input it needs. I found only isolated instances of
this situation in plastics manufacturing in 1987: a few firms in sectors other than
plastics manufacturing maintained a limited capacity to produce specific, large-series
plastic components. But in many of the cases observed in 1987, firms in user industries
opted to contract out the production of plastic components to specialized firms.
Where there are many clients demanding an intermediate input but only one
supplier or a few suppliers (that is, the assembly or downstream sector is competitive
while the upstream or supply sector is monopolistic), the transactions cost literature
argues that forward integration is the outcome (ibid. :93). Under such conditions, the
supplying firm may charge high prices, leading the client firms to vary factor proportions
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as they seek a cheaper combination of inputs. But in the process, factor use becomes
inefficient, and high welfare losses are likely. Incorporating into contracts clauses
compelling clients to use the input in the appropriate proportion would be cumbersome;
monitoring, again, would be difficult and costly. Forward integration into the "client"
sector may thus help the supplier firm reduce total costs by minimizing the cost of
monitoring; it might also restore efficient factor proportions in those sectors.
This kind of situation arose in the relationship between the petrochemical
suppliers and the plastics manufacturing industry. In several instances, plastics
manufacturers had attempted to substitute recycled material for freshly produced
polyethylene, or low-quality dyes for higher-quality ones, or multipurpose lubricants-
even cooking oil-for specializd demolding lubricants, with varying success and
"welfare loss." Yet Williamson's predicted integration did not take place. For the
suppliers, integrating forward to prevent such substitution was hardly an attractive
option. For these firms-either large petrochemical ventures or transnational
corporations in the chemical industry-some input substitution downstream implied
little risk and, consequently, forward integration made no economic sense. (More on
this particular topic in Chapter V).
These transactions-cost-based microeconomic models, then, do not coincide
with the general direction of my findings in the Venezuelan plastics industry-that is,
that uncertainty led to vertical disintegration and subcontracting-because of the
models' microeconomic concept of uncertainty. When the problem is microeconomic
uncertainty, internalizatino helps solve it. When uncertainty is macroeconomic,
internalization is not the solution.
Akternative Institutional Approaches: Subcontracting as a Thini ModeL
Before rushing to discard microeconomic models completely, it is important to note the
emergence of a second set of microeconomic models of the relation between uncertainty
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and vertical integration, These models look at inter-firm relationships under a more
nuanced light, yet with a transactions costs framework as a backdrop. Firms can arrive
at subcontracting from the disintegration of larger, more diversified firms (which has
been the implicit assumption in my analysis) or from the integration of smaller nits.
Subcontracting represents a stage in an incomplete process of either integration or
disintegration: it involves recurrent contracts and more stable links than would be
granted in free-market transactions, but not necessarily the equity sharing or merger that
full-fledged "hierarchies" would require. As I elaborate below, some of the alternative
institutional models see these intermediate forms of inter-firm relationships as the last
resort in business environments that are hostile either toward free competition or toward
full-fledged hierarchies (Nafm, 1984). Other models in this still nascent family conceive
intermediate levels of governance-under the rubric of "strategic alliances"-as
deliberately sought-after forms of inter-firm relationship in a business environment that
favors and rewards them (Mody, 1991).
Naim has argued that, in developing countries, market transactions experience
far more friction than the theorists of "transactions cost" economics identify in industrial
economies. In developing economies, there are more limits to the application of
entrepreneurs'rationality and more uncertainty than traditional models would suggest-
because of these economies' greater vulnerability to international market fluctuations,
greater volatility in domestic markets, poor information infrastructure, and scarcity of
managerial skills. And because of the legal system's limited ability to enforce contracts
and the lack of business discipline, there is more room for oppornmistic behavior.
All these factors, as transactions cost theorists propose, drive firms away from
arm's-length transactions in the market and toward the formation of administrative
hierarchies. But the constraints to developing administrative hierarchies (lack of skilled
humnan resources, technical difficulties of maintaining administrative control, policy
constraints on firm growth) arise sooner in the formation of a hierarchy and are stronger
in the developing world than in industrial economies. As a result, Nafm asserts, firms
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would tend to concentrate toward the middle, both in the spectrm of firm size and in
the continuum between free markets and hierarchies. This model is consistent with my
observations in the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry in 1987 (discussed in
Chapter III): subcontracting was pervasive and medium-size firms prdominated in the
sample at large and even mor markedly in the subsample of firms in subcontracting
relationships.
In a more positive vein, Ashoka Mody (1991) proposes that, in an industry in
which innovation and continuous leaming about technology and market conditions are
an important asset, there is incentive to attempt incomplete forms of vertical
integration-"strategic alliances". Mody defines alliances as "extended barter
agreements," "quantity-based and rule-based exchanges" (Ibid.:5), and a
"double-hostage system where reciprocity equaliza the exposure of the parties...
[and] hazards are equilibrated" (ibid.:9-10). These forms of inter-firm relationship
develop in markets in which access to information is most crucial, and in response to the
nature of the market for information (or lack thereof). Strategic alliances have the
advantage over market transactions of being driven by rules that prevent information
leakages, and they mitigate the uncertainty about the behavior of partners, which would
otherwise be competitors. Alliances would also develop in sectors in which the rate of
innovation is fastest. Compared with fully integrated hierarchies, they have the
advantage of being flexible and allowing firms to adjust easily to changes in
technological and market conditions. Although the Venezuelan plastics industry is by
no means at the technological cutting edge, I found Mody's model useful in thinking
about the benefits of alliances as a way to obtain the skills and information needed to
address technical adaptation and market access problems.81
81 The argununt on "interlinked transactins" in Chapter Vs in fact, can be seen as
analogous to Mody's treatment of strategic alliances.
S179-
2. Macroeconomic Models: Industry Behavior under Uncertainty
Investment Behavior under Uncertainty. In the"make-or-buy" decision a firm
faces when seeking to procure an input, subcontracting (or vertical disintegration) can
be seen as one of the "buy" options; investment in capacity expansion would be
associated with the "make" option. Thus, new theories addressing investment behavior
under uncertainty (Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1988) would be relevant to the analysis of
the relation between industrial organization (vertical disintegration, subcontracting) and
uncertainty, although they do not refer explicitly to this relation.
These theories highlight the fact that because investment can be very bulky (as it
is in plastics manufacturing) and disinvestment difficult and costly, firms perceive
investment as an irreversible decision. Thus, they may opt to invest only if capital's
marginal contribution to profits is definitely higher than its cost (Arrow, 1968). , in
addition, the rate of profit is uncertain because of uncertain demand or supply factors,
investors may opt not to invest at all. In other words," . .. uncertainty may be more
relevant for investment decisions than other conventional variables such as interest rates
or taxes... When there is uncertainty about the economic environment or about the
permanence of economic incentives, irreversible decisions will be delayed to avoid long-
lasting mistakes... "(Serven and Solimano, 1989:6, 22).
Serven and Solimano review the literature addressing three forms of uncertainty
that affect investment decisions. The first is demand uncertainty, which leads firms to
curtail investment out of fear that newly created capacity may go underutilized if
demand turns out to be lower than expected. The second and third are supply-related:
the real exchange rate and the interest rate. Under uncertain future exchange rates,
firms will opt not to enter the export market, even if current exchange rate movements
"would seem to make entry profitable," presumably out of fear that their export
competitiveness or revenues, measured in domestic currency, will erode in the future
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(Serven and Solimano, 1989:24; Kugman, 1988). Under uncertain interest rates, "a fall
in expected future interest rates need not lead to increased investment" (Serven and
Solimano, 1989:25). Serven and Solimano predict little response or unexpected
responses to price changes because, given the irreversibility of investment, investors are
expected to place value on waiting for better information on markets. Under
uncertainty, the opportunity cost of waiting increases, and actual prices become less and
less relevant to investment decisions.
This strand of literature is concerned with uncertainty, then, because it affects
governments power to influence investment choices through price changes-that is,
through exchange rate, interest rate, and monetary policy. As I mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter, these models interest me because of their indirect implications
for industrial organization, a subject that the models themselves, concerned with other
macroeconomic phenomena, do not explore.
Suppose that, as in Venezuela in the 1980s, there is great uncertainty about
demand, price controls, exchange rates, interest rates, and the cost of raw materials.
And, again as in Venezuela, suppose that there is also a great demand-pull opportunity
for suppliers because of import controls. What would firms do? Under the
macroeconomic models described in this section, firms probably would not invest in
expanding their own productive capacity. But they would want to capture a share of
the growing demand in case that higher demand is here to stay. Unwilling or unable to
expand capacity through investment or a full merger with others, a firm in this situation
is likely to engage in some form of incomplete integration with other firms
(subcontractors), flexible enough to avoid bulky, fixed, and irreversible costs, but tight
and stable enough so that tht firm can control the quality and flow of product at
minimal transactions costs, almost as if it were producing in plant. In short, uncertainty
leads to subcontracting.
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Segmentation under Demand Uncertainty. Michael Piore's model of market
segmentation under flux and uncertainty (1980) explores the technological
underpinnings and political economy implications of a model-such as those described
above-that focuses on the impact of uncertainty in the aggregate demand facing an
industry. His model is more applicable to my empirical observations in 1987 because it
focuses on macoeconomic uncertainty and not on the problem of partners' cheating and
noncompliance that attracted the attention of transactions costs economists. In general
terms, Piore proposes that under demand uncertainty, firms would opt to contract out
production to meet surplus demand rather than invest in the equipment required to meet
that additional demand. The model assumes the predominance of technologies with
increasing returns to scale and thus firms' "natural" tendency to try to expand market
share-an assumption consistent with conventional plastics manufacturing processes. It
thus diverges from the transactions cost explanations, which are not technology-driven.
But Piore then adds other elements to the model. First, he points out that not all
production processes in the firm are susceptible to automation and suggests that more
labor-intensive processes may therefore remain on the periphery of the automated
processes. And second, he argues that, because of demand fluctuations, it would not be
rational for the firm to try to cover the entire market. The core or client firm would
invest as long as it can use its equipment at near-full capacity, and it would contract out
surplus demand and complementary (especially nonautomated) subprocesses to other
firms.
Besides welfare and efficiency implications, which also underlie the transactions
cost literature, Piore's product market segmentation model has clear political economy
implications. First, it emphasizes that segmentation results in the transfer of the costs of
economic uncertainty, through disintegration and subcontracting, to the smaller,
peripheral firms. Second, because many of the peripheral firms use production
processes that are not susceptible to automation, these firms are more likely to take a
low-road approach to production than the "core" firms; thus, the costs of uncertainty
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are transferred not only from larger to smaller firms but also, in principle, from capital
to labor. The model of product market segmentata us indicates the mchanisms
through which demand uncertainty translates into further inequality in the workplace
and in product and labor markets. And it presents again an image of subcontracting as
arena for conflict on competition between clients and suppliers, capital and labor.
In sum, the literature dealing with the effects of uncertainty on firms' and
investors' behavior is of limited use for analyzing the problem at hand for three reasons.
On the one hand, some of this literature (the transactions-cost-based models) is
concerned with uncertainty with respect to the behavior of partners in business
relationships. In other words, it deals with '"microeconomic" uncertainty, while that
which concerns my study has its origins in macroeconomic policies and fluctuations (i.e.
it is external to the subcontracting relationship). On the other hand, the macroeconomic
literature on uncertainty and investment behavior falls short of stating the industrial
organization implications of such uncertainty. The product market segmentation model,
however, does exactly that: it looks at the consequences of uncertainty for the
organization of production. Yet it is highly stylized and limits its attention to demand-
side uncertainties. Rather than rely on any of these models, then, my analysis of the
plastics industry will use elements of each, proposing a slight reformulation that focuses
on the impact of supply-side macroeconomic uncertainty on industrial organization.
D. Timid Investment Choices under Demand Uncertainty: Explanation of
Subcontracting in the 1980s?
Piore's model of market segmentation predicts a particular type of investment
behavior consistent with choosing to subcontract, and a tendency toward increasing
differentiation between client and subcontractor firms. This section discusses the results
of a 1987 survey of client and subcontractor firms in a sample of 126 Venezuelan
plastics manufacturers that was designed to test the validity of such predictions for
those firms. The results of the survey showed that the firms did not practice the type of
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investment behavior postulated in Piore's model and that segmentation between clients
and subcontractors was not as marked as expected. The survey results pointed toward
an alternative pattern of subcontracting-one in which risks and rewards appeared to be
more equitably shared between client and subcontractors.
1. CapacIty Utilization
Under Piore's model of segmentation, uncertainty, and subcontracting, finns
acting as clients in a particular industry would be expected to operate at near-full
capacity. Presumably, they would attune their capital investments to the stable segment
of demand2 so as to minimize capital idleness and hence the burden of fixed capital
costs on their unit production costs. Only under this condition would the strategy of
using subcontracting as a hedge against uncertainty be successful.
The industrywide survey of capacity utilization undertaken annually by the
Central Statistical Office indicates that capacity utilization, although generally low in the
1980s, began to improve in the plastics industry toward the end of the decade. 83
82 In Piore's 1980 of product market segmentation under dernand uncertainty, this notion
of a "stable" versus an "unstable" portion of the demand serves the purposes of the
model but is somewhat hard to visualize. How can a firm, for instance, pedict which
one would be the "stable" segment of the demand? From my Venezuelan case studies, I
can extract examples. Transtoys, a toy producer that held the patent for the production
of the Barbie doll, and thus had the monopoly over this market in Venezuela,treated the
Barbie market as its "stable" segment, although the market for Barbie dolls could suffer
ups and downs itself. When demand for toys in general experienced an upsurge in the
1980s, the firm captured the market for other products, but it used the capacity of others
(subcontractors) to deal with much of that extra demand-i.e. the firm perceived this
second portion of demand as "ntabhle."
83 'The Annual Survey of Capacity Utilization in Manufacturing undertaken by the Oficina
Central de Etadfstica e Informitica (OCEI), defines "declared capacity utilization" as
the ratio of the value of production declared by a firm to the maximm possible value of
production given the technology available to the finn. 'Ibe factors considered by the
survey that might constrain near-full capacity utilization include scarcity of
administrative and technical personnel or skilled labor; weak demand; imor
-184-
Capacity utilization in the plastics indutry was lower than that in manufacturing as a
whole until 1986 but then surpassed it in 1987 and peaked in 1988 (Table IV). The
increase can be explained by the captive demand created by the de facto import
substitution policies implemented between 1983 and 1988. This specific advantage was
compounded by the expansionary fiscal policy adopted by the Jaime Lusinchi
administration in the wake of the 1988 presidential elections, which stimulated local
demand in -ay industrial sectors. Plastics manufacturing firms reported operating
nearly three (2.70) shifts a day on averge through 1987 (which makes economic sense
given the industry's technological features),8 compared with the manufacturing avenge
of closer to two (2.13). According to the official survey, capacity utilization was
highest among large firms: in 1987, they reported operating at 67% of capacity
(compared with 53% for small- and medium-scale enterprises).
Table IV.6 Capacity Utilizaffon by Firm Size, 1986649
(percent)
1986 1987 1988 1989
Plastics manufacturing 56 65 68 51
Large enterprises 59 67 69 53
Small and medium-size enterprises 42 53 58 39
All manufacturing a/ 60 62 61 44
Large enterprises 62 63 62 45
Small and medium-size enterprises 42 48 49 34
a. Excluding oil refineries.
Source: Oficina Central do Estadfstica e Informitica (1991), Capacidad Udlizada en
la Industria Manufacturera Fabril,1986-fl.
competition; problems in access to domestic or imported inputs; problems in access to
working capital; and high cost for labor overtime.
m Because machine startups are costly and transformation routines continuous and
repetitive, the most economically rational strategy is to ke- the equipment operating 24
hours a day.
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At 65% in 1987, capacity utilization in the plastics manufacturing industry was
relatively good. Yet 35% idle capacity isnevertheless high in the context of rapid
growth in demand and output. Entrepreneurs' perceived reasons for the less-than-full
capacity utilization shifted gradually from a balanced mix of weak demand and difficult
access to inputs in 1986 to increasing emphasis on access to inputs-especially domestic
inputs-in 1988 (Table IV.7).
Table IV.7 Factors to which eneuAttribute the L-than-FuR
Capacity UtiiatIon, 1986-89
(percentage of all respondents; more than one answer allowed)
Reason 1986 1987 1988 1989
Scarcity of skilled labor 22 12 21 1
Weakdemand 47 33 27 68
Import competition 6 0 9 3
Difficult access to domestic inputs 50 67 82 53
Difficult access toimportedinputs 50 55 55 44
Difficult access toworkingcapital 22 18 27 18
Sorce: Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informitica (1991), Capacidad Utiliada en
la Industria Manufacturera FabriL 1986-90.
The 1987 sample survey asked entrepreneurs to estimate the capacity utilization
in their main plastics transformation technology in the previous year (mid-1986 to
mid-1987). Based on these estimates, firms were then grouped according to three
different ranges of capacity utilization. The findings, although not fully comparable with
the official survey because of the lack of sample-wide weighted averages, appear to be
consistent with it (Table IV.8).
The largest share of the respondents had capacity utilization in the middle range,
60-79*, and significant shares of the sample were distributed nearly equally above and
below the middle, suggesting marked inequalities within the industry. Curiously, this
pattern repeated itself in the subsamples of subcontractors and client firms, though
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capacity utilization tenckd to be higher among subcontractors than among clients. If
80% is taken as a cutoff point, subcontractors enjoyed full capacity utilization mom
often than client firms and mom often than the sample at large. If 60% is the cutoff
point, the distribution of firms above and below that line is exactly the same for the
subsamples of subcontractors and client firms, and firms in both subsamples suffered
from lower capacity utilization than the average plastics firm.
I interpret these sample observations as signifying the presence of a "sellers
market" in plastics transformation services: it was clients (the "buyers") and not
subcontractors (the "sellers") that suffered most from underutilization of their
equipment. This is somewhat inconsistent with Piore's model of segmentation under
uncertainty, which suggests that subcontractors would be the most dependent on and
vulnerable in the subcontracting relationship.
Table IV.S Subcontractor and Client Firms by Range of Capacity Utiization,
1987
(percent)
Capacity utilization
throughout the year Subcontractors Client firms All fuims a/
80-100% 36 26 32
60-79% 29 38 39
Less than 60% 35 36 29
Total 100 100 100
a. The last column also includes firms whose managers reported undertaking no form of
subcontracting or contracting out.
Sorce: 1987 survey of 126 plastics manufacturers.
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2. Investment in New Capacity
If the model of segmentation under uncertainty holds, firms would perceive
investment in new capacity as a clear alternative to contracting out-and would reject
that alternative. Under the model, firms would opt for subcontracting to maintain a
foothold in the market during demand peaks without having to purchase equipment
whose future utilization cannot be guarantee.
In the 1987 sample survey of 126 plastics manufacturers, two-thirds of the client
firms reported having invested in equipment for plastics transformation since 1983
(Table IV.9). Interestingly, this share was higher than that for all firms in the sample
(whether engaged in subcontracting or not). Even if the firms that did not answer this
question (a relatively high number) had not invested, that would not change the basic
finding: Contracting out did not preclude firms' simultaneously investing in expanding
their own capacity; it almost seemed to make investments more likely!
Table IV.9 Period In which Client Firns Acquired Equipment ./
Number of Percentage
Period in which all capital goods were acquired firms of total
Before or in 1983 6 17
After 1983 23 64
No information 7 19
Total 36 100
a. The year ofl1983 is chosen as acut off point due tothe signifcant policy changes
undertaken after that year.
Source: 1987 survey of 126 plastics manufacturers.
The motivation for purchasing new equipment may differ among client firms,
however, depending on whether a firm is a single- or multi-process plastics
manufacturer.
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Subcontracing plun Invetment among Mult-Process Firm. Among
mnuilti-process plastics manufacturers, the choice of a strategy combining investment in
capacity and subcontracting might be explained by a firm's desire to diversify or expand
into other processes. Subcontracting may, in such cases, provide the firm with
flexibility in the transition from one product or process mix to mother. Of the 18 client
firms that reported having multiple plastics transformation processes, ten (56%) had
invested in new capacity in the past four years (Table IV.10). Among those ten firms,
only one reported near-full utilizatinn of its productive capacity. Four firms estimated
that their equipment had been used at 60-80% of its maximum capacity in the past year,
and four others reported even lower capacity utilization (less than 60%). The firms
reported that they had invested in capacity in order to change or diversify their product
line (particularly in the toy industry, where the import controls opened up a vast new
array of opportunities for domestic producers) and to update their equipment to
enhance efficiency.
Table IV.1O Timing of Investment Decisions by Single- and Multi-Process Client
Firms
Single-process Multi-process
Timing of equipment purchases firms All client firms
All before or in 1983 5 7 12
Some after 1983 13 9 22
Total 18 16 34
Source: 1987 survey of 126 plastics manufacturers.
My detailed case studies of subcontracting networks provide some support for
the argument that muld-proces clientfirw used capacity investment as a strategy for
easing the transition between different transformation processes. Among my five case
studies, two of the client firms were plastics manufacturers (Minitoys and Transtoys)
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and one of them (Transtoys) was a multi-process factory. Transtoys had indeed
undertaken investments in recent years and still planned to expand its capacity for
rotational molding; at the sanr time, it was subcontracting injection molding to four
other firms. Why would it devote inancial resources to expanding its rotational
molding capabilities when it appeared to be more injection molders that it needed?
Transtoys managers responded that good rotational molding was difficult to find in
Venezuela; most rotational molders were old and unsophisticated and used primarily to
produce simple items, such as balls. Transtoys needed more sophisticated rotational
furnaces to produce doll heads with tiny features. With injection molding in more
abundant supply, investing in rotational molding equipment had seemed the more
strategic choice.
My case studies provide richer evidence among multi-process subcontractors of
firms' using a combination of subcontracting arrangements and capacity expansion as a
transition strategy. Filmplast, for example, a large, powerful firm that had started in
1966 as an injection molder, bad recently decided to shift to the extrusion of plastic film,
which would allow it to produce large quantities of a high-priced output in a highly
integrated fashion and at a relatively low cost. Yet, as it prepared to shed its massive,
24-machine injection molding system, it was hit by the demand upsurge of the
mid-1980s. In response, rather than sell its injection molders, it decided to continue in
injection molding, but as a high-quality subcontractor.
Blowplast, a smaller firm in my fourth subcontracting network, maintained
substantial capacity in blow molding and in injection molding. During the 1980s, when
injection molding services were in high demand, Blowplast focused on building demand
in that area. But it never opted to invest further in injection molding because it had
recently expanded capacity in its traditional business-blow molding. When demand for
its injection molding exceeded its capacity, it resorted to contracting out. In contrast, in
the 1990s, as the opening of import markets has led to dimmer prospects for injection
molding, Blowplast has increased the use of its until now somewhat idle, but new, blow
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molding equipment The demand for blow-molded bottles and containers for the
har c and food processing industries is likely to survive the demand slump
following the trade ibheralization umasures of 1989-90.
Perceiving rthesame change in the environment, which had pursued a
successful business in precision injection molding, is now shifting its emphsis to two
altenative busiztsses: producing toys for final market (with part of the injection
molding equiprMnt previously dedicated to molding for other firms) and blow molding.
In sum, among multi-process firms, subcontracting plus investment seemed to be
a variable transition strategy, a finding consistent with Piore's model.
Subcetwctbng plus Imaetment aung Slngie-Ptvceus Clent Piray. The
investment patterns of single-process client firms raise more intriguing questions. In the
1987 sample, 13 (or 59%) of the 22 client firms that had made investments in the past
four years were single-process firms. Thus, these 13 firms had recently purchased new
equipment apt to produce the type of item whose production they were also contracting
out to others. In a smoothly operating market, this decision would have been
economicaly rational only if demand had been growing so fast that even recently
purchased equipment had reached full capacity utilization, making subcontracting
necessaiy to meet the surplus demand. Or, in fir terms used in Piore's model, "the
stable segment of the [local] demand" may have been growing and thus permitting
further investment while subcontracting was being used to cover extraordinary peaks.
As I noted earlier, output and demand indeed grew significantly (although in waves)
during 1983-88. Yet, as I elaborate further, this factor does not fully resolve the
paradox of the coincidence of subcontracting and investment in single-process plastics
manufactorers.
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Of the 13 single-process client firms in the 1987 sample that had bought
equipment in the previous four years, five reported working at near-full capacity. These
firms had probably decided not to invest further, either because of capital constraints or
because of a perception of uncertainty in the demand, as postulated by Piore's model.
When they reached capacity constraints, they had consequently opted for
subcontracting. Six of the other single-process client firms that had recently purchased
equipment reported having between 20% and 40% of their installed capacity idle in the
past year. This group of firms exhibited an investment Lehavior that was not only
inconsistent with the model of segmentation under uncertainty, but also abnormal from
the perspective of economic rationality. They had invested in equipment for their only
transformation process (mainly injection molding); they maintained a non-negligible
level of idle capacity; and, in addition, they were contracting out (injection molding)
services to other firms. This finding raises three complementary questions: Why would
finns invest in equipment if they then could not use their capital goods productively?
Why were firms contracting out to other firms plastics transformation services for which
they had a certain level of idle capacity? And if the investment seemed appropriate
when made, why were firms prevented from using their capacity fully, given the
burgeoning demand in 1983-88? 1 address these questions in the last two sections of
this chapter, as well as in subsequent chapters. But before that, the following section
looks at whether the segmentation predicted by Piore's model was observable in the
industry under study.
3. Evidence of Segmentation
If the model of segmentation under demand uncertainty were to apply to the
Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry in the 1980s, one would expect to find two
additional kinds of evidence. First, there should be technological and economic
segmentation between firms acting as clients and those acting as subcontractors in the
industry. And second, satisfaction with market and productive conditions should be
higher among client firms (which, according to the model, had a dominant position in
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the "stable" segment of the market) than among subcontractors (subject to the vagaries
of the unstable portion of the demand). This section looks at the evidence gathered in
this regard (Table IV.11). Most of the variables it presents are primarily qualitative.
"Measurements" draw from entrepreneurs'responses and perceptions about the
performance and well-being of their enterprises. Supporting the conclusions of
Chapter III, the data in this section suggest that the presumed economic and
organizational segmentation was less than obvious in 1987.
Table IV.11 Evidence of Segnmentatlon: Economic, Organizational, and
Technology-Related Variables, 1987
Clients Subcontractors All firms a/
A. Entrepreneur considers competition in the
product market very tight 74 69 67
B. Fin has plans for future expansion of
capacity
Preliminary idea 27 15 13
Concrete project 32 25 29
Plan currently in execution 24 35 33
No expansion plans 18 25 25
C. Entrepreneur is satisfied with the labor
market 18 32 30
D. firm has systematic productivity programs 47 36 35
E. Fin has computer-assisted manufacturing 41 33 39
F. Hrm has a systematic program of
preventive maintenance
By the firm's own personnel 67 80 81
Contracted 15 9 9
None 18 11 10
G. Finn is a member of AVIPLA (the
industry's business association) 85 67 75
a. Also includes firms that were neither clients nor subcontractors.
Somre: Survey of managers of 126 plastics manufacturing firms.
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Tight Markets. Most interviewees in the industry considered the markets they
were in very tight Moreover, interviewees from firms engaged in subcontracting
relationships, as clients or subcontractors, perceived their markets as more competitive
than the average plastics manufacturing firm did. This fiding might be associated with
the fact that, as we saw in Chapter III, most of the "action" in the industry was
concentrated among medium-size enterprises, which, as we also saw, were those that
engaged in subcontracting the most. The smallest and the largest firms-those that
engaged in subcontracting the least-tended to develop and focus on specific niches,
relying on their privileged access to remote areas, or to capture monopolistic power in
mass markets, respectively. Thus, subcontracting could be associated with the
medium-size firm's strategy to cope with increasingly competitive markets.
Among firms engaged in subcontracting, clients perceived a harsher competitive
environment than subcontractors did. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive, given
that client firms would be associated with fmal markets that were highly protected. In
contrast, subcontractors would cater to a significant extent to firms in other sectors,
where, as I mentioned earlier in the chapter, growth trends had been at best ambiguous.
This paradox could be interpreted in different ways. First, because perceptions
are affected by expectations, the clients' lower satisfaction might have been due to their
being more "demanding." This presumption would fit the conventional wisdom that
clients are better off or more sophisticated than subcontractors, but it might instead
have to do with the high expectations created by trade protection. A related
interpretation would be that, precisely because of the expectations trade protection
created, supply to protected final markets (by client firms) may have soared-hence the
high degree of competition. A good example of this is the toy industry, where there was
a significant inflow of new entrepreneurs, many of them former importers, that may
have saturated the market. The investment in capacity expansion among client firms, a
puzzle presented in an earlier section, might be partly explained on these same grounds.
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Second, the demand for plastics manufacturing services to which subcontractor
firms catered was stimulated indirectly by trade protection. But the supply of
subcontractors, whose role is to provide a technical service based on scarce assets-
specific skills and equipment-may not have been elastic enough to respond to such a
spill-over effect. As a result, a seller's market may have developed.
The Clients have better organizatonal and technological capabilides... In
certain crucial technological and organizational functions, client firms outperformed
subcontractors (see Table IV.11). For example, they had systematic productivity
programs more often than both subcontractors and the average plastics manufacturing
firm did. These productivity programs generally were not very sophisticated; they
consisted of such simple practices as establishing targets for raw material use and
machine output and monitoring, and recording and evaluating results. Nevertheless,
they reflected the firms' concern with enhancing cost-effectiveness not only by tapping
the cheapest source of inputs but also by improving factor use.
Clients also were more likely to use computer-aided manufacturing (CAM). In
most cases, again, CAM applications had not reached a high level of sophistication:
they consisted of numerical control mechanisms for programming, operating, and
monitoring the molds and equipment. Only in a few cases was CAM used for modeling,
for example, the speed and pattern of pouring plastic material into the molds and
cooling it, and rarely for aiding process or product design. Large, mass production
enterprises-underrepresented among both clients and subcontractors-also used CAM
for integrating diverse processes within the plant, as in the case of the soft drink bottle
producer described in Chapter II.
Clients were more often members of the industry's main formal business
association, AVIPLA, than subcontractors were. Membership in AVIPLA served an
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important purpose in the mid-1980s-facilitating access to raw material quotas and
dollar quotas for imports of inputs or equipment and negotiating price increases. A
firm's unwillingness to participate could thus be understood only when alternative
organizations (the Venezuelan Chamber of Toy Producers, CAVEFAJ, or the
association of manufacturers of containers) could provide similar services. But I
interviewed many entrepreneurs, particularly from small enterprises, who had decided to
withdraw from the organization because they disagreed with it or felt rejected by it.
Some interviewees declared that AVIPLA, having started as an association of small-
and medium-scale enterprises, had grown into one for the big producers (including the
joint-venture petrochemical producers that had been strategically included in the early
1980s) to the detriment of the small producers, who now felt displaced. (A more
optimistic interpretation, of course, is that members grew out of the small-scale stratum
thanks to the success of their organizational practice).
In the use of preventive maintenance systems, subcontractors revealed slightly
better performance than client firms. The range of systems was very broad in each
subsample, however-from mere periodical replacement of oil and spare parts to
elaborate computerized systems of specialized maintenance on daily, weekly, monthly,
and annual schedules. Periodical preventive maintenance helps sustain or improve
productivity, minimize work stoppages and disruptions, and, when done in-house,
improves workers' and technicians' knowledge of the firm's equipment-which can lead
to successful adaptation. About 80% of the subcontractors reported that they relied on
their own employees to perform preventive maintenance, compared with only 67% of
the client firms. But client firms (15%) also hired preventive maintenance services.
That fewer client firms opted to keep preventive maintenance personnel and
programs in-house stemmed in large part from the diversity of their production; if they
manufactured plastics, it was only one of their production processes. Thus, for many
clients, internalizing preventive maintenance capabilities may not have been justified.
Subcontractors, however, usually focused exclusively on plastics transformation, and
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their accountability to others in this single service seemed to force them to pay closer
attention to preventive maintenance of plastics transformation equipment In fact, in
many cases it was the subcontractors that provided the maintenance services to their
clients.
But Client Firms Face Severn Skil Constraints. Of client firms, 82%
reported being dissatisfied with the current labor market The problems they cited
related not to costs or to discipline (which would support the hypothesis of
subcontracting as a cost-cutting strategy) but to specialized skills. Client firms reported
severe needs in equipment maintenance (mechanical, electrical, electronic technicians);
mold making and maintenance (machine tool technicians); operation and supervision of
injection molding and extrusion; and project design. Adding up the requirements staled
by my interviewees in 1987 and extrapolating their responses to the entire industry
produced an estimated deficit in specialized technicians of some 950 professionals, or
more than 40% of the supply of specialized technicians in the industry at that time.
Fewer subcontractors reported being dissatisfied with their access to appropriate skills
in the labor market, a difference that can be explained by the fact that subcontractors
accounted for a relatively high share of the technical personnel in the sample. Judging
from this fact alone, one would infer that subcontracting may have been a strategy to
gain access to scarce specialized skills in plastics transformation.
Subcontractors Showed as Much Optimism as Client Firms about te Future.
Among the firms in the 1987 sample, 61% of subcontractors and 59% of client firms
reported that they were undertaking or had developed capacity expansion projects for
the future. If future investment plans are a sign of an entrepreneur's optimism about
future economic conditions and of satisfaction with present and past business
experience, then subcontractors were at least as satisfied with their business experience
as clients were. But, on the contrary, investment plans reveal entrepreneurs' responses
to other expectations or pressures that would make investment attractive (as I discuss
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later), then the data imply that both clients and subcontractors were subject to such
pressures.
Summarizing the Qualitative Evidence. Client firms appeared to enjoy greater
technological and formal organizational advancement. But subcontractors seemed to
enjoy the comparative advantage of being able to count on one of the scarcest and most
important resources required in plastics manufacturing: specialized skills. This contrast
probably explains the subcontractors' relatively comfortable perception of their markets.
This conclusion diverges from the image of a segmented industry-in which only the
clients benefit from stability and subcontractors suffer from uncertainty-that my
original hypothesis would portray.
E. Investment Behavior: Idiosyncrasies of the Industry and the Country
As the abstractions of reality that they are, models should not be expected to
describe relationships precisely. Thus, we probably should not be surprised that,
contrary to the predictions of the 1980 market segmentation model, client firms were
not working at full capacity and that they mixed capacity expansion with subcontracting.
But accepting this caveat still leaves a dilemma: whether unexpected findings indicate
mistaken behavioral assumptions in the models that implicitly or explicitly guide
research endeavors, or simply reflect that such behavior is set against a business
environment so different from the one considered by the model that the actual outcomes
cannot but differ from the expected ones. In this particular case, I lean toward the
second explanation. The literature has amply demonstrated that, in plastics
transformation, capacity idleness can be particularly detrimental to a firm's profits-and
thus that entrepreneurs will try to avoid it. Consequently, the proposition that demand
uncertainty acts as a deterrent to long-term investments is reasonable enough to make
us think that it may help explain plastics manufacturers' decisions in the mid-1980s. Yet
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many factors other than demand uncertainty may also have influenced their decisions in
developing competitive strategies.
I elaborate here on two other factors that may have affected firms' investment
behavior and willingness to subcontract: the dependence of injection molding
transformation technology on the mold, a piece of equipment whose demand and supply
are driven by peculiar factors; and the impact of the exchange rate policies of the early
and mid-1980s on investors' expectations. I will argue that these two factors led many
plastics manufacturers to expand their productive capacity even if they were
experiencing low levels of capacity utilization or engaging in contracting out at the
time. (In Chapter V, I discuss a third and very important factor that helps explain
otherwise seemingly irrational investment behavior: the access to raw materials).
1. The Case of the Migrating Molds
In this section, I argue that one reason why firms engaged in subcontracting, as
observed during my survey of 1987, was the dependence of plastics transformation
technologies on a unique piece of equipment: molds. Molds are a factor of
production-that is, "capital"-because they are used in producing output without
being consumed in they "assist" labor in adding value to the raw materials.
They are not, however, a fixed piece of capital. They are interchangeable parts to be
used on another piece of capital-th injection, blowing, or rotational transforming
machine; molds thus resemble the drill in a milling machine or a die in a stamping press.
But unlike the drill or the die, they are associated with a specific product: by definition,
the mold for a given container can only be used to produce such a container. Also, they
have intricate mechanisms that allow for the appropriate speed of melting and dispersion
of t material, and for trimming and ejection of the product. As a result, they are less
flexible, complex, and much more costly than drills or dies.
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Decisions regarding the production or purchase of molds are driven by factors
like those that guide investment in any equipment Because the use of molds exhibit
increasing returns to scale, decisions to procure them must be justified by expectations
of large production runs. In addition, the decisions are affected by uncertainty. There is
a make-or-buy decision associated with procuring molds, as there is with procuring
intermediate products and components. Whether a firm produces molds itself or rents
or buys them from another firm depends on how much, for how long, and at what
potential rate of profit it will use them. Up to this point, the "mold issue" appears to be
a purely technical matter in which acquisition is driven by the usual rules of investment
behavior. But, as with all apparently technical matters, if stretched somewhat, it starts
revealing its political-economy implications.
An inherent and crucial feature of molds is that they embed a specific product's
design, as well as all the technical and economic data, market research, and
experimentation behind that design. Thus, molds are as much key conveyors of market
control and information as they are mere pieces of equipment. Markets for information,
as has been so profusely argued in recent literature, are highly imperfect-some would
even say nonexistent. The difficulties of establishing and enforcing property rights when
it comes to information open up opportunities for moral hazard and free-riding,
problems that have been commonly dealt with through patents. It is often the case that
the use of molds is restricted by intemational patents.
Two simple examples from plastics manufacturing help make this discussion
concrete. The first concerns the cap of a plastic bottle of shampoo. There are many
different models: screw caps, pressure caps that cover the entire circumference of the
bottle's rim, and pressure caps that cover only, and fit into, a narrow strip at the top of
the bottle. Not only would these three broad types of caps, considered alternative types
of product technology, likely be protected by different patents, but even the type of
hinge that attaches the closing portion of a pressure cap to the body of the cap can be
subject to a specific patent (for example, there are binges that look like tiny door hinges,
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others that look like flat vertical strips, and still others that look like tiny bow ties). In
Venezuela, there are firms that acquire the patent for a mold embedding a particular
kind of product technology for a simple, mass-consumption item such as a plastic bottle
cap, and thereby establish a monopoly on providing injection molding for this item to an
interested multinaonal corporation.
A much more obvious example of monopolistic behavior based on patenting
concerns dolls. A doll is an item whose demand depends on created fashions (product
differentiation and then market development). The famous Barbie doll is a unique item,
for example, and a firm's dominant position on its market depends on having the precise
molds for its production. There is a stringent patent on the design and use of these
molds, which can only be obtained directly from the creator, Mattel. Again, obtaining
the mold for such a product allows a firm to create a monopoly that, given the right type
of market, can bring the firm high rents.
Circumventing the patent and copying the molds for plastic bottle caps would
make little economic sense because of the high cost of the endeavor and because the
market for bottle caps is usually fairly monopsonistic, leaving little chance of a sufficient
market for the "pirate" caps. Copying would also be difficult in the case of the doll, as
the illegal deed would be hard to hide in the markets. Indeed, the product may not even
reach the markets: in a recent case in Venezuela, the manager of the Mattel licensee
firm (one of my case studies) teamed up with labor leaders to stop a shipment of
"illegal" Barbie dolls that an importer was trying to sneak through Venezuelan ports
from Southeast Asia.
But the relevance of the unique features of molds to the current discussion is not
just that they allow local mold-making and plastics transformation firms to create
monopolies when they get hold of the patents (which, aslIwill elaborate in Chapter VI,
became a strategy for surviving the economy's structural adjustment process). The
relevant issue here is that, because of the cost of or legal constraints to producing a set
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of molds, many plastics transformation firms opted for renting them from the
transnational corporations that license the production of the plastic product in question.
In so doing, they became subject to trade policy clauses or to rules imposed by the
transnational partner that, especially in the 1980s, became an added source of
uncertainty for firms and, consequently, an additional reason to contract plastics
transformation out to other firms.
How could a firm that transformed plastics and entered into a transaction with a
transnational corporation precisely in order to obtain the molds that it would inject end
up having to contract out injection-molding capacity so that it could use the molds in
question? This paradox was the result of a combination of factors, including the
stringency of trade regulations, the inefficiency of national ports, and the rigidity of
transnational corporations' rules.
Molds obtained from transnational corporations were brought into the country
under the trade category of "temporary imports." This category allowed a domestic
firm under a licensing arrangement with a transnational corporation to import sets of
molds for up to three months without having to pay import tariffs, export fees, or port
duties. Delays in exporting for which the domestic firm could be held responsible would
be penalized with fines. Normal practice for a transnational corporation would be to
send a set of molds to Brazil for part of the year, to somewhere in Asia for another part
of the year, and, finally, to Venezuela for the rest of the year-a strategy that ensured
that the transnational partner would extract maximum rents from its investment in
molds. But for the domestic partner, importing and port procedures were never smooth
enough to allow flawless operational planning.
Among the five case studies that I analyzed in 1987, two were cases of toy
producers, Minitoys and Transtoys. Minitoys was a rather small and new firm; it had
only thirty employees and had been created a year and a half before my survey, in 1985.
In their previous business "incarnation." Minitoys' owners and managers had imported
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toys, and it was their old contacts with transnational corporations that eased their shift
to toy production when toy imports were prohibited in the early 1980s. In 1987,
Minitoys' "network" consisted of one subcontractor, Miscellplast. In contrast,
Transtoys was a large enterprise (more than 250 employees) that had been created in
1969. In 1987, it relied on five subcontractors and benefited from the monopolistic
power granted by its control over the Venezuelan license for the production of the
Barbie doll. Despite the significant differences between them, both Minitoys and
Transtoys were to a great extent pushed into subcontracting by the problems they
encountered in temporary importation. Problems associated with temporary mold
imports abounded:
First, ports and customs procedures were extremely inefficient, slowed
by red tape and flawed by bribing. For other imports, such "informal
taxes" might have been tolerable. But because the point of temporary
importation was to have the molds in the country for a scanty three
months, delays were particularly burdensome, and thus the opportunities
greater for increasing the informal taxes.
Second, inadequate information flows across countries sometimes
resulted in embarrassing technical problems. For example, Minitoys
once found out too late-after a requested set of molds had arrived in
Venezuela-that the components to be produced with the molds had
been designed to be assembled with an ultrasound procedure that was
neither included in the package nor available in Venezuela. Temporarily
importing the ultrasound machine was considered infeasible because it
would have involved serious delays in assembling the product, causing
the firm not only to miss the sale season (Christmas) but also to incur
high space rental costs. Minitoys decided instead to glue the
components together. The result was a less durable and less attractive
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product than the toy that had earlier been imported-and a deterioration
in the firm's reputation.
* Third, the requirement that the importer pay the freight costs added
another source of uncertainty to the practice of temporary imports
because of the unprecedented devaluation of the bolivar. It also made
delays even more burdensome and costly.
* Fourth, because delays were occurring not only in Venezuela, but also in
most other countries using temporary importation, the migration of
molds across countries sometimes followed unpredictable patterns.
* Finally, all these problems were compounded by the fact that production,
assembly, and delivery seasons for toys are rather well defined (before
Christmas and summer vacation), creating rigidities on the demand side.
Molds needed to be injected as close to the sale season as possible
because of the high cost of keeping inventories of bulky components.
But once the molds were in the country, regardless of the time of year,
the importer had to inject them immediately, or risk missing its only
opportunity to use the molds.
The surge in demand in the 1980s-and producers' eagerness to take advantage
of it-further compounded these problems. Minitoys, Transtoys, and all other toy
producers using temporary imports of molds experienced unpredictable overflows of
molds at some points of the year and idleness at others. Yet producing the molds
domestically was impossible because of high (or unjustified) investment costs or license
restrictions. Temporary importation of molds was thus the preferred strategy for a few
years. But it was necessary to develop a strategy to ensure appropriate and prompt use
of the molds when they arrived. Investing in own capacity was not justified because of
the uncertainty of the production patterns (supply-side rather than demand-side
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uncertainty) and the bulkiness of the investments. Thus, both Minitoys and Transtoys
decided to share the task of injecting molds with other partners when too many molds
arrived at the same time. Transtoys also opted to rent its idle capacity when molds were
unavailable, thus becoming a firm that was simultaneously a client and a
subcontractor. 85
Would better operational planning by the domestic producer have resolved the
problem? Probably not. More precisely, there was probably no "better" operational
planning options available to the domestic firms. Even if the firms could control the
pattern of mold migration, it probably would not have made sense to try to spread mold
importation through the year because of the high inventory-related costs of
accumulating toys and components at the wrong season. To a certain extent, then,
tolerating (even encouraging) marked production peaks and managing them through
subcontracting was the best available option for these client firms. Viewed from this
perspective, subcontracting was simply an important component of an operational
planning strategy adapted to unusual business conditions-conditions stemming from
the nature of the technology and the international market (patented designs); the
regulatory environment (temporary importation and cumbersome customs and port
procedures); the practices of the unavoidable partner ("migrating" molds of
transnational corporations); and the cost structure of the firm and the peculiarities of
domestic demand (need to avoid high inventory costs, and seasonality). In other words,
subcontracting was an appropriate institutional solution for its place and time.
85 This timing of the manufacturing schedule had repercussions in other aspects of the
firms' operations. Together, the seasonality of markets and the peaks in mold injection
forced firms to rely on large contingents of temporary workers to assemble and pack the
products whenever the components were being injected. That is one reason why, as
discussed in Chapter III, client firms (a large share of them toy producers) relied on
casual hiring much more frequently than subcontractors did. This finding is in contrast
to my original expectations that it would be subcontractors that would be forced to do so
most often, as a cost-cutting strategy. As I will discuss in Chapter V, the tightness of
markets during particular seasons made the emergence of "interlinked transactions" very
likely.
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2. Policies, Expectations, and Nervous Investment Behavior
The story of the "migrating" molds reveals the interaction among procurement,
investment, subcontracting, and labor hiring practices, and thus the complexities for
firms of designing an investment strategy, in a specific developing country context. But
this story did not apply to all firms in the sample of plastics manufacturers surveyed in
1987-it was limited to toy producers and a few other sectors dependent on
transnational licenses for which domestic production or permanent importation of molds
was not desirable or possible. This section discusses a contextual factor that did affect
the general investment environment for the industry (and for all Venezuelan
manufacturing). It addresses two paradoxes documented in previous sections: first, the
decisions simultaneously to subcontract and to expand capacity, and second, the
decision to expand capacity in the context of current capacity idleness. To address
these paradoxes, this section deals informally with the effect of expectations on
investment and supply behavior and-through that conduit-on subcontracting
networks.
The policy instability and unpredictability characterizing most of the 1980s in
Venezuela were particularly marked in foreign exchange policy. The bolfvar had traded
at a rate of 4.3 per dollar for the twenty years preceding 1983, but in that year the
government established a multi-tier exchange regime that discriminated between
imports, exports, and their essential, nonessential, public, and private components. For
imports alone there were three different tiers (Figure IV.3), whose definitions varied as
a result of at least three policy reformulations between 1983 and 1987. When the
two-tiered system of exchange rates applied to foreign exchange earnings from exports
was added, a very complicated system resulted . At times this system created significant
subsidies to exporters (for example, between 1983 and early 1985), and at times it
eroded the rents that exporters by then considered entitlements (for example, after
1986). But beyond the effect on export activity, which was not significant for the
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industry as a whole, the variability in exchange rate regulations and the growing gap
between the slowly increasing official exchange rate and the free-floating rate started
fueling expectations of an imminent devaluation.
Figure IV.3 Bolivar Exchange Rates for Different Import ActivIties, 1982-88
(bolivares per U.S. dollar)
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Most plastics transformation equipment used in the Venezuelan plastics industry
was, and continues to be, imported-primarily from Italy, the United States, Germany,
and Japan.86 Even firms choosing to purchase second-hand equipment would face price
86 As a rough indication of the little importance of second-hand purchases in the industry,
the Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informhtica industrial surveys indicate that, in 1988,
only 10% of all investmnt in fixed assets (most of it in equipment) were purchases of
second-hand fixed-assets. Interestingly, however, this percentage had been growing
since 1982 (when it was 7.8%), while it had been declining in manufacturing as a whole
(from 16% in 1982 to 3.4% in 1988).
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increases in the event of a devaluation because of the ripple effects of the increased cost
of imported capital.
Thus, a reasonable strategy in the context of an expected devaluation and
restricted capital flows was overaccumulation of capital, mainly imported but also
second-hand purchased in the domestic market. Themacroeconomiciteratuehas
recorded and analyzed this phenomenon as "the speculative hoarding effect of imported
capital goods" (Serven and Solimano, 1989; Dornbusch, 1989). Investment in the
plastics industry indeed remained relatively high in the 1980s, despite the uncertain
business environment, owing to the devaluation expectations. It almost tripled between
1983 and 1988.
Several of my interviewees in 1987 reported having made equipment purchases
precisely in anticipation of capital gain following the predicted devaluation. Under the
tightly administered exchange rate system, this widespread practice creAed a heavy
burden on the government's administrative apparatus. Imports of capital goods were
classified as "nonessential" and thus accorded a somewhat subsidized exchange rate.
RECADI, the ministry of industry office in charge of allocating subsidized dollar quotas,
was flooded with requests, often channeled through the different entrepreneur
associations-among them, AVIPLA. The black market for dollar quotas is said to
have thrived, as RECADI officials started adding to the legal cost of dollar quotas a
discretionary premium. Entrepreneurs with closer connections to or more influence in
the business associations were most likely to get access to scarce dollars.
It was thus the enterprises with a stronger capital base, or with better lobbying
connections, that benefited from the investment spree of the late 1980s; investment
expenditures, as a percentage of total output, grew faster among large firnn than among
nedium-size and smaller ones (Table IV.12). But, again, how much did this
overinvestmnent afifet their profit rates through the creation of idle capacity? As I
mentioned earlier in this chapter, several firms In my 1987 sample reported both recent
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investments and relatively high levels of idle capacity-a situation for which the
"nervous" investment behavior described here is an explanation. For these firms, lack of
skilled labor, scarce raw materials, problems in obtaining molds, or difficulty in tapping
the right product markets prevented them from putting their new capital to fuller use.
In other cases, however, recent investments seemed reasonably utilized. What made the
difference?
Table IV.12 Investment Growth by FIrm Size, Plastics Manufacturing Sector,
198348
Year LSE MSE SSE Total
1983 10.1 -11.0 -29.0 -6.9
1984 54.7 -34.3 253.7 31.6
1985 48.6 -21.7 -65.7 -2.2
1986 25.9 124.3 37.4 45.4
1987 11.7 11.7 -38.7 6.7
1988 75.9 -1.0 6.6 46.7
Soure: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informitica, Anuario Estadtutice, 1982-88;
Banco Central.
My interviews indicated that firms followed at least two distinct strategies in
order to utilize the recently acquired capacity. The first had to do, as over-investment
itself did, with the expectations of policy reform. Those firms that could obtain the
working capital needed for advanced production and building of inventories did so,
particularly in 1988. The imminent change in administration (elections were held in
December 1988, and the new president, Carlos Andr6s Pdrez, was to take power by
February 1989) and the rumors of radical policy reform(probably stemming from an
exploratory World Bank mission in mid-1987) caused entrepreneurs to expect a
liberalization of prices. The beginning of an "inventory cycle" was at work, then, in
1987-88: firms overproduced and built up inventories in anticipation of the price bike
associated with the liberalization; the second stage of such a cycle, still to be seen then,
was a deep contraction in production right after the reform.
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The second strategy firms used to increase the utilization of recently acquired
equipment was to offer their excess capacity in subcontracting arrangements to firms
that had better access to working capital and final markets and that were trying to build
up inventories of final product for the reasons presented above. The adoption of this
strategy by a non-negligible number of well-off plastics manufacturers explains two
findings that counter my original expectations: the presence in the industry of highly
sophisticated and relatively large subcontractors, with a blurred technological or size
distinction between clients and subcontractors; and the fact that the market remained a
seller's market despite the entry of these new subcontractors. With regard to the second
finding, I found cases in which sophisticated firms practiced a "skimming" strategy in
supplying transformation services--that is, they supplied highly sophisticated services
for which some clients would be willing to pay a higher price and thus did not threaten
the lower-cost markets in which most other subcontractors were engaged. Filmplast is
a case in point, discussed in the section on subcontracting plus investment among
multi-process firms.
F. Conclusions: The Merits of Supply-Side Explaations
That uncertainty can have a greater effect on investment behavior and other
aspects of finn strategy than simple changes in relative prices is now widely recognized
and has become a dominant concern in the microeconomic and macroeconomic
literature. Yet, as I discussed earlier, there are many conceptions of uncertainty and
perspectives from which it is analyzed. This diversity in approaches has led to
contradictory views of the relation between uncertainty and subcontracting.
Institutional nicroeconomic approaches predict a tendency for firms to integrate
vertically (to invest rather than purchase or subcontract) as a result of uncertainty,
where uncertainty is defined as the consequence of inadequate information regarding the
behavior of partners in market transactions. Alternative microeconomic approaches
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argue, instead, that information-rich subcontracting relationships (or "strategic
alliances") may be a preferred option where information and knowledge are crucial
factors of production-in this case, neither very loose market transactions nor rigid
mergers are desirable. The macroeconomic approaches that I have cited are consistent
with my observations, as they predict that macroeconomic uncertainty brings about
delays in investment. But only one approach-Piore's 1980 model of segmentation
under demand fluctuations and uncertainty-goes further to establish a link between
investment patterns and industrial organizational choices.
As I discuss in earlier sections, my observations on the plastics industry in 1987
did not fully coincide with the predictions of that model. Although firms were
undertaking subcontracting in the context of great uncertainty, they did not seem to be
seeking subcontractors merely as a way to deal with demand peaks or to avoid
investment. And subcontractors did not seem to be in a more vulnerable position than
their clients, at least in 1987 (as also discussed in Chapter III). In this chapter, I have
offered two different explanations for the divergence of my observations from the
model.
First, I have argued that there might be features of the business environment that
lead to seemingly "abnormal" investment behavior. In the example of the "migrating
molds," technical characteristics (the dependence on complex, expensive, and
proprietary pieces of equipment), combined with market structure (the multinationals'
monopoly over patents and patented molds, and the domestic monopolies conveyed by
exclusive licenses), regulatory problems (delays and corruption in ports and customs),
and seasonal patterns of demand, compel firms to contract out the injection of some of
their molds even if their own equipment remains idle part of the year. I have also shown
that anticipation of a devaluation leads to speculative hoarding and to inventory buildup
beyond that expected under conditions of certainty, and explains why firms that have
invested heavily in the near past may still plan to continue investing even as some of
their equipment lies idle. Under these explanations for the divergence between the
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predictions of the model and reality, eliminating the contextual factors affecting
investors' decisions would suffice to make the model fully applicable.
My second explanation refers to the locus for uncertainty. There is another
important divergence between the segmentation model and the 1987 evidence from the
Venezuelan plastics industry: although demand was fluctuating, managers seemed to be
affected less by uncertainty on the demand side than by uncertainty on the supply side.
What difference does it make whether the uncertainty confronted by a firm occurs on
the supply or the demand side? The theories of investment behavior under uncertainty
seem to make little distinction between these two sources of uncertainty. Whether the
uncertainty relates to aggregate demand, exchange rates, interest rates, or government
policy in general, these theories predict a decline in investment. But I would argue that
the political economy implications of each kind of uncertainty are distinct.
When it is a matter of demand uncertainty, as Piore's 1980 model indicates, a
zero-sum game results: subcontractors may benefit in times of demand peak, but they
suffer the brunt of the troughs, as their clients are well entrenched in the stable segment
of the demand. If there were no demand peaks, the core firms could still continue
operating optimally at near-full capacity without the assistance of subcontractors, while
the subcontractors, which offer their transformation capacity whenever demand swings
up, could easily perish during troughs. But when subcontractors offer their clients a
crucial input without which the clients could not satisfy even the stable segment of the
demand to which they cater, then subcontractors gain negotiating power. Clients value
them whether in demand peaks or troughs. In this positive-sum model of
subcontracting under uncertainty, clients provide subcontractors with demand, and the
subcontractors provide their clients with access to vital inputs without which they could
not operate optimally.87
87 The situation changes, of course, when supply-side fluctuations and constraints
disappear. This happened after 1989. Chapter VI describes thuecosqee.
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In this chapter, I have used the case of the migrating molds and expected
exchange rate devaluations as examples of how supply-side uncertainty can lead firms to
outsource or offer their services as subcontractors, when this otherwise would not be
predicted. An even better example is the case of raw materials. How uncertainty in raw
material procurement led to subcontracting is discussed in the following chapter.
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V. ACCESSING INPUT MARtKET IN THE 1980 THE ROLE OF
SUBCONTRACTING
In Chapter UI I questioned the argument that firms in the Venezuelan plastics
industry adopted subcontracting as a strategy to cut labor costs in the 1980s. In
Chapter IV, I showed that firms' investment behavior in that period did not always fit a
model whereby subcontracting would be performing a capacity-enhancing role in the
face of major uncertainties. I argued, instead, that subcontracting increased in order to
cope with the growing pains of accessing input markets, and that this gave
subcontractors a comparative advantage vis-h-vis their clients that they would lack if the
reasons for subcontracting were different.
This chapter elaborates on the idea that subcontracting was driven by
supply-side concemns, by looking at how subcontracting facilitated the access of client
firms to petrochemical raw materials in the mid-1980s. Because client firms considered
raw materials as their most crucial input in that period, it would follow from my
previous argument that the subcontractors' role as facilitators of access to raw matenals
provided them with a specific edge in the plastics industry of the mid-1980s. This was
particularly true when the client firms were small and medium enterprises, but it also
happened among multinational corporations which wanted to avoid the trouble of
dealing with local resin markets.
The chapter ends with the proposition that the obsetved subcontracting
networks might be interpreted as a case of "interlinked" or "interlocking" transactions in
different markets (the market for plastics transformation services and the market for
resins). According to this interpretation, subcontracting would help firms share the
burden of the transactions costs associated with gaining access to the resin market.
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A. A Wide Range of Situations: The 1987 Ca Studies
The strongest evidence that client firms used the institution of subcontracting as
a way to ease their access to input markets is that their managers' openly admitted it
during my 1987 interviews.88 The manager of Minitoys, the client firm in my first case
study, presented raw material procurement as the only constraint on the firm's
expansion:
We are not restricted by space or land rent, as we have already bought the plot
of land adjacent to the plant and we could construct a structure twice as big as
that we have today. We do not lack the necessary capital either: with the
capital that we have put into subcontracting payments for the past two years [i.e.
since the firm's inception], we could have acquired two injection molding
machines. It would not have been a matter of financial feasibility, either. An
injection molding machine, operating 24 hours a day, pays for itself. But we
have not been willing to run the risk of making new investments because of the
uncertainty with regards to raw material provision. . . . To the dilemma of
uncertain supply, there are two possible solutions. If the firm is large and has a
lot of capital, it can build stocks. But if it is a small scale enterprise, it is forced
to subcontract (interview, September 17, 1987).
Minitoys first sought its only subcontractor, Miscellplast, for the purpose of
manufacturing a set of molds. Once the relationship was established, however, Minitoys
realized that Miscellplast could not only do injection molding but, more importantly, it
maintained an inventory of raw material for use in its subcontracting business.
Miscellplast had been able to increase the size of the "ration" of raw materials procured
from the large petrochemical suppliers thanks to its subcontracting business. And
Minitoys, even if it tried to continue procuring resins directly from the distributors for
A detailed description of each of the five case studies is presented at Annex IL88
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its own injection molding, started depending more and more on Miscellplasts injection
molding and on its inventories to cope with peaks in production and raw material
bottlenecks. Having been created in 1984 as an independent producer, in 1987 Minitoys
was relying on Miscellplast for 50% of its plastics transformation-hence around half of
its plastics procurement
Although not all toy producers were in Minitoys' critical situation, most found
subcontracting at least convenient with regards to resin procurement. Thnstoys, the
client firmin my second case study, was a large domestic toy producer with a long
history of substantial consumption of resins from the petrochemical corporations. It
thus did not have to break into the resin market when the import protection and
consequent demand upsurge of the early 1980s gave it the opportunity to increase
production. As one of the "traditional clients" of the petrochemical corporations,
Transtoys just renegotiated its quota upwards with little trouble. Yet as the
petrochemical suppliers reached the limits of their productive capacity in 1987-88,
uncertainty in the provision of raw materials became more of an issue. In that context,
the manager of Transtoys recognized that subcontracting mitigated the uncertainties
involved in the access to inputs by creating alternative inlets for raw material.
Many transnational corporations found it convenient to rely on local
manufacturers for their plastics transformation needs. For instance, by law, automobile
producers were obliged to incorporate a large percentage of value added locally into
their assembly operations. They developed-as they do elsewhere-multi-tier
subcontracting networks. In the case of Cwplast, the subcontractor in my fifth case
study, the automobile assemblers did not contract out plastics transformation directly;
they maintained ties with local economic groups (suppliers of mechanisms and
components) which, in turn, outsourced plastics transformation. Carplast was a group
of three plastics transformation units: one in charge of injection molding, another in
charge of blow molding, and a third one engaged in recycling of plastic materials,
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embedded in a larger group of producers of automobile parts. Procurement of raw
Materials and other inputs was thus done under the aegis of the larger economic group,
which was known by its use of its political and economic clout to achieve access to
preferential dollars and other restricted inputs. In the case of Carplast's clients, then,
avoiding the complexities of resin procurement was not the main objective, but
definitely a welcome by-product, of subcontracting relationships.
On the other hand, Transchool, the subsidiary of a large transnational
corporation producing office and school items and the client firm in my fourth
subcontracting network, had never transformed plastics in house and, at least until the
time of the 1987 interview, it did not plan to do so. My interviewee at Transchool
believed that subcontracting was beneficial for both parties involved, precisely because
of its association with raw material procurement:
Subcontracting resolves the inconveniences of dealing with the petrochemical
suppliers facing both the subcontractors and ourselves. On the one hand, it
saves us the trouble of having to procure raw material. On the other hand, it
gives the otherwise small subcontractors a history of consumption that allows
them to gradually enlarge their quota in their transactions with the petrochemical
suppliers (interview, November 11, 1987.)
A few subsidiaries of multinational corporations procured raw materials directly
from resin suppliers, despite the fact that they outsourced plastics manufacturing. Yet
even in those cases, seemingly defying my argument, the procurement of raw materials
was a factor in the decision to subcontract. Muldnac, a subsidiary of a large
multinational corporation producing personal care items and home supplies (and the
client firm for my third case study), is a case in point Originally, Multinac's
subcontractors procured their own raw material, thus saving the client corporation the
trouble of engaging in negotiations with the petrochemical suppliers. The interviewees
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at Multinac declared that, over the early and mid-1980s, the percentage of the
company's production costs represented by payments to subcontractors had gone up due
to the increasing costs of raw materials. Moreover, in the mid-1980s, its two smallest
suppliers (Justinplast and Belgplast) started facing problems with the petrochemical
distributors. At that point, Multinac engaged in negotiations to purchase the raw
materials for them. Procurement of raw materials ended up being less troublesome for
Multinac than it had been for its subcontractors. Thanks to the fact that it was
purchasing material for two subcontractors and to its large size and economic power,
Multinac could amass a substantive demand quota and access the producers directly.
As Multinac assumed the responsibility for resin procurement, it started finding its
relationship to its smaller subcontractors (and particularly, to Justinplast, also troubled
by labor conflict)less and less attractive. When I visited Multinac in November of
1987, the managers declared that they could produce in-house the items that they were
contracting at a lower unit cost than their subcontractors-especially mass produced
and potentially more profitable products, such as disposable shaving razors and pens.
The reason why they were maintaining these subcontracting relationships in 1987, my
interviewees argued, was the corporate headquarters' unwillingness to approve their
proposed investment plans for expanding in-house injection molding capacity.
The link between subcontracting and raw material procurement thus varied
across subcontracting networks. It went from cases where raw material procurement
was seen as a crucial and deliberate reason for subcontracting, as in the Minitoys and
Transchool cases; to cases where it had emerged later on as an important subcontracting
advantage, as the case of Transtoys and, to a lesser extent, Carplast; and finally, to cases
where procurement had not been resolved satisfactorily through subcontracting, thus
forcing the client firm to intervene in the resin market, as in the case of Multinac.
Subcontracting was associated with input procurement particularly in the case of
relatively new client firms. ft helped to share uncertainty in raw material provision
between the contracting parties, with arrangements varying across networks. But in all
cases, either because of the success of subcontracting in easing the access to raw
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materials by client firms, or because of the negative impact upon subcontracting
networks of its failure to do so, my case studies revealed that the linkage between
transactions in the raw materials market and transactions in the market for plastics
transformation services became increasingly important in the 1980s.
B. What Was so Troublesome about Resin Markets?
The proposition that the expansion of the institution of subcontracting in the
Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry in the 1980s was a result of troublesome
access to petrochemical inputs is eminently counter-intuitive. Venezuela is one of the
world's largest oil producers, ranking fifth after the former Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia,
the United States and Iraq in 1980. It was one of the first oil producing developing
countries to engage in massive investments in petrochemicals following the first oil
boom. In 1985, it ranked 31st among the largest producers of industrial chemicals.9
Even if the merits of resource-based industrialization as a development model have been
questioned,90 other things equal, one still might expect the availability of petrochemical
inputs to offer an advantage, not an obstacle, to the development of downstream
industries. Why, then, did petrochemicals become the critical constraint to the
development of plastics manufacturing? The clash between demand-side and supply-
side policies which hampered the unfolding of backward linkages, the inherent technical
rigidities of the industry, and problems in the management of distribution channels
together help to explain this paradox.
89 Industrial chernicals (ISIC 351) includes petrochemicals. The comparison in the text
refers to value added. The source is UNIDO (1991): Industry wid Devdlopnaent
Global Redr 1991192.
90 The potential of resource-based industrialization as an engine for development is
questioned because of the fact that resource richness tends to discourage rauch needed
economic reform. For a recent coprtve and mnryarticle, see Auty (1994).
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1. A Jump In the Derived Demand for Resins
As the debt crisis hit Venezuela in the early 1980s, the government scrambled to
implement myriad policies to curtail capital flight. Trade restrictions generated strong
demand pressures in the market for resins and plastic materials, to which the
petrochemical industry responded through non-price rationing. Controls on imports of
plastics manufactures in 1983 created a massive captive demand for domestic plastics
manufactures. As presented in the preceding chapter, the volume of plastic manufacture
imports fell by three-fourths between 1983 and 1988. My own rough estimates indicate
that the demand facing domestic plastics manufacturers, measured in constant bolivares,
may have gone up by 25%. Plastics manufacturing output grew by nearly 50% in the
same period.
Given that resins represent over 75% (and, in many cases, over 90%) of the total
weight and value of inputs for plastics manufacturing, demand for resins increased in
tandem with the surge in the demand for plastics manufactures. Gross output of the
resins most frequently used by plastics manufacturers-low-density polyethylene
(LDPE), high-density polyethylene (HDPE), polystyrene (PS), and polyvinyl chloride
(PVC)-almost doubled between 1983 and 1988 (Table V. 1).91
91 In this discussion, the terms "secondary petrochemical industry," "resin producers,"
"joint-venture corporations," or "petrochemical corporations" refer, indistinguishably, to
firms belonging to the International Standard Industrial Code 3513 (synthetic fibers,
plastic materials and artificial fibers). For periods in which data has not been available
for the four-digit groups (LCe. before 1984), the text refers to the three-digit group ISIC
351 (industrial chemical substances). 'Ihe error involved in using ISIC 351 as a proxy
for ISIC 3513 might be significant, however: in 1984 and 1988, gross output of ISIC
3513 represented 32% and 41%, respectively, of the gross output for ISIC 351.
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Table V.1 Apparent Consumption of Selected Resins by the Venezuelan Plastics
Manufacturing Industry, 1982-88
(thousands of metric tons)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
LDPE
Gross Output (A)
Imports (B) a/
Exports (C)
Apparent Consumption (D=A+B-C)
Installed Capacity (E)
Est. Capacity Utiliation (A/E, %)
HDPE
Gross Output (A)
Imports (B)
Exports (C)
Apparent Consumption (D=A+B-C)
Installed Capacity (E)
Est. Capacity Utilization (A/E, %)
PS
Gross Output (A)
Imports (B)
Exports (C)
Apparent Consumption (D=A+B-C)
Installed Capacity (E)
Est. Capacity Utilization (A/E, %)
37.4
51.1
0.0
88.5
68.0
55
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
n.a.
28.2
0.3
3.6
24.9
70.0
40
57.2
2.1
1.6
57.7
68.0
84
0.0
37.7
0.0
37.7
0.0
n.a.
30.6
0.1
4.0
26.7
70.0
44
59.5
11.2
2.0
68.7
68.0
88
49.6
7.6
18.1
39.1
80.0
62
38.2
0.1
6.1
32.2
70.0
55
58.4
11.6
0.0
70.0
68.0
86
57.8
0.8
12.7
45.9
80.0
72
37.2
0.1
6.8
30.5
70.0
53
67.9
13.0
0.0
80.9
68.0
100
66.6
1.3
6.8
61.1
80.0
83
44.1
0.1
5.3
38.9
70.0
63
67.8 67.5
26.3 34.5
0.0 0.0
94.1 102.0
68.0 68.0
100 99
72.6
3.3
9.6
66.3
80.0
91
48.1
0.1
4.1
44.1
70.0
69
77.1
2.0
3.5
75.6
80.0
96
50.9
6.0
7.6
49.3
70.0
73
PVC
Gross Output (A) 28.8 30.0 27.7 28.5 31.6 35.5 31.8
Imports (B) 16.7 13.1 30.9 25.7 26.1 25.7 51.2
Exports (C) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.1 1.7 1.7
Apparent Consumption (D=A+B-C) 45.5 43.1 58.6 54.0 55.6 59.5 81.3
Installed Capacity (B) 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0
Est. CapacityUtilization(NE, %) 72 75 69 71 79 89 80
a. Import figures for 1982 include also HDPE.
Taken from: Ministerio de Fomento (1991), Estudie doe Cadena de Re s y
Pldslcos.
Sources: Ministry of Energy and Mines, petrochemical corporations, PEQUIVEN,
Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informkiia.
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2. Niley-DrIven Ceustraluta -n the Supply Ski.
The 1980s provided the p t demand conditions for the development of
backwad linkages from plastics M fto petrochemicals. Yet additional
supply of p chm lsto nt the burgeoning demand was not foartcoming for two
reason. First, the country's critical debt situation made it difficult, at least politically, to
engage in the heavy investment required to expand pe m capacity. Second,
even if the decision to expand had been taken then, the maturation period for a
petrochemical plant is long and domestic capacity would not have been available on
time to mitigate the deficits of the 1980s. The only addition to domestic resin
production capacity during the decade was an eighty thosand ton HDPE pat
programmed during the previous decade, which opened in 1984 and reached full
capacity only two years later (Table V.1). Thus local productive capacity of the resins
in highest demand, with the exception of HDPE, remained practically unchanged
through the 1980s.
On the other hand, the structure of the Venezuelan petrochemical industry also
remained unchanged. The industry had (and still has) a monopolistic structure.
upstream, a single state-owned corporation (PEQUVEN) was in charge of basic
petrochemicals. The production of secondary petrochemicals (polymers or resins) was
controlled by seven firms, each of them producing one distiirt product line
(Figure V.1). One of these seven firms, Ntroplas, was fully state-owned and other two
were private. But the four largest and most impoitant amongthem-Esirnos del
Zulia, producing PS; Plastilago (HDPE); Polilago (LDPE)92; and Propilven
(polypropylene, or PP)-were the so-called empress snbius (literally, "mixed
92 "PMastiago" is shlrt for "Plisticos del Lago," the producer Mfhg-esy oytyee
and "Polilago" is short for "Niomros del Lago," die psdtwer of low-dnsity
n i),joint ventures between the Venezualan state and domestic or forign
capital (Table V2). Particuarly for HDPE and LDPE, local prodicers reached ful
capacity taninn-between 1984 and 1986, hence making it impossible for them to
support furtlmr growth of thedown m industry.
1S8
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent firms in the secr in 1988, according to
OficinIasCe terio md enor adtie
SOWn: Minsteio e ORMo(1991),fsa~ el aeadeRsnryJiecs
Table V.2 OWnerpStmre of Three Mabn Reb Joint Vaertaes, 1991
Capacity Shares
Enterprise Resin (metric tones) Partners(%
Estirenos del Zulia PS 70,000 PEQUIVEN 37.5
Grupo7Wliano 37.5
Dow Chemical 25.0
Plastilago RDPE 80,000 PEQUlVEN 49.0
GrupoZuliano 31.5
CDF Chemie 15.0
Mitsui Group 4.5
Polilago LDPE 68,000 PEQUIVEN 40.0
Grupo Zuliano 30.0
CCDF Chlmie 30.0
Note: PEQUIVEN is the Venezuelan state-owned basic petrochemical corporation.
(rupo Zuliano is a group of Venezman private investors.
Soewn: PEQUIVEN.
The alternative to domestic production of resins was, of course, to import them.
But government policy constrained that option. The government prevented plastics
manufacturers from engaging directly in resin imports and reserved the right to import
raw material to the petrochemicaljoint-venture corporations. For LDPE, HDPE, PVC
and PSsignificant levels of imports were required. Plastics manufacturers often
complained of the delayshigh costs, hurdles, and quality inconsistency associated with
such rushed compensatory imports.
Since prices for, and quality ot locaily produced petrichenicals were quite
competitive with those of imported petrochemicals, the motivation behind the
govczmnt's decision to curtail petrochemical imports was not a traditional
protctinis arenet. hepsicylegrdig ptrohemcaltrade canw as a sideseffect
of the govunnts concern with capital fllgts mnd the erosion of formign exchange
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reserves, rather than a deliberate industrial policy or protectionist trade policy. By
giving exclusive power over international purchases to the tightly controlled and
generally well-performing joint-venture petrochemical enterprises, the government was
aiming to ensure "orderly" and measured international trade, and to avoid hoarding and
speculative behavior in the face of potential future devaluations-and which would
thereby help women the country's external balance situation.
3. The Impact on Prices
One of the reasons to believe that the controls upon petrochemical imports did
not amount to a traditional protectionist effort was the fact that, as mentioned above,
domestic prices did not rise beyond prices for imported resins. As I will elaborate here,
the cost of domestic raw materials did increase through the 1980s, not so much because
of demand pressures but because of the inflationary effects of the devaluation of the
bolivar. This obviously created increasing needs for working capital on the part of the
plastics manufacturers and growing pressures upon their finances. Yet having freer
access to imported materials would not have made such pressures less severe, as prices
for raw material in international markets had also increased significantly.
Official prices for commodity resins produced in Venezuela were monitored by
the government The price increases observed in the 1980s in the formal market were
closely associated with the cost push resulting from the devaluation of the bolivar, and
much less so with a "demonstration effect" traceable to changes in the international
price of substitute resins, or even with domestic demand pressures. Indeed, the
devaluation of the bolivar affected the cost structure of the petrochemical industry
significantly. Because of the industry's import dependence, the devaluation of 1983 had
an immediate inflationary impact on it. The share of the imported raw materials upon
total raw snaterial costs increased consistently through the decade, from 45.7% reported
for large-scale enterprises in ISIC 3513 in OCEI's 1984 industrial survey, to 62.6% in
1988. With respect to the total value of gross output in current terms, imported raw
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material constituted 27.2% in 1984 and it reached 35.4% in 1988. Considering that the
exchange rate in the controlled market doubled between 1984 and 1988 and that it
almost quadrupled in the free market, it is not difficult to understand that prices of resins
rose sharply over the 1980s. As shown in Table V.3, the price index for ISIC 351 grew
faster than that for overall manufacturing and, indeed, was the fastest growing price
index in the whole manufacturing sector throughout most of the 1980s.
Table V.3
(1984= 100)
Venezuela: Fastest Growing Industrial Price Indexes,196(-90
ISIC 351 ISIC 341 ISIC 371 ISIC 384
Industrial
Chemical Paper and Iron and Automotive Overall
Year Substances Cellulose Steel Industry Manufacturing a/
1980 52.68 76.35 52.26 63.04 n.a.
1981 91.37 79.12 56.90 74.21 n.a.
1982 94.99 85.64 71.59 78.49 80.82
1983 94.25 87.31 74.87 84.64 85.36
1984 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1985 112.10 115.90 119.50 105.50 115.90
1986 123.30 120.50 126.30 115.60 129.10
1987 186.70 167.50 187.90 209.40 179.60
1988 276.80 199.80 252.20 243.20 218.90
1989 556.00 557.70 503.30 515.50 420.90
1990 765.43 669.70 669.54 642.62 622.58
a. Excludes oil and oil refineries.
Source: Venezuelan Central Bank.
Domestic prices for individual resins showed a more moderate growth trend
than the index for the chemical industry at large, although such growth was still
significant-for LDPE, an almost threefold increase between 1983 and 1988; for PVC,
a more than twofold increase in the same period; and for HDPE, a twofold increase
between 1984, the first year in which this resin was produced in Venezuela, and 1988.
But, most importantly, prices for the main resins remained under those fetched in
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international markets during the period of high protection.93 The price advantage of
domestic producers increased towards the end of the decade, in part owing to a
significant increase in international prices for the main commodity resins. For instance,
the f.o.b. price for LDPE, HDPE, and PVC from the United States increased by nearly
50% between 1987 and 1988. Compounded by the gradual devaluation of the bolfvar,
prices of imported resins, if manufacturers had been able to import them directly, would
have become unaffordable. In 1988, it would have been five times more expensive for a
domestic manufacturer to purchase one metric ton of LDPE and three times more
expensive to purchase one metric ton of HDPE or one of PVC-particularly if forced to
get the dollars at the free floating exchange rate-than it would have been to purchase
the same ton of material from Polilago, Plastilago or PEQUIVEN (Table V.4). The
public sector and the joint-venture corporations were allowed to import strategic inputs
at more favorable exchange rates. Left to choose between domestic and foreign
providers of the main commodity resins on the basis of price and quality, domestic
plastics manufacturers normally selected the former. By the mid-1980s, then, the main
problem facing Venezuelan plastics manufacturers in their attempts to acquire domestic
raw materials was not related to price rationing.
93 'Ihe relatively low -rc of domestic resins seemed to be the result of a cost advantage
resulting from the reliance on domestic feedstocks-and not of subsidies or protection.
A 1986 dissertation ranked industrial chemical substances among the Venezuelan
industries enjoying higher levels of comparative advantage in international markets
(Martinez-Mdttola, 1986).
Comprlson between Domestic and U.S.Prices, Selected Resins,
198748
Resin 1987 1988
LDPE
Domestic Price (Bs/mt) (A) 10,340 15,400
US Price, fob Gulf ($/nt) 890 1,328
US Price, fob Gulf ("preferential-rate" Bs/mt) (B) 12,905 19,256
US Price, fob Gulf (average floating rate Bs/mt) (C) 24,920 46,480
Domestic/US Price, at "preferential" rate (A/B, %) 80 80
Domestic/US Price, at average floating rate (A/C, %) 41 22
HDPE
Domestic Price (Bs/mt) (A) 12,398 13,800
US Price, fob Gulf ($/nt) 874 1,294
US Price, fobGulf("preferential-rae" Bs/mt) (B) 12,673 18,763
US Price, fob Gulf (average floating rate Bs/mt) (C) 24,472 45,290
Domestic/US Price, at "preferential" rate (A/B, %) 98 74
Domestic/US Price, at average floating rate (A/C, %) 51 30
PVC
Domestic Price (Bs/mt) (A) 11,761 12,510
US Price, fob Gulf ($/mt) 819 1,086
US Price, fob Gulf ("preferential-rate" Bs/mt) (B) 11,876 15,747
US Price, fob Gulf (average floating raze Bs/mt) (C) 22,932 38,010
Domestic/US Price, at "preferential" rate (A/B, %) 99 79
Domestic/US Price, at average floating rate (A/C, %) 51 33
Note: In principle, the "preferential rate" is the one at which joint-venture
petrochemical corporations would be allowed to purchase the resin, while the "average
floating" rate would be that at which individual manufactres would have to buy them.
SPme: Ministerio de Fonwnto (1991), Esud de Ia Cadets de Pewogqiciy
Pura=*"
Table VA
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4. Management of Distribution Channels: The Main Bottleneck
The joint-venture petrochemical corporations benefited from the set of policies
imposed in the earlyl1980s. The only exception was Estirenos del Zulia, which
depended on an imported monomer, styrene, for the production of its polymer,
polystyrene (PS), and hence had to cope with rising international prices for inputs and a
weakening bolfvar. But the other two joint-venture corporations, Polilago and
Plastilago, enjoyed a robust domestic demand and hence near-full capacity utilization
through the 1980s. Combined with relatively easy access to "preferential" dollars which
helped the corporations hedge against the devaluation, the high revenues resulted in
consistent increases in the level of profits. While gross profits as a percentage of total
value added declined for all industries from 28% in 1994 to 26% in 1998, in the
synthetic resins, plastic materials and artificial fibers industrial group (ISIC 3513) this
percentage went from 32% to 36% (Table V.5). However, it was not the spill-over of
this bonanza that brought about the flourishing of the plastics manufacturing sector
downstream-petrochemical corporations conveyed such a bonanza downstream to
plastics manufacturing only in a very restricted and selective manner, as I will elaborate
below.
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Table V.5 Gros Pnit - a Percentage 1f Total Value Added,198448
(%)
Sector 1984 1988
All Industries 28.1 26.3
Large (More than 100 employees) 31.9 27.8
Medium 1(51-100 employees) 7.1 19.6
Medium II(21-50 employees) 13.3 21.4
Small (5-20 employees) 13.5 21.1
ISIC 3513 311 35.9
Large (More than 100 employees) 29.1 36.8
Medium I1(51-100 employees) 40.1 27.5
Medium II(21-50 employees) 40.8 29.0
Small (5-20 employees) 5.9 3.0
ISIC 356 13.6 20.3
Large (More than 100 employees) 18.9 18.5
Medium 1(51-100 employees) 62 19.6
Medium H(21-50 employees) 9.7 23.0
Small (5-20 employees 5.0 31.1
Note: ISIC 3513 includes synthetic resins, plastic materials, and artificial fibers. ISIC
356 includes plastics manufactures.
Somrce: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informitica, Encuesta Industrial(diverse
years).
The demand upsurge of the early 1980s caught the joint-venture petrochemical
corporations unprepared. They had the installed capacity, they had the required inputs
and capital, but they did not have the managerial nfrastricture to cope with the sudden
avalanche of orders. Between 1983 and 1988, as mentioned earlier, the demand for
petrochemicals ahnost doubled. This involved more frequent and larger orders,
increased demands for transportation, and complex finished-product inventory
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In order to facilitate distribution without adding to their administrative
complexity, the joint-venture corporations opted for segmenting their clientele into two
portions: large consumers (buying twenty or more metric tons of a given resin per
month) and small consumers (buying less than twenty metric tons per month). "Large"
customers would be served directly by the joint-venture corporations, while distribution
to "small" customers was delegated to smaller private intermediaries or retailers with no
(demonstrable) equity linkage with the petrochemical corporations. There were only ten
of these retailers to supply the whole industry. They often focused on specific items,
thus becoming monopolies or oligopolies in the provision of specific resins (Figure V.2).
I -.
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flgure V.2 r M -a ValueChain Channels, 198
(slie)
Noe:rNumbers in boxes represent the frms in the category as recorded by the
ndustrial survey ofthe Central Statistical Office in 1988.
Souce: Ministerio de Fomento (1991), Estudio de 1a Cede.. dePetrequtmicay
This customer maiket segmentation strategy seemeda very reasonable solution
to the problem of nana distributon, but it turned ito a nightmare for consumers
Eithet because of theprivate retailers inability to ope ith such a large and diverse
demand, or in their atempt take advantage f it theyengaged in ractices of
over-pricing and quantitative supply restrictions My interviewees in the plastics
a nufacturing industry described cases of overnvicing; advance charge forth
issUng ceipts to document the practe; i arbitrary makps at times of defici
20 metric tonshnb--h-or more
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and untimely or inadequate deliveries. The effect of such illegal practices was to create
unprecedented uncertainty regarding costs and delivery of raw materias-articularly
troublesome for firms engaging in temporary rentals of molds (discussed in Chapter IV)
or subject to demand seasonality.
But besides the uncertainty and arbitrary practices associated with abuse and
corruption, the distribution arrangements involved two types of biases. First, there was
a bias against small firms, which could only purchase from the retailers at marked-up
prices. Although this "legal" markup was the expected charge for reaching out to the
smaller consumers, it unavoidably put the smaller producers at a cost disadvantage. It
also addx4 to pressures on their limited working capital. Second, there was a bias
against new or growing firms, as resin quotas were defined according to the firm's
historical consumption. In other words, the quota that a firm would receive next year
depended on what it had demahded this year. This measure aimed to reward traditional
customers and shelter them from supply fluctuations. In the early 1980s, when domestic
producers had not reached full capacity, this model was applied flexibly and did not
impose major constraints on growing firms. But as deficits started to become critical in
1986, getting access to a quota turned into a zero-sum game. Thus, having nurtured a
relationship with the resinesuppliers in the past became a very valuable asset for plastics
manufacturers.
Nevertheless, petrochemical producers had to satisfy the local demand as fully as
possible, and were entitled to import resins in cases of deficit Forced by the demand
pull, domestic producers increased output, reaching very close to their plants'theoretical
S The bias against smaller producers affected a significant portion of the industry. In
1988, about two-thirds of the total production of low-density polyethylene was absorbed
by fifteen clients which enjoyed direct access to the joint-venturepercmia
producers. Meanwhike the remtaining plastics mnfcues(oeta50 codn
to the 1988 survey of the Central Statistica Office) had either to compete for the
reannone-third of production and, most likly, deal with the retailers, or rely on
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maximum capacities-in 1988, Polilago was producing at 99% of its theoretical
maximum capacity and Petroplas at 80%. Reliance on imports became mom and more
important at that time, when demand would not recede, partly spurred by the plastics
manufacturers' drive to create inventories in anticipation of policy changes after the
1988 presidential elections. As a result, in 1988, up to 34% of the apparent
consumption 95 of LDPE was impcted, and so was 63% of the apparent consumption
of PVC. As established by the regulations, these imports were made directly by the
domestic resin producers, Polilago and Petroplas. The most likely customers for the
imported portion of the resin supply were, again, smaller and newer producers without a
foothold on the stable segment of the supply (i.e. firms who had small quotas, or lacked
quotas of locally produced resins). These customers complained about the problems of
being relegated to the imported portion of resin supply. Resin imports exhibited
unpredictable delivery, cost, and quality.
5. The Perverse Effects of WeR-Intentloned Policies
The previous sections discussed the difficulties faced by plastics manufacturing
firms in the procurement of petrochemicals, unexpected in an oil-rich country. I have
argued that those difficulties were not expressed in increased prices; they were instead
"nonprice" restrictions. According to mainstream economic theory, economic actors
(firms, investors) respond to nonprice restrictions through "extra-market" responses, i.e.
by generating institutions. In my example, the institution of subcontracting was the
response. All of this, one could argue, was nothing more than the unintended negative
results of well-intentioned policies of the 1980s:
95 Apparent consumption is defined here as gross output of the domestic producers of
resin, plus imports, minus exports. See Table V.1. The definition excludes inventory
creation by the resin producers, negligible in the period 1984-88. Resin inventory
buildup by resin producers became an issue after 1988, when the structural adjustment
program generated a contraction in the demand for resins.
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The first "good intention" of the policies established in 1983 was to prevent
speculative behavior in resin trade, given the unstable foreign exchange situation. The
government banned resin imports and gave exclusive import rights to the joint-venture
corporations. Domestic prices, however, were watched closely, thus this measure did
not result in speculatory behavior-via arbitrary price increases-on the part of the
joint-venture petrochemical corporations themselves. This measure appeared to reach
the intended goal of avoiding speculation by plastics manufacturers in import-export
resin markets-speculatory practices took place instead in other realms, such as the
distribution of dollar quotas under the restricted exchange regime. The measure did
result, however, in the creation of severe quantitative constraints on input access
confronting plastics manufacturers downstream.
The second "good intention" was to shelter established plastics manufacturers
from the vagaries of the resin market by maintaining a policy of quotas defined on the
basis of historical consumption. The explicit argument was that traditional customers
had demonstrated their commitment to the trade, deserved to be rewarded for that, and
were most likely to use the resources productively. This measure may have indeed
sheltered traditional producers from the worst consequences of the resin deficit that
ensued, but it did not keep other entrepreneurs from joining the trade. What the
measure achieved-and this is the unintended negative result-was to create serious
obstacles for dynamic producers engagingin further investment and modernization in
the industry.
The third "good intention" was to avoid burdening the petrochemical producers
with the task of administering the distribution of resin to an ever growing number of
clients, many of them of relatively small size. This would save scarce managerial
capabilities in the industry so as to devote them to the actual business of the
corporations--rouction-and it would also avoid burdening the cost structure of the
industry with marketing overhead. Smaller distributors could also reach customers
more easily. One can presume that the producing companies benefited from this
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measure as planned, although it is clear from the 1987 interviews that the distribution
system did not work to the benefit of the smaller customers. The private retailers were
less visible than the petrochemical corporations and enjoyed monopolistic or
oligopolistic power in a market facing unprecedented demand pressures; under these
conditions, they established unauthorized markups and got de-facto credit from their
customers by requesting payment prior to delivery.
Thus it is no wonder that small and medium-size producers, new firms and those
willing to grow were forced to seek alternative routes to procure raw material and to
minimize the uncertainty in procurement My thesis, again, is that subcontracting
provided one such route.
C. Tnsactons and Uncertainty: Sharing the Costs of Market Acces
Access to raw materials was the number one problem identified by all of the
firms involved in the five plastics subcontracting networks analyzed in 1987-an
assessment confimed and explained by the troublesome situation of the petrochemical
industry that I have described in preceding sections.. The declarations by managers
quoted in the first section of this chapter support such my argument that gaining access
to raw materials became one of the main elements in the decision to subcontract plastics
transformation services in the 1980s. The question is how the relationship between
subcontracting services and access to raw materials unfolded. I address this question by
looking at the specific nature of the inter-firm arrangements.
In the discussion that follows, I have focused on two interrelated roles of
subcontracting networks: transferring the costs of the bwnuacdins required to get
access to inputs, and transferring the costs of uustauy in the provision of such
inputs 6 My case studies indicate that different networks resolved tese two issues in
different ways (see Table V.6). Yet in most cases tie solutions revealed tin centrality
of raw material procurement to tie subcontracting relationship.
Tabe VA Cts of Ac to Inputs through b
Interviews to Fve SNetworks in 197
A. Bearing the Transactions Costs: Who Purchases Resins?
Gient Subcontractors
Network I (Minitoys) X
Network 2 (Transtoys) X Xa/
Network 3 (Multina) X X a/
Network 4 (Transchool) X
Network 5 (Caiplast) X
B. Bearing the Costs of Uncertainty: Who Keeps Stocks?
Gint Subcontactors
Network 1 (Minitoys) X
Network 2 (Transtoys) X Xa/
Network 3 (Multina) X X a/
Network 4 (Tanschool) X b/ X
Network 5 (Carplast) X
a. Arrangement varies according to explicit rule.
b. Stocks built with material provided by the subcontractors.
Sowwe: 1987 interviews with firm managers in five networks.
1. Tasfrbgor Sharin&theComb df AcceSS
Transactions with retail distributors of resins were particularly costly in terms of
managerinim. First there was the negotiation of quotas, requiring a certification of
tin historical pattern of consumption. Subcontractors that had been in tin trade for a
weconomics literature may not indicate such a cr-ct distinction
beween these two typos of costs, s unoertaisy is one of the possible souces of
cods. I find it convenient, however, &o spsa dem. In doing so, Iadopt
anarower (more literal)definition of " eals coss."
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while enjoyed a "natural" comparative advantage in this sense. Quota negotiations were
followed by often heated discussions over the price per kilogram, which was not always
charged at the official rates. For instance, among my interviewees of 1987, two talked
about an unofficial markup of over 40% in crystal polystyrene (from an official price of
Bs.221kg to Bs.3 1/kg) not recorded in the receipts, and others complained about
unexplained price increases in LDPE.
Retailers alluded to three reasons for (or three components of) the markup-a
justification that was not accepted by the customers. The first component of the
markup was associated with storage costs. Customers suspected that such costs were
not really borne by the retailer, as the high demand implied an almost just-in-time flow
from the producers to the customers. In addition, storage cost was often due to the
retailet's inefficiency in delivery; it was only natural, from the customers standpoint, that
the retailer, and not them, should bear it. A second component of the markup,
according to the retailer, was associated with the provision of credit. Customers
rejected this argument categorically, given the fact that retailers were not fulfilling their
promise to provide 30- and 60-day credit. Indeed, they often required immediate full
payment, under the threat of nondelivery, or refused to deliver the material until the 60-
day installment was received, thus disrupting the customet's production schedule. The
third component of the markup was allegedly the cost associated with the provision of
technical assistance-service which, according to the customers, was never provided.
In addition to the actual markup, then, the managerial cost of negotiating quotas
and prices became increasingly burdensome for subcontractors. Buyers
(subcontractors) could pass the burden of the markup on to their clients in the
subcontracting network, through their own subcontracting rates. But, as the cost of
negotiation could vary significantly across subcontractors, this turned into a competitive
element (Jetting more out of each hour of bargaining, or acquiring the lobbying power
necessary to minimize the taaeit spent in resin transactions became important
elements for the achievement of a competitive edge on the part of the subcontractors.
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Subcontractors were always centrally involved in the procurement of raw
material in the subcontracting networks analyzed in 1987 (Table V.6 above), although
the specific modality of the transaction varied from network to network. The first,
fourth and fifth networks (Minitoys, Transchool and Carplast) represented one such
modality. In these three networks, the subcontractors were fully in charge of procuring
raw materials for the subcontracting transaction. In all three cases, the subcontractors
happened to be smaller in size than their clients (except in one case: Hispaplast as a
subcontractor for Transchool), yet they had been in the plastics manufacturing trade for
some time and thus had gained an entitlement to relatively large and stable quotas of
raw material, a factor that client firms found attractive.
The way each of these networks had reach this stage varied. Minitoys, the client
firm for the first network and itself a plastics manufacturer, was created by former toy
importers right after the prohibition established on toy imports in 1983. Minitoys'
owners had plenty of capital and the "technological" edge resulting from their former
ties with transnational toy producers, which translated into exclusive patents for the
production of popular toys. They first established contact with Miscellplast, their only
subcontractor, seeking assistance in the production and maintenance of molds for thrir
injection-molding machines. Only a year into the life of the enterprise, however, they
realized that raw materials were becoming the binding constraint on their operations,
particularly owing to their lack of a history of consumption. Thus they decided
subsequently to take advantage of their relationship with Misceliplast, which also acted
as a subcontractor, to get around that problem.
The client firm in the fourth case study, Trancheel, had never acted as a
plastics manufacturer, nor had it any intentions to do so. My Transchool interviewee
explicitly declared that the main reason to stay away from in-house plastics
manufacturing and to contract out such services was the firm's lack of appetite for
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entering the complicated world of plastics transformation and, particularly, the struggle
to obtain raw materials.
Carplofts clients, all of them automobile assemblers, had alongstanding
experience of outsourcing plastics manufacturing. Venezuela's local content regulations
for the automotive industry favored such a practice. Hence the original reason to
engage in subcontracting had little to do with raw material procurement. Yet
subcontracting plastics transformation saved the automobile assemblers the cost and
pain of negotiating resin quotas when these became a hurdle for production.
The second and third networks (Transtoys and Multinac) presented another
modality of raw material management They rationalized the procurement mechanism
by segregating their subcontractors according to their ability to access raw material
quotas-a function of size and age of the subcontractor, for the reasons discussed
earlier, The client firm provided the raw material to the smaller and younger
subcontractors, while it would let, or require, larger subcontractors to procure their
own. Again in these cases, the way in which the networks arrived to these particular
arrangements had been different
fwuhtoys, for instance, had always transformed plastics in-house and had a long
and robust history of consumption, hence its entitlement to large quotas and its
relatively strong negotiating power in dealing with the retailers. Transtoys engaged in
subcontracting in 1983, in order to meet the fast growing demand after the prohibition
of toy imports, and to cope with the uncertainties associated with the temporary
importation of molds for the Barbie doll, its main product In 1987, it was contracting
out the injection molding of different doll and toy parts to five firms, one of which was
large and modern (Filrnplast). As mentioned in Chapter IV, Filmplast also had a long
history in plastics transformation, and it became a subcontractor in the area of injection
molding only as a transitional strategy. It thus had easy access to the petrochemical
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and had no problemin obtaining raw materials smoothly and at the most
convenient rates. Transtoys' four other subcontractors (refeted to in Annex M as
Heelplast, Cosmeplast, Packingplast and Microplast) were either too small as customers
or too new to be able to compete favorably in the market for raw materials. In these
cases, Transtoys procured the inputs.
In 1987, Muhnac was also procuring raw materials for its two smallest
subcontractors, Justinpiast and Belgplast, and indirectly using the resin quotas of its
largest subcontractors, Germaplast and Colomplast But it had not always followed this
differentiated practice: before the resin supply situation had become critical, even
Justinplast and Belgplast were self-providing raw material. Multinac bad thus avoided
engaging in negotiations with the petrochemical suppliers altogether, since it did not do
any in-house plastics transformation. When the petrochemical corporations segmented
the resin market and delegated small-scale distribution to the retailers, and later, when
resin deficits became pressing, Justinpiast and Belgplast started facing the severe
procurement problems characteristic of small firms. It was then that Multinac started
considering a segmented resin procurement strategy, and by 1986 (aided by the strong
political leverage that its economic importance granted it), Multinac relieved the smaller
subcontractors from the task of purchasing the raw material that they would transforn.
However, on hindsight, it is clear that this became the first step in its disengagement
from these smaller suppliers, to a great extent because they had stopped fulfilling one of
their most strategic tasks: that of keeping Multinac away from the resin procurement
bnaines
2. T meinor Sharing,the Costs of Uncertainty: St
Prom the perspective of theorists of industrial economics and business
administration, inventory building has evolved from being a reluctant "hIro" to being the
"villain" of the manufacturing story. Professor Arnoldo Ha of the Sloan School of
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Management enjoys recounting that, in 1985, he and Dan Candia were panted an award
for an operations research book that developed a complex model to determine optimal
inventory levels aiming to smooth supply and in-process disruptions. 'They should have
taken that award back," he jokes, "because immediately afterwards we started to receive
news in the States about how the Japanese had done away with inventories
altogether!"97 Nowadays, a firm that maintains non-negligible input inventories, in-
process components, or output is perceived as suboptimally organized and not
cost-effective. By keeping stocks, that firm is bearing the costs of uncertainty that it
could avoid if it invested in creating the intelligence, internal organization, and tight
inter-firmlinkages required to minimize the uncertainty associated with the production
flow.
When uncertainty results from problems exogenous to the value chain (e.g.
international supply shocks, policy changes), however, there are limits to what any
rearrangement of the production process can do to resolve it. Hence the need to resort
to the second-best solution of inventory creation. In Venezuela, unprecedented
uncertainty in the provision of resins resulted from both the difficulty and slowness in
developing new petrochemical investments, and the constraints imposed on imports by
an official policy aimed not at industrial protection but at avoiding speculation in the
foreign exchange markets. Under such conditions, it is hard to argue against plastics
manufacturers' choice to create resin inventories. This is why-even if the title of this
section, "Transferring, or Sharing, the Costs of Uncertainty," reflects current beliefs that
maintaining inventories is uneconomical to the firm-I would argue that holding
inventories conferred plastics manufacturing firms acting as subcontractors a junctural
competitive edge in the 1980s.
S Prof. Ha's lecture at the MIT Executive Short Course in Corporate Strategy, held on
June 12-17, 1994. The book he referred to was Hax,.Arnoldo, and Dan Cadia (1984):
Prededa and mrgor Mangesent(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hail), for
which the authors received the 1985 Joint Publishers Book of the Year Award from the
Institute of Industrial Engineers.
In all networks studied in 1987, subcontractors were in charge of maintaining
stocks of resins (Table V.6 above). In the cases of Minitoys and Carplast, the
subcontractor had full and exclusive responsibility over the maintenance of the stock of
material to be used in the transaction withat particular client Miscellplast, Minitoys'
subcontractor, went even beyond that: it also created and kept an inventory for
Minitoys which the latter could use for plastics transformation with its own injection
molding machinery. In the words of Minitoys'manager,
In the low season, it might happen that part of Miscellplast's monthly resin quota
can remain unused. When we realized that this was the case, we asked
Miscellplast to allow us to use that idle portion of the quota. We would provide
Miscellplast with a justification for its request for resin (in the form of an order),
they would buy the material, we would reimburse them for it, and they would
keep the material in stock for us until the time to use it came up... (interview
with the manager, September 17, 1987)
The client in the fourth network, Transchool, opted for creating a small
"emergency stock" of resins-and, in 1987, it was planning to enlarge it-even if the
firn did not do any plastics transformation itself. Its main objective was, of course, to
prevent to the extent possible the disruptions in production generated by the
subcontractors' inability to obtain the raw material timely. Yet Transchool also
benefited from the access toraw materials enjoyed by its subcontractors when gathering
the material to build its stock. In little amounts, Transchool purchased raw materials
from its subcontractors, or it used its subcontractors' "contacts" (maybe the idle
portions of their quotas, as in the case of Minitoys and Misceliplast) to get access to
suppliers.
In the case of the second and third case studies (Transtoys and Multinac), the
tratment varied, again, depending on the particular subcontractor. In the Transtoys'
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network, Filmplast, the largest subcontractor kept its own stocks. In the rest of the
subcontracting relationships, Transtoys not only provided most of the raw material, but
it also kept stocks both for its own in-house transformation and for its subcontractors'.
Yet, as declared by my Transtoys interviewee, some subcontractors kept their own
stocks and thereby helped Transtoys hedge against uncertainty in raw material delivery.
One of the reasons why Transtoys avoided linking molding services with raw material
transactions in the case of smaller subcontractors was the firm's realization that such
practice resulted in significant increases in plastics transformation rates, associated with
raw material procurement Transtoys could avoid paying such markups because it had
its own channels to access resin quotas; other producers, such as Minitoys and
Transchool, lacked such channels and hence were captive of their subcontractors for the
procurement of raw material. Nevertheless, even in cases such as Transtoys', having a
set of subcontractors who were also capable to access the resin suppliers became a risk-
management strategy. As the Transtoys' owner put it, "having subcontractors means
that there are alternative resin quotas available to Transtoys . . . " (interview, August 7,
1987).
3. The Subcontractors' Viewpoint: Choice versus Dependence
My account of the way in which subcontracting networks distributed the costs
of transactions and uncertainty associated with input procurement depicts a situation in
which subcontractors were generally appreciated (and, often, well remunerated) for
their role in facilitating such access. I have offered evidence that subcontractors were in
charge of providing raw material in most of the transactions that I studied in 1987. And
I argue that subcontractors in rhe plastics industry gained bargaining power in the 1980s
when they managed to capture a privileged position in resin distribution channels. My
case studies also illustrate that success in positioning themselves in the raw material
market varied among networks. Whether a subcontractor managed to get such a
competitive edge or not dependecimainly on the length of their history in the trade and,
seemingly to alesser extent, on their size.
Yet this account has relied primarily on the declarations of client firms.
Interviews with the subcontractors provided further insights on the range of variation in
the level of subcontractor autonomy or bargaining power. My interviewee in
Misceliplast, the only subcontractor in the first network, revealed his perception of this
small firm's particularly strong bargaining power when he declared that
Misceliplast segregates its clients according to their reputation and commitment.
When we trust them, we are ready to provide them with the required raw
material and to offer storage services. Those whom we do not trust, we force to
put the raw material themselves... (interview with the manager, November 2,
1987).
The interviewee at Justinplast, on the other hand, offered a powerful testimony
of the vulnerability of subcontractors vis-h-vis their clients, even in cases in which the
business relationship seemed tight and stable. After a failed venture in the business of
producing cassettes in the 1970s (because of the liberalization of imports of cassette
components), Justinplast turned into a subcontractor for Multinac in 1979. Multinac
invested heavily in Justinplast to adapt the equipment and the organization to its
injection molding and assembling needs. Justinpiast provided all of Multinac's supplies
of components for shaving razors, ballpoint pens, and toothbrushes, and it assembled
the razors. In the 1980s, demand pressures created by a Multinac manager who decided
to triple the supply of shaving razors on short notice forced Justinpiast to operate
practically on a "just-in-time" basis for Multinac. From the subcontractor's viewpoint,
this event cemented the relationship between the two firms. In August of 1985,
however, in what seemed to be a hostile move, Multinac decided to automate and
integrate the razor assembly operation. In the words of my Justinplast interviewee,
...just a few months after the assembly operation was moved to Multinac, in
December of 1985, the new robot with which Multinac was assembling the
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shaving razors experienced a severe quality control problem. Multinac stopped
the production of razors for six months and, consequently, it delayed its orders
for plastic parts from Justinplast, which by then was operating practically on a
just-in -time basis for Multinac. By the end of 1986, then, Justinplast had
molded much less plastic than usual and hence had consumed much less resin
than in previous years. In other words, the "historical consumption" for 1986
was very low and thus affected Justinplast's ability to request a larger quota for
1987. .. (interview with manager, August 5, 1987)
Justinplast's operations were thereby badly disrupted. Regardless of the fact that
Justinplast had been a resin consumer for several years, the 1986 slump in demand from
Multinac, coinciding with one of the worst deficits in the industry, made it very difficult
for Justinpiast to recover its pre-1986 quota levels. The fact that Justinplast had only
one large customer-considered initially a sign of trust and firmness in the
relationship-turned to Justinplast's disadvantage. Bargaining with resin retailers in
1987 became extremely difficult. It was after this juncture that Multinac decided to
start procuring raw material directly from the suppliers and started to lose interest in its
smaller subcontractors. As seen by Multinac, it was just a matter of the subcontractor's
inability to gain a foothold on the resin market. As presented by Justinplast, it seemed
more like the drawback of working with zero-inventory in the context of restricted and
rigid input markets, and without any commitment on the part of the client firm to share
the costs of disruptions in the production flow.
D. On TrnatosCosts and Market hnterlinkages
My interpretation of the role of raw material procurement in the development of
subcontracting networks in the Venezuelan plastics industry of the 1980s has repeatedly
referred to the ideas of transactions costs and market interlinkages. These terms are
staples of today's economic literature and have undoubtedly played an important role in
bringing institutions back to the mainstream of economics. My treatment of these
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concepts does not fal squarely within the usual interpetation of the terms. I have used
them in a way that differs from that put forward by their main proponents, however.
The reason for this difference in treatment is the more central position that st policy
and intervention play in my usage of the terms, as I elaborate below.
1. Other Forms of TransaconetnCosts
As concerns the transactions costs literature, transactions costs are "the costs of
running the system" (Arrow, 1969:48)-as opposed to the costs of production-or "the
economic equivalent of friction in physical terms" (Williamson, 1986:176).
Transactions costs can be onerous where suppliers, producers and consumers exhibit
detrimental self-interest-seeking behavior ("oppornism"). They can also emerge in the
context of insufficient information regarding the natue and behavior of the transacting
parties ("bounded rationality"). These costs can be particularly important in cases
where transactions require specific investments which would go to waste if the
transaction fails ("asset specificity").
The search for information regarding the partner's behavior in order to ascertain
the chances for opportunistic behavior can be very costly. Similarly, the costs of
enforcing contract clauses attempting to minimiz the room for opportunism can be
taxing for the partners to the market relationship. The theory indicates that firms can
economize on such transactions costs by creating "institutions" (rules of the game,
relationships, incentives) different from those underlying the horizontal market
transaction. Integration into "hierarchies" is a preferred option: presumably, once
merged into a single unit, information flows among partners are smoother and interests
more harmonious, hence the original sources of transactions costs disappear. In this
framework, subcontracting would be conceived as an intermediate stage between free
market relations and fully integrated hierarchies: it is an institution where partners
engage in repeated transactions with each other, thereby having a chance to learn about
each other and making the relationship increasingly information-ricb. Thus
subcontracting is a transactions-economizing arrangement. In these models, the state
exists only as a part of the environment, either exabt frictions in market
transactions (through the imposition of tax, quota, and price control schemes,
Williasn, 1986:96)or diminishing them (through the provision of efficient legal and
judicial systems to oversee and enforce contracts).
In the cases that I have just presented, I have defined the cost of attaining access
to raw material quotas as a transactions cost, and I have singled it out as the most
important one. The cost of getting access to raw materials was obviously a "friction," a
"cost of running business" for plastics manufacturers. Yet it was not intrinsic to the
market relationship between firms engaging in plastics manufacturing deals as clients or
subcontractors; it occurred in the relationship between those firms and the raw material
suppliers. Most importantly, it emerged thanks to specific rules imposed or endorsed by
the state-the import bans, the exclusive power of petrochemical corporations over
imports, and the quota distribution system--aming, paradoxically, to prevent other
forms of oppornistic behavior associated with foreign exchange scarcity. In other
words, it was an administratively imposed cost, and not one due to inadequate
information or incomplete markets.
A pictue somewhat similar to the petrochemical-plastics dilemma emerging
from my case studies is considered by Williamson (1986:92-93; alsb cited in
aiapter IV). He describes the case of a transaction between amonopolistic supplier (in
my example, akin to the petrochemical corporations) and customers in a competitive
industry (in my example, the plastics manufacturers), where the latter try to avoid the
monopolistic prc- imposed bythe former through iiyut stitching. In the theoretical
example, -nu switching not only affects the demnand facing the supplier, but it also
results in less-than-efficient resource use. The optimal solution is for the supplier to
integrate forward. With integration and direct flow of inputs from the upstream process
to the downstream process, the incentive to switch inputs downstream disappears, thus
restoring production tothe most efficient combination of inputs. Also, internal transfer
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pricing substitutes for the previous practice of monopolistic pricing upstream, likely
leading to a lighter cost structure. In theoiy, the transactions costs dissipate.
There is, indeed, an intenational trend toIvards forward integration from resin
production to plastics transformation. Yet the forward-integration solution could not
apply to my case studies in the 1980s. First, the incentive for the suppliers was not
there: input switching (i.e. the use of substitute or recycled materials by plastics
manufacturers) was negligible, as potential substitutes were scarce or inappropriate.
But even if input switching had been technically possible and petrochemical
corporations had tried to integrate forward to avoid it, legal and economic efficiency
considerations precluded the acquisition of relatively small plastics manufacturing by
massive, partially state-owned petrochemical corporations of strategic importance.
Instead, plastics manufacturing firms (and those in need of plastics transformation
services) opted for incomplete forms ofhoritontal(and backwawt)integration, to share
the burden of the transactions costs. In other words, they decided to start or enhance
subcontracting relationships.
The development of this institution diminished the number of transactions with
resin suppliers; in some way, it could be said that it added some efficiency to the system
by facilitating the creation of economies of scale in the management of access to inputs.
But, beyond that, the institution of subcontracting among firms doing or using plastics
transformation did not eliminate the reasons for transactions costs; it did not dissipate
them. Itjust transferred the transaction cost from one manufacturing firm (the client) to
another (the subcontractor)-a solution, and a problem, that could be said to fall
outside the main focus of tranactions cost economics. Subcontracting, as presented in
my plastics manufacturing cases, was thus not an optimal
transactions-cost-economizing device. Again, it was a second-best solution, where one
party was relieved of th rnntoscosts by passing it on to the other.
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My account of subcontracting relationships in the 1980s up to this point,
including the discussions in Chapters III and V, however, has presented a case of
relatively balanced relationships between clients and sub tt which contrasts
with the notion that they were "victims" of the transactions-costs transfer. The flip side
of the argument-and one of the reasons why subcontractors as a group seemed
relatively well-off during the 1980s-is that the fact that subcontractors bore the costs
of transacting in the resin market also rneant that they were the party with access to
such a constrained and difficult market. The subcontractor had an effective bargaining
tool vis-k-vis its client when that client firm was unable to access input market at a
rasonable cost.
In the case studies that I have described, the first and fourth networks (Minitoys
and Transchool) were definitely examples of subcontractors trading on relatively equal
terms with their clients, thanks to the control over access to inputs that they had gained
over the years. What did subcontractors claim in exchange for such an important trade
card? In exchange, they got access to consumer demand (through the derived demand
for plastic components), of which Minitoys and Transchool had plenty thanks to their
tight connections to ditribution channels.
The example of Multinac and its two smallest subcontractors (Justinplast and
Belgplast) is exactly the opposite case: At a certain point, it became excessively hard or
costly for Multinac to rely on Belgplast and Justinpiast for the indirect provision of
resins. Multinac then developed alterative channels for the provision of resin, either
through taking advantage of loopholes in the system(which would not be difficult for
this powerful multinational) or through its other subcontractors. Once it did so, the
burden of finding other ways of making their services attractive to Multinac lay on the
two small subcontractors. (My 1992 evidence, discussed in Chapter VI, revealed that
Belgplast found such alternative mechanisms, while Justinpiast could not.)
25O0-
In sum, my usage of the concept of transactions costs differs conceptually from
the recent usage of the term. Not that opportunities for exercising, and attempts to
minimize, opportunism among partners in subcontracting networks were not there. On
the contrary, cases where subcontractors diversified clients to minimize risk, or where
clients disseminated different parts of a given good among subcontractors in very
different locations to avoid that a single subcontractor ran away with their final product,
or strict clauses prohibiting the "opening" of the molds, to avoid copies of the mold
technology and design, were not uncommon. Indeed, the fear of opportunism and its
associated transactions costs shaped subcontracting agreements, as I will further discuss
below. Yet my argument is that the emergence or strengthening of subcontracting was
the response to a source of uncertainty exogenous to the value chain, and one which
was deemed more serious than partners' opportunisa: raw material availability and the
policies that guided their supply.
2. Other Forms of Interilnked Transacdons
As summarized by Clive Bell, "[An interlinked transaction is one in which two
parties trade in at least two markets on the condition that the terms of all such trades are
jointly determined" (1988:797). The notion of interlinked transactions is closely related
to that of transactions costs, in the sense that in both cases insufficient information and
the aim to minimize the costs of opportunism are the point of departure. Indeed, Bell
indicates that mitigating transactions costs might be one of three possible purposes of
transactions interlinkages.98 Engaging in simultaneous transactions in different markets
with the same partner has two effects: it emphasizes reciprocal obligations, bringing the
two parties closer together, and it offers the leverage associated with the relationship in
one market to enforce the fulfillment of contracts in another. Both of these properties
98 The other two purposes of transactions interlinkages proposed by Clive Bell art to
exercise "profitable control" over the doings of a partner, in order to prevent moral
hazard problems, and to screen potential partners (ibid. :800-801).
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reduce uncertainty in the relationship: "flbe]deliberate intetwining of several
transactions between two agents springs directly from the necessity of close control
when information is costly to obtain and hmrically eld"'(ibit764).
Early on, economists defined the notion of interlinked transactions and markets
as a pie-capitalist form of organization-hence e ese towards
exemplified in F.G. Bailey's 1966 statement that "[The watershed between traditional
and modern society is exactly this distinction between single-interest and multiplex
relationships" (quoted in Bardban, 1980:82). Many studies since have demonstrated
that interlinked transactions are well and alive in contexts where market exchange is
already the dominant transactional mode (Bardhan, op.cit, 82-87; Hart, 1986:185;
Braverman and Stiglitz: 1982, amongst others). Yet most studies addressing the concept
of interlinked markets are based on rural case studies. They are also mainly concerned
with the linkage between labor and other markets (particularly,land and credit), hence
they usually look at the relationships between tenants or peasants and landlords. One
could think of a ready application of this concept to the case of small scale enterprises in
the informal sector, where some forms of "tied" labor and dependence on informal
credit and land markets are common. Nevertheless, little has been written on interlinked
transactions in non-agricultural enterprises in the informal sector and, even less so, on
interlinkages emerging in the relationships between firms in the "moder" industrial
sector, such as the case that concerns this study.
I will argue that the notion of interlinkezl transactions is useful in understanding
subcontracting relationships in the Venezuela plastics industry in the 1980s,
particularly when one tries to view them from the perspective of the subcontractors. On
which basis would subcontractors compete for the client firms' business? In a highly
regulated context, characterized by scarcities in several markets, they would not
necessarily compete on the basis of cheaper services (although many clients mentioned
-rc as an important factor), but likely on the basis of their ability to dfrntaetheir
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product. Usually, such a differentiation was achieved by "bundling" the service of
plastics transformation together with other services or resources to which clients would
attribute high value-i.e. scarce services or resources such as specialized mold-making
skills, mentioned in Chapter III, or mold maintenance services, mentioned in Chapter
IV, or resources affected by severe quantitative restrictions, such as patented
technology, or the case of raw materials that concerns this chapter. Such strategic
bundling of services, or interlinked transactions, not only helped the subcontractors
attract clients, but they also facilitated the task of keeping them "captive," at least as
long as raw material scarcity remained the main hurdle facing plastics manufacturers.
Examples of strategic bundling of, or interlinked, transactions in plastics
transformation are multiple. One could even find cases analogous to several of the
examples of such interlinkages in the prolific literature on rural markets, as well as to
each of the rationales for market interlinkage discussed by Clive Bell in his summary
article on the matter
Interlinking frwsactions to cope with incomplete or imperfect markets:
As mentioned earlier, clients could opt for buying the idle portion of a
subcontractor's resin quota off-season, and the subcontractors would accept
such a transaction on the condition that the client would contract out the
transformation of all or part of that raw material to the subcontractor making
the purchase. In some cases, such as that of Miscellplast, the subcontractors
could even offer to store the material until the peak season arrived. This
way, on peak season, neither the client firm would have to be worried for
not finding the necessary raw material, nor the subcontractor would have to
be concerned to fd clients. Both would be committed to work with the
other in the subcontracting relationship, thanks to the raw material
arrangement. This example is akin to the one described by Pranab Barrdhan
(1984), where ". .. agricultural laborers (wouldJ take loans from a farmer
during the slack season in exchange for a promise to work for him during
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peak periods, when otherwise he may have no assurance of getting enough
workers just when he needs them... "(cited in Bell, ep.cd.:798).
* Interlocking tansactons to save trnsacdons coss: Bell reminds us that
transactions costs"... depend on the number of separate occasions an
individual attempts a transaction and [... ] on the number of other parties
with whom he deals," and that "when two people trade with each other in
two or more markets, at least one of them should profit thereby" (Lid.:799).
The reason why this argument was relevant in the case of subcontracting
networks in the Venezuelan plastics industry of the 1980s has been repeated
in preceding sections of this chapter. Through subcontracting, the client firm
avoided the trouble of dealing with complicated markets for raw materials-
the example of Transtoys, which simply refused engaging in plastics
transformation altogether in order to avoid such troubles, is a case in point.
Similarly, through being subcontractors in a network, plastics manufacturers
such as Justinplast and Miscellplast avoided the trouble of having to access
final markets directly (ie. doing consumer marketing analysis, developing
products and producing and assembling all the parts, negotiating with the
government the "consumer price" to be charged for the good, developing
distribution networks, handling inventories of parts and final product). This,
despite the entrepreneurs' personal preference for having "independent"
businesses.
* Interlinking tuasacdons to migut. problems of moral hazdt: One way
in which client firms would make sure that a "demanding" subcontractor
such as Misceliplast would continue to provide them with raw material
would be to reassure this subcontractor that all, or at least an agreeable part,
of the raw material provided would be transformed by this subcontractor on
terms that it deems acceptable. Similarly, it is obviously in the interest of the
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subcontractor to bundle the transaction in market for plastics transformation
with the transaction in the complicated market for resins, if the subcontractor
knows that the availability of resins would affect clients' capabilities to give
them plastics transformation jobs. This example is akin to that of
sharecropping, where "one wayofinducingworkerstopayduecare[. ..
while transplanting and weeding is to offer them exclusive rights to harvest
the crop on a share"basis and where the landlord does better at playing
the moneylender, too," .. . if the amount and terms of the credit available to
the tenant affect his performance as a cultivator and this, in turn, affects the
landlord's income "(Bell, op.cit.:800). Bundling transactions, in cases
like these, allows one party to exercise a greater degree of control over the
other. It also allows the parties to screen among partners, another of the
functions of interlinked transactions discussed by Bell.
Stretching the argument to the extreme, subcontracting could be defined, in any
case, as the bundling of several transactions or several markets together. When the
client buys plastics transformation instead of doing it in-house, it indeed acquires a
package of services and resources: raw materials, labor, capital, complementary
services, and the managerial skills to obtain all these resources and to put them to work
together. The subcontractor is, then, paid for such a package. The distinct feature of
subcontracting relationships in the Venezuelan plastics industry during much of the
1980s was that such bundling was, as qualified earlier, "strategic." In many cases, it
was not the plastics transformation service itself that made a particular subcontractor
attractive to the client firms, but that subcontractors' ability to gain a foothold on crucial
markets that it could skillfully link to its transformation service. The more the control
of the subcontractor over particularly tight markets or scarce resources, the better its
chance of attracting and keeping clients, and the better its chance of exerting control
over its subcontracting relationship. Such strategic power was conferred to the usually
weakest party in a subcontracting relationship, the subcontractor, by the nature of
government regulation.
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: Perfect Adjustmneat Strategy or Second-Best Solution?
This chapter completes this study's exploration of the nature of subcontracting
relationships in plastics manufacturing in 1983-88. 1 have analyzed Venezuela's plastics
manuacturing subcontracting from three different angles. Pint, in Chapter II,I
explored whether firms engaged in vertical disintegration of production and
subcontracting in order to cut labor costs. On the basis of surrogate indicators, I
arrived to the conclusion that cutting labor costs was not a driving force for
subcontracting, as observed in this particular industry at the time. Moreover,
subcontracting was far from the subordinating and polarized relationship portrayed by
the informal sector literature; when in need of keeping labor cost in check, firms in the
sector opted for other strategies (e.g. individual hiring of casual workers). In
Chapter IV, I looked at whether subcontracting was, instead, a strategy to avoid
irreversible investments in the context of uncertainty, and whether it became a
mechanism for transferring the costs of uncertainty from client firms to subcontractors.
My observations led me to reject this hypothesis too. This time, the reason why the
model did not conform to reality was the complex policy environment in which
subcontracting developed in the 1980s, which generated apparently "irrational"
investment responses. It was supply-side uncertainty, and not demand-side uncertainty,
that drove subcontracting in the 1980s-and this distinction made subcontractors
better-off than they would have been otherwise.
Finally, in this Chapter, Ihave rounded up this argument by discussing the form
of supply-side difficulty that seemed to cary most weight in plastics manufacturing in
the 1980s: uncertainty and high transactions costs in the supply of petrochemical
inputs. My focus on the petrochemical problem, and not other supply-side problems
also confronting the industry-e.g. the problem of specialized skills or the bottdeneck
represented by molds and poor connections to the metal working industry-stems not
from this being the mnst urgent and overwhelming problem, but from the paradox that it
raised regarding resource based industrialization. It would seem as if the conclusion to
be arrived at, akin to that of the so-called "curse" thesis (Auty, 1994), were that natural
resource abundance leads to atrophy of downstream activity. But is that really so?
It is not resource abunda per se, but policies that govern their management,
and supply responses to those policies, that determine the success or failure of forward
linkages from a resource base. The observed period, 1983-88, is as much a proof of the
success as it could be of the failure of linkages between petrochemical investments and
plastics manufacturing in Venezuela. Until the late 1970s, plastics manufacturing had
developed in Venezuela on the basis of imported petrochemical inputs. With subsidized
interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate, and abundant petrodollars to spend, getting
access to equipment and resins was not a problem for aspiring plastics manufacturers.
The industry grew extremely fast, although from a very small basis, during the 1970s.
Yet it reached the limits imposed by a rather narrow market and import competition. In
the 1980s, in contrast, import competition disappeared, a captive demand was created
and, in addition, cheap raw material supply was available right within the country. Not
only did plastics manufacturing output reach record levels, but petrochemical
corporations made profits for the first time, in the protected context of the 1980s. The
government had fulfilled the first of its two functions in an "unbalanced growth"
strategy, as postulated by Hirscbman (1958:202-203): initiating development through
policies and investments that set up imbalances that "cry to be corrected."
The exhaustion of this patter of growth arrived as a result of the same policies
that had engendered it. With continued protectionism, upstream suppliers felt
overwhelmed by local demand for resins and, unable to get access to increasing resin
supplies, downstream plastics manufacturers were stymied. At that point, instead of
fulfilling its second function in the unbalanced growth strategy (relieving pressures,
"catching up,""'fllling in"...) (Hirschman, op. cit.; Shapiro, 1989), which would have
prbbycosse of liberalizing resin imports, the government maintained the strict
import controls. Such policy "stubbornness"male eminent sense from the perspective
IK
of the policy makers. The purpose of the trade and exchange rate policies had never
been tosupport local industry, but to avert the intensification of the bal f payment
crisis of 1983.
Bcuethe kpRblM f-ad by patcfauatresi rcrn esinswas not.
the resins' high price, but nonprice constraints, the manufacturers' response was not a
typical market response (i.e. bidding other buyers out of the resin market by offering
higher prices) but what mainstrameconomists would call an "institutional" response:
they developed an "institution," alternative to the market, to manage access to resins.
FIRm who had a foothold on the resin market because of a longstanding history of
consumption offered that advantage to other fins-newcomers, firms willing to grow
faster than their quotas would allow them, smaller firms. Subcontracting grew in the
1980s, I argue, for those reasons. It evolved to encompass more complex transactions
and, as discussed in this chapter, it interlinked markets and thus turned into an insurance
mechanism benefiting the subcontractors involved. In other words, it became the
perfect institutional adaptation to the restricted supply conditions of the 1980s and, for a
change, allowed for relatively strong bargaining power for subcontractors vis--vis their
clients.
From the welfare standpoint, however, the institution of subcontracting was a
second-best solution. Because it was based on some firms' (subcontractors') mnonopoly
or oligopoly power over restricted resin quotas, it lent itself to the generation of
monopoly pricing and rents and, presumably, to inefficient operations. In the longer
term, it also lent itself to the intensification of inequalities in the industry, as the number
of firms benefiting from such astrategy was, by definition, limitea Furtherm te,
subcontracting based on the control over resin quotas obviously had less prospects as a
source of dynamic comparative advantages than an alternative strategy based, for
instance, a firm's monopoly over specialized skills. Although on i
arr aeum entvlved ad epme atganmopex hywac based
on a saieore
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Nevertheless, the fact that such a curious institutional solution developed, which
required coordination, resources, and wit, calls one's attention to the resource behind
these decisions: entrepreneurship. Could the management skills and learning involved
in developing increasingly complex subcontracting arrangements be applied to the
generation of other forms of comparative advantage, under a different incentive
framework (since I have placed such strong emphasis on the incentive framework)?
Starting in 1989, the turn of events provided the conditions to explore this question: a
macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment program was put in place, altering the
incentive framework prevailing in the 1980s. Chapter VI looks at the preliminary
evidence (1989-92) on subcontracting responses to adjustment.
VL. ETRN TUE 190s SURCONTRACIING UNDER ADJUST1MNT
A. Itontn
This chapter documents the rcsponse of subcontracting networks in the
Venezuelan plastics industry to the onset of the structural adjustment program in
February, 1989. The recent literature on inter-firm networks and the organization of
work conveys the message that systematic inter-firm cooperation contributes to firms'
resilience in the face of economic disruption, as weli as to their proneness to innovate.
For instance, the main thrust of the flexible specialization and industrial districts
literature has been to explain, in terms of these two concepts, the dynamism of some
industrial clusters in Italy, Germany, Denmark, and other OECD countries, despite the
countries' generaleconomnic stagniation ,during the late 1970s and 1980s.99 As
acrecnmic regulation mechanisms falter, this literature contends, inter-firm
networks and the social relationships thataccompany them in industrial clusters offer
the safety nets, insurance mechanisms, and information flows that mitigate business risk
promote innovation, and encourage production. Authors who apply the industrial
district concept to developing countries do it under the presumption that it represents an
appropriate solution to the problem of industrial development in such economies, where
small-scale and labor intensive firms, market fragmentation, and uncertainty are the rule
rather than the exception. 100
According to this literature, then, the proliferation of subcontracting networks in
Venezuela's plastics manufacturing during the 1980s and hence theircosius
presence when structural adjustment was implemented in 1989 could have been
The relevant linarc kicdes Porw andSabel(1984), Banni (1978) Smaco
(1982), and Pyke ad (1992)
100 eL(1992), Scitzk(1990,992)SM992)
low0
expected to provide plastics manufacturers with an institutional infrastructure that
would enhance their resilience in the face of thange. If this had been so, following
macroeconomic stabilization one would have expected relatively better performance
from firms in networks than from other plastics manufacturers, as well as the survival of
the networks themselves.
My research indicates that networks' performance during economic turbulence
and downturn is contingent both on the nature of the network and the features of the
downturn. Knowing the origins and evolution of the networks thus helps to understand
their response to adjustment In contrast to the literature just cited, my findings of the
1980s led me to expect the demise of most subcontracting networks in Venezuela's
plastics manufacturing after adjustment, unless subcontractors moved swiftly towards
developing new sources of competitiveness. Evidence presented in previous chapters
suggested that much subcontracting resulted from the client firms' efforts to overcome
constraints on access to such crucial inputs as specialized machining (mold making) and
molding skills (Chapters III, IV), foreign exchange (Chapter IV) and, especially, raw
materials (Chapter V). For specialized machining and molding skills, the problem was
real scarcity: demand for specialized technicians outstripped supply, and neither the
training system nor immigration could fumish the required personnel in the short term
(at a time when the economic crisis made the country less attractive to specialized
immigrant labor). For raw materials and foreign exchange, however, the problem of the
1980s was primarily administrative: firms might have been able and willing to pay more
for dollars and resins in the international market, but they were not allowed to do it.
If overcoming administrative constraints was the main driving forve for
subcontracting, then the stabilization and structural adjustment program was bound to
weaken the rationale for most of subcontracting-or to uncover an alternative rationale.
By definition, the purpose of a macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment
program is to eliminate distortions and administrative constraints on the free operation
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of markets. With the disappearance of the factors that I had identified in 1987 as the
main reasons for subcontracting, would subcontracting also disappear? Or, following
the literature on industrial districts and inter-firm cooperation, had firms in
subcontracting relationships discovered other advantages of joint action and opted to
maintain some form of network? Would firms in thr networks exhibit special resilience
in the face of a demand contraction?
Contrasting the experience of the plastics manufacturing industry in 1989-91
with that in 1983-88 offers an ideal natural experiment to address these questions. 101
The outcome of this final step in my inquiry on Venezuela's plastics manufacturing
subcontracting, presented in this chapter, is an image of significant restructuring of
subcontracting networks under adjustment the demise of capacity subcontracting and a
process of selective vertical integration in specialization subcontracting. The short-term
success of some firm strategies to cope with adjustment is explored.
B. Turning Away from the Old Ways: The Adjustment Program of 1989
1. The Old System
In previous chapters, I have indicated that the set of policies that the Venezuelan
government implemented in the 1980s was aimed at coping with the economic
conditions associated with the 1983 debt crisis: weakening and overvaluation of the
domestic currency, depletion of the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank,
massive capital flight, and stagnation of domestic production. These emergency policies
established a multitier exchange rate system, a multitier system of tariffs and quantitative
restrictions on trade (including, as in the case of toys, import bans), and interest rate
101 Thej caveat is that, at the time of the analysis, only three years had elapsed since the
adjustment program had been initiated (1989, 1990, and 1991). Hence, the observations
in 1992 indicate only general directions of firm strategy.
ceilings, and included frequently changing mesures to compensate for the erosion of
real wages caused by the gradual devaluation of the bolivar. The policies fit the
prevailing decision making model-ad hoc and piecemeal treatment of issues, chief
concern with maintaining politicallegitimacy, attempt to reond simultaneously to
multiple and sometimes conflicting interests, and lack of sufficient autonomy for the
government to transcend the traditional role of provider and controller and to perform
instead the role of promoter and standards-enforcer.
For many Venezuelan plastics manufacturers, the policies meant, as discussed in
earlier chapters, a sudden jump in demand. But their ability to meet this demand was
hampered by an uncertain resin supply, uncertain cost and availability of foreign
currency and thus imports, regulations increasing nonwage labor costs, and-because of
the out-migration of foreign-born specialized technicians-a shrinking supply of
specialized skills. That profits in plastics manufacturing grew consistently as a share of
output through the 1980s is proof, however, that supply-side constraints did not fully
prevent the industry from benefiting from the growing demand. Yet, in the face of these
constraints, entrepreneurs had to dedicate scarce time and skills to negotiating complex
transactions with each other (as in the subcontracting arrangements described in
Chapter V) and to lobbying the government for concessions to overcome the supply
hurdles, taking advantage of the piecemeal approach to policy.
A prime example of lobbying to enhance an industry's prospects is the case of
toy makers. They found themselves in a bind in 1983, when the government imposed an
import ban on the trade category "toys," including also their components (small motors,
dolls' joints, eyes, and synthetic hair). Toy mnanufacturers lobbied for disaggregation of
the trade code into two subcategories-finished toys and toy components-rather than
try to produce the components locally (my interviewees insisted that local production
would not be economical). It was at this time that CAVEFAJ, the Venezuelan Chamber
of Toy Manufacturers, got its initial push. Created in 1975, CAVEFAJ had remained
small and inconsequential throughout the 1970s. In 1983, when toy importers serving
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the Venezuelan market were constrained from continuing their activities, many turned to
manufacturing and joined the chamber. Putting their sophisticated organizational
abilities to work, they transformed CAVEFAJ into one of the strongest and most
articulate bNsiness organizations in the country. By 1985, CAVEFA had succeeded in
getting the trade code dThat enabled toy makers to import mechanisms
under a reasonable tariff and to sell Venezuelan-made toys locally under the full
protection of the import ban. For toy manufacturers, the strategy was successful:
between 1985 and 1987, this combination of factors generated the fastest growth the
toy industry has ever experienced.
2. The New System The Eighth Five-Year Plan (1989-93)
The 1989 policy reform program disrupted that old system, although only the
stabilization measures established by presidential decree were implemented promptly-
trade reform, liberalization of some public service rates, devaluation of the bolivar, and
simplification of the exchange rate system. Reactions from consumers and from
representatives in Congress slowed down the introduction of other measures
(privatization program, labor market reform, tax reform), resulting in a somewhat
incomplete structural adjustment. This section summarizes the reasons for, and the
nature of, the program started in 1989.
Carlos Andrds Pdrez was elected Venezuela's president in December 1988 and
tcoK power in February 1989. Hausmann (1990:4) summarized the major
macroeconomic imbalances that greeted this new administration:
First, an external babalance was reflected in a large current account
deficit, low liquid international reserves (US$300 million), an exploding
foreign exchange premium, short-term central bank dollar liabilities
(recognized official rate letters of credit) of US$6.3 billion, of which
-264
nre than US$1 billion was overdue, and the lack of an interational
financing plan for 1989.
* Second, thefscaldefiit, which had reached 9.9 percent of GDP in
1988, was projected to rise to 12 percent ofGDP,mainlyasarsultof
the impact of rising expliicit icit subsidies on goods.
* Third, repressed ijahden wM causing serious shortages of basic
products and massive speculatory inventory accumulation. This situation
was generated not only by growing pressure on controlled prices, but
also by the general perception that a major devaluation was imminent
* Fourth, severefancialrepreulon was-being generated by inflationary
expectations in the context of controlled interest rates. Strong demand
emerged for credit, which was generally used to finance inventory
accumulation or capital flight. For the first tint, a parallel interest rate
appeared, hovering around 30 percent while the official ceiling was at
13 percent.
Backed by a team of young economists, some of them recent graduates from
top-ranked U.S. universities, and with the blessing and subsequent financial support of
the International Monetary Fund ad the World Bank, President Pdrez put forward an
economic program that attempted to break with the habits of the past, including those
that his earlier administration, presiding over the oil boom of the 1970s, had fostered:
widespread subsidization and indiscriminate protection; lack of reward to efficiency,
competitiveness, and innovation; and excessive reliance of productive and service
activities on government financing. Many of the program's measures-especially those
associated with macroeconomic stabilizatin-were implemented immediately through
presidential decrees. The planning ministry summarized these, and other measures
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requiring congresional approval, in a documnt entitled HC n Vi'. ("the great
turnaround") presented to the Venezuelan Congress in January 1990.102
"The great turnaround" recognized several achievements of the past-a solid
democracyYto3 a relatively modern production apparatus, well-developed basic industry,
broadly expanded education and health systems, and a set of technically capable regional
development corporations that could aid the decentralizatin process. But it also
highlighted problems: declining and unequal incomes (by 1989, a third of Venezuelan
families were under the absolute poverty line104); an overextended state, which
hampered effective action by both the public and the private sectors; an inefficient
productive system; poorly performing nontraditional(non-oil)expats; an excessively
centralized political system; and inefficient provision of services and justice. The
document summaried Venezuela's problem as "the obsolescence of a development
model based on import-substitution,... made obvious in 1983, as a result of the fall in
the oil prices, capital ffight, and the suspension of external lending by commercial
banks .. ." (CORDIPLAN, 1990:1-2). It called this crisis an opportunity for change,
and the proposed program asubtegichexagon, based on "social commitment, growth
without inflation, inationtional competitiveness, conservation of natural resources,
institutional change, and enhancement of human capital". (ibid:l1).
The set of measures that swiftly followed have been described by Venezuelan
observers as less a deliberate, orderly translation of these good intentions into action
than "a consequence of a demse effect" (Hausmann, op.cit:9; also Nafm, 1992). Once
102 CORDIPLAN (1990), E Gn Vlu*e: innmleteu Generles EelV~il Pif de la
Nacidm. Document presented to the Venezuelan Congress, January 1990.
103 Yet the solidity of such a democracy may have been closely associated with the
104 'fle stimate infElGw. Vli*g is much lower than that in a World Bank study on
poverty and social sectors, which reped the share of the population living in poverty
in 1989 at about 53% (World Bank, 1991).
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the unification of the exchange rate into a single, floating rate was decided on-a
somewhat unavoidable step, given the unsustainable balance of payments situation and
the low foreign exchange reserves-adjusting some public service rates and liberalizing
prices, interest rates, and trade became either necessary or less politically costly.
Hausmann and Nafm argue that price liberaliztion, for example, became necessary as
the price control system simply collapsed under the avalanche of applications for
product-by-product price increases after the devaluation. And trade liberaliztion
became politically acceptable to consumers because it neutralized the effect of the
devaluation on the price of imports. Whether carefully planned or not, the set of
measures put in place in 1989 by the Pdrez administration added up to a "big bang"
approach to stabilization.
The stabilization measures had severe short-term macroeconomic consequences.
The official interest rate on loans jumped from 13% to an average of 34.3% between
1988 and 1989105. The average exchange rate increased from Bs. 33.5 per dollar to
Bs. 43.1 per dollar, as the cheaper, 'preferential" exchange rates were eliminated. The
end-of-year consumer price index increased from 35.5% to 81%. GDP contracted by
8.9%, driving the open unemployment rate up from 7% to 10%. On the other hand, the
public deficit decreased from 9.4% to 1.1% of GNP (although mostly as a result of the
devaluation, which inflated oil revenues in dollar terms).
In 1990-92, however, GDP recovered and unemployment declined, indicating
that, after the initial shock, the economy was reacting positively to the stabiliztion
measures. Some signs of recovery were already observable in 1990, fueled mainly by
the private sector's confidence in the newly reformed economy, as reflected in
increasing return capital and foreign investment flows (Figure VI.1). The inflationary
effects of the devaluation softened; inflation fell in 1990 to half its 1989 level and
105 Rane in the growing black market for capital had long reached those levels (Hausmaun,
1990).
remained roughly in check thereafter, slowing down the downward trend in the
purchasing power of wages.
Figure VI Net Foreign Direct Inetn,95-91
(US$ millions)
2,000--
1,500-
1,000
500
0
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Serve: World Bank (1993), Weld TaB1993-4 volum 2, p. 490.
The growth taking place in 1991-92 occurred under conditions very different
from those prevailing in th previous growth period (1983-8): real interest rates and
inflation were much higher,akhough in check, in the early 1990s; fiscal accounts failed
to stabilize (as a result of declining oil export revenues combined with t stalling of the
privatintion and tax reform programs); and t exchange rate continued to rise
(Table VI.1). So, in contrast to t pre-adjustment era, when admnrVCaacted
as the main rationing rhnmin the early post-adjustunt era marks - served
that funton
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Table V.1 Result oflde Stabiization Component of the Economic Rdonu
Prgram,19i-9
Indicator 1987 1988 1989 1.990) 1991 (es)
Economic ityand pr trends
Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 5.8 -8.9 6.9 10.4 7.5
Inflation (end-of-year CPI) 40.3 35.5 81.0 36.5 31.0 32.0
Balane of payments
Current account (US$ billions) -IA -5.8 2.2 8.0 1.7 -1.7
Gross international reserves (US$ billions) 9.4 6.6 7.6 11.8 14.1 13.5
Publicsectorsurplus(%ofGNP) -1.6 -9A -1.1 0.2 -0.6 -6.0
interest rate an lous (%) a/ 12.6 13.0 34.3 34.7 37.5 40.6
Floating exchange rate (Bs. per dellar) bl 31.6 40.5 43.1 50.5 61.7 72.7
Unmplopaent rate (%) 8.5 6.9 9.9 8.8 7.5 6.9
a. The figures cited are the official rate. In 1988, black market interest rates reached
nearly 30%.
b. Given the maintenance of a parallel, official two-tiered exchange rate system, the
average exchange rate in 1987 and 1988 was lower than that presented here.
Source: Central Bank; presentation by Dr. Jose I. Moreno Le6n, Harvard University,
April 27, 1993.
3. the Secondary Petoche Industry
With respect to petroleum and its derivatives, the main objective of "the great
turnaround" was to increase and diversify opportunities for generating foreign
exchange, create adequate commercialization strategies, and eliminate subsidies and
adjust prices in order to promote efficiency and ensure competitiveness. Thus, the
government lifted the ban on resin imports and allowed all resin users to import directly
according to their needs, lowered the remaining import tariffs, reduced subsidies to the
petrochemical industry, and abolished the troublesome system of distribution quotas and
W-2OR
retailing channela It also allowed petrochemical corporations to export their surplus
output and to exchange their export proceeds at the free-floating exchange rate.
Adjustment benefited most of the corporations. As a result of the
continued devaluation of the bolfvar and the inherent cost advantage of much of local
petrochemical production, prices for most domestic resin remained competitive despite
the price and the elimination of subsidies (Table VL2). Thus, exports
started to pick up while domestic customs remained interested in purchasing resins
locally-which petrochemical corporations further by improving delivery
services and technical advice. Meanwhile, resin imports lagged because of the general
contraction in the demand for and output of plastic manufactures. As a result, both
capacity utilization and profits in the secondary petrochemical industry remained high in
the short run (Tables VI.3 and VL4).
For plastics manufacturing firms, policy reforms affecting the petrochemical
industry were either good or bad news, depending on the foundation of their business
during the 1980s. Firms whose growth had been stifled earlier by bans on imported
resins and/or by the rigidity of domestic resin quotas could now resume plans for
expansion. These firms included, among my case studies, some muitinational
corporations and local users of plastics containers; the reforms encouraged them to shift
from procurement of resins through subcontractors to self-procurement. Firms that had
maintained modest but stable resin quotas during the 1980s (e.g. small-scale firms with a
Jong tradition in plastics mwufacturing) were severely affected by the trebling of
domestic resin prices in bolfvar terms between 1988 and 1990. Finally, firms that had
acquired market power in the 1980s based on their exclusive access-to large resin
quotas (e.g. many of the subcontractors in my case studies) lost this competitive
advantage.
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Table VL2 Venez anand US. Prices ofSehectd ReSs, 198-90
(price per metric ton)
Resin 1988 1989 1990
LDPE
Venezuelan price (Bs) 15,400 38,630 43,110
U.S. price, fob Gulf (US$) 1,328 1,175 1,145
U.S. price, fob Gulf (Bs, preferential rate) 19,256 n,.a. a
U.S. price, fob Gulf (Bs, average floating rate) 46,480 44,650 52,441
Venezuelan/U.S. price (%) a/ 33 87 82
HDPE
Venezuelan price (Bs) 13,800 31,250 45,000
U.S. price, fob Gulf (US$) 1,294 1,050 1,145
U.S. price, fob Gulf (Bs, preferential rate) 18,763 ta. n.a.
U.S. price, fob Gulf (Bs, average floating rate) 45,290 39,900 52,441
Venezuelan/U.S. price (%) a/ 30 78 86
PVC
Venezuelan price (Bs) 12,510 31,780 34,100
U.S. price, fob Gulf (US$) 1,086 900 903
U.S. price, fob Gulf (Bs, preferential rate) 15,747 n.a. n.a.
U.S. price, fob Gulf (Bsaveragefloating rate) 38,010 34,200 41,357
Venezuelan/U.S. rice (%) a/ 33 93 82
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: In principle, the preferential rate is the one at which joint venture petrochemical
corporations were allowed to import resins until early 1989, while the average floating
rate was the one at which individual manufaturers would have to buy them. The
preferential rate was eliminated in early 1989. For 1987 data, see Table VA in
Chapter V.
a. Calculated based on U.S. p-e in bolivares at the floating rate.
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (1991), skidle de a Cadena de ReanuI y PIdMces.
Tae VL Apparent M by the Vneman
PlatinMantninrngIndustry,19NS-90
(thousands of metric tons)
Resin 1988 1989 1990 a/
LDPE
Gross output 67.5 57.8 72.0
Imports 34.5 29.1 3.2
Exports 0.0 18.5 13.0
Apparent consumption b/ .102.0 68.4 70.0
Installed capacity 68.0 68.0 68.0
Estimnatecapacityutilization(%)c/ 99 85 106
HDPE
Gross output 77.1 59.6 84.6
Imports 2.0 1.4 1.1
Exports 3.5 13.2 41.9
Apparent consumption b/ 75.6 47.8 50.2
Installed capacity 80.0 80.0 80.0
Estimatecapacityutilization(%)c/ 96 75 106
PS
Gross output 50.9 40.9 42.0
Imports (B) 6.0 0.5 4.2
Exports 7.6 22.0 19.5
Apparent consumption b/ 49.3 19.4 27.7
Installed capacity 70.0 70.0 70.0
Estimnatecapacityutilization(%)c/ 73 58 60
PVC
Gross output 31.8 32.6 17.6
Imports 51.2 24.1 14A
Exports 1.7 2.6 5.2
Apparent consumption b 81.3 54.1 53.8
Installed capacity 40.0 40.0 40.0
Estimate capacity utilization (%) 80 82 44
Note: Data forl1982-87 are in Table V.l inChapter V.
a. Until 1988, inventory movements were insignificant. Inventory building was high in
1989, however. Apparent consumption for 1990 thus hides inventory depletion equal to
7,800 MT for LDPE, 6,400 MT for HDPE, 1,000 for PS, and 27,000 MT for PVC.
b. Calculated by subtracting exports from the sum of gross output and imports.
c. Calculated by dividing gross output by installed capacity.
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (1991): E&tudIo de l. Cedena. 4e Resin.asy Pldstkeas.
Ministry of Energy and Mines, resin producers, PEQUIVEN, Oficina Central de
Estadistica e Informttica.
Table VIA Gros Proftas a Share Of Gross Output,1963-91
(perent)
Sector 1988 1989 1990
All industries 26.3 36.9 47.9
Large (moe than 100 employees) 27.8 40.0 51.8
Medium 1(51-100 employees) 19.6 19.2 154
Medium II(21-50 employees) 21.4 22.3 20.4
Small (5-20 employees) 21.1 18.4 19.1
ISIC 3513 35.9 43.6 22.8
Large (more than 100 employees) 36.8 44.5 23.7
Medium 1(51-100 employees) 27.5 24.9 20.3
Medium II(21-50 employees) 29.0 39.1 5.3
Small (5-20 employees) 3.0 8.4 -78.2
ISIC 356 20.3 14.4 8.4
Large (more than 100 employees) 18.5 8.8 2.5
Medium 1(51-100 employees) 19.6 14.5 19.2
Medium 11(21-50 employees) 23.0 26.0 16.3
Small (5-20 employees) 31.1 31.5 16.2
Note: ISIC 3513 is the code for synthetic resins, plastic materials, and artificial fibers.
ISIC 356 is plastics manufacturing.
Soure: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informitica, Encuuuta Industrial(various
years).
C. The View from the Industry: Medium-Term Recovery
1. A Short-Term Shock
The short-term contraction following the stabilization program of 1989 was
severely felt in plastics manufacturing, but this was predictable. The relatively high
protection that plastics mnfcuigenjoyed during the 1980s had facilitated the
proliferation of new ventures without the necessary checks to ensure their sustainability.
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Many firms had developed inefficient patterns of resource use that became onerous with
liberaliztion. Many had made large investments in equipment even if they could not
fully utilize it (Chapter IV). And many with access to "preferential" exchange rates had
engaged in hoarding behavior and incurred massive debt in dollars that became
untenable after the devaluation. The weight of labor and raw materials in the cost
structure faced by the average plastics manufacturing firm did not increase in 1989, but
the cost of capital did-and significantly-cutting further into the aleady relatively low
profit rate in the industry (Table VI.5). The industry's costs increased from 87.3% of
gross output in 1988 to 89.4% in 1989.
Table VL5 Cost Structure in the Plastics Manufacturing Industry, Selected
Years, 198449
Item
Labor
Raw material
Fuels
Electricity
Dpreciation
Interests
Other capital expenditures
Other general expenditures
Indirect taxes
Total costs
Total costs as percentage
of output
Bs.
Millions
874
2,513
19
87
249
237
151
431
18
1984 1988
Percentage Percentage
of total
costs
19.1
54.9
0.4
1.9
5.4
5.2
3.3
9.4
0.4
Bs.
Millions
2,187
8,640
38
232
540
665
328
1,193
45
4,580 100.0 13,869
89.1
of total
costs
15.8
62.3
0.3
1.7
3.9
4.8
2.4
8.6
0.3
1989
ercentage
Bs. of total
Millions costs
2941 15.4
11,523 6.4
56 0.3
396 2.1
768 4.0
1,233 6.5
457 2.4
1,649 8.6
65 0.3
100.0 19,088
87.3
100.0
89.4
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (1991), Estudie de la Cadena de Resinsusy Pldsticos;
Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informhtica, Encuesta Industrial(various years).
Even worse, demand facing local plastics manufacturers declined sharply in
1989. The reason was not that trade liberalization let in a massive inflow of plastic
m
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imports. In fact, for the industry as a whole,106 the volume of competing imports
declined from 5,541 metric tons in 1988, a year of deficit-financed economic expansion,
to 3,622 metric tons in 1989, the year of the stabilization shock, a 38% decline in real
bolivar terms (Ministerio de Fomento, 1991:157). The decline in demand occurred
instead because of a fall in purchasing power and the stagnation or severe decline
experienced by some of the largest purchasers of plastics parts and components. The
purchasing power of wages fell by 21% in 1989, and gross output fell in real terms by
69% in the automotive sector and by 12%, 24%, and 20% in the food, beverage, and
personal care product sectors.
Revenues in the plastics manufacturing industry declined in real terms by 23%
between 1988 and 1989, from Bs. 6.6 billion to Bs. 5.2 billion (1984 bolivares). As a
result, profits in the plastics manufacturing industry not only fell below their
pre-adjustment level, but also fell further behind average profits in manufacturing
(Tables VI4 and VI.5). Gross output, employment, and the number of firms in the
industry also declined (Table VI.6)
Table VI.6 Gross Output, Employment, and Number of Firms In the Plastics
Manufacturing Industry,1988-91
1988 1989 1990 1991
Gross output (1984 Bs. billions) 6.84 5.48 5.58 7.12
Employment (number of workers) 23,141 22,072 21,457 23,266
Number of firms 404 403 424 440
Note: Data cover all subsectors in plastics manufacturing, while the case studies of
networks focus on injection molders.
Soure: Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informitica, Encuesta Industrial(various
years).
106 This assertion, however, does not apply to the injection-molding subsecaor, as I explain
later. In injection molding, import competition became fierce.
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Far worse off was the plastics manufacturing subsector to which most firms in
my subcontracting case studies belonged: injection molding. These firms not only had
to face the effects of eroding domestic purchasing power, they also had to compete
fiercely with imports as car assemblers and subsidiaries of transnational corporations
producing personal care items started to import fiished items containing plastic parts
and components. Unlike most other plastics manufacturs, imports of injection-molded
items soared (Table VI.7). This may have stemmed as much from renewed interest of
local consumers in imported goods as from the decision by a nonnegligible number of
local producers to return to their former role as importers, particularly common in
sectors such as toy making.
Table VI.7 Imports of Selected Plastics Manufactures, 198749
(metric tons)
Imports (tons) Growth (%)
item 1987 1988 1989 1987-88 1988-89
Large containers at 54 72 233 33.3 223.6
Shoes b/ 4 8 98 100.0 1,125.0
Furniture and parts c/ 2 17 39 750.0 129.4
Bicycles 1 4 28 300.0 600.0
Dolls 14 19 91 35.7 378.9
AU plastics manufactures 5,605 5,541 3,622 -1.1 -34.6
a. Trade codes 39070721 and 39070799.
b. Trade code 64018900.
c. Trade code 94038900.
Somre: Ministerio de Fonmento (1991), Estudie die la Cadena die Resis y Pldslices.
2. The 1990 UpswIng
The contraction in demand and output was short-lived. At the same time that
consumer demand bounced back, gross output in sectors that traditionally had been
purchasers of plastic parts and components also recovered (Figure VI.2).
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The plastics manufacturing sector as a whole benefited noticeably from this
economic resurgence. Gross output exceeded Bs. 40 billion in 1991, 4% more in real
terms than the highest level achieved during the expansion of the 1980s (Figure VI3).
Employment and the number of firms engaged in the industry also reached historic
peaks in 1991 (see Table V.6). Profits as a percentage of gross output declined,
however, reflecting the squeeze caused by increasing input prices and interest rates.
Figure VI.2 Gross Output in Selected Sectors that Consume Plastics
Components, 1988-91
(1984 Bs. billions)
Bs. bflons
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Source: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informtica, Encuesta Industrial(various
years).
In sum, while the stabilization and structural adjustment measures generated a
severe economic contraction in 1989, the economy bounced back in 1990. By 1990,
demand and output in plastics manufacturing not only had recovered, but they had
surpassed their 1988 record levels. Quite in contrast with the situation prevailing in the
1980s, this time growth occurred in the context of liberalized markets.
IigurVL3Gr Output InPasticsMAnrn,1982-91
(1984 Bs.billions)
1984 B.. Sm
8
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4
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0
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
IGrossousput
3. Enterprise., Large and Smal
In the end, what appeared a nearly irreversible contraction in the plastics
industry in 1989 turned into a seemingly robust 1991-92recovery in which the industry
uS only returned to, but surpassed, the output and employment levels that it had
enjoyed during the demand boom of the mid- and late 1980s. Over the decade 1982-91,
output in the plastics manufacturing industry grew at an average annual rate of 5%,
employment by 3%, and investment by 8.5%. But the industry's profit margins, already
low compared with those of manufacturing as a whole, eroded from 6.4% in 1981 to
4.7% in 1991.107
107 Average real profit volumes per firm increased by about 1.2%. At the same time, the
share ofroft per wodcer declinldby about 1% during the 1980s.
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Profits were squeezed because of demand-side as well as supply-side factors.
First, in a slowly growing market, an increasing number of firms were producing an
increasing volume of output, necessarily encroaching on one another's turf, putting
downward pressures on prices, and affecting one another's capacity to generate further
profits. Second, in the face of an increasingly burdensome cost structure, sales growth
could not always translate into higher profits. And third, the investment binge of the
late 1980s, encouraged by the constant expectation of a sharp devaluation of the
bolfvar, was later reflected in a stock of idle equipment that affected firms' fixed costs
per unit of output and thus profit rates.108
Redistribution of wealth, income, and profits across firms occurred against this
backdrop of fast output growth cum slow profit growth. Firms' performance in
response to economic change varied; firm size seems to be associated with some of that
variation (Table VI.8). Between 1982 and 1991, large enterprise performed best,
increasing its industry share in total number of firms, total number of employees, volume
of fixed capital measured in real terms (with a significant gain), and real value of gross
output. The rest of the segments lost ground in relative terms, although the two smaller
segments (firms with 5-50 employees) employed more people and produced more
output per worker in 1991 than in 1982.
108 In theory, against such a backdrop, it would not be surprising to observe growth in
"traditional" forms of subcontracting-4hose aiming to cut labor costs-which, as
discussed in Chapter III, did not seem to be the dominant form of subcontracting during
the 1980s. Because my 1992 research was designed to follow networks existing in
1987, it did not capture the errgence of other networks (possibly labor-cost-cutting)
elsewhere in the sector. Conversations with labor representatives in July, 1992,
indicated that the practice of hiring casual labor was increasing after adjustment.
Household survey statistics report an unchanged 38% share of informal workers in the
ecorwmy as a whole between 1988 and 1991. The subject of whether adjustment
"revived" other traditional labor-cost-cutting mnechanisms is left as subject for future
research.
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Table VL8 indicators of Economic erfornance in the Plastic Industry by
Firm Size,Selected Years,1982-91
Firm sit cteoM a/
Large scale
MediwmIn
Smal alel
Total imlusry
Largw cae
MediumI!
Small scale
Total inustry
1982 1988 1989 1991
(%) (%) (%) (%)
40 10%
57 14%
118 28%
200 48%
415 100%
7,496 41%
4,293 23%
4,220 23%
2,442 13%
18,451 100%
ixed capital(1984 Bs. millions)
Large scale 512 33%
Medtium 476 31%
Medium 1 308 20%
Smal scale 243 16%
Total industry 1,539 100%
Grs ntput (1984 Bs. milions)
Lurp scale 1,924 43%
MedinmI 1,210 27%
Medium H 866 19%
Small scale 477 11%
Total industry 4,477 100%
PAt as peremtage of gras output
Large scale 9.1%
Medium I 7.3%
Medium!! 0.1%
Smal scale 4.6%
Ttal industr A4%
58 14%
49 12%
125 31%
172 43%
404 100%
13,130 57%
3,573 15%
4,354 19%
2,086 9%
23,143 100%
1,057 63%
183 11%
312 19%
116 7%
1,668 100%
4,165 61%
944 14%
1,130 17%
607 9%
6,845 100%
7.6%
72%
8.6%
9.9%
79%"
51 13%
53 13%
128 32%
171 42%
403 100%
11,924 54%
3,818 17%
4,272 19%
2,055 9%
22,069 100%
739 58%
203 16%
219 17%
113 9%
1,274 100%
3,162 58%
825 15%
1,042 19%
452 8%
5,480 100%
3.5%
5.4%
9.6%
11.0%
56 A
59 13%
49 11%
141 32%
191 43%
440 100%
12,330 53%
3,484 15%
4,941 21%
2,511 11%
23,266 100%
1,131 70%
165 10%
197 12%
120 7%
1,612 100%
4,389 62%
864 12%
1,236 17%
628 9%
7,118 100%
3.9%
5.4%
7.9%
2.5%
A7%a %N amwnj 6m. .f .r w .wow .M W
Note: Large scale =me than 100 employees; nedium scale I=51-100
medium scale 11=21-50 employees; small scale=5-20 employees.
Serce: Oficina Central de Estadfstica e Informkica, LacualasIfduat (various
year).
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More interesting than this general assessment of the industry's performance
through the decade is to observe how different group of firms behaved during three
distinct subperiods: (i) the years of heavy protection and supply-side constraints,
1983-88, (ii) the short-term post-adjustment contraction in demand, 1989, and (iii) the
medium-term recovery after adjustment, 1990-92. Observation of these three
subperiods reveals that large enterprise exhibited the most volatile behavior, putting into
question the convention that the large-scale segment is the "protected" or "stable"
sector of the economy. Smaller enterprise, on the other hand, seems less willing to take
the exit option and to use sudden layoffs at times of severe crisis. This discussion
reveals the rather lackluster supply response and economic performance of
medium-scale plastics manufacturers, those most frequently engaged in subcontracting.
Protectonism and Supply Constiins (198348). During these six years, the
industry's output grew in real terms by 53%, or an average 9% per year. Most of the
benefits of this growth accrued to large enterprises. In absolute terms, employment,
investment, ind output grew more in the large-scale segment of the industry than in the
other three segments combined, leading to a far more concentrated industry than that in
1982. (Much of that tendency toward concentration can be traced to the restrictions in
access to capital and raw materials that Chapters IV and V have documented.) The
marked erosion of large firms' profit rates during this subperiod suggests, however, that
fast entry at this segment of the industry led to harsher competition among these firms
(a finding that was also indicated in Chapter IV). The slow growth in the small and
medium-size segments, on the other hand, may have been the result of severe barriers to
entry imposed by supply-side constraints. Protected by such barriers, yet aided by the
demand boom, the small and medium-size enterprises that remained in the sector not
only experienced an increase in their rate of profit, but also improved the average
productivity of their workers. in sum, during the protectionist period of the 1980s, the
really "protected" portion of the plastics manufacturing industry seemed to be a
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relatively large subset of the small and medium-size enterprises (likely coinciding with
injection-molders).
These findings are consistent with my conclusions from the case studies of
subcontracting networks in the 1980s. Discouraged by the high competition among
large enterprises in plastics manufacturing, as well as by supply-side constraints, some
large users of plastics components may have opted to remain out of this industry (the
case of Multinac and Transchool). Other large plastics producers decided to offer their
services as subcontractors (the case of Filmplast) as a response to the harsh competition
for market shares in plastics manufacturing. And medium-size enterprises with a
foothold in the resin markets (a small and fixed number of firms) could take advantage
of a safe turf and the demand boom and engage in a highly profitable subcontracting
business. Contrary to what subcontracting theories of the 1970s and early 1980s would
suggest, subcontractors in the Venezuelan plastics industry were doing very well in the
1980s (Chapter III).
PuteAdfutawent Contraction in Deand (1989). During the sudden and
severe demand contraction of 1989, the plastics industry shrank. The number of plastics
firms declined (although official statistics only report a slight decline), and employment
fell in real terms by 5%, the value of fixed capital by 24%, and gross output by 20%.
This downturn reflected mainly the fast exit and disinvestment in the large-scale segment
of the industry; among large enterprises, employment fell by 9%, fixed capital by 30%,
and gross output by 24%. By contrast, according to aggregate statistics, small- and
medium-scale enterprises Impgly maintained their position. In general, small and
medium-size plastics manufacturers showed greater resilience and stability, albeit
modest growth, in the face of the unfavorable conditions immediately following
adjustment. Possible explanations are that small-scale businesses can rely on informal
(often family) sources of labor, and that exit from a business by a small-scale
entrepreneur is often prevented by the fact that too much is at stake (the entrepreneur's
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job, property, status). My case studies indicate a higher incidence of failure among
small- and medium-scale firms than official statistics do. This probably stems from the
fact that the case studies were concentrated in injection molding, the subsector that had
benefited most from the import ban of the 1980s and thus was, in turn, most affected by
the inflow of imports after 1989.
Medium-Tern P.O-Adusument Recovery (1990-92). As confidence in the
economy returned after the reforms and the inflationary effect of the devaluation
subsided, the plastics industry started to grow again. Between 1990 and 1992, output
rose in real terms by 30%, at an average 14% per year, and it grew faster among the
largest and the smallest firms (at 18% per year in each of these two segments). Yet the
growth at the two ends of the firm size spectrum differed in nature. Among large
enterprises, fast output growth was accompanied by unprecedented capital investment,
higher profit rates, and a decline in the share of total employment in the industry. Thus,
among large firms, growth after adjustment was noticeably capital-intensive, and it
apparently met with the demand needed to support it This patter is consistent with my
finding that some large-scale firms integrated plastics transformation through
capital-intensive investments (for example, Multinac). Fast growth in the small-scale
segment, by contrast, resulted from a high rate of new entry (a 6% increase in firms per
year), a similarly high rate of growth in employment (11% per year), a minimal increase
in the value of fixed capital (and a decline in fixed capital per firm, indicating that new
entrants were less capital-intensive than existing firms), and a marked erosion of profit
rates (from 11% in 1989 to 3% in 1991). These elements add up to a scenario
dangerously close to involudonary growth (or the "low road" to growth) for
small-scale enterprises (Schmitz, 1990:267).
The Performsance of Medium-wcale Plastics Manufacturers (21-101)
emrployees). During 1982-91, the medium-scale segment of the plastics industry had the
least remarkable performance, in both achievements and losses. The number of firms
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and employees in this segment remained fairly stable in absolute terms through the
decade, but the segment's relative share in plastics manufacturing as an employer fell
from 46% in 1982 to 36% in 1991. Its share in total fixedcapitaland gross output fell
even more precipitously, from 51% to 22%, and from 46% to 29%, respectively. And
the results regarding the firms' profits varied across the two subsegments of
medium-scale enterprise. For smaller firms (21-50 workers), profits as a percentage of
gross output increased markedly and were the highest in the industry in 1991, while
profits for the larger firms (51-100 workers) wavered between 5% and 7%.
In sum, the performance of medium-scale enterprises was even through the
period, albeit mediocre. This may stem from one of two possible causes. First, varied
experiences of firms in this heterogeneous segment may have balanced out to a stable
aggregate picture (which would be likely, given the differences in trends observed
between the two tiers of the segment, as shown in Table VI.8). Second, the greater
occurrence of inter-firm networks in this group of firms may have promoted resilience,
by restricting entry during peaks and supporting network members during troughs. But,
at any rate, if one assumes that the medium-scale segment of plastics manufacturing did
indeed include most of those engaged in subcontracting in the 1980s, and that official
statistics offer a good representation of these firms' performance, then official statistics
indicate that firms participating in subcontracting did not exhibit the brightest economic
performance in the industry during the period 1982-91.
The remaining sections of this chapter discuss in more detail the diverse patterns
actually followed by the networks observed in 1987 and 1992 and the coping
mechanisms used by subcontractors in the face of evolving subcontracting links.
D. The View from the Network
Many intertwined factors affected networks in the period 1989-92. It was thus
not surprising to observe different patterns of adjustment among networks:
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e First, capacity subcontract lg proved the most vulnerable form. In
high demand in 1987, capacity subcontractors had improved their
bargaining power in relationships to such an extent (Chapters III and IV)
that their underlying vulnerability was difficult to perceive until the
demand contraction of 1989.
* Second, the changed business environmentforced specializaton
subcontctig networks to restructure and to stremUline, in a process
that I refer to as "selective integration." Client firms applied the
knowledge gained during six years of intensive use of subcontracting to
selecting the subcontractors that demonstrated that they could best meet
their clients' post-adjustment needs. The integrated the more massive
and technically simpler portions of plastics manufacturing and continued
to subcontract, from the best suppliers, the more complex parts or those
required in smaller quantities.
* Third, whether based on capacity or specialization subcontracting,
networks that had developed relatively complex arrangements tying the
provision of restricted raw materials to the provision of manufacturing
services exhibited no more resilience than those formed only for
transforming plastics.
Revisiting the 1987 case studies in 1992 revealed a less positive picture than the
macroeconomic and industrywide figures would suggest Two of the five
subcontracting networks studied had disappeared, and the three remaining ones had
been substantially restructured (Table VI9). Of the 20 finms in the five subcontracting
networks observed in 1987, three had dropped out of the market (Misceliplast,
Heelplast, and Moldplast, the three smallest firms in the networks), and another had
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virtually ceased manufacturing to become an importer of finished plastics manufactures
(Minitoys). Of the 16 subcontracting relationships in those five networks, only six
survived (the relationships between Germaplast, Belgplast, 109 Colomplast, Hispaplast,
and Carplast and their respective client firms). In only two of those six cases
(Germaplast and Belgplast) did the volume of services subcontracted increase between
1987 and 1992. In these two cases, moreover, the quality of the subcontracting link had
improved.
The year 1989 was a period of "weeding out" of subcontracting networks. The
conditions that prevailed in 1989 left client firms with, in general, less demand for their
products and hence less business to outsource to their suppliers. It thus gave a severe
blow to the few existing cases of capacity subcontracting, whose main rationale was to
enhance the client firm's productive capacity at times of sudden demand upsurge.
In addition, the new economic conditions also stripped subcontractors of their
role as intermediaries in input procurement. As flows of goods, currency, and capital
across the nation's borders were facilitated by liberalization, the difficulties and
uncertainties in obtaining molds, raw materials, dollars, and equipment diminished. It
became neither attractive nor necessary to delegate to another firm the responsibility for
negotiating resin quotas with the government; to depend on other manufacturers to
cope with the unpredictable and rigid schedules for temporarily imported molds; or to
hoard dollars and imported equipment in anticipation of a massive devaluation of the
bolivar, behavior that left firms with idle capacity and thus the need to offer
transformation services. Only true specialization subcontracting networks-in which
the subcontractor still had something to offer that the client could not efficiently
produce in-house under the new conditions-continued to make economic sense.
109 Belgplast participated in two of the five networks studied, serving both Multinac and
TranschooL.
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Table VI.9 Sumnuary of Changes Experienced by Networks,1987-92
Firm still Volume Relationship Volume Employment Cha
Client or existed in produced still existed subconutred Number of
subcontactin firm 1992 incnased in 1992 increased workers Prcent
Minitoys a/ -25 -80.6
Miscellplast -6 -60.0
Transtoys X -246 -54.3
Filmplast X X 59 20.3
Heelplast -40 -100.0
Cosmeplast X -25 -50.0
Packingplast X n.a. n.a.
Microplast X n.a. n.a.
Multinac X X -168 -45.7
Justiplast X -36 -40.0
Germaplast X X X X n.a. n.a.
Colomplast X X n.a. n.a.
Belgplast X X X X 35 100.0
Transchool X 110 100.0
Blowplast X -3 -7.1
Contplast X X -20 -14.3
Belgplast X X X X 35 100.0
Techplast X n.a. n.a.
Moldplast -14 -100.0
Diverse client firms a/ b/ b/
Carplast X X X 7 11.5
Total (known) -372 -21.5
n.a. Not available.
a. Firm still existed in 1992, but mainly as an importer of finished goods.
b. Employment figures for these client firms, which were automobile assemblers, are
not available; however, the transport industry as a whole experienced a decline in
employment of 13% between 1987 and 1991.
The subsequent upturn in the national economy and in the industry in 1991-92
gave firms another chance to thrive. Presumably, only if they had discovered that
collective pmductdve action provided them with a competitive edge worth exploiting in
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the context of the new demand upswing they would have opted for resuming
subcontracting. Renewed reliance on subcontracting would have suggested that the
subcontracting experience during the 1980s had not been in vain, but had resulted in
networkwide learning that would benefit participants long thereafter. That such a
hypothetical revival of subcontracting did not take place but in a very few cases
(a) reconfirms my findings of the 1980s that it was the supply-side restrictions prevailing
in that decade that drove much of subcontracting, but (b) indicates that little was leamt
regarding broader advantages of inter-firm networking.
1. The Demise of Capacity Subcontracting
Capacity subcontracting is a relationship between a client firm and a
subcontractor operating in the same sector and capable of undertaking similar
production processes. It is thus a case of "horizontal" productive disintegration. The
client hires the subcontractor in order to cope with a temporary upsurge in demand that
has outstripped its productive capacity. Because of its temporary and fluctuating
nature, this form of subcontracting is expected to diminish the subcontractor's ability to
accumulate, invest, and grow if no mechanisms are in place to mitigate the effect on it of
the fluctuation and uncertainty (Piore, 1980; Holmes, 1986).
My 1987 survey revealed that, even though there were numerous cases of
horizontal disintegration, Venezuelan plastics manufacturers engaged in subcontracting
generally did not conform to this conventional model of capacity subcontracting. The
segmentation between client firms and subcontractors expected under this model was
not obvious because, taking advantage of supply-side complications facing their clients,
many capacity subcontractors moved beyond capacity enhancement to perform roles in
the relationship that improved their share of the benefits accruing to the subcontracting
network (Chapters EI and IV). This "enhanced" mode of capacity subcontracting
shows that firms were able to develop institutional forms adapted to prevailing
economic conditions (Chapter V), and thus resilience to adverse changes. But this
resilience had its limits; the two subcontracting networks that ceased to exist after the
1989 adjustment effort, the networks of Minitoys and Transtoys, were those resulting
from horizontal disintegration.
The Minitoys Netwrt Capacitys otran and put intermediation were
seamlessly combined in the rlationship between Minitoys and its only subcontractor,
Miscellplast. But the firms' symbiosis did not prvent Misceliplast from going out of
business or Minitoys fromretuming to its previous importing activity-because the
firms did not use that symbiosis to develop new and different sources of
competitiveness.
Minitoys illustrates a failed cycle of import substitution. Minitoys was founded
when its owners, a relatively wealthy Venezuelan family, could no longer pursue their
toy importing business because of the 1983 import ban. After some trial and error, the
family installed a small but modem plant in an industrial zone in a working-class town
outside Caracas. Relying on the contacts that it had developed as an importer, the
family obtained exclusive rights to inject the molds of several well-known foreign toy
makers. It also captured the demand from those distributors and retailers to which it
had provided imported toys before the ban. The family had thus obtained control over
two factors on which it could base a small monopoly: proprietary technology and
distribution channels.
The company's experience as a producer-which lasted from 1984 to 1991-
did not prove as happy as the owners had foreseen. As a new and small firm, Minitoys
had difficulty in getting access to resins, its main raw material input It confronted
marked and often unpredictable peaks and troughs in the availability of molds: at times,
thousands of dollars' worth of temporarily imported molds would be lying on the floor
awaiting use; at other times (although less frequently), its machines were idle. When the
company started contracting out the manufacture of molds, it had problems in finding an
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appropriate manufacturer, first abroad and then in Venezuela. It confronted severe
bouts of labor conflict when the regional union, known for its confrontational stance
toward management, attempted to "enter" the shop; Minitoys' management prevented
that move through a counterproposal that presumably offered more attractive labor
benefits than those offered by the regional union. 110 When I visited the company in
1987, the family member whom I interviewed-the eldest child, who was general
manager of Minitoys-expressed disappointment with the prospects for plastics
manufacturing.
The Minitoys plant was one of the newest and best organized and modem that I
visited. And the link between Minitoys and Miscellplast developed into one of the most
multifaceted that I found-it combined plastics transformation with input provision and
storage and mold making and maintenance. Having absorbed so much of the partners'
attention and effort, this subcontracting relationship was one that could have been
expected to persist Yet given the poor expectations shown at Minitoys during my first
visit, it was not entirely surprising that the firm shed nearly all of its plastics
manufacturing business and returned to importing shortly after the government
liberalized imports. The main problem facing Minitoys as a manufacturer-uncertainty
and restrictions in access to raw materials-had been resolved by the reform program,
yet new problems cropped up after adjustment. My Minitoys interviewees complained
about the increasing costs of inputs (imported inputs were more expensive than locally
produced ones, as mentioned earlier), the "unmotivated and unproductive labor force,"
and infrastructure and service problems. By 1991, Minitoys' management had decided
to return to importing toys.
Minitoys did not dispose of its plastics transformation equipment immediately,
however. It first tried to use it to perform maquila-type services for foreign clients, but
the experiment reportedly failed because of inefficient customs procedures. Then it
I could not confirm this information with workers in the firm.110
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opted to maintain its most depreciated molds and to inject them only during the
appropriate season. The farm dismissed all of its workers except for its highest-qualified
plastics technician, who often remained idle while awaiting the period when the residual
molds would be injected. The owners had realized that selling the equipment would
result in great losses to the company; the market had been inundated with used
equipment as a result of the recession in the plastics industry following the reforms.
The dissolution of the Minitoys network clearly entailed social losses. It left
some 30 workers unemployed, a modem set of machines and a prime piece of industrial
real estate underutilized, and a specialized technician "captive" so that other firms were
prevented from benefiting from a skill in high demand. It led to the interruption in
demand for transformation services from a small-scale plastics manufacturer
(Miscellplast) that, confronted with similar behavior from most of its clients, was forced
to declare bankruptcy. It resulted in two "ghost" manufacturing firms-Minitoys,
which apparently would reassemble as a manufacturing firm only seasonally and based
on casual labor, and Miscellplast, whose owners were scrambling to reconstruct their
business relationships in a new city, sustaining themselves, for the time being, from the
proceeds of a small cattle farm.
How did having belonged to a network affect these firms' chances of surviving
in the plastics business under the new conditions? In no remarkable way. Although
belonging to a network helped both firms weather the complicated supply-side
conditions of the mid-1980s, it did not seem to make them either more or less prone to
failure after adjustment. The subcontracting relationship itself was doomed for at least
one good reason: its strength had been based on a circumstance that disappeared with
the liberalization of markets-constrained access to raw materials. In addition, the
subcontractor failed to seek new ways to attract the business of its client under the
post-adjustment conditions; it had relied too much on an artificial comparative
advantage-its access to raw materials under administrative constraints. Yet these are
hardly the most important reasons for the dissolution of the Minitoys network; more
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crucial is that the Minitoys family bad always been in the import-export business and
found it easier and more profitable to return to that business as soon as it could.
The Transtoys Network In contrast to the Minitoys network, where capacity
enhancement was one of several reasons for subcontracting, the Transtoys network was
a textbook case of capacity subcontracting, and it followed the pattern that would have
been expected: it grew significantly during the demand boom of the mid-1980s, and it
disappeared with the demand contraction. The firm did not seem willing, however, to
restart the cycle when demand shot up again in 1990.
Transtoys is one of the largest and best known firms in the toy making trade in
Venezuela. Founded in 1969, by 1979 it had obtained the license to produce the
components for and to assemble the Barbie doll in Venezuela. At that point, it started
contracting out to local seamstresses the production of Barbie doll dresses, but it did all
of the plastics transformation in-house. When the toy import ban was imposed in 1983,
Transtoys was well positioned to capture a large share of the new demand for toys
facing local producers, and it did so. It broadened its range of products and expanded
its rotational molding capacity, but it opted not to expand injection molding, because of
lingering uncertainties and the capacity available elsewhere in the economy, and instead
turned to subcontracting. The first injection molding subcontractor that Transtoys
engaged was Filmplast. This large enterprise, managed by a friend of Transtoys' owner,
was shifting from injection molding of components to extrusion of bulk film and thus
found the arrangement with Transtoys attractive as a transition strategy.
In response to the continued growth in the market in 1985 and beyond, and
following its policy of diversifying risks across suppliers, Transtoys decided to engage
more subcontractors. By 1987, it was working regularly with five other firms of
different sizes. The subcontractors would "reserve" for Transtoys an agreed on amount
of "machine time" each year, although the orders would be made and paid by the piece,
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as was usual in the business. Provision of inputs varied from firm to firm, with larger
ones, such as Fimplast, providing their own resin and others relying on Transtoys for
resi.
When structural adjustment reforms opened Venezuelan markets to toy imports
in 1989, the market for Transtoys's cheaper product lines was invaded by East Asian
manufactures, which, despite tariffs and transport costs, were less expensive than
Transtoys's. The firm's decision to expand through subcontracting during the 1980s
paid off in the 1990s, by making restructuring easy: Transtoys simply had to
discontinue production of lines that had stopped being competitive, discharge the
subcontractors that had assisted in injection molding those products, and focus on
in-house injection and rotational molding of products in which it could maintain some
competitive advantage. Transtoys's plastics subcontracting network disappeared.
Realizing that the only-or easiest-way that it could dominate a market was
through controlling proprietary technology, Transtoys decided to concentrate on
production of the Barbie doll and items licensed by Walt Disney Productions. The firm
could comply with the standards set by the two parent corporations because it had good
equipment and skilled, experienced personnel. Holding the exclusive rights to produce
products with clear identities, under brands with well-developed customer loyalty,
would protect the firm from predatory competition. The firm started relying
increasingly on temporary labor, yet, located in a low-wage, secondary agricultural
town, was able to pay wages above the regional average. Its wages maintained
harmony in labor relations and helped gain its workers' loyalty-and even the support of
some trade unions.I I I
111l When Transtoys's "Barbie" market was attacked in the only way in which a monopoly
of its sort could be anaced-through "pirating" or the introduction of similar products
in Venezuelan markets through underground channels-one of the few instances of
union-mnanagemnent collaboration seen in the Venezuelan plastics industry occurred.
Labor unions and Transtoys's management allied to investigate, and denounce, a large
shipment of Barbie dolls coming from East Asia.
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When I asked Transtoys's manager why the firm would not resume
subcontracting as demand recovered in 1990, he answered that the firm had decided to
concentrate on safer markets. A narrower market implies less need for capacity
enhancement arrangements. But my interviewee also revealed that subcontracting in
itself could be risky: it can overstretch management capabilities and involve
transactions costs that can be kept at a minimum by focusing on in-house
manufacturing.
2. The Restructuring of Speilimation Subcontracting
Specialization subcontracting is a relationship between client and subcontractor
firms belonging to different industrial sectors or having complementary technical and
productive capabilities. It is thus an instance of "vertical" productive disintegration. By
definition, then, these networks are more robust than capacity enhancing subcontracting
networks, because both parties have something unique to offer the other that it cannot
attain on its own. Among the case studies observed, specialization subcontracting
networks did not disappear completely, as capacity subcontracting networks did, but
they did experience noticeable changes. Faced with shrinking demand, the possibility of
importing finished product, and a much less constrained environment for plastics
manufacturing, most client firms became increasingly selective in engaging
subcontractors. In other words, specialization subcontracting networks were
"rationalized" to adapt to the emerging market conditions.
Firms started integrating the production of simpler plastics components and
those that they required in the largest quantities. Clients using many plastic parts or
components tended to move to partial (or selective) integration, as in the cases of
Multinac and Transchool, discussed below. Clients needing one or a few simple plastic
components might fully integrate their production, eliminating subcontracting; for
example, several domestic producers of oil, vinegar, and other processed foods decided
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to fully integrate the injection and blow molding of containers, bottles, and caps. But
client firms maintained outsourcing arrangements for more specialized pieces, those
required in small quantities, or those whose production was time-consuming and
demanded a high input of labor per unit of output. Within this general rule, variations
occurred; mechanisms for integration varied, as did the criteria for choosing among
subcontractors. The examples of Multinac and Transchool illustrate two such
variations.
Mudhnac. Multinac, a foreign-owned subsidiary of a large North American
corporation in the personal care business, arrived in Venezuela in 1954, before the
beginning of Venezuela's latest democratic period. Its history can be described as the
outcome of the interaction of decisions and policies of three distinct actors: local
management, the parent company, and the national government. The influence of each
is evident in all the strategy shifts that Multinac has made.
National policies provide the general backdrop for the evolution of Multinac's
strategy. During the four years before Venezuela's return to democracy in 1958,
Multinac operated as the parent company's local distributor in Venezuela, monitoring
the market and channeling and distributing imported finished products in the country.
When the newly elected democratic government of R6mulo Betancourt initiated
Venezuela's first program of import-substituting industrialization, as part of the new
social-democratic agenda of the early 1960s, Multinac was forced to increase the local
content of its sales in Venezuela. It decided to produce ballpoint pen components in its
Venezuelan plant.
Fiscal contraction and the opening of trade at the beginning of the 1980s showed
Multinac the perils of integrating in the context of uncertain demand. In 1981, it
decided to shed its injection molding operation and start subcontracting to Justinplast.
Initially, Multinac opted for a close, symbiotic relationship through which it could
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reserve for itself much of the control over the subcontractor's operations. It supported
the subcontractor's restructuring of its plant to adapt it to Multinac's needs. Justinplast
worked only for Multinac, which gave it responsibility for producing more than 60% of
the value of its sales in Venezuela. But when the government banned imports in 1983
and Multinac's need for locally produced components soared, the company saw its
dependence on its single subcontractor as too risky and limiting. Between 1983 and
1989, Multinac maintained its link with Justinpiast, but it also diversified its risks by
contracting out to several other firms. The government's liberalization of trade, the
exchange rate, and interest rates in 1989 opened up Multinac's options: it could import
finished goods, invest to produce in-house, or continue subcontracting. It pursued a
mixture of all three.
Punctuating the firm's general trajectory was a conflict between the concerns of
local management and the global policies of the parent company. Local management
wanted to increase the value added by the firm itself in the transformation process and
to enhance its strategic autonomy and control over production. In other words, local
management leaned toward vertical integration. Throughout the 1980s, local managers
maintained that subcontracting was becoming excessively onerous for the subsidiary;
they estimated that injection molding of the longest-series product could be performed
in-house at 60% to 70% of the cost charged by the subcontractors.
The parent firm sought to impose policies that were consistent with its global
strategy, but not always with local management's demands. Parent company managers
did not authorize the investment required to integrate injection molding in the 1980s.
They perceived Venezuela's economic environment at that time as too risky, and they
were concerned about possible supply-side constraints to in-house production.
When local managers resumed their pressure after Venezuela's liberalization in
1989, however, the parent company approved the investment in a large-scale injection
molding line for the production of razors. By 1991, Multinac was exporting 40% of its
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production of razors to Australia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico.
Encouraged by this success, local managers devised another project-a large blow
molding line to produce bottles for a new line of shampoo-and developed the proposal
to the highest detail to demonstrate its financial feasibility. Expecting a positive
response to this proposed expansion of local operations, they learned instead that the
parent firm had decided to sell the entire global shampoo line to another corporation.
Complicating this basic conflict between the local and parent companies were
the variable idiosyncrasies of the parent company management, which affected not only
the local subsidiary but also its subcontractors. The variability was reflected in part in
the shifting priorities of successive presidents of Multinac, each of whom, according to
one of my interviewees, brought to the subsidiary goals and a management style shaped
by his experience in the parent corporation's structure.
In the late 1970s, a new president of Multinac was appointed from the
engineering department of the parent corporation. This appointment led to a
proliferation of guidelines for improving operations management, establishing tighter
relationships with suppliers, and enhancing technical excellence both in the subsidiary
and among its subcontractors. It was during this president's tenure that Multinac
started outsourcing to Justinplast and supported Justinplast's investment in transaction-
specific equipment and training.
In the early 1980s, a president selected out of the marketing department
immediately made his influence felt by ordering the firm to incmase sales by 200%
within 30 days. Meeting this challenge involved an extraordinary effort by Justinplast,
which produced all the components for a product that then constituted 75% of
Multinac's sales in Venezuela. Justinplast added a third work shift and new personnel,
and it redesigned its assembly line to make it semi-automatic and to accommodate more
workers, a model later copied in other Latin American countries.
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In the second half of the 1980s, the "marketing president" was replaced by a
president straight out of the auditing department. This new president found that the
urgent sales drive of the early 1980s had led to great distortions in the cost structure,
and decided to streamline the subsidiary's operations. His first measure was to
robotize-and thereby integrate-the assembly operation designed by Justinplast, which
only a few years earlier had been considered a model for other subsidiaries. This step
created serious labor and financial problems for Justinplast, which was forced to fire a
large number of workers and to justify the decline of its business to its creditors.
Moreover, when the newly installed robot experienced a failure and Multinac halted
razor production, Justinplast had to cut its resin quota with the petrochemical suppliers.
This interruption in its consumption history translated into severe supply problems in the
following years. The relationship between Multinac and Justinplast started weakening.
The confluence of these three factors-national policy reform, increased
pressure by local managers to invest and integrate vertically, and the streamlining
attempts of the "auditing president"-led to the strategy of selective integration
implemented after adjustment According to my interviewees, after liberalization,
imports of new product lines and relatively more sophisticated items became the most
important emerging threat to Multinac's business in Venezuela. In response to a
competitor's decision to increase imports of such products, Multinac launched an
aggressive import strategy, focusing on the more sophisticated lines of pens and razors
produced by the corporation. The subsidiary thus partially returned to its original role
as a local outlet or distributor for the parent company. This was the first distinctive
element of its post-adjustment strategy.
The second element of Multinac's competitive strategy was to cut the costs of
local production. This effort centered on installation of the large-scale injection molding
line that enabled the firm to mold all plastic components of the disposable razor, its
major local product, in-house. Six operators could now control the injection molding
- 298 -
operation that had required 30 to 40 people at Justinpiast. Installation of the new line
streamlined the firm's operations and reportedly led to a significant reduction in cost.
Multinac's success in cutting costs helped persuade the parent corporation that the
subsidiary could export profitably and that, when exports materialized, it could benefit
from economies of scale and make better use of its investments. The subsidiary thus
became a perfect textbook example of post-adjustment export orientation-although
based not on cheap and abundant labor, but on cheap and abundant raw material and
energy.
Multinac had a third set of products for which there was a market in Venezuela,
but no one large or profitable enough to justify the cost of importing them or of
investing in in-house production capacity, despite the firm's monopoly in these goods.
These products included, for example, containers with special technical features or
mechanisms, such as pressure valves, and often required more precision and technical
attention in selecting inputs and in molding than the firm's simpler products. Integrating
the production of these goods would have required the company to hire specialized
technicians and to retool molds frequently, a production mode that would affect the
productivity of its capital. For these products, then, Multinac decided to subcontract
production.
For subcontracting these small batches of relatively sophisticated plastic
components, Multinac, which had become thoroughly familiar with the market during its
intense contracting-out experience in the 1980s, could choose among the best plastics
injection molding firms in Venezuela. To ensure that it received the best quality service
at the lowest possible unit cost, the firm set potential subcontractors in competition with
one another. Initially, the unit costs might not have been fully competitive with
top-of-the line producers in other countries, but Multinac's monopolistic position gave it
room to maintain a less-than-efficient cost structure. Yet the threat of being left without
business in an environment of uncertainty pushed subcontractors to strive for increasing
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efficiency and quality. It is in this network that I found the more successfully adjusted
subcontractor (Belgplast).
ThuwhooL Founded in 1965, Transchool is a joint venture between
Venezuelan investors (with 80% of total equity) and a large U.S. manufacturer of items
for use in schools and offices (markers, highlighters, watercolors, glues, crayons,
erasers). It has always been an assembler in 1987, by then a firm with 110 employees,
it was contracting out the injection molding of all the components for its markers and
highlighters and the containers and caps for its remaining products. The subcontractors
were of diverse sizes-two of them larger than Transchool, two medium-size, and one
small-scale-and they were located in the Capital or Central regions, relatively close to
the client (15 to 60 miles away).
Although all the subcontracting networks studied in 1987 played some
intermediating role in the market for raw materials, Transchool's network was the purest
example of this economic rationale for subcontracting. My interviewee at Transchool,
the procurement manager, insisted that it was not in Transchool's interest to engage m
plastics transformation, despite the firm's large requirement for plastic components.
When I asked him, as I had my Multinac interviewee, whether he had ever made a
comparative analysis of the costs of subcontracting and those of producing in-house, my
interviewee answered that he had not, adding emphatically that "we do not want to
enter that business... Plastics transformation is a complex endeavor, and as long as
there are other firms that are willing to take the risks, we will continue to contract such
services out to them." My interviewee also believed that subcontracting was also the
best option for the subcontractors, because many could not compete in final markets. In
his opinion, then, under the circumstances, subcontracting was the best possible option
for all parties involved.
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Transchool's stance toward subcontracting was thus very different from that of
Multinac-ailthough both firms had defined their make-or-buy strategy based on a
similar assessment of market conditions. Multinac's managers, although they manifested
discomfort with having to depend on outside contractors, particularly for the production
of their mass-market products, relied on subcontractors because of the complications
involved in transforming plastics. Transchool's managers, apparently less aware of
alternatives, were convinced that subcontracting was the best possible option, also
because of the difficulties involved in transforming plastics. For Multinac, it was easy to
predict that a change in economic conditions favoring plastics manufacturing would
result in a return to that activity. For Transchool, it was less obvious that a change in
external conditions would lead the firm to enter the business of injection molding. Yet
that is exactly what it did shortly after the liberalization of 1989.
Like Multinac, Transchool segmented its subcontracting market-in my
interviewee's words-"by price." The firm integrated the production of low-cost
components and containers and continued subcontracting production of the costlier
components-those that required more precision and more sophisticated equipment.
But rather than invest in new machinery, as Multinac did, Transohool opted to acquire
an existing firm. This small finn, located in a secondary town not far from Transchool's
assembly plant, had never been a Transchool subcontractor.
Once free access to raw materials was established by the reform program of
1989, Transchool calculated that it was paying too high a rate for the transformation of
simple pieces. Transchool had surrounded itself with plastics manufacturers considered
among the best in the country, which reduced its need to perform quality control and
monitoring, but at the price of relatively high rates. These rates became harder and
harder to afford as other costs (for example, interest and public service rates) picked up
in the 1990s and as alternative strategies for procuring different types of plastics
items-among them, integration-started seeming less risky. Although the plant that
Transchool purchased was not very sophisticated, it could produce the simple injected
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items for which it was intended, and it gave Transchool management direct control over
the production process.
K The Subcontractors' View: Coping with Adjustment
The 1989 reforms particularly affected subcontractors, stripping them of their
main sources of bargaining power in the subcontracting relationship (robust and
fast-growing demand, restricted access to raw materials, and an uncertain supply-side
environment). Three years after adjustment, when demand started to recover but before
most firms bad been able to restructure and stabilize, subcontractors were displaying a
wide array of coping strategies, some running in completely opposite directions from
others. This section seeks to find some order in the apparent chaos in firm strategies
following adjustment In particular, it seeks to identify strategies that not only helped
firms cope with the new conditions, but also might help them position themselves to
compete more effectively in the 1990s.
During my 1992 field study, it seemed too early to judge the potential long-term
success of each of these post-adjustment strategies. Only two and a half years had
elapsed since implementation of the stabilization and adjustment measures. In addition,
some firms seemed to be pursuing a mix of different types of strategies, often in an
apparently chaotic fashion. With these caveats, Table VI. 10 lists the six coping or
competitive strategies that I identified, along with the firms that adopted each of them as
their main post-adjustment strategy and the apparent results in terms of employment and
sales.
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Table VL10 Main Post-Adjustment Strategies of Plastics Subcontractors,1992
General Specific strategy Firm Change in Average
strategy employment annual real
1987-92 a/ growth in sales
1988-91
Migration out of plastics Heelplast -40
Exit 
_(-100) 
(bankruptcy) Potential fxture reentry Miscellplast -6
into plastics (-60)
Diversifica- Justinpliast -36 n.a.
tion (-40) (probable
decline)
Product/ (market Carplast +7 27
market- niches) (+12)
based Concentra- Blowplast -3 0
tion (-7)
Change (in less- Hispaplast -20 0
tradable (Miscell- (-14)
(restructur- goods) plast,
______ ~Transtoys) 
_____
in) Propnetary Germaplast n.a. n.a.Process/ -eholg -poa
tehno- increase)
logy-
based Transtoys -246 -4
(-54)
Economies Belgplast +35 27
1_of scope (+100)
- Not applicable.
n.a. Not available.
a. Figures in parentiries are percentage change.
Soure: Interviews with firm managers, 1992.
In comparing the fates of different subcontractors, a first distinction that
becomes obvious is whether a firm opted (or was forced) to exit plastics manufacturing
or remained as a producer and undertook changes. Most subcontractors in the case
studies remained in the sector, only two-both relatively small and located in Caracas-
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Among the surviving subcontractors, some developed coping strategies based on
product markets in which they could maintain some control. Some, such as Carplast
and Justinplast, which had depended on one or a few products and clients, opted to
diversify into many markets. Others, such as Blowplast, Hispaplast, and Transtoys,
which had left their original niches during the 1980s to exploit new opportunities
opened by protection, returned to their original businesses or concentrated on a niche in
which they could hold monopoly power.
Other firms did not scramble to find new markets, but instead sought to compete
in the markets in which they had always participated by trying to gain an edge over
other subcontractors. Some of them sought a technological edge by acquiring exclusive
rights to use certain technologies; others focused on learning and on implementing
organizational improvements, with the aim of enhancing their flexibility, quality, and
delivery time.
Among those firms for which there is information, only two, Carplast and
Belgplast, had experienced an increase in employment and real growth in sales between
1988 and 1991. Their size of operation was similar: in 1991, both firms had about the
same volume of sales (Carplast Bs. 87.3 million and Belgplast Bs. 84 million) and
employment (Carplast had 68 workers and Belgplast 70), and thus the same average
labor productivity. They had followed very different strategies: Carplast had diversified
away from its original products and clients; Belgplast had opted to enhance its
technological and organizational capabilities as a subcontractor.
In the following sections, I describe the way in which subcontractors'coping
strategies unfolded.
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1. The Last Resort: Exit
Both Heelplast and Miscellplast disappeared as plastics manufacturers after the
1989 stabilization program. These two firms differed in many respects: Heelplast had
four times more employees than Miscellplast (40 compared with 10); Heelplast mixed
subcontracting with production for final markets in a specific niche (plastic heels sold in
the interior of the country, and exported to Colombia as long as Heelplast retained a
cost advantage); Miscellplast had always focused on producing as a subcontractor for
others. They depended, directly or indirectly, on different product markets-Heelplast
on shoes and toys, and Miscellplast on toys, personal care, machinery, and home care.
Heelplast had a few clients; Miscellplast had dozens. The key similarity between these
otherwise dissimilar firms was that both had been engaged in capacity subcontracting
relationships with all or most of their clients.
With the demand contraction of 1989, the clientele of these two firms dwindled.
The gradual improvement in markets in 1990 and 1991, accompanied as it was by
increases in the costs of capital and raw materials and by a consolidation of
subcontracting networks, did not help these firms restore their pre-adjustment business.
Their failure to recover was a clear indication that their comparative advantage in the
pre-adjustment period had been based on factors (available capacity, access to raw
materials, cost differentials with Colombia) that lost importance after adjustment.
The demise of Heelplast, whose owner decided to sell the machinery and exit
plastics manufacturing altogether, was not surprising. Heelplast seemed to be a simple
plastics transformer, with no special technical skills to offer. This assessment is
supported by its choice of market niches-the country's remote interior, exports at
border towns, production of simple toy components.
By contrast, Misceliplast had a higher-than-average proportion of specialized
and experienced technicians among its workers and multiple connections in the business,
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and it prided itself on its mold making and maintenance capabilities. Its recovery after
the demand upswing of 1990 probably was further hampered by disagreements among
the shareholders, which led one of the main shareholders to abandon the firm, and to
managerial slack.
In contrast to Heelplast, which left plastics completely,
Miscellplasts remaining shareholders were thinking of resuming activities in plastics
transformation in 1993 or 1994. Relying on another family business (small-scale cattle
raising and farming), the remaining shareholders took some time to seek new contacts.
When I interviewed them in 1992, they had vacated their old site in Caracas and moved
to an industrial zone in Valencia, some 100 miles away, where they had started building
a large shed. The main mold technician and a couple of assistants recruited in the new
location were studying the production of molds, and the firm's mechanic was
conditioning the machinery. They were planning to begin production of a large series of
containers by order to a large-scale food processing company (food processing was a
growing sector in 1992, yet many food processing companies had opted to integrate the
production of their plastic containers). Final launching of the project awaited the
successful closing of the deal with the prospective client.
2.Product-Market Based-Coping Strategies
Firms that decided to cope with adjustment by focusing on their product-market
strategies-seeking alternative markets in which they could gain an advantage without
much altering their production processes-went in two opposite directions: some
diversified their risks by broadening their clientele, and others decided to consolidate
their operations, focusing on particular products and clients.
Divenj~lcadien. Traditionally, Justinplast had served one client and Carplast
very few clients, and both suffered during adjustment because of their dependence on
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such a narrow outlet for their output. They were thus forced to diversify across many
different clients. Both had been suppliers for well-known and demanding mnitin
subsidiaries, in specialization subcontracting relationships. Yet both were left
unprotected after the onset of adjustment.
The case of Justinplast is the most dramatic one. As discussed earlier, problems
with its client, Multinac, had started long before adjustment, when Multinac's shifting
corporate strategies dragged Justinpiast through organizational changes that sometimes
proved very costly for the subcontractor. Through its fragmented attempts to integrate
parts of the production process, Multinac caused Justinplast to lay off workers, eroding
the good labor-management relations that had earlier characterized the subcontractor.
And through failures in its production schedule, Multinac caused Justinplast to stop
production temporarily, interpting its history of raw material csand
affecting its access to raw materials and cheap flnance When labor conflict Md raw
material constraints slowed Justinplast's deliveries, the relationship between the two
finrs deteriorated further. A change in management at Justinplast, resulting from its
savvy general manager leaving to take a political assignment, precipitated the end of the
firm's relationship with Multinac.
With the onset of adjustment, Multinac invested its own plastics transformation
capacity and decided to discharge Justinplast. Justinplast hal started to develop local
contacts with firms seeking plastics transformation services and it accelerated those
efforts in 1989. In 1987, ft had started to inject components for a smoke detector
during troughs in its operations; in 1988, it won a contract to inject copnnsfor a
fn by a local firm; in 1989, it started making boxes for car batteries; and in
later years, ft worked on small but continuous contracts for Eledrolux, Avon, a food
processing firm, a toy firm, and a few other clients. Partly because of the conditions of
the market, and partly to avoid the extreme dependency that ft had experienced in its
relations4 with dtinac, Jutiniast' asried to diversify the firm's clientele as
much as possible.
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Justinplast's managers also tried to use the experience they had acquired in
assembling toothbrushes for a sister firm of Multinac to develop the capacity to produce
toothbrushes for final markets. In 1989, as soon as import restrictions were lifted, the
firm's new general manager decided to import a large piece of machinery for injection
molding, and inserting bristles in, toothbrushes. By the end of 1991, the firm had
produced Bs. 9 million in brushes and acquired a license to export to Caribbean nations,
but this business had not yet taken off. Although Justinplast would have liked to move
faster toward concentrating fully on its toothbrush production, this new business
required that it develop marketing skills and the ability to compete with imports for
distribution outlets.
My Carplast interviewee also singled out marketing capabilities as one of the
most important needs of subcontractors trying to restructure their business. Carplast's
clients, several automobile assemblers, had turned to importing finished cars and
components right after the trade liberalization measures of 1989, and the demand for
Carplast's output had plummeted. The multiple, strong connections of its parent
conglomerate with the automobile assemblers prevented the subcontracting relationship
firm disappearing altogether, but the business that Renault, Fiat, General Motors, and
Ford were able to offer Carplast in 1992 was insufficient to keep the plant running.
Carplast's managers decided to reach out to other potential customers. Using contacts
made with the help of its parent conglomerate, Carplast was able to enter into contracts
with Hoover, and with a Venezuelan home appliance company and a beverage
producing company, and began injection molding parts and containers for them. The
firm also launched a line of hard plastic glasses and jars, for which it had to refit the
plant to meet hygiene requirements. More recently, Carplast has undertaken a direct
marketing campaign targeting local artisans and food producers, offering to produce
and deliver to their homes containers and parts in relatively small quantities and at a
premium. Despite its apparent piecemeal production, Carplast had been able to achieve
significant real growth in sales since 1988.
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Concentradon on the Producton of Less flwdable Goods. Blowplast and
Hispaplast had a different point of departure and followed a different strategy than
Justinplast and Carplast. During the period of high demand and protection from 1983
to 1988, Blowplast and Hispaplast had expanded and diversified their product lines in
order to satisfy a growing clientele and to control increasing shares of the plastics
transformation business. Both had also diverged somewhat from their core production
process-blow molding-because injection molding was in high demand and more
profitable. When imports were allowed in 1989 and many goods requiring plastic parts
and components were imported as finished items, demand for injection molding declined
significantly. By contrast, demand for blow-molded goods suffered less, and recovered
sooner after the general contraction in demand in 1989. Import liberalization had less
impact on blow molding products-typically bottles and hollow objects with low
cost-to-weight or cost-to-volume ratios and thus expensive to transport-than on
products that could be imported profitably. In this context, both Blowplast and
Hispaplast decided to return to their original business of blow molding, focusing on this
"less tradable" segment of the plastics transformation market and reducing the range of
products they produced.
Although both firms became firmly entrenched in the business of blow molding,
their forced retreat from injection molding meant that they experienced no major
increase in their volume of sales between 1988 and 1992. While raw materials had been
their main concern in the 1980s, now their attention was directed toward labor costs and
discipline and to maintaining their clients' business. Some of their clients had opted for
vertical integration of the blow molding of simple containers, obliging Blowplast and
Hispaplast to start paying more attention to costs, hence to labor organization and
productivity, and to quality.
3. Process- and Technology-Based Coping Strategies
Subcontractors in this last set in my sample were less concerned with conquering
new markets than with improving their competitive position in the business that they
were already in. They focused, then, on introducing changes in their production
process, by adopting either new technologies or new organizational solutions. In a
mature business such as injection molding, however, there is a limit to the innovations
that a developing country subcontractor can introduce in the production process. Some
of the firms considered here gained a competitive edge by acquiring exclusive
technology patents that pleased clients (in what one could call form of monopsony);
another tried to improve its response time and flexibility to satisfy the need of its largest
clients at the time for precision plastics transformation in small batches, with excellent
quality control and at the lowest possible cost
Clinging to Patents and Cefliftcations. Just as Transtoys, among the clients,
consolidated its business by focusing on the product lines in which it could hold some
form of market control (the Barbie doll and Walt Disney toys), some subcontractors
consolidated their business by concentrating on the injection molding of items whose
design or production involved some form of proprietary restriction. Some firms could
take advantage of information networks formed on the basis of nationality or academic
affiliation to keep abreast of new market requirements.
Germaplast used such contacts to gain a competitive edge over other potential
subcontractors in dealing with the Venezuelan subsidiary of one of the world's largest
corporations in the personal care product industry. One of the crucial issues that the
corporation faced in its global operations was procuring good-quality molds for the
injection molding of its plastics parts and containers. In its Latin America division, the
corporation had serious problems procuring molds locally in Brazil and Mexico and
often had to import molds from the United States at a great cost. It had similar
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problems in Venezuela until Germaplast arranged to get assistance in designing and
producing its molds in cooperation with a German mold producer whose technology
was certified by the European division of the client corporation. Germaplast thus
provided the subsidiary not only the service of construting and maintaining the molds
under certification of a third party, its German partner, but also the injection molding of
components and containers, meeting world-class standards that other local firms could
not guarantee.
Exploiting Economies of Scope. Like Miscellplast and Germaplast, Belgplast
has a relatively high proportion of specialized technicians among its staff, and it also has
developed much-needed mold making and repairing capabilities. Yet it is not as large or
as financially strong as Germaplast, nor did it enjoy the direct access to large resin
quotas that Miscellplast had in the 1980s. Indeed, in its earlier subcontracting
arrangements, Belgplast seldom provided the raw material. Belgplast's traditional
strategy has been to offer service of demonstrable quality and versatility, plus the
additional feature of mold making. In the initial years after being founded in 1981,
Belgplast remained small and its owners and managers worked to build up technical
capabilities and a menu of services that they could offer to potential clients-preferably
subsidiaries of foreign corporations. After some trial and error, Belgplast started to
develop a loyal clientele. Between 1985 and 1988, Belgplast took much of Multinac's
business away from Justinplast. In 1987 it started producing components for blenders
and other appliances for Oster, and in 1989 it entered into contracts with Procter &
Gamble and Electrolux. Continuing to expand, the business now has 24 clients,
including other foreign companies, such as Mennen, and local producers of electric
devices and mechanisms.
By basing its strategy in the 1980s on a resource that was scarce not because of
administrative constraints (resins or dollars), but because of structural constraints
(specialized skills), Belgplast ensured its survival after the market liberalization.
Belgplast's problem in the 1990s, as reported by its managers, is the "excess" demand by
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corporations. But financial constraints prevent the firm from expanding capacity to
respond to the fast-growing demand. Like all small firms, Belgplast has been affected
by the post-adjustment hike in interest rates and resin prices. And in an inflationary
environment, the usual practice of giving clients 30 days of credit on their orders has
weakened the firm financially. In addition, for "internal technical reasons," Belgplast
faces problems in enhancing the productivity of its current capacity. The short-series
and small-batch production that dominates its business requires frequent changes to
molds. This task can take from three hours to an entire day, leading to work stoppages
that are too frequent and too long. Belgplast's managers aim to shorten the retooling
time and idle periods, through training and organizational analysis and change, so as to
increase the productivity of capital and ensure a faster response to clients.
F. Conclusions
From my observation of the response of subcontracting to stabilization and
structural adjustment in 1989-92, the conclusion that jumps to the eye is that having
been operating in inter-firm networks for almost a decade guarantees neither a firm's
superior performance nor its resilience in the face of economic disruption. This
conclusion would probably please the critics of the flexible specialization and industrial
districts literature, who reiterate that the new forms of internal or inter-firm organization
of industry are not but reformulations of the old forms of dominance of large-scale
capital over small-scale. More interesting, my conclusion would not come as a surprise
to the foremost defenders of flexible specialization and industrial districts either, they
have gone to great lengths to explain the restrictive conditions under which "true"
industrial districts develop-and my Venezuela case studies certainly did not meet such
a test. In other words, if I were to formulate my findings in terms of a polarized debate
between those who defend the industrial districts literature and its detractors, I would
find myself in the curious situation of having supported neither. That is the situation, I
would say, in which most empirical studies attempting to apply these strands of
literature to developing country industry find themselves.
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The contribution of this study, I would argue instead, is not in supporting o
disproving any of the ends of this debatwhich, in addition, would be wrongly
depicted in terms of such extremes-but to bring up what are the specific conditions
that led to the alleged "lack of success" of networks in Venezuelan plastics
manufacturing and what this means with regards to the prospects for the development
of the concerned firms or new networks in the future. To this purpose, in this
concluding section I will touch on three topics: (i) what learning emerged from the
network experience of the 1980s; (ii) are the ones observed the only types of
networking activities going on in the industry; and (iii) what routes are there to
"prosperity" in Venezuela's plastics manufacturing, judging from the short-term post-
adjustment experience of plastics manufacturers? Before doing that, I will summarize
the overall framework in which subcontracting networks' response to adjustment took
place in Venezuela.
1. The Impact of Adjustment
The stabilization and structural adjustment program established in Venezuela in
February, 1989, followed what can be called a "big-bang" approach: it was as swift as
possible, and it was comprehensive and across-the-board. Regarding industrial sectors,
it differentiated only slightly in terms of the position of the product in the value chain-
liberalization was somewhat swifter and deeper, usually, the further downstream in the
value chain. However, trade liberalization was still "flat" in the sense that it did not
target particular sectors nor it pursued the promotion of dynamic comparative
advantage. In essence, and partly as a result of international agencies' pressures to
avoid deliberate inter-sectoral differentiation and targeting, the assumption underlying
the trade liberalization and industrial policy program was that opening markets would be
enough to spur growth.
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The liberalization of trade, the exchange rate, prices, service rates, and interest
rates caused a severe short-term shock in 1989, manifested in inflation, a deep
devaluation of the exchange rate, and interest rate hikes, leading to a severe short-term
contraction of the demand facing domestic industry. Yet the economy seemed to
recover, particularly in 1991-92: the inflation rate stabilized at around 30% per year,
the country's current account and foreign exchange reserves strengthened, public sector
accounts improved, unemployment declined to 7%, foreign direct investment soared,
and Venezuela's GNP was one of the fastest growing in the world, at 10% in 1990 and
7% in 1991. After a one-year lag, industry at large, and the plastics manufacturing
industry in particular, recovered and showed record gross output levels.
Within plastics manufacturing, the impact of the demand contraction and
subsequent recovery varied according to firm size. Employment and gross output in
large scale enterprises experienced the most marked fluctuations in percentage terms.
Small scale enterprise did not drop so deeply during the contraction, indicating less
propensity to exit the business on the part of small-scale entrepreneurs, yet it benefited
significantly from the industry's upturn. The type of recovery experienced by large- and
small-scale enterprises differed, however while the former seemed to expand in an
increasingly capital-intensive way after the policy reforms, output growth in the
small-scale sector grew seemed to be the result of an increase in the number of firrns in
the segment working with more labor intensive methods (possibly an indication of
growing inforraal sector labor arrangements and involutionay growth). In sum,
performance in the industry grew increasingly polarized.
Medium-scale enterprise, the segment with the highest concentration of plastics
manufacturers engaged in subcontracting relationships, showed resilience during the
1989 downturn, If one associates this outcome with the high likelihood that
nrdium-scale enterprises participated in networks, then the hypothesis emerges that
participation in networks may have helped firms weather the demand contraction. On
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the other band, medium-scale enterprise growth performance at the time of the 1990-91
upturn was mediocre; if, again, this is associated with the fact that medium-scale
enterprises were very likely to be in a subcontracting relationship, the resulting
hypothesis would be that participation in networks was not conducive to faster growth
than autonomous operation, even under favorable marker conditions. In brief,
subcontracting would seem to act as a risk averting mechanism, yet not a dynamic,
growth-promoting one.
The actual behavior of networks differed from what could be inferred from
official industrial statistics in two respects: (i) on average, the demand contraction and
adjustment had a more severe impact on networks and their participating firms than
overall official statistics suggested; (ii) performance, however, differed markedly across
networks and between individual firms. For instance, two out of the five original
networks dissolved. Four out of 19 firms (that is, 21% of all firms in the original
networks) went bankrupt or otherwise abandoned the sector, while official statistics
indicate that the number of firms increased by 9% in both plastics manufacturing as a
whole and in its medium-scale segment. On the other hand, two successful
medium-scale firms in the network case studies increased their sales by 27% in real
terms between 1988 and 1991, while gross output for plastics manufacturing as a whole
increased merely by 4%, and in the medium-scale enterprise segment by only 1%, in the
same three-year period.
The fate of networks had a lot to do with the origin and nature of the network.
Networks resulting from horizontal disintegration of production, i.e. capacity
subcontracting, did not survive the demand contraction. In contrast, specialization
subcontracting, resulting from the vertical disintegration of production, survived, but it
tended to restructure, following a strategy of "selective integration."
The fate of individual subcontractors was not fully determined by their clients'
responses to adjustment. The case studies reveal that even subcontractors previously
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belonging to the same network adopted very different strategies, and with very different
degrees of success (here, I will refer to "success" as the ability to resume output, sales,
and employment growth in the period of 1-2 years after the stabilization program). The
evidence suggests that small- and medium-scale finms that opted for (i) technical and
organizational change akin to "flexible specialization" (i.e. improving quality, delivery,
and cost standards in the production of a broad range of products on relatively small
batches); (ii) product diversification, catering to market niches in particular locations,
preferably in the surroundings of the concerned firm; and (iii) gaining monopoly in a.
given market by capturing the patent or exclusive right to a given mold or technology,
were more likely, in that order, to adjust successfully. Although all large-scale firms
involved in the networks survived, the only one that thrived in local and export markets
was Multinac, which integrated vertically the production of a simple, mass produced
item in which it acquired a comparative advantage thanks to its reliance on cheap raw
material and energy. The observation of firms' coping and adjustment strategies
suggest a few thoughts regarding the process of firm learning, the various "roads to
prosperity" in the industry, and the alternative organizational mechanisms available to
firms in plastics manufacturing; these topics are addressed in turn below.
2. Learning Through Subcontracting
Subcontracting as an organizational form is presumed to facilitate learning
across firms. In a subcontracting network, because firms are engaged in the production
of goods that are interrelated, it is more likely that information will flow smoothly
across firm boundaries than it would be among individual firms competing against each
other. In a network, the success of one of the members may well affect that of others,
hence there is an incentive to assist partners in achieving their objectives most
effectively. Such an assistance more often than not includes transferring knowledge
regarding markets, products, or technologies. How much of that learning took place in
Venezuela's plastics manufacturing, and how did it influence the likelihood of success of
the firms in the context of economic turbulence?
-316-
I identified at least thre types of learning taking place in the subcontracting
networks that constituted my case studies. The first type is what is traditionally known
as know-kow transfer multinational enterprises, in particular, would "teach" their
subcontractors specific technologies, how to establish and monitor standards, how to
control input and final prduct quality, and how to comply with tight delivery schedules,
all of this presumably within clearly established cost parameters. Many of my
subcontractor interviewees perceived know-how transfer as a natural byproduct of the
subcontracting relationship, and one which happened primarily for the benefit of the
client (i.e. a discipline imposed to ensure the client's own product quality and profits).
Yet the fact that a large percentage of the suppliers for multinational subsidiaries
survived (and, they tended to be among the successful survivors) indicates that this
relationship may have had the positive effect of conveying practices that helped
subcontractors maintain resilience and a competitive edge after adjustment. 112
A second form of learning happered in the opposite direction: clientfirms
learnedfrom subcontractors. Often, that learning concerned the adaptation of the
client's demands to the particular conditions of production prevailing in Venezuela. For
example, one small-scale injection molder (Moldplast) found out that a scarce imported
mold lubricant could be replaced without any loss in quality or efficiency by an
inexpensive oil available in Venezuela; this supplier thus averted the breakdown of the
pace of production due to the lack of the imported input. Another example is that of
Justinplast, which developed a semi-automatic assembly line for Multinac, later utilized
by Multinac in other Latin American countries. I have no evidence that this instances of
bottom-up learning aided the subcontractor concerned in strengthening its bargaining
112 Certainly, it could also have been that multinationals had a more robust demand and
thus helped their subcontractors weather the post-stabilization contraction. ft could also
have been that subcontractors were good performers to start with and, for that meaon,
they were selected by the multinationals.
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position or improving its resilience to economic change-although the skills associated
with such innovations and learning should have been a valuable transferable asset.
Again, both subcontractors and client firms highlighted the importance of these
forms of "one way" learing only when the source of the know-how was their particular
firm-never or seldom when it was the other partner. This suggests a couple of ideas:
(i) that the learning that the interviewee firms received from others was relatively
insignificant for the firm's overall productivity and profitability to start with, in which
case the network experience was resulting in negligible learning; and/or (ii) that the
people involved were not willing or able to perceive and take advantage of the
information that was being conveyed to them and to internalize it for use in future needs
or in different contexts. In the first case, the fault would be with the nature of the
subcontracting relationship itself (lack of trust, information-poor, detached, little value
added by the collective undertaking of the tasks). In the second case (which would only
seem possible as a subset of the first one), the concerned people's skills, control over,
and perception of their jobs would need to be reconsidered.
The third type of learning concerned the nature and stnactwv of the
subcontracting networks themselves. Access to petrochemical inputs was a source of
bargaining power in subcontracting networks in the 1980s, and firms that had gained
such an access tried to shape subcontracting arrangements so as to stabilize the demand
for their plastics transformation services. Several such stabilization or "insurance"
mechanisms are mentioned in Chapter V. I interpret these phenomena as "learning"
because they consisted of deliberate and gradual institutional change and adaptation
aimed to achieve the objective of improving the status of the initiator (the subcontractor
that developed the specific arrangement). Networks that had evolved into these more
complex forms, involving interlinking markets and transactions, seemed most robust and
successful under the conditions prevailing in 1987 (protected markets, difficult access to
petrochemical inputs).
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Interestingly, these more complex networks showed no more resilience in the
face of the subsequent macroeconomic change than others did. From the point of view
of the new institutional economics-which postulates that all "actors" tend to be
economically rational and that all institutions are thus their rational and deliberate
responses to particular constraints-the explanation is trivial: the conditions under
which the old institution of subcontracting developed had disappeared after the policy
reforms of 1989, and so should subcontracting networks themselves. What this implies,
however, is that the understanding that the "actors" involved had of their subcontracting
relationships did not go beyond the narrow limits of whatever concrete outcome the
networks were trying to achieve at that particular time (e.g. asserting control over input
markets). The concerned subcontractors did not understand the networks as a means to
achieve broader objectives, but as a tool to attain a single-minded and immediate one.
What seemed in 1987 as "more complex" forms of networking (i.e. interlinked
transactions) revealed themselves as rather shallow ones after adjustment.
The subcontractors in the "input brokerage"-oriented networks, then, did not
experience the breakthrough of evolving from rent-seeking to real learning and investing
in skill development-i.e. pursuing dynamic comparative advantages, based on the
application of skills and organizational change to enhance productivity (Amsden,
1989:20-23). But this may have been too much to ask from them, anyway. Since the
inception of democracy, Venezuelan entrepreneurs had existed in a generally protected
environment where a rich state distributed oil wealth to those who could articulate their
demands effectively. On the other hand, the "big-bang" stabilization and adjustment
program brought about such a massive economic disruption that the bases for local
entrepreneurship were bound to be shaken. Under such a shock, possibly any network,
anywhere, whether composed of good or bad performers, would have been shaken.
Probably this was not the tint to be expecting such a breakthrough. Yet, having
experienced the 1982-91 swing, and with a better ndrtdig of the potential of
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collective work aiming to enhancing productivity and resilience, rather than rent-
seeking, a more positive outcome might be expected next time around.
3. Alternative Networking Mecbanfln
Tim above bleak portrayal of enterprises' and networks' performance in the
1980s assumes, however, that these were the only experiments with networking
undertaken by Venezuela's plastics manufacturers. They were not In parallel to
productive networking-subcontracting, the subject of this study-the was an
instance of associative behavior that seemed much more successful at readapting to the
new conditions than productive networks themselves: entrepreneur or business
associations, fora created by entrepreneurs in a given sector in order to air their
concerns, develop sectorwide positions, and present their demands to the government,
suppliers, and other associations in an organized way.
The Venezuelan Association of Plastics Manufacturers, AVIPLA, grew rapidly
during the period of protectionism of 1983-88 because, as discussed in Chapters II and
V, the government assigned to this and other private entrepreneur associations a role in
the allocation of resin and dollar quotas. This was more than enough to make AVIPLA
a very powerful and popular association. The role it was playing was not very different
from that played by the "input-brokerage" oriented subcontracting networks. AVIPLA,
like subcontracting networks, was playing a role in facilitating their members' access to
restricted input markets. It did so by lobbying the government for policy changes, by
posing a tough negotiation stance on behalf of its members at times of dollar quota
negotiation, and even by welcoming the large joint-venture petrochemical corporations
as members to the association, so as to narrowing the gap between input suppliers and
users. Its membership grew significantly as a result.
When the input market situation smoothed out after stabilization and adjustment,
AVIPLA suffered, just as sucnrcignetworks did. AVIPIA, as many
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subcontracting networks, was stripped of its main role, and hence lost most of its
iveto a large proportion of manufacturers. Although I was never given a
concrete figure regarding membership loss in 1989-90 (a topic that seemed to be of
great concern for organizers, as it was treated as a taboo), Iwas told that it had been
significant-but that "the core members remained." This crisis pushed AVIPLA
members to shift their strategy. They tried to tendon the simple role of brokers and
lobbyists and to become promoters and knowledge-generators and disseminators. They
increased the frequency of their industrywide aessment studies (annual instead of
biannual); they hired a second economist to pursue industrywide studies of
competitiveness, a decision that some members contested, as they thought that the
association needed, instead, an engineer they started participating more actively in
international technology and plastics fairs: they attended international courses on new
business managennt concepts, such as Total Quality Managemt they intensified
their connections with successful business associations in other Latin American
countries (Colombia, Mexico); and, in 1992, they were starting to develop a project for
a subcontwcdng bourse ("bolsa de subcontractaci6n"), a database to facilitate the
formation of specialization subcontracting networks serving other industries. 113
As a result, the association was blooming again in 1992. In other words, this
institution experienced the breakthrough that subcontracting had not to evolve from a
lobbying mechanism, dependent on protection, to a more independent and proactive
promotion role. The reason why the association survived while the sector stalled or
declined would be that the nature of the relationships linking these entrepreneurs was
broader, transcending particular transactions, and aiming to improve the environment
113 'Ihe asnpinbehind this project was that informatice was the factor preventing
further outsourcing from firms in other industries. 'Ihis is not always the case, as the
marginal success of many sucnrcigbonres in several countries has proven
(conversation with Mr. Juan Jog6 Llistcrri, Private Sector Development Unit, Inter
American Developnwnt Bank, Washington, D.C., May 1994). Yet the initiative
indicated a recognition of the need to expand the association's roles to promote
productive endeavors. I have no evidence of the success of this experiment.
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and resources available to the participating firms in pursuing their business. Another
reason-explaining both AVIPLA's survival and its overcoming the rent-seeking
threshold-may have been that the association had the personnel that many small- and
medium-scale enterprises could not afford, to scan the markets and keep a broader
perspective regarding the prospects for plastics manufacturing beyond the ups and
downs of the local industry. Hence it provided the members with a sense of continuity,
support, and mission, that individual transactions with clients in a loose subcontracting
network could never offer.
In this study, I have deliberately referred to entrepreneur associations only in a
tangential way; my main concern has been with the organization of the production
process itself. Yet these brief observations on business associations echo concerns in
recent articles that may call for further exploration of the Venezuelan case (although out
of the context of this dissertation). Doner (1992), for instance, argues that business
associations may be as powerful in determining an industry's fate than a strong
government or multinational capital, hence they deserve to be given a more prominent
place in the process of economic and industrial development than they have been until
now. Moore and Hamalai (1993), in contrast, warn against optimist predictions-such
as mine-that business associations can successfully overcome a purely lobbying
function and become true industrial promoters in the context of liberalized markets.
Based on empirical studies of business associations in Nigeria and Sri Lanka, Moore and
Hamalai contend that these associations "might (a) be so successful in extracting rents
through lobbying and cartel activity that suppresses or distorts competitive markets that
(b) they become constraint on economic growth (ibid.: 1908-09)." In the presence of a
multiplicity of associations, these authors believe, activist organizers may develop
"corporatist" tendencies, i.e. "attempts to establish Privileged relationships . . . [with]
state agencies, .. . to the exclusion of actual or potential competing associations"
(ibid.:1896).
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My observation is that, indeed, AVIPLA is having an experience that contrasts
with Moore and Hamalai's argument. Indeed, the strengthening of the association's
professional personnel and the increase of its promoting activities after liberalization
suggests a positive role in supporting the modernization of the sector. Yet again, until
1992, AVIPLA did not face any competition as a representative of the plastics
manufacturing, but the possibility of divisions given emerging differences in
entrepreneurs perceptions of the requirements for development in the industry could
result in fragmentation and competition among business associations in the future. A
promising area for future research.
4. Two Routes to a Firm's "Prosperity"
The assessment of the industry's post-adjustment experience also reveals that
there is more than one road to a firm's prosperity (or at least to short-term recovery)
that policy, when devised, ought to facilitate or encourage. One of them is the
traditional mass production road. Multinac, with its decision to integrate vertically and
to invest in capital intensive and large scale injection molders for the production of a
simple item (shaving razors) pursued this first road successfully. Because the
incremental organizational demands of this solution were few, and the requirements for
cost-effectiveness (cheap commodity resins, cheap energy, easy transportation,
favorable geographical location) were all in place, Multinac could soon expand its
market beyond the Venezuelan limits and extract increasing returns from its investment.
This strategy, however, seemed to have very little spill-over to the rest of the economy:
large capital requirements make it unaffordable to many entrepreneurs, the employment
that it generated was minimal, and its input-output connections to other industrial
sectors were limited to the purchase of large amounts of commodity resin-possibly
even crowding local plastics manufacturers out of the lower-price local resin markets.
The other firmn-level strategy that had met with success in the short term
revolved around small-scale enterprises trying to develop economies of scope:
-323 -
(i) Belgplast, whichtriedtoenhanceits ability to respond flexibly and swiftly to its large
clients, and (ii) Carplast (and, in an incipient way, Justinpiast) which diversified its
product base and reached out, for the flrt time, to potential market niches in its locality.
Whether these are the seeds to rudimentary forms of flexible specialization and
industrial district strategies, respectively, in Venezuela's plastics manufacturing is yet to
be seen. But the policy prerequisites to the success of each of these types of strategies
are very different.
Multinac clearly benefited from a purely "hands-off" attitude from the
government, complemented by its own corporate management's willingness to support
the large investment (also a result of the enhanced foreign and private capital confidence
in the country's economy inspired by the policy reforms). Belgplast would probably
benefit from targeted training strategy, better access to financial resources, and support
in the development of advertisement strategies to reach out to potential corporate
clients (an initiative that Belgplast was already undertaking in a modest way). Carplast
would benefit, in addition, from improved infrastructure favoring its outreach approach
in its region, as well as from support in strengthening its still budding marketing and
product-development capabilities. There are some areas in which the national
government's advantage and responsibility are obvious-for instance, in designing and
pursuing credible policies and providing public goods. Local and regional governments,
although still undeveloped in many Venezuelan regions, might at some point perform a
catalytic role in attracting the required resources to benefit firms in their jurisdictions.
And AVIPLA, given its recently renewed impetus, might fulfill an important role in
promoting networking mechanisms, disseminating information on international trends
and on ways to enhance competitiveness, and articulating the sector's demands and
proposals to different levels of government.
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Vil. CONCLUSIONS
These concluding notes address three Umn: (i) how national economic
policies can influence the development of subcontracting networks in ways that are not
often dealt with in the current literature on industrial t;(ii) why firms'
emerging strategies to cope with the impact of structural adjustment, such as in the case
of Venezueia's plastics m turg, indicate thatb t flexible specialization and
the mass production paradigms can be useful in charting directions for future growth;
and (iii) how a favorable resource base can support or affect the development prospects
for plastics manufacturing.
A. The Muddled Reaity of SubCOntraCtIng In a Developing Economy:
Macro-maicro Linkages
Subcontracting in a rapidly changing "'late industrializing"economy, this study
has shown, does not necessarily conform to the typical models advanced in the relevant
industrial organization literature. That is, subcontracting may reflect neither flexible
specialization, nor cost-cutting segmentation or subordination in the context of a
dominant strategy of mass-production. And it may show no clear progression toward
either of those models: subcontracting does not follow a continuous or linear
development path, but is subject to fits and stats, and different types of subcontracting
networks can coexist even in a relatively small manufacturing sector and evolve in
seemingly opposite directions.
The subcontracting networks whose rapid growth I observed in 1983-88 did not
conform to the typical model of inter-firm relationships portrayed in the informal sector
and product market segmentation literature. In general, subcontractors were no smaller,
no less centrally located, no less willing to invest, and no less optimistic about their
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markets and their future than client firms. No strong evidence emerged to support a
conclusion that, in general, client firms relied on subcontractors to cut costs associated
with paying or managing a large workforce or to avoid bulky and indivisible investments
in the face of demand uncertainty-paradoxically, many firms using subcontracting also
were expanding their own capacity. Instead, the evidence collected in 1987 indicated
that subcontracting offered clients more than the opportunity to avoid labor costs, and
offered subcontractors a better chance for capital accumulation than is usually assumed
in the informal sector and segmentation literatures.
But that does not mean that the inter-firm networks that I observed conformed
instead to the model advanced by the "flexible specialization" literature. Although firms
supplying plastics manufacturing services through subcontracting arrangements often
had highly skilled technicians at their helms (in many cases, former employees of larger
plastics manufacturing firms and experienced workers who had immigrated from
Europe), their workforces were not highly specialized in general. The firms' core
technology was not what the flexible specialization literature means when it talks about
"general-purpose machines." 114 Nor, in most cases, had it advanced enough to
integrate computerized operations-which, as the literature suggests, facilitates flexible
specialization because it reduces the cost of batch operations. Moreover, the
geographical configurations that I observed diverged from the industrial district
concept. In general, geographical clustering did not seem important for the networks'
operations. 115 The local government-in contrast to the national government or
multinational corporations-had little to do with the initiation or the success of
subcontracting networks in any locality.
114 As I discuss later, however, the strategy of some firms after adjustment involved treating
the plastics transformation equipment as "general purpose" equipment, changing molds
as required by the specific product. More on the implications of the technological
features of plastics manufacturing is presented later in this chapter.
115 I will argue later that this migt change in the future.
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My explanation of this seemingly "muddled"reality of subcontracting in a
developing country highlights the crucial-but not always deliberate-4mpact tat
national ,nacreecenemic polcy can have on inter-flra reiotinships and
interindawvy lSkages. In following too closely the current debate on industrial
organization in developed countries-which, on one side, stresses the role of local
governments and social relationships and, on the othr, the power and mobility of
multinational capital-the emerging developing country literature may too quickly
dismiss the importance of national policy and macroeconomic factors. That is certainly
the case for Venezuela, where local governments have only recently begun to emerge as
vocal and influential actors, and where evidence shows that subsidiaries of multinational
corporations can adapt their strategies to specific national conditions to some extent.
During 1983-88, the government of Venezuela implemented a highly restrictive
protectionist scheme that responded not to specific sectoral conditions and
requirements, but to the urgent need to stabilize the balance of payments and to stop
capital flight and the erosion of the country's foreign exchange reserves. The scheme
imposed high tariffs (and, in some cases, outright bans) on imports of many final
products containing plastic parts. As a result, it created a strong captive demand for
locally produced plastic products and generated a sharp rise in derived demand for
resins (or polymers), the main input in plastics manufacturing.
The trade protection scheme also gave special protection to "strategic"
industries. chief among these industries was the secondary petrochemical industry,
consisting of a few large joint venture petrochemical corporations, which the
govemment charged withman resin supply (including channeling all necessary
resin imports to Venezuelan plastics manufacturers). Under protectionism, these
petrochemical corporations became profitable for the first time, but the responsibility for
managing all resin supplies soon overpowered their administrative capabilities. As a
consequence, plastics manufacturers downstream faced insurmountable bottlenecks and
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high transactions costs in getting access to resins, at a time that they needed them most.
The situation became particularly critical around 1986-7.
I have made the claim that a crucial role for subcontracting in Venezuela's
plastics manufacturing then became that of intermediation or brokerage in the restricted
resin markets. Older plastics manufacturers with a long-standing foothold in the now
restricted resin markets became subcontractors for newcomers. These newcomers,
attracted to businesses involving plastics manufacturing by the stepped-up
protectionism, were excluded from access to crucial resin inputs by supply
bottlenecks. 116
This claim marks a clear departure in my thesis from a common assumption in
theories of market segmentation and subcontracting-that subcontracting, as opposed
to vertical integration of production, is mainly a response to demand uncertainty. In my
story, subcontnacting aries mainly in response to supply and policy uncertainty.
This interpretation has several implications for the role of subcontracting in the
organization of plastics manufacturing and in its prospects.
First, the interpretation explains why subcontracting in Venezuelan plastics
manufacturing in 1983-88 seemed to have more benign effects on subcontwrtors than
the product market segmentation literature would usually predict. Subcontractors did
not depend solely on demand upswings experienced by their clients. They had a
strategic resource to offer that their clients needed during both peaks and troughs in
demand. That made the demand for subcontractors' services somewhat less uncertain
and led them to adopt optimistic investment and development plans. But it also meant
that the subcontractors' bargaining power in subcontracting relationships depended on
the continuation of policies effecting restrictions in the resin markets. As a result, many
subcontractors focused more on influencing policy and seeking ways to take advantage
116 The full explanation of this unusual is presented in Chapter V.
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of their access to resin markets than on creating alternative sources of comparative
advantage.
Second, because many of the subcontracting networks of the 1980s bloomed
under abnormally restrictive trade policies, their apparent success hid infect
economically and technicay inefficient operadons. The lesson to the supporters of
inter-firm collaboration (such as me) is that fast-growing networks are not necessarily
economically efficient networks. One easily detected exception to the claim of
inefficiency are the subcontractors linked in one way or another to multinational
corporations. Though also sheltered by protection in many cases, multinationals still
had to respond to cost and revenue pressures from headquarters, and they in turn
exerted those pressures on their subcontractors. In other words, multalonaLs
substtuted for the government in exacting improvement in performance from the
subcontractors to whom the government was indirecdy grantng protecdon. To the
extent that multinationals are not at the vanguard of technological innovation, they
contribute little to technological advancement in developing country industry. In the
Venezuelan plastics industry, however, they played a nonnegligible role in raising
delivery standards.
Third, although protection led to inefficiencies on many fronts, it also resulted in
benefits for the industry. It allowed significant investment in modern plastics
manufacturing capacity in the 1980s, which helped the industry to rebound strongly and
relatively quickly after the post-adjustment demand contraction of 1989-90. By
affording a group of dynamic firms the opportunity to "connect" with local subsidiaries
of foreign producers, protectionism helped the industry to accumulate technical
laming. Protectionism also resulted in instistdonaland oiganraionallearning.
Even under the relatively stable conditions of trade protection during 1983-88,
subcontracting networks evolved, adjusting to the prevailing economic constraints.
They became more and more complex as subcontractors started to incorporate informal
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insurance mechanisms into their contracts-interlinking the markets for raw materials
and transformation services, for instance.
Consistent with my characterization of subcontracting as multifaceted, I have
identified several other explanations-besides raw material intermediation-for the
proliferation of subcontracting in the 1980s. 117 These explanations concen, for
instance, scarcity of specialized skills, investors' reactions to exchange rate uncertainty,
and the operational disruptions caused by the uncertain supply of molds obtained
through temporary importation. But many of the explanations fit the same pattern as
that centered on raw material supply. They too highlight the ability of subcontractors to
assist client firms in resolving supply bottlenecks and uncertainties created, in large part,
by macroeconomic policies designed to resolve issues deemed of greater urgency (e.g.
an external debt crisis) than industrial development Iemphasize resin supply
bottlenecks and uncertainty because this rationale for subcontracting was frequent in the
industry, because it is unusual in the literature, and, of course, because it related to one
of the themes of highest concern for a country such as Venezuela: the prospects for
resource-based industrialization. At the end of this concluding chapter, I turn to a brief
exploration of this theme.
B. Subcontracting after Ajgstment: PossIbilties for Progress
After having departed in my interpretation of the Venezuelan experience from
the two "sides" of the industrial organization debate, Inow return to them. I try to
show, briefly, how they both can be relevant and useful in defining the future prospects
of this industry. But, more important, any policy implications and assessments of the
future prospects of subcontracting relationships and the plastics manufacturing industry
need to be considered in the light of the complex subcontracting relationships already in
place. In Chapter VI, I have described the diverging trends for subcontracting networks
117 See ChaptersIVandV.
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in VenezueWs plastics manufacturing after the "big bang" stabilization and adjustment
program of 1989. Here I try to build on those trends to offer a view of the possibilities
for growth in those networks and in the industry in the long term.
In response to structural adjustment, subcontracting in plastics manufacturing
took two routes, primarily at the initiative of the client firms, whose relative bargaining
power in the networks increased as economic conditions changed under structural
adjustment. 118 Some networks, primarily those based on capacity subcontracting,
disappeared. 119 Second, some others, most often specialization subcontracting,
underwent a significant restructuring that I have called "selective integration." Selective
integration involved a two-pronged segmentation of the clients' procurement
process: 120 (i) ceasing to outsourco-hence vertically integrating-the transformation
of simple products that could be produced in-house in large series with large economies
118 Ido not claim that this conclusion-that structural adjustment strengthens the
bargaining power of client firms in subcontracting networks-is generalizable. Whether
it applies to a particular case depends on the conditions prevailing before adjustment.
As my study documents, in the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry, the
bargaining power of subcontractors in subcontracting relationships stemmed in large
part from the fact that they often had easier access to crucial -nu markets (e.g., raw
materials) than their clients, and this advantage disappeared with strucbnl adjustment
119 Capacity subcontracting is an arrangemnt between two firms that undertake the same
production processes, in which one (the client)subcontracts with the other (the
subcontractot) to enhance its production capacity during sudden demandpeaks. In
specialization subcontracting, which occurs between firms in two different production
sectors, the client firm(e.g. an automobile producer without in-house
capabilities) outsources the production of plastic parts to the subcontractor.
120 Although this segmented procuent strategy may appear to closely resemble Michael
Piore's proposition in Dalism amdDiwcuOuMuiry in IuntdhfSeckinS (Berger and
Piore, 1980), it differs from it in a very important respect in this case
would not be driven by the differmential impact of demand fluctuation and uncertainty
across the two product market segments-as both segments would be affected by such
flux in similar ways. The segmentation would be driven, in rost of the subcontracting
networks with which I am fwsnilitr, solely by she ticnlgcieurmnsof each type
of prdut (notably, spcaeSinemx iiern e.upet ndappit quality
control capabilities). In Piore's model, technological sgetto sarrqiie u
the differential impact of demand uncertainty seers to be the factor driving the choice of
iem ousoed.
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of scale, and (ii) continuing to outsource to the best-performing subcontractors the
production of more sophisticated parts and components in smaller batches and under
tight on-tint and on-spec121 delivery conditions
Some of the subcontractors whose clients severed subcontracting links failed to
survive-most of themsmaller firms who depended heavily on a few clients and
engaged in capacity subcontracting. Increasing interest rates, labor costs,2 and raw
material costs, together with the impact of the demand contraction immediately
following the introduction of the adjustment program, broke firms that had been
operating at narrow profit margins.
Those subcontractors who survived-whether or not their subcontracting
relationships did-responded to stmuctural adjustment in ways that were by no means
determined solely by their clients' change in strategy. Subcontractors treated similarly
by their clients adopted different responses. To lay the groundwork for evaluating the
prospects for growth offered by each of those strategic responses, I sketch out the
firms' responses below, distinguishing between two broad groups of coping strategies:
product-market-based and process- or technology-based coping strategies (Figure
VI. 1). Firms pursuing product-market-based strategies took two seemingly opposite
routes: (i) diversifying into a broader set of products, or (ii) concentrating on a
narrower set of products over whose production the firm could maintain some degree of
monopoly (particularly, products not easily traded internationally). The process- or
121 From Ameden(1989:188), who defines "on-spec" as "deliveries that conform to
piedetermined quality standards
122 An unusual aspect of Venezuela's 1989-91 adjustment program was that the heavy
liberalization measures were accompanied by the pougion of a new Labor Law that
enhanced workers' rights, increased hiring and firing rigidities, and increased labor costs
and the penalties for employers' nocmlac. The new law responded to the political
imperatives of the moment by helping to calm the concern of organized labor about the
amp odutmetmeasures. It may nt have imposed heavy costs on
formal sector firms, but it did on those firms at the fringe, who were now operating more
conspicuously outside the law.
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technology-based responses also were of two types: (i)relying on the patent for a
product or on exclusive rights to the use of a mold as a source of monopoly power over
the supply of the product, and (ii) developing process or technological improvements to
meet emerging client demands, such as low-inventory operations, fast production of
small batches, improved quality at competitive cost, and transparent cost accounting.
(My labeling a strategy "product-based" does not imply that it did not involve process
and technological changes, and vice versa; the label merely denotes the main emphasis
of a firm's strategy.)
Figure VI1 Firms' Strategic Responses to Structural Adjustment In Venezuela's
Plastics Manufacturing Industry,1989-92
Networkwide Elements of ci ent Subcontrcor'sra Cs
outcome firm's strategyE
Wet Typicaly, mproduction
Typically, small batch production
Source: Interviews with firm managers, 1992. See also Table VL10.
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Under the mw*et divennJica#tin stratgy, subcontractors that had relied heavily
on a single strong client cast their net more widely to capture new clients in markets to
which they had never before catered. This sudden shift in markets required internal
organizational changes (developing outreach and marketing capabilities), financial
support (to develop new capabilities and prototype products), and technical, plant-level
changes (to comply with hygiene and safe-handling regulations and product
specifications in new markets).
The diversification strategy often also led to a shift in geographical focus.
Subcontractors that had depended on long-standing subcontracting links, now broken.
with a client located at a distance often looked for new clients that were closer. Firms
in their own towns and in nearby rural areas with which they had never had any business
relationship suddenly became attractive targets for marketing efforts. At first, however,
these "wandering" subcontractors focused on creating captive markets where they could
reap monopoly profit. For instance, a former automotive components supplier started
making plastic containers for rural producers for whom getting access to suppliers
elsewhere in the region was more difficult. This strategy involved turning out diverse
products and, consequently, frequently retooling machines.Y2
Thus, for subcontractors pursuing the diversification strategy, eamings depended
on their increased ability to respond quickly to the changing and diverse demands of a
larger clientele-sometimes combined with the creation of a captive clientele on a
geographical basis. Among the subcontracting networks that I studied in detail in 1987
and 1992, two subcontractors explicitly adopted an aggressive diversification strategy,
and one of these experienced the fastest output growth after adjustment. But this
successful subcontractor belonged to a larger group of automotive suppliers owned by a
relatively large financial group, and the costs of its diversification strategy may have
123 In plastics manufacturing.Imnran by "retooling" the process of mounting and
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been partly hidden in the corporate structure. The other subcontractor that adopted
diversification was ane supplier that, with adjustment, had experienced one
of the mut severe hits among the observed firms: it was suddenly by the
single client to which it had been dedicated for a long period. Although for this
subcontractor the diversification strategy had not yet led to growth, it had enabled the
firm to weather a ca*trophic change in demand conditions.
A subcontractor pursuing the second product-market-based strategy-increasing
the concentradond selectiift ofproduds wad aarkets-needed first to identify a
relatively large, profitable market, usually for an intermediate product not easily tradable
internationailly (for example, medium-sized and large containers). Then the firm would
concentrate its efforts and scarce resources on large-series production of that narrow
range of products. The subcontractor's comparative advantage over other suppliers
depended usually on good business contacts and access to modem plastics
transformation equipment that would allow it to reap the benefits of scale economies.
Among the firms in my case studies, two subcontractors adopted the concentration
strategy between 1989 and 1992. In 1992, the managers of these firms reported that
they had experienced no real growth in output during that period, but had been able to
stay afIoat by retrenching labor.
Subcontractors that retained their traditional clients after adjustment adopted
two types of process- or technology-based responses. Those that, thanks in large part
to their good past performance, had won the exclusive right to ti are of a technology
(unbodied in a machine or in imported molds, for instance) or the patentfor apart or
product, adopted a mass prduction approach. 124 By stepping up their efforts to
maintain competitive costs and good quality and delivery sadrsacmaid
124 Inall caues, the paent orutchnology was foreign. hnone example, a highly reputable
Germn firm certied aVeneuan plasticsmthe o o
technology in response to de quitby alocal se sidiaryofalurpAmerican
corporation that its sapplier have such a certification.
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when necessary, by a iately targeted business relations-they had managed to hold
onto those exclusive rights after adjustment. Those rights gave them a monopoly over
the supply of products that, because of their reputation or special qualities, enjoyed a
solid local demand and thus enabled the subcontractors to maintain a relatively stable
mass production system. Two firms in my case studies relied on the "proprietary
technology" strategy. One, which had historically relied on that strategy, experienced
growth after adjustment. The other, which had lost other important business after the
liberalization of trade, experienced a slight real decline in gross output.
The other subcontractors in this set pursued the strategy based on more
efficient and flexible batch production seeking economies of scope. When clients
segmented their subcontracting strategy, they needed to continue to outsource the small
batch production of more complex items that required precision and high-quality
processing and handling. For that, they chose among their best-performing, pre-1989
subcontractors-in most cases, small- and medium-scale firms. But the more
competitive post-adjustment market conditions required higher cost, delivery, and
quality standards. To retain their contracts, the subcontractors had to meet a challenge
that they described as "retooling as fast as possible, molding as well as possible, and at
the lowest cost possible." Only one of the firms in my case studies clearly followed this
route. For that firm, the initial steps in implementing the "tiexibilization" strategy
consisted of having production managers (who, in my example, also happened to be the
firm's general managers), technicians, and workers identify inefficiencies in molding and
retooling and reorganizing the production process to address those inefficiencies.
The diversity of strategic responses in a relatively small market indicated that
1992-the year of my latest observations-was still a time of change and relative
uncertainty. And with only three years having passed since the adjustment program had
been introduced, it was early to predict whether these strategies would survive in the
long run. Indeed, some may already have failed or evolved in different directions under
33&
he major reversal of theist a mmtZthe four strategic
response sketched above were sufficiently distinct in 1992to provide the basis for a
tentative asemnt of ft longer-term prospects for a developing country
manufacturing sector such as the one that I bave analyzed.
To provide a paralleiwith the two routes to prosperity proposed by Piore and
Sabel in The Second Indwan auide, the clients choices and subcontractors'
strategic responses described above can be reclastifiedin two categories in terms of
their technological-institutional foundations: (i) strategies based on low-cost mass
production (the clients' vertical integration of simple, large-series products, and the
subcontractors' strategic responses 2 and 3 in Figure VII1), and (i) strategies based on
efficient small batch production (subcontractors' responses I and 4 in the figure). Small
batch production was responsible for the real growth in output of two of the three
subcontractors that reported growth. 125 For the one client firm that had experienced
growth, however, much of the growth was accounted for by the mass production prong
of its "selective integration" strategy.126
Following Harrison's conclusions in Lean and Mean, however, I consider these
growth opportunities hardly autonomous. For Venezuelan manufacturers, much of the
potential for growth remains contingent on the availability of the market outlets and
sources of technical learning represented by strong multinational corporations. Among
the five firms in my detailed case studies (which included a total of 20 firms) that
125 Of a total of 15 subcontractors in the five case studies.
126 Ibis finn, the subsidiary of a powerful mutntoaoprton, had managed to
lanch a successful mass production strategy foilowing a massive investment in modern
injection molding machinery. Shortly thereafter, it stantd exporting somr of its mass-
produced personal care products to other markets in Latin Amarica and the Caribbean
and was soon to approach markets in North Africa. Under given conditions, then, both
-as prdcto and small batch prdcto repmsatd incipient gr-t opprcnities.
Unfortnanly, I lack data on profits, which would have aSlowed me to assess the actual
financial success of these s . bus, by "success,"I m real growth in gross
outputas reported by the interviewees.
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adjusted successfully 127 to policy reforms in the medium term, four were closely tied to
multinational interests, as subsidiaries or as subcontractors.128 Moreover, in the
subcontracting networks that survived, the client firms were all subsidiaries of
multinational corporations serving the Venezuelan market, and two of the four
subcontractors that achieved significant real growth after adjustment were suppliers for
subsidiaries of multinational corporations. And that some multinationals pursued
subcontractors successful as suppliers for other multinationals implied that this was seen
as an efficient screening device for good performers. On future prospects for
subcontracting in the Venezuelan case, I thus find relevant Amsden's conclusion in
Asia's Next Giant on subcontracting in Korea. She believes that, although in equity
terms links between large corporations and smaller subcontractors may leave much to
be desired,
[iun terms of growth and efficiency, however, Korea's subcontracting system has
been an ideal vehicle by which to spread the progressive practices of the modem
industrial enterprise to the remainder of the productive economy. (Amsden,
1989:188)
Returning to Piore and Sabel's two "possibilities for prosperity," it is important
to reiterate that, of the five "successful" firms in my case studies, only three based their
recovery strategies on a typical mass production solution (relying on a large, stable
market and developing economies of scale). The other two were developing small batch
production systems-one as a subcontractor for larger companies, often multinational
subsidiaries producing personal care items, household appliances, and school items; the
other as a subcontractor for other firms and producers in local markets. Coincidentally,
these two firms experienced the highest growth after adjustment and were among the
smallest in my case studies. Considering the technological imperatives to which they
127 Again, in terms of real growth in gross output.
128 For more detail, see Chapter VI and, in particular, Table VI.9.
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had to respond-diverse clients and multiple products, short series, and fast
turnaround-I would venture to suggest that their short-term success was based on an
incipient version of a "flexible specialization" model. Other factors point in the same
direction. Both firms were led by managers and technicians with good technical
knowledge of their business, many with high degrees. Employer-worker relations
seemed harmonious. Recognizing the need for fast retooling times, the firms'
technicians conceived their plastics transformation machines virtually as "general
purpose" machines to which product-specific molds were attached as required. And
both firms had their own mold making and maintaining capabilities, which increased
their knowledge of, and control over, their injection molding business. In addition, the
second firm was creating links with the surrounding communities-a hint of the post-
adjustment possibilities for developing mini industrial districts in some Venezuelan
localities?
My observation of post-adjustment trends of Venezuelan subcontracting thus
suggests that, in developing countries, hybrids of rudimentary flexible specialization and
mass production may continue to be the rule and not the exception (Sabel, 1990:223).
Moreover, in many sectors, multinational corporations will remain important in terms of
output, employment, and as sources of subcontracting opportunities (Harrison,
1994:12-13). In thinking of options for industrial organization and development in the
developing world, then, it would seem as if a certain degree of contradiction with
regards to industrial organization paradigms in good currency has to be tolerated.
Sectoral policy prescriptions for a sector such as plastics manufacturing will need to be
eclectic, incorporating support to incipient flexible specialization, as well as viable
manifestations of mass production, and taking advantage, where possible, of
multinational procurement systems.
Whether the preconditions for the longer-term success of any of these models
exist in a developing country context needs to be examined, however. One of such set
of preconditions would be the industry's institutional, technological and social context
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For instance, can market largesse and stability be ensured so as to make mass
production viable in that industry? Do firms have access to computerized technologies
that would make batch production more competitive? Are institutions in place to
support the development of "collective efficiency" and collective insurance mechanisms
among smaller firms in that industry?
In a case such as plastics manufacturing, another such set of preconditions
relates to inter-industry linkages. The question is whether, in Venezuela's restructured
economic environment &f the 1990s, oil and natural gas riches can represent a source of
economic advantage. I turn next to a brief consideration of that question.
C. Prospects for Plastics Manufacturing In an Ofl-Rich Country
That a resource-rich developing economy should be able to develop dynamic
comparative advantages based on its abundant resource would not seem to be an
unreasonable proposition. Presumably, the abundant resource would provide, first, the
foreign exchange basis for the heavy capital investments required for primary and
secondary processing of the resource and, later, the low-cost input (the abundant
resource itself) for further processing downstream. As some supporters of resource-
based industrialization have suggested, an aggressive official investment strategy would
help the country "overcome the hump" represented by capital-intrsnsive primary and
secondary processing industries and thereby open up possibilitivA for less bulky private
capital investments downstream (Radetzki, 1977:332-33; Auty, 1990:55-57). Cross-
country data examined in Chapter II indicated that for oil-rich countries there was
indeed a correlation between success in plastics manufacturing (measured in terms of
gross output growth) and development of the capital-intensive petrochemical sector to
link oil riches upstream with plastics manufacturing downstream. This seemed to be the
case for Venezuela, which in the mid-1980s figured simultaneously among the largest
developing world producers of oil, petrochemicals, and plastic manufactures1 29
The opinion of my interviewees in the plastics manufacturing industry that
difficult access to petrochemical inputs was the main constraint on their operations thus
appeared paradoxical. And, as seen throughout the document, I have placed this
apparent paradbx at the core of my explanation of growing subcontracting in the 1980s.
A more careful look at the policy framework of the 1980s makes it both more
obvious and less paradoxical. The policies adopted clearly were going to lead to
bottlenecks: 130
To prevent further capital flight during the severe debt crisis of the early
1980s, a strong protectionist scheme was put into place to encourage
domestic investment.
129 Evidence is presented in Chapter IL Tables II.3 and IL4.
130 Certainly, broader theories on the crippling effect of resource richness also abound-
and there is no question that some of them apply, at leastn past, to the Venezuelan
cas.According to themppuarmCrocnir guCC OC-Mntao the2henomnnknown as
the "Dutch disease," basic resource export booms create relative price and exchange
rate misaignens(overUation)thtmakrdble sectors ls cono IV~l
attractive and hence discourage industrial invetment A related arUmnz the "resource
curse thesis, esthe perverse incentives with regard to industrial policy
sequencing created by resource richness(Auty, 1994). According to thiz thesis,
resource richness conceals the urgency of pursuing-and hence delays agommn'
decision to pursue-export-based, low-cost industrial divesfcto. In the early
development stages of successfuidustiaiiEast Asian counie these ators
maintain, this diversification generated the foreign exchange needed to finance slowly
maturing capital-intensive investments in primary resource processing. The opposite
sequence, this approach suggests, leads to foreign exchange starvation and industrial
These theories can serve as a useful backdrop tonnesaniglonger-term processes at
work in the Venezuel.n economy. However, my explanation of thepenhmia
bottlenecks in the 1980s focuses on the short-term impact of policy decisions made
during that specific period.
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* At the same time, and also to avoid depletion of foreign exchange
reserves through a mounting trade deficit, imports of petrochemical
inputs were restricted and reserved to the joint venture petrochemical
corporations; these corporations were also charged with the exclusive
distribution of any petrochemical inputs required by the growing local
plastics manufacturers.
* Plastics manufacturing was one of the sectors showing a stronger supply
response, in part because of the initial availability of cheap local
petrochemical inputs and idle plastics manufacturing capacity built up
during the oil booms of the 1970s.
* When plastics manufacturing shot up, input prices did not rise because
they were under strict controls: locally produced resins had a maximum
sales price; and resins imported by the petrochemical corporations
enjoyed an exchange rate subsidy and their local sale also was subject to
price controls.
* The slow maturation of additional petrochemical projects and the import
restrictions led to severe input supply bottlenecks.
Growth in plastics manufacturing was thus built on two "illusions": an
artificially captive demand and artificially low input prices. In the short run, policies
seemed to have a self-defeating effect, limiting further growth in plastics manufacturing.
Could this period be interpreted, on the other hand, as one of deliberate
government attempts to "get prices wrong" so as to increase the return to investment
and accelerate industrial growth (Amsden's 'learning paradigm" in Asia's Next Giant)?
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The answer would be no if it is recognized that the entire strategy was driven not by the
explicit attempt to generate industrial development, but by the attempt to avert the
further deterioration of the country's balance of payments and foreign exchange
reserves. Another important ingredient for the "learning paradigm" formula also was
missing: there were no government measures to exact high performance and delivery
standards from the firms benefiting from potection and subsidies. 131 But the outcome
of this period of protectionism did resemble the early results of a "learning paradigm"
strategy: Venezuelan petrochemical suppliers strengthened their capital base and
maintained high profits for the first time in their short histories. Downstream, plastics
manufacturers made significant investments in modern equipment-which formed the
platform on which plastics manufacturing was able to rebound after adjustment
measures were introduced in 1989. That, however, was the story of the 1980s. What
are the prospects for effective links between the now strengthened petrochemical
producers and plastics manufacturers in the 1990s?
With the productive capacity in place, thanks to the investments encouraged in
the 1980s by the "wrong price" framework, the policy reforms of the early 1990s held
the promise of a dynamic petrochemical-plastics complex in the years ahead. The least
efficient plastics manufacturing firms were weeded out, and lagging petrochemical
producers (primarily the styrene producer, which relied on an imported input) started to
restructure. New petrochemical capacity, resulting from the investments of the 1980s,
came into operation. Venezuelan commodity resins remained competitive in price, yet
joint venture corporations also recognized the need to sharpen their complementary
services and marketing strategies in order to maintain an edge over experienced foreign
producers. A few experiments with asia and final product exports were initiated in
plastics manufacturing, with varied success. In the short run, however, both the
131 I have suggested elsewhere in the study that ulinadtnal subsidiaries may have played
such a standard-setting role in some instances, and that intrasectoral competition may
have exerted some cost-cutting pressures on manufacturers.
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petrochemical and the plastics manufacturing industries reached record output levels.
Should this success be taken as an indication of promising long-termprospect for
plastics manufacturing, and could oil richness again be considered a possible source of
comparative advantage for plastics manufacturing under the more competitive
conditions of the 1990s?132
Venezuela's petrochemical industry has not yet diversified into the most
profitable segment of the resin market--specialty resins-nor does this seem the way to
go in the short and medium term. Specialty resins include a diverse spectrum of alloys
and compounds mixed almost on a custom-made basis, produced in small quantities and
with a high cost-to-weight ratio. They demand technical sophistication from the
producer and a production method resembling "flexible specialization" rather than mass
production. The source of competitive advantage in this segment of the resin market is
technological innovation and product differentiation. Because the Venezuelan market
for this type of resin is not yet developed and the availability of abundant petrochemical
inputs is not an important factor in their production, diversifying into specialty resins
does not seem the most likely or promising route in the near term.
The current options for crating effective linkages between petrochemicals and
plastics in the Venezuelan case ramain, then, in commodity resins-simpler,
standardized, mass-produced materials with a low cost-to-weight ratio, for which
petrochemical raw materials represent a relatively high share of total production costs
and for which the country has extensive production capacity.
That it is to the advantage of local plastics manufacturers to have local installed
capacity in commodity resins is clear. First, Venezuelan petrochemical corporations
132 What foliows is speculation based on the asupinthat the policy reforms will be
continued. In fact after major political unrest and the impeachment of the president in
1993, the structural adjustment measures were abnoeand a general sense of
economic awd political uncertainty prevailed again in 1994-95.
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continue to have a significant comparative advantage over international producers in
producing commodity resins for the local market,not only because of the availability of
natural gas in the country, but also because freight costs add a nonnegligible share of the
costs of imported resins. Second, proximity and familiarity of the resin supplier is
important, because even the minimal variations possible in commodity resins to meet the
customer's needs can be of significant economic and technical importance for the
plastics manufacturer. indeed, Venezuelan petrochemical corporations are icreasig
their efforts to reach out to local plastics manufacturers. They are trying to identify the
customers' specific needs and to adjust their products-to the extent possible in
commodity resins-to those needs and to offer technical assistance where required.
But an important question is whether local plastics manufacturers would
continue to be an attractive market for Venezuelan petrochemical corporations, now
that markets are being liberalized and opportunities to sell resins in potentially more
profitable markets abroad are opening up. The answer is twofold. First, the risk that
Venezuelan petrochemical corporations would decide to "abandon"local customers for
higher-paying customers abroad is mitigated by the threat of instability in those foreign
markets. Maintaining a stable base of local customers provides insurance against the
regular troughs in competitive international markets. Hence, Venezuelan petrochemical
corporations will always find it convenient to nurture a certain number of local
customers.
Second, more on the normative side, petrochemical corporations could be
encouraged to continue supplying their products locally, and as efficiently as technically
possible, by allowing them to integrate forward into plastics manufacturing. Formosa
Plastics, the Taiwanese petrochemical-plastics conglomerate, provides a perfect example
of such a strategy (Li, 1989; Wade, 1990:80). Forward integration allows the
petrochemical corporation to reap more fully the benefits of its upstream scale
economies in the production of resins, and hence gives it the incentive to produce resins
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as efficiently as possible. That, in turn, should enhance the competitiveness of the
plastics manufacturers downstream.
The problem with opting for forward integration is that it would seem to
threaten the notion of a broader capital ownership base in the plastics manufacturing
industry-one of the original concerns of this study on subcontracting networks. The
large petrochemical corporation is likely to displace or crowd out other local plastics
manufacturers and to increase the concentration in the industry. A balance would need
to be struck between allowing for a certain degree of forward integration-to
encourage the petrochemical producers to be as cost effective as possible in producing
resins-and maintaining a diverse and competitive group of plastics manufacturing
firms. The balance between these two extremes probably will be determined by the
petrochemical corporation's own need to mitigate uncertainty in the integrated plastics
manufacturing operations. Expanding downstream to capture larger and larger shares
of the plastics manufactures market might not be good for the corporation, as a resin
producer or as a plastics manufacturer, because it would increase the corporation's risks
in both businesses.
Identifying that balance-between proceeding with forward integration of
petrochemical interests into plastics manufacturing and maintaining a broad capital base
that would allow for local competition and innovation in changing markets-is left to
another study. In pursuing such a question, however, it would be useful to examine
examples of successful integrated petrochemical-plastics conglomerates, as well as cases
of oil-rich developing countries that have succeeded in both petrochemicals and plastics
manufacturing, for instance, the People's Republic of China, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia.
In the background of such a study should be, nevertheless, the lesson extracted from
this study of the Venezuelan plastics manufacturing industry: that both mass production
and flexible specialization ought to be considered valid options for future progress in
plastics manfluig.
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EPILOGUE
The last portion of the field research for this dissertation was undertaken in
1992, a year when Venezuela was still enjoying the benefits of the post-adjustment
economic recovery. After 6.9% real GDP growth in 1990 and 10.4% in 1991, the
economy still showed a robust 7.5% real growth in 1992. The optimism felt in that
context made me talk about the "two roads" to growth in the industry-one of which
would lend itself to a reformulation of subcontracting relationships. Political and social
unrest, and the policy reversals that followed the impeachment of President Carlos
Andr6s Pdrez have since tempered such optimism. Yet they reconfirmed that
developing strategies to deal with uncertainty remain a priority for Venezuelan
enterprises, large and smalL This reality, and the business association's (AVIPLA's)
efforts to address it through collective action, in a context that sounds very similar to
that of the 1980s, are illustrated in the following article appeared in the Venezuelan
daily journal El Nacionalon January 24, 1995:
Main Problems Faced by Plastics Man4facturers
by Luis Manuel Escalante
Venezuela's plastics manufacturing industry, 80% of which corresponds to
small-scale enterprises, is being affected by high input prices, difficulties in input
supply and access to foreign currency, and the decline of national demand.
These factors have contributed to an decline of capacity utilization to 50%.
Employment capacity has declined by 55.2%, from 23,000 workers in January
1994 to 18,699 in December 1994. Considering that each direct job generates
four indirect jobs, the outcome is that 21,505 workers have been rendered
jolss.
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These are the results of the annual survey of AVIPLA. The decline in
production stands between 20 and 40 percent during 1994. With regards to the
perspectives for this year, most of AVIPLA's interviewees manifested their wish
to invest, but only under improved conditions. Ofal manufacrers, 51.7%
expects to augment production volumes in 1995 by about 10%, while 17%
expects to maintain 1994 levels. In order for production increases to be
possible, AVIPLA will engage in a number of discussions with PDVSA,
PEQUIVEN, and the ministry of mines, as well as with the entrepreneur
association for the chemical industry and the planning ministry, so as to design
an industrial policy specifically targeted to plastics manufacturing, to reap the
benefits of the comparative advantage enjoyed by this sector in intemational
markets.
In other words, a new strategy for the development of the industry will be
designed. It will include the revision and reduction of tariffs, identification of
potential markets, the promotion of strategic alliances to facilitate the opening of
new markets, the continuation of the development of specialized labor, and the
support to conservationist campaigns and to the national governments' initiative
to create the Import-Export Bank.
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Petr6leos de Venezuela, Sociedad An6nima (Venezuela's
state-owned oil corporation) '
Proposed project for the strategic management of the Venezuelan
petrochemical industry, 1975
Corporaci6n Petroquimica de Venezuela
Polypropylene
Polystyrene
Poly-vinyl chloride
Advisory Commission for the Preferential Exchange Regime,
Venezuela's Ministry of Industry
Sistema Administrado de Precios (Price Control System)
Styrene Butadiene (synthetic rubber)
Small scale enterprise (defined in Venezuela as firms with 5-20
workers)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
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ANNEXI SOURCES AND INTERVIEWS
Insdtudens and PreofinalAsoid s
Vanessa Cartaya, Research Director, Tnstituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones
Sociales(ILDIS). Caracas (several interviews).
Carlota Pdrez and Manuel Guevara, directors of the Programa de Actualizaci6n
Industrial(PA) and Ana Maria Segnini, Beila Cols, Nicolis Torres, and Nancy Lucena,
members of the "Plastics Team." Planning Department ofthe Ministry of
Caracas, Spring and Summer, 1987.
Carmen Leonor Martinez, Relaciones Internacionales, Asociaci6n Venezolana de
Exportadores. Caracas, March 10,,.1987
Yolanda de Lozano, Departamento de Promoci6n de Exportaciones, Area de Plhsticos,
Instituto de Comercio Exterior. Caracas, March 10, 1987.
Ignacio Puroy (author and industrialist connected to entrepreneur associations).
Caracas, March 13, 1987.
Ger6nimo Blanco, Secretario General,Sindicato Onico de Trabajadores del Plistico y
Similares del Estado Miranda. Caracas, March 17,1987.
Victor Maldonado, Administrador, FEDEINDUSTRIAS. Caracas, March 17 and 20,
1987.
fibisay Reyes, Secretaria Ejecutiva, Cimara Venezolana de Fabricantes de Juguetes
(CAVEFAJ). Caracas, March 23, 1987.
Tsvi Kornbluth, Director, CAVEFAJ. Caracas, March 24,1987.
Rogelio Carrillo, Presidente, and Floralba Landaeta, Asociaci6n Venezolana de
Industriales del Plistico (AVIPLA). Caracas, March 26, 1987.
Carlos Valentin, Secretario T6cnico, Grupo Programador de Quimica, Ministerio de
Fomento. Caracas, June 15, 1987.
Floralba Pdrez, Principal Economist, AVIPLA. Caracas, March 23, 1992.
Jesds Robles, Research Coordinator, and Rolando Dlaz, Labor Area, ILDIS. Caracas,
March 24, 1992.
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Jost Luis Feijoo, Material En eedng, Universidad Simdn Bolivar. Caracas, March
27, 1992.
Paul Esqueda, Fundaci6n Instituto de Ingenierfa, Universidad Sim6n Bolivar. Caracas,
March 27, 1992.
Mercedes Aleixandre de Seftortas, Administrackn de Mercadeo, Estireno del Zulia,
C.A. Caracas, April 9,1992
Vladimir Josd Tovar, Federaci6n Nacional de Trabajadores del Pl stico,
FENTRAPLAST. Caracas, April 21,1992.
Alfredo Adolfo Behrens and Wilfrcdo Valdivia, TOCARS-Toyota. Caracas, April 23,
1992.
Sutomo Fujio, Manager, MMC Automotriz, Mitsubishi. Caracas, April 27, 1992.
Olga Lucia Cobo de Morales, Vicepresidente de Planeaci6n y Desarrollo, Federaci6n de
Industrias del Metal, Colombia. Interview at AVIPLA headquarters in Caracas, May 6,
1992.
Ignacio Herndndez, Economist, AVIPLA. Caracas, May 6, 1992.
Jos6 Ram6n Moreno, Superintendente de Mercadeo, Polimeros del Lago, C.A.
Caracas, May 18, 1992.
Doris Puente, Chemicals Team, Ministry of Industry. Caracas, June 9,1992.
Consuelo Iranzo, Industrial Organization and Labor Issues Researcher, Centro de
Estudios para el Desarrollo, Universidad Central de Venezuela. Caracas, July 1992.
Participants to the Labor Roundtable at ILDIS, Caracas, July 9,1992: Vladimiro Jost
Tovar, JosE M. Gonzilez Araque, Luis Felipe Maizo, Maria Santaella, Gregorio
Bracamonte, Carlos Rios, R. Maldonado, Silverio Palacio, Humberto Mendoza,
Orlando FernAndez, Rolando Diaz, Consuelo Iranzo.
Enterprises
Isidro Canela Pascual, INDUMEPLAST. Caracas, June 9, 1987, and May 13, 1992.
Raymond Porte, FAACA, Cda, June 1987 and May 7, 1992.
Leonardo Pizani, Javier Shnchez and S. Goite, Plastycasset, Cda, August 5 and
November 20, 1987.
-374-
Cornelio Keleti, Industrias Rotoplast de Venezuela. Caracas, August 7 and November
2, 1987, and April 21, 1992.
Jos6 de Sousa, Money Plast. Caracas, September 11, 1987, and October 30, 1987.
Gustavo Rubio, Rubiplast. Guarenas, September 17, 1987, and April 22, 1992.
Giovanni Olivero, Mecatorn. Caracas, November 2, 1987, and telephone interview in
April 1992.
Juan JosE Fraca, Sanford de Venezuela. Caracas, November 11, 1987.
Gustavo Bermddez, Compafifa Gillette de Venezuela. Los Teques, November 19,
1987, and April 29, 1992.
Cdsar Castillo, Fraser de Venezuela. Caracas, April 20, 1992.
Tsvi Kornbluth, JEICA de Venezuela. Caracas, April 24, 1992.
William Crespo, Noveplast. Caracas, May 4, 1992.
Alberto J. Blanco, Sanford de Venezuela. Caracas, May 5,1992.
Antonio Mazzarella, Teleplastic. Caracas, May 5, 1992.
Ram6n Alvarez, Plasticasset. Cda, May 7, 1992.
Manuel Nieto Canedo, Plisticos Cosmos. Charallave, May 7, 1992.
Julio Cabilla Linares and Jos6 Ram6n L6pez, Distrofar. Caracas, May 12,1992.
Klaus Moreau and Eugenio Garcia, Ypra Pldsticos. San Antonio de los Altos, May 12,
1992.
Maria Ang6lica Freschi, Procter & Gamble de Venezuela, May 22,1992.
Marco Vizquez, Oster de Venezuela. Barquisimeto, May 29,1992.
>2 27. V ~27. ~t<A; U -
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ANNEX U STATIS7ICAL ANNEX: THE 1378SAMPLE SURVEY
1. Number of plastics mannwefa included in the sample: 126
2. Survey period: June to October, 1987
3. This sa present&
* 30% of all plastics manufacturers included in the "universe" on which the
Central Stiatitical Office based its 1987 annual industrial survey (410 firms);
* 34% of all plastics manufacturers registered in the records of the Labor
Ministry as of 1984(369 firms);
* 27% of all plastics manufacturers registered in the Mininy of Industry in
1987 (459 firms); and
* 11% of all the firns whose existence could be detected in 1987 by the
"Plastics Team" at the planning unit of the Ministry of Industry, from
different sources (1,127 firms).
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4. Comparison between the sample and the firms registered by different
institutions, with regards to size and location:
Comparison Between Sample and Offcbial with regards to im SAe,
1967
(%)
Size distribution
Small (5-20 employees)
Medium 1(21-50 employees)
Medium 11(51-100 employees)
Large (more than 100 employees)
Total
Total number of frms
20
27
22
32
100
126
OCE
11
16
27
46
100
410
Labor
9
13
35
43
100
369
Minisryof
20
19
32
28
100
459
310
wloodomwom"
Cesaarion twen assinend~icil~eistieswith regards to Rhghunal
(%)
Laba
Capital
Cntl
LIanos p)
Centro-Occiental
-A a
Nor-Oriental
Guayana
Total
Total.umbaer of firms
39 58
39 23
2 2
Li 6
7 5
0 4
2 2
0 0
100 100
126 410
Mimistry Whyof
(1984) I r
50 52
30 32
3 2
5 7
5 4
3 1
2 1
1 0
100 100
369 459
5. Other characteristics of the firms in the sample:
t of tie Firs According to Date of Creation, 1987
Laresae phascmlee Smse eAl Bras
Nriod No. (%) No. ( ) No. (%Y No. (%) Year Avg.
Befom 1950 0 0.0 1 1.7 0 0.0 1 0.8 -
1950-1959 7 17.9 2 3.3 0 0.0 9 7.2 0.90
1960-1969 14 35.9 14 23.3 3 11.5 31 24.8 3.10
1970-1979 14 35.9 28 46.7 11 42.3 53 42.4 5.30
1980-1982 2 5.1 6 10.0 5 19.2 13 10.4 4.33
1983-1986 2 5.1 8 13.3 7 26.9 17 13.6 4.25
1987 0 0.0 1 1.7 0 0.0 1 0.8 1.00
Teal 39 100.0 0 100.0 26 100.0 125 100.0 -
0
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nof Fins According to Nunber of Plants,1987
(%)
No. of No. of
plants respondents (%)
1 115 92.0
8 6.4
3 1 0.8
4 0 0.0
5 1 0.8
Tocal 125 100.0
of Firms surveyed by Share of National Capital In Total Equity,1987
of No.of
national capital firms (%)
0% to 25% 2 1.6
26% to 50% 0 0.0
51% to 75% 9 7.2
76% to 99% 2 1.6
100% 112 89.6
Total 125 100.0
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Dof Firm Surveyed by Type of Good Produced,197
(%)
Good No. offirms (%)
Finalcosmtn
TOYS 5 4.0
Health sectr 3 2.4
Other 20 15.9
Industrial use Ihems
Diverse 6 4.8
Manufacture 4 3.2
Agriculture 1 0.8
Parts and cmoet
Wrapping, containers 28 22.2
Construction 14 11.1
Equipment components 8 6.3
Electronics 7 5.6
Automotive 5 4.0
Other industry 19 15.1
Recycled material 4 3.2
O ther 2F6
TOta 126 100.0
Isth Frm a Menhetofthe Plasdeanufacurr'-socaioAVPA)? 1987
By firm size
Smail scl-
Medium scale
ADfirss
Yes
No. (%)
8 30.8
50 83.3
36 90.0
94 74.6
No
.No. ()
18 69.2
10 16.7
4 10.0
32 25.4
Total
No.
26 100.0
60 100.0
40 100.0
126 100.0
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Do the Firm's Workers Belong to a Union? 1987
(By firm size)
Firm size No union Yes, enterprise union Yes, tra& union Total
(workers) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Small scale
(5-20) 19 76.0 2 8.0 4 16.0 25 100.0
Medium I
(21-50) 13 39.4 3 9.1 17 51.5 33 100.0
Medium I
(51-100) 5 18.5 6 22.2 16 59.3 27 100.0
Large scale
(100 and
more) 4 10.8 16 43.2 17 45.9 37 100.0
Alfirms 41 33.6 27 22.1 54 44.3 122 100.0
Do the Firm's Workers Belong to a Union? 1987
(By regional location)
No union Yes, enterprise union Yes, trade union Total
Region No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Capital 14 28.6 5 10.2 30 61.2 49 100.0
Central 13 27.7 18 38.3 16 34.0 47 100.0
C-Occidental 10 71.4 2 14.3 2 14.3 14 100.0
Zulia 3 33.3 2 22.2 4 44.4 9 100.0
Nor-Oriental 2 40.0 1 20.0 2 40.0 5 100.0
All firms 42 33.9 28 22.6 54 43.5 124 100.0
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Use of Carnal Labor,1987
(36 firms, 29% of the sample, declared that they used casual labor)
Feture
Seasonal
No answer
Acdvity
Plastics fomalin
Complementary pocesses
Services
No answer
Location
In the plant
At home
Diverse
No answer
No.eof firms
6
15
7
8
2
16
2
16
16
7
4
9
(%)
16.7
41.7
19.4
22.2
5.6
44.4
5.6
44.4
44.4
19.4
11.1
25.0
38
B. Survey Qumtlm
1. Name of thefirm
2. Products
3. CCneel ne
4. Are office and plant in different lnoCtinns
5. Number of plants
6. Location of plants
7. Date of creation
8. Area of construction in plant(s)
9. Investment in fixed assets
10. Pewentage of nationally owned equity
11. Is thefirmamember of AVIPLA
12. Is the firm a member of a local entrepreneur association
13. Does the firm belong to any other association
14. Do the firm's workers belong to a union
15. Total number of workers and employees at current capacity
16. Number of employees (paid a monthly wage)
17. Number of manual workers (low-skilled, paid a daily salary)
18. Management personnel
19. Administrative personnel
20. Marketing personnel
21. Production personnel, current level of capacity utilization
22. Production personnel, if using capacity fully
23. Personnel in "other" areas
24. Total personnel, if using capacity fully
25. Casual labor currently being used
26. Casual labor at pea timns
27. Foreign-born personnel
28. Transportation services: own or subcontracted
29. Security servcetown or subcontracted
30. Claigsrie:own or subnrc e
31. Numher ofenginers
32.t Number ofotrunvriypnanna
33. Nunberofsilerworkers
34. Numher oflow-skill worers
35. Use of casual labor timing,location, activity, skills
36. Female workers, cunrut level of capacity utilizatin
37. Wit
38. If ot withlabormarketconditionn, why
39. If you need mo university aduateshow many
40. If you need me technicians, how many
41. If you need me production workers, how many
42. Turnover of professinal and technical personnel
43. Turnover of production workers
44.0 oe the.fr bare a 'human resource managementunt
45. Is there training for professionali and technical staff (own-managed,
su1bcont Idracteidnone)
46. Is there training for production workers (own-managed, subcontracted, none)
47. Have you ever hired consultant services in the area of human resources
48. Number of plastics transformation processes in the firm
49. Main patg rnfrminpocs
50. Work shifts
51. 1986 output (Bs. thousands)
52. Average warker productivity estimate (ouptwokr)
53. Use of scrap plastic material
54. Do you subcontract any of the production processes
55. Which phase of production do yousuotrc
56. DN you offer productive services to other firms
57. What productive services do you offer to other firms
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58. Have you ever modified your product line
59. Estimate of capacity utiliation, on the basis of curent work shifts
60. Do you have investment/expansion programs
61. Which stage of the production process do you plan to expand
62. Human resources needed after the expansion (number, skills)
63. Is the availability of human resources a constraint to expansion
64. Do you have productivity programs
65. When have you made investment in equipment (years)
66. Do you have preventive maintenance programs
67. Do you offer preventive maintenance services to other firms
68. If you use molds, are they owned by your client
69. Do you have a quality control laboratory
70. Do you subcontract technical assistance
71. Do you pay royalties or licenses
72. Do you have computers? What are they used for
73. Is your market tight
74. What is the main distribution channel for your products
75. Are you currently exporting products
76. Have you ever exported products
77. What type of products have you exported
78. Does your firm confront human resource problems
79. What is the internal organizational structure of the enterprise
80. Do you belong to a conglomerate
81. Has the organizational structure of the enterprise changed in the past five years
82. What type of changes has the organization experienced
83. Has the organizational change been successful
84. Are you planning any organizational change in the future
85. Do you produce for other firms by customized order
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ANNEK m TUE CASE STUDIES:
FIVE SUBCONTRACTING NETWORKS,1931992-
CaseC Smi- rm Saeanracerca aLn a_ _ _
Subcontracting Network 1 M y SEi Lplt(SSB)
(toy )oducer)
Subcontracting Network 2 Transtoys (LSE) Fimplast (LSE)
(toy producer) Heelpiast (MSE)
cosmeplast (ME)
Packingplast LSE)
_____________ 
______________Microplast (MSE)
Subcontracting Network 3 Multinac (LSE) Justinpiast ([SE)
(subsidiary of a multinational, Germaplast (MSE)
producer of personal care Colomplast (LSE)
items) Belgplast (MSE)
Subcontracting Network 4 Transchool (LSE) Blowplast (MSE)
(subsidiary of multinational, Hispaplast ([SE)
producer of school and office Belgplast (MSE)
items) Techplast (LSE)
Moldplast (SSE)
Subcontracting Network 5 Diverse large scale enterprises, Carplast (MSE)
subsidiaries of mutinainal
__________________automobile corporations________
Note: SSE= Small Scale Enterprise (5-20 workers)
MSE= Medium Scale Enterprise (21-100 workers)
[SE = Large Scale Enterprise (101+ workers)
At the request of the interviewees, the real names of the firms in the
subcontracting networks listed above have been omitted in the body of the dissertation
and the following case studies.
Periods of Visits ad Inter'ws: October-December, 1987
March-June, 1992
SUDCONTRACTING NETWORK 1:
MNlYS" AND THE RTUDSTITUT1ION CYCLE
CONTN-
First Impressions. 387
A. THE ORIGINS R......................................................................................... 391
* Minitoys' History Experimenting with Import-Substitution........391
B. THE PROBLEMS................................................... 393
* Molds, Multinationals, and Local Skillsa...........................393
" Fighting the Union................................................................................ 395
* Skills: The Missing Middle.................................................,.......0397
* The Haunting Problem of Resin Supply................................... 397
C. THE SOLUTIONS......................................................................................... 400
0 The Ncision to Subcontract Multiple Objectives............... 400
* Miscellplast: Changing Fates of an Innate Subcontractor.................. 401
* Sweating or Creating-or Both?.............................................................. 403
MixedModesofSubco ............................ 404
BD AFTER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT.......................406
* The Impact of Economic Reform: Back to the Future ............. 406
o Reform and Small Subcontractors: Forced Resiructuring of Linkages*... 408
* In 5 fSum:Ring" as "i"?........................................409
SUBCONTRACTIG NETWORK 1:
"MINITOYS" AND fEE IMPORT-SUBSTITUION CYCLE
First Iaspuasions
Septemear 17,1987: 1 arrive in Guarenas, a working-class, satellite town of
Caracas, and enter one of the industrial zones created by the government during the
industrial decentralization drive of the 1970s. The zone even has a guard post-
though no guard. I ramble about on pleasant, tree-lined roads sometimes seeming too
bushy and too quietfor an industrial zone-before finally finding Minitoys, a smalL
impeccably white, shoe-box-type building rounded by a tall wail. Mr. I.. a young,
well-dressed person, comes out to meet me. He expects a Fomento official and
addresses me accordingly: dryly, somewhat confrontationally. We traverse the
spacious, clean, well-illwninated plastics workshop, which is filled with the pounding
noises of a few injection-molding machines and with workers (many of them women)
going about their tasks and looking at me curiously. We climb a metal staircase to the
(also clean and well-lit) cubicle-like administrative areas. He speaks and walks
rapidly and somewhat angrily, as if my visit would be too short to air all his
complaints, or as if he were warning me that this would be my last opportunity to visit.
April 22,1992: 1 return to Guarenas. I look for traces of the 1989 riots. The
violence that yielded at least 500 deaths started right here on February 28, 1989, the
morning when workers awaiting bus rides to jobs in Caracas found out about the fare
increases. Yet everything seems as quiet asfive years ago-still no guard at the guard
post. I arrive at Minitoys, and Mr. R. arrives right behind me, driving one of the most
expensive sports cars on the Venezuelan market. This time I come as an JESA
researcher-and that may explain in part the difference in the way he treats me. His
walk is less rushed, his speech more analytical the visit longer and more relaxed
Again we walk across the shop, which is still impeccably white. But this time there is
no pounding sound Only a technician in blue work clothes, an "employee of
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confdence," inhabits the shop. The upstairs cubicles are a shade livelier, as a
secretary and Mr. R.'s brother and father shuffle papers and talk on the phone. After
the usual "cafecito, "I write my first ironic, anecdotal comment in the margin of the
questionnaire: "After adjusmen4 managers have more time to talk"
Novenber 2,1987: It is difficult to walk around this crowded area of Caracas
squeezed between the old town of Baruta and the sprawling, new, middle-class suburb
of La Trinidad In this area first dominated by residences, then by commerce, a little
pocket of small industry has survived Misceliplast, Minitoys' subcontractor, sits
toward the end of a dead-end, yet noisy, lively, and dirty street surrounded by
mechanics' workshops, retail shops, Baruta's old cemetery, and other small
manufacturers (primarily offurniture and garments). In sharp contrast with Minitoys,
Miscellplast's building looks n-down: the brick and metal shed is dark inside and
overcrowded with machines, materials, and people. The pounding noise reverberates
against the metal roof A small group of middle-aged technicians in blue work clothes
gathers at the door. Mr. P., my interviewee and one of the partners of the enterprise,
is among them. He seems disturbed and reluctant to talk After some back-and-forth,
Mr. 0., another partner, takes over, directs me to the "office" (a little compartment in
a corner, papered with calendars and service orders), and tells me his story.
April 1992: Miscellplast's telephone is not answered After five years, it could
be anything: the line is down, the number has changed, the firm has disappeared So I
go to La Trinidad and walk lot by lot , along the dead-end street, yet fail to find
Miscellplast. "I think I saw it right here!" I say to myself But with the street just as
crowded as before, it is hard to remember which door is the right one. Following
pounding noises, I walk into a shop but find no plastics transforming machinery inside.
The workers who come to greet me confer for a while. "Miscellplast? Isn't that the
Italian guy who moved to Valencia?" one of the workers asks finally. Others agree.
When I get home, I look in the phone book for Mr. a.'s home number. The woman who
answers informs me that her husband and son are now in Valencia and gives me their
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phone number there. "Moving to Valencia,"I think "is a move up: more lan4 good
industrial network, good infrastructure." To a certain extent this may have been true.
Yet when I cat, I get a different picture: Misceilplast is in transition, and its prospects
are uncertain.
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SUBCONTRACTING NETWORK 1:
"MJINITOYS" AND THE IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION CYCLE
The first subcontracting network comprised the client firm, Minitoys, a
30-employee toy producer, and one subcontractor, Misceiplast, a small-scale plastics
transformation company (Table 1). The relationship between the firms can be
characterized as capacity subcontracting: the client had the equipment and skills needed
to perform the plastics transformation services that it had been subcontracting to
Miscellplast. According to conventional economic theory, a firm would use capacity
subcontracting only as a transitory strategy. If it faced sustained excess demand, a firm
would decide, ceteris paribus, to invest in capacity, especially if it held a technology
with increasing returns to scale. Yet, when I interviewed the firms in 1987, they had
maintained their relationship for about three years-since the client firm had been
formed in 1984. The main question that this case raised, then, was this: Why would a
plastics manufacturer start operations by subcontracting, and then maintain capacity
subcontracting indefinitely?
This network's situation changed radically with the onset of structural
adjustment in 1989. Yet my post-adjustment observations in 1992 confirmed my
conclusion in 1987: that supply-side constraints went far toward explaining why
Minitoys opted for subcontracting.
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Table 1 General Characteristics of Subcontracting Network 1, 1987
Minitoys Miscellplast
(client) (subcontractor)
Regional location (distance from Guarenas, Capital Caracas
client) Region (45 km)
Year founded (length of relationship 1984 1971
with client) (3 years)
Employees 30 10
Subscribed capital (Bs. millions) a/ 2.5 0.4
Domestically owned equity (%) 100 100
Main products Plastic dolls and toys Diverse plastic
with or without parts by long series
mechanisms (injection (injection molding)
molding and
assembly)
a. At the official exchange rate in 1987 of Bs. 14.50 per dollar, the subscribed capital of
Minitoys was $172,000 and that of Miscellplast, $28,000.
A. THE ORIGINS
Minitoys' History: Experimenting with Import-Substitution
The owners and managers of Minitoys were members of a Venezuelan
upper-middle-income family from Caracas-a father and four young sons, all university
graduates. Until 1984, they had been importers of toys from well-known brands, such
as Playskool, Tonka, and Fischer Price. Moreover, they were the exclusive
representatives of those brands in Venezuela. The prohibition of toy imports in 1983
clearly forced the family to restructure their business.
They decided to remain in the line of plastic toys, which they knew well, but
now as producers. Because of the family's long-standing links to the large, international
toy corporations from which it had imported before 1983, it could easily gain access to
licenses. But that would mean that the firm would have to cater to the upper segment
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of the market-that is to the sophisticated consumers who had purchased its imported
toys. The family made a deliberate decision to do so, a decision that imposed strict
quality requirements on the firm. It would have to satisfy not only demanding
consumers (admittedly, within the comfortable margin allowed by import prohibitions),
but also demanding foreign partners. As the interviewee put it, "Our market is a market
of diversity, a market of 'impact' . ." And it had to comply with national norms for
toys, including using of nontoxic colors, eliminating any cutting edges after molding,
and forgoing the use of post-consumer recycled material.
In 1984, relying only on its own capital, the family rented a shed in Mariches, a
"spontaneous" industrial zone at the center of a populous, squatter settlement area in the
mountains east of Caracas. Backed by credit from a local commercial bank, the family
bought two new injection molding machines from Italy (with mold capacity of up to
400 grams and 750 grams, and transformation capacity of 130 metric tons and
260 metric tons, respectively) and a second-hand machine from the United States (with
mold capacity of up to 1 kilogram and transformation capacity of 400 metric tons). It
also bought some older accessory equipment, such as a mixer, a recycling mill, chillers,
and machinery for packaging with plastic film. Soon after the family bought a plot of
land in an industrial zone in Guarenas-somewhat farther from Caracas, but well
connected to transport systems and with good industrial infrastructure-and started
making firmer plans for production.
In 1984, Minitoys sold Bs. 3 million in toys ($400,000); its sales increased to
Bs. 8 million ($1.1 million) in 1985, Bs. 10 million ($690,000) in 1986, and an estimated
Bs. 25 million ($1.7 million) in 1987. According to my interviewee, these sales figures
incorporated a price increase of about 50% over the period 1984-87, due to an increase
in non-wage labor costs and in the prices of cardboard and resins. Thus, Minitoys' sales,
measured in dollar and real terms, almost tripled between 1984 and 1987.
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B. THE PROBLEMS
Molds, MultinatIonals, and Local Skls
Because Minitoys faced a market of "diversity and impact," having rapid access
to new and popular designs was a crucial aspect of its competitive strategy. As I have
discussed elsewhere, in the plastics industry (especially in injection molding) design is
embedded in a "migrating" portion of the transformation machinery-molds. Molds are
a complicated piece of equipment: they incorporate the sometimes complex shapes and
mechanisms of the product, and they have sophisticated technical features to ensure that
molding takes place under the right pressure and temperature and at the right speed for
each process and that retooling is smooth and precise. Molds are also expensive: their
manufacture by the metal-working industry requires very specialized skills. The large
investment they represent sometimes is not justified in a small market. 1
Minitoys confronted the "mold dilemma" as soon as its founders opted to enter
manufacturing. The founders solved it, somewhat satisfactorily, in two different ways.
Minitoys' close relationship with major international toy producers enabled the
firm to acquire licenses and to use temporary mold imports.2 But the firm encountered
many problems in using temporary imports because of the inefficiencies of ports and
customs procedures, and because of constant rumors that the temporary-import practice
would be prohibited at any time. Also, inadequate information flows between countries
sometimes resulted in embarrassing technical problems. For example, a mold brought in
My interviewee said that Minitoys'investment in newly constructed molds amwnted to
only Bs. 700,000 in 1984-86-about 3% of the total current value of sales for the
period. The last (smail) mold that Minitoys ordered, in 1987, cost Bs. 45,000, or the
equivalent of $3,000 at the then-current exchange rate.
2 The "temporary import" feature of trade policy allowed a Venezuelan firm to rent a
mold from a foreign firm for up to three months, exempt from any tariffs and port duties
on the entry or exit of the mold.
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from Spain through the temporary-import mechanism produced pieces that, to the
managers' surprise, were to be assembled by means of an ultrasound system that
Minitoys lacked. In the end, they had to glue the pieces together, producing a toy that
was less durable and less attractive than the foreign-made product In addition, the
gradual devaluation of the bolfvar rendered the practice of temporary imports less and
less attractive to parent firms and more and more expensive for domestic users. An
additional source of uncertainty in the cost of temporary imports was freight, which had
to be paid by the local user.
Nevertheless, Minitoys' management still perceived temporary mold importation
as economically justifiable in most cases; Venezuela's small market made construction of
molds by domestic users too onerous. But the firm's managers wanted to explore
having a small inventory of their own molds, an option that might offer more flexibility
and stability than temporary mold imports could and that might also help broaden their
markets.
As a second option, then, Minitoys sought suppliers that could construct molds
according to blueprints obtained under license from foreign firms. The managers
contracted with a firm in Spain, but found it difficult to control the quality of the
product from afar. In addition, delivery was overly costly and its timing unreliable.
Through informal contacts, the managers learned about two local mold makers:
Miscellplast and Metalsertina. Metalsertina was a small metal-working firm owned by a
Portuguese technician and located in Turumo, a small town on the outskirts of Caracas
not too far from Minitoys. Metalsertina constructed three sets of molds for Minitoys,
demonstrating excellent quality and delivery performance. But Metalsertina was unable
to cope with the soaring demand for its molds, and it started rejecting orders.
Metalsertina is a paradoxical example of a firm that had extremely valuable technical
skills but that, because of archaic or scanty managerial, marketing, and strategic
abilities, was unable to exploit the potential of the growing market that it faced.
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Minitoys was then left to test the option of Miscellplast. The first set of molds
that Miscellplast produced for the firm were very satisfactory, and Minitoys later
ordered three more sets. (In getting to know Miscellplast, Minitoys discovered that it
could also inject-mold plastic goods-a discovery that soon proved very useful.) In
1987, Minitoys was obtaining 70% of its molds through temporary importation, but
thanks to its association with Miscellplast, it was able to draw from its own inventory
the remaining 30% of the molds that it used.
Fighting the Union
In 1987, 30 people worked for Minitoys. Eleven of them (almost 40%) were
"empleados," employees paid a monthly salary; the remaining 19 (60%) were "obreros,"
unskilled production workers paid a daily salary. The "empleados" included the four
founding brothers, who allocated their time among managerial tasks; a plastics
technician who controlled the machines and supervised the transformation process; a
chief of assembly who oversaw the assembly process; a chief of personnel and
inventory; a receptionist; an administrative assistant; and two drivers. Among the
"obreros," the majority worked in packing and assembly operations and some tended the
transformation machines; most were engaged only as temporary workers, and 60% were
women. The managers claimed that worker turnover was very low, that the firm never
tried to save in labor benefits, and that its priority was to create as much employee
stability as possible.
Management reported no major problems with the unskilled labor force. But
this was because the abundance of unskilled workers in the Guarenas area provided for
easy substitutability. Nonetheless, the regional trade union covering the Guarenas area,
well known for its combativeness, had sometimes confronted the fim. According to the
manager interviewed, around 1985 the regional trade union, SINTRASIN MIRANDA,
threatened to call a strike against the firm if management did not fulfill its obligations to
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the union-primarily, approving the extension (sanctioned by law) of the regional
collective contract to Minitoys' workers and paying monthly dues to the union.
Management refused to meet SINTRASIN's demands-allegedly not so much
out of unwillingness to fulfill the conditions in the collective contract, but out of fear of
subsequent encroachment by the regional union. Moreover, the firm started a legal
battle to "get the union out" of the shop. And it identified SINTRASIN's Achille' heel.
Until 1983, inflation in Venezuela had been so low that traditional collective contract
negotiations had excluded indexation of wages and benefits or limited it to low, fixed
levels (a practice still followed). SINTRASIN had adopted the collective contract
signed in other regions that included several social benefits for workers, but it
considered a wage increase formula that fell far short of compensating for inflation in
the mid-1980s. Minitoys, aware that the Labor Law permitted the creation of enterprise
unions through direct negotiation between management and workers, entered into
negotiations with the workers offering them a more advantageous wage formula than
that established by the regional collective contract. The workers accepted the offer, and
management succeeded in driving the regional trade union out of the shop.
Although part of Minitoys' work force received better compensation than other
workers in the region, it is likely that the absence of an independent union made certain
practices easier, such as casual hiring of labor and putting out. Indeed, Minitoys used
temporary labor extensively in the shop and also used the putting-out system in homes
for its assembly operations. Management justified this practice on the grounds of the
product's yearly cycle: with 75% of Minitoys' sales in December and advance assembly
impossible because of the massive storage space it would require, assembly operations
had to be concentrated in the second half of the year and required a special addition of
manpower. In the firm's favor, ft can be said that the shop's hygiene, lighting, air, and
general working conditions appeared to be far above the industry average.
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Skills: The Missing Middle
Although availability of unskilled labor did not represent a problem for the firm,
that of semi-skilled and highly skilled labor did. Plastics technicians and experienced
machine operators were hard to come by. According to the interviewee, the only good
plastics technicians available in the Venezuelan market were foreign-born, and they
were growing scarce. Minitoys depended on a highly paid foreign technician to turn on
and service its electronic machines. And, although it lacked employees with the skills to
maintain, adapt, and construct molds, it had a full-time, permanently employed plastics
technician (who performed regular preventive maintenance of the equipment) and an
inventory technician. For such a small firm that depended so heavily on temporary
labor, Minitoys had surprisingly good access to in-house technical skills. Yet for a
growing firm with pretensions to serve a high-quality market, they were not enough.
The Haunting Problem of Resin Supply
Minitoys also confronted difficulties in the procurement of raw materials, even
though most of the materials the firm needed were produced locally. Faced with a
booming demand thanks to import substitution of plastics manufactures, the
joint-venture 3 petrochemical firms that had monopoly over local sales and imports of
polymers and resins were reaching capacity. They established supply quotas that-to
ensure that loyal clients and stable firms would not be hurt-were based on historical
consumption. In addition, the "empresas mixtas"4 had to approve any resin import
SaThe joint-venture petrochemical producers, or "empresas mixtas," combined a Iarg
share of state capital with domestic and foreign private capital.
4I call the joint-venture companies producing high- and low-density polyethylene and
polystyrene in Venezuela "empresas mixtas". 'These -ag companies had capital
contributions from the Vernzelan state (though PEQUWVEN, the state-owned
petrochemical corporation), dormestic private capital (through the Grupo Zuliano, a
group of investors from the western, oil-rich section of the country), and foreign
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agreement entered into by Venezuelan plastics manufacturers. Allocating resin
according to historical consumption created a serious problem for new or growing
plastics manufacturers.
To make administering the quotas more feasible, the "empresas mixtas"
segmented their market into two parts: larger consumers that used at least 20 metric
tons a month, and smaller consumers that used less than that amount. The "empresas
mixtas" distributed the raw material through two channels: directly from the factory to
the large consumers, and indirectly, through a few private sector intermediaries, to the
small consumers.
The oligopolistic private intermediaries, in Minitoys' opinion, followed arbitrary
retailing practices that greatly affected their captive clients. They required advance
payments, which eroded the manufacturers' working capital; and they forced the
consumers to pay price increases that had not been officially approved, without
providing a receipt that could be used to protest the practice. Asked for explanations,
the distributors complained that the "empresas mixtas" treated them the same way. The
irregularities in the private distribution system created a second problem for small
producers: uncertainty in prices and delivery of raw materials.
As a new and a small enterprise, Minitoys faced both these problems and
experienced serious shortfalls in its supply of resins as a result For example, even in
1987, Minitoys needed some 150 metric tons a year of polystyMne (high impact and
crystal), but managed to procure from the distributors only about 80 metric tons. It
started substituting across resins (high-density polyethylene for polypropylene and vice
versa), but the substitution affected process and product and failed to compensate for
the supply shortfall. From its inception, the firm was forced to keepsome temporarily
imported molds idle because of lack of raw materials. It was also forced to limit its
investors from the United States, Japan, and Frane Other cmnisproviding resins
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production to a narrow range of products to avoid dependence on too many different
types of resin. Recycling the scrap material it produced was only a partial solution:
Minitoys could use 50% in molding the pieces that did not have to meet the highest
standards.for durability and appearance. The rest it sold to other, lower-quality
producers.
For a while, Minitoys even tried bribing customs officials and relying on "hidden
imports" of resins. But the extra costs of such practices were high and could not be
passed on through the product's price: requesting a price increase under the controlled
system of the 1980s required presenting to Fomento a detailed, itemized account of
costs ihat could hardly be stretched (at least convincingly) to cover bribes and black
market prices. The complex institutional setting for industrial production seemed to
have (unintended?) self-regulating mechanisms against some forms of corruption.
Minitoys was not the only firm facing these problems. In 1987, there were at
least 200 small-scale enterprises in the Venezuelan plastics industry, and those hoping to
grow under import substitution all had to confront the private distributors. But the
problem of lack of historical records of resin consumption was especially acute for the
toy uiporters rned into producers. The Venezuelan Chamber of Toy Manufacturers
(CAVEFAJ), founded in 1975 by just 10 members, remained small until 1984, when it
started growing rapidly-to 50 member firms in 1985,84 in 1986, and 110 in 1987
(according to an official of CAVEFAJ,5 the 1987 membership constituted 90% of the
industry). Although not all these firms were new producers, most were nevertheless
growing rapidly and lacked a history of resin consumption commensurate with their new
(for example, PVC) were usually domestic private firms mixing imported materials.
Ms. Tibisay Reyes, executive secretary of CAVEPAJ, interviewed on March 23, 1987.
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needs. By 1987, a collective effort was in the making: CAVEFAJhad plans to create a
resin inventory center to serve small and medium-size toy maatrr.6
C. THE SOLUTIONS
The Decision to Subcontract: Multiple Objectives
The case of Minitoys illustrates the multiple goals that can be pursued through
subcontracting. Minitoys had, as we have seen, several serious problems, all of them on
the supply side: lack of access to adequate supplies of resins; paucity of specialized
technical skills in plastics transformation; and difficulty in procuring good-quality molds.
Experimentation with different suppliers led Minitoys to Miscellplast,7 where, almost
miraculously, Minitoys found the solution to most of its problems. It started by
subcontracting Miscellplast's capacity at peak times (during the second half of the year);
Minitoys would inject 50% of its total production in the shop and contract the other half
to Misceliplast. But by 1987 Minitoys contracted out half its total production
throughout the year.
As described thus far, this subcontracting arrangement appears to be a normal
capacity-subcontracting relationship. But soaring demand was only part of the reason
for Minitoys' early and increasing use of subcontracting. Miscellplast soon started
performing a diverse set of function for its customer. When temporary importation of
molds seemed precarious, Miscellplast constructed molds (a total of four sets between
1983 and 1987). When raw m proved to be a major constraint Minitoys either
asked Miscellplast to inject the molds or requested a share of the "idle portion" of
6 Whthrthese plans wer reaz or not the colpeof the inutyatrstruCtural
adjustina in 1989 likely resdered this effort Shwat-lived.
7Neither Minitoys nor Misceliplust belonged to AVWPLA, and Miaceilpiast dii not belong
to CAVEPAJI, so it is unlikely that formal organizations played a role in bringing these
two firmstoe-e.
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Miscellplast's resin inventory. Indeed, Miscellplast had always used its clients' orders to
maintain a high level of resin consumption, which gave it access to the best distribution
channels. It had been able to accumulate a relatively large inventory of resin, which
served its own purposes as well as those of its customers.' As Minitoys' manager put it,
"Miscellplast keeps an inventory of raw material for us." Finally, through the
construction of molds and provision of injection-molding services, Miscellplast gave
Minitoys indirect access to the valuable skills of its mold and plastics technicians.
Misceilpiast: Changing Fates of an Innate Subcontractor
Miscellplast, the subcontractor, was a small-scale firm founded in 1972 by three
technicians who had recently immigrated from Italy, Portugal, and Spain, where they
had acquired their technical skills. After working for large companies in Venezuela,
they had sought to apply their experience independently in an industry that was rather
undeveloped. 8 In launching Miscellplast, they relied on contracts from large,
well-known customers (for which they had worked as employees) such as General
Electric (appliances), Avon, and Stanhome. General Electric had even contributed some
of the machinery used at Miscellplast. In its early years, the firm had
11 injection-molding machines with varying capacity.
My Miscellplast interviewee attributed all the firm's ups and downs to the
"mentality" of the partners. Yet the decisions of individual partners clearly coincided
with other, larger events. During the economic recession and the beginning of the debt
crisis, in the early 1980s, the firm, in the interviewee's words, "was dead." General
Electric decided to reintegrate plastics transformation and took its equipment and its
business away. One of the partners decided to leave Miscellplast (to join the new
General Electric workshop) and sold four of the remaining injection molders. The firm
SIn 1971, the Venezuelan Central Statistical Office (OCEI) recorded about 100 plastics
manufacturing firms. By 1974, the industry had grown to 170 firms.
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fell into crisis. But a new and dynamic partner with more sales and marketing
experience (with a little help from the import substitution program, I imagine) brought
new vitality to the firm. New clients emerged, old ones returned, and investment in new
equipment could resume. By 1987, Miscellplast hal some 30-40 clients ranging from
Stanhome and Avon (to which it had rendered services for 15 and 10 consecutive years)
to Minitoys, one of its newest clients. It had seven old machines and two recently
purchased ones.
Curiously, despite the apparent bonanza, my Miscellplast interviewee declared
that the firm was working at only half its plastics transformation capacity. In fact,
clients may have been seeking out Miscellplast for its mold-repairing and mold-making
capabilities rather than for its plastics transformation capabilities. Or the multiplicity of
customers may have been more a sign of Miscellplast's attempt to diversify risks than a
sign of true business success. "Only those plastics manufacturers who have their own
products, produce in long series, and work directly for the market can be producing at
full capacity," the interviewee believed. Moreover, "working directly for the market
yields more profit per unit. As a subcontractor, one faces a restricted spectrum of
clients; as a final producer, one caters to every household." Yet the interviewee
admitted that producing directly for the final market required a large initial investment
("at least Bs. 1 million," he estimated) that many small-scale entrepreneurs could not
afford and involved cumbersome activities and serious risks.
The interviewee also complained that customers were concerned more with
price than with quality. This led subcontractors to compete on the basis of price, to the
detriment of firms that considered themselves capable of turning out a higher-quality,
higher-cost product. In certain cases, Miscellplast would "retaliate" by demanding that
the unreliable client take the responsibility of supplying the raw material to be molded
(rather than, as in normal practice, Misceliplast supplying the material). Yet the
interviewee also declared that the reason clients approached Misceliplast was their
appreciation of the firm's 100% quality control.
-403 -
Sweating or Creating-or Both?
Miscellplast presents a puzzling contrast The firm's relatively high
concentration of valuable skills and menu of long-standing, demanding customers
suggested that it was equipped to perfonn high-quality, relatively sophisticated wort
Misceliplast had what many others would have liked to have: the ability to construct,
adapt, and maintain molds. It also had a respectable number of injection-molding
machines (although Minitoys' manager claimed that they were old and slow). The
interviewee declared proudly that Misceliplast had always been able to produce what it
had been asked for; that it had often advised its clients and resolved technical problems
for them; and that it had sometimes rejected the technical specifications proposed by
parent companies, particularly when they came from abroad and were inappropriate for
domestic inputs or factors.
But the firm also had all the physical characteristics of a sweatshop. It inhabited
a dark and poorly ventilated shed that was crowded with noisy machines and piles of
bags of polymer awaiting use and molded pieces awaiting shipment, and located on a
similarly crowded, polluted, and noisy street.
Of the 10 people working for Misceliplast in 1987, one was a university-trained
professional, two were mold or plastics technicians with long, rich work experience, and
a fourth was a highly skilled worker who had been at Miscellplast since its foundation-
a high percentage of skilled personnel. But the other six were unskilled machine
operators, two of them women, who were reportedly paid the minimum legal salary plus
(according to the employer) 100% additional per year in social benefits. Although the
workers were affiliated with the regional trade union (which, like the union shut out by
Minitoys, had negotiated a non-indexed collective contract), there was little record of
union intervention, probably because of the firm's small size.
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Mixed Models of Subeontracting
In sum, some features of this network resembled those of a "conventional"
cost-cutting, capacity-expanding subcontracting relationship akin to those predicted by
Piore's 1980 model of segmentation in the context of flux and uncertainty. First, the
client firm was working at full capacity, but the subcontractor was not. Second, the
client was larger-in terms of both personnel and capital-and more modern than the
subcontractor.
In other ways, however, the network differed from the relationship a
segmentation model would suggest. The subcontractor, although smaller, had
accumilated more valuable skills (in mold-making and technical skills related to plastics
transformation) than the client. The type of unionization and the location of the two
firms indicated that avoiding a higher level of labor organization was not a factor in the
subcontractor's selection: the subcontractor was located at a central point of the capital
city, and its workers were affiliated with a regional trade union; the client was in a
nearby dormitory town, and its workers were affiliated with a less aggressive enterprise
union.9 Finally, the client firm relied only on this one subcontractor, and the
subcontractor diversified its risks by maintaining relationships and contracts with
multiple clients. To make the task of characterizing the relationship between Minitoys
The presumption that firms with enterprise unions have less "labor trouble" than firms
whose workers are affiliated with a regional or national trade union is misleading. Some
regional and national trade unions are very narrowly focused and superficial in their
treatment of labor issues: their concer is restricted to having the collective contract
approved and ensuring that the firm pays its dues. Once these requirerents are met,
they have little presence in the firm. That was the case for the subcontractor in this
example. Enterprise unions, on the other hand, are the result of presumably direct and
friendly bagiigbetween employer and workers, but they might he targeted by
external regional or national labor unions, and maaernay have to periodically
convince workers of the advantages of having a closed, enterprise union rather thanjoining the national or regional trade unions or federations. This-was the case for the
client firm in this exunple.
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and Misceliplast less difficult, I divide the relationship into three segments that exhibit
different fetre
The mold-making segment of the subcontracting deal between Minitoys and
Miscellplast might conform to the neoclassical-textbook, technical conception of inter-
firm division of labor suggested by Stigler (1951): a client engaged in a production
process with increasing returns (plastics injection-molding) opts to subcontract a related
process that does not exhibit increasing returns (customized mold-making) and in which
a small-scale, highly skilled firm thus has a comparative advantage.
The second, plastics-transformation segment of the deal (which I would argue
was almost residual) exhibited sweatshop characteristics. In frying to understand this
contrast, one wonders whether Miscellplast's low environmental and labor standards
were the result of (i) a precarious financial situation-which would contradict somewhat
the view that the subcontractor had a unique comparative advantage in the market; (ii) a
backward approach to management, in which the owner/technicians attributed little
importance to the quality of the work environment and preferred to invest profits
elsewhere (machinery, other personal ventures); (iii) the belief that remaining in a central
location was beneficial, even though it meant that the firm would remain overcrowded
and underserved by decaying and inadequate industrial infrastructure.
The third segment of the subcontracting arrangement between Minitoys and
Miscellplast (the resin provision and storage agreement) adds a novel twist to the
interpretation of this network. Having access to large quotas was obviously a
significant comparative advantage for the subcontractor-a privilege that added to the
advantage that the subcontractor enjoyed thanks to its mold-making skills. Why, then,
did the subcontracur feel obliged to use precious space to store material and keep
customers' inventories? Perhaps Misceliplast perceived it less as a burden than as
another necessary arans to maintain a captive demand.
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In its attempts to minimize risk the subcontractor seemed to be speading itself
too thin. Not only did it serve 30-40 customers, a courageous undertaking for a
10-person enterprise. It also allocated scarce managerial resources among three very
distinct functions: injection molding, mold construction, and raw material management.
The apparently unnecessary complexity of this strategy could be attributed to the
partners' scanty experience in modem management. Or it could be that the strategy was
a very rational response to the complex environment facing firms in the mid-1980s.
D. AFTER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
The Impact of Economic Reform: Back to the Future
The policy changes of 1989-90 radically changed the operating conditions for
this subcontracting network. The first clear impact of the adjustment was a serious
contraction in domestic demand in 1989. Minitoys was unprepared for the export
market; it had devoted its six-year life to substituting for the imports that it had brought
into the country until 1983. Despite the presumably more advantageous environment
for exports after adjustment, only about 4% of the firm's sales bill in 1991 consisted of
exports-to Peru and Ecuador, taking advantage of the zero tariff established by the
Andean Pact accord. The firm had also experimented with a "maquila"-type operation:
a forign client would send the material, Minitoys would inject-mold it, and it would
then ship the pieces back to the client. The experiment failed, however, because of the
slow transit of material and manufactured parts through Venezuelan ports. To add to
the problem of finding new sources of demand abroad, the pressure of import
competition was revived by the elimination of non-tariff barriers and import
prohibitions.
Minitoys, as mentioned earlier, catered primarily to middle- and upper-income
consumers, with tastes highly influenced by international fashions and the ability to py
for higher quality, modern designs, brighter colors, and better materials. These
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consumers were precisely those willing and able to shift to imported toys as soon as
they were allowed in. And domestically produced toys lost any significant price
advantage when the government eliminated subsidies for locally produced polymers and
imposed wage compensation measures that increased firms' labor costs. Furthermore,
despite six years of protection, most domestically produced toys catering to
higher-income consumers were less durable than foreign-made toys, and their colors and
other features less attractive. Producers offered the excuse that locally produced
colorants and additives were not always of good quality and that imported ones were
expensive. But there also may have been problems of quality control. Minitoys had no
quality control unit and reportedly could not find enough workers with
injection-molding skills.
After 1989, when consumers gained access to more attractive alternatives, the
"captive demand" argument for capacity subcontracting disappeared. Another big
incentive for subcontracting disappeared when lower tariffs and the elimination of
petrochemical monopolies, starting in 1989, made it easier to obtain resins and imported
colorants and additives.
But, as follows from earlier observations, the easing of market-wide supply-side
constraints after adjustment should have also eased the domestic operations of plastics
manufacturers. Yet Minitoys found being an importer far more attractive than being a
manufacturer. Manufacturing involved too many costs and risks, including-in the
words of my Minitoys' interviewee-dealing with the rising prices of inputs, an
unmotivated and unproductive labor force, and infrastructure and service problems. By
late 1991, Minitoys had decided to stop regular manufacturing operations almost
completely and to retum to importing.
Minitoys nevertheless has kept its injection-molding equipment. Its managers
were discouraged from selling the equipment immediately by the deep trough that prices
for injection-molding equipment were in in 1992. "Stuck" with the equipment, the firm
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has also retained some highly depreciated molds, its most specialized production
worker, and a couple of office assistants in the belief that it could eventually undertake
some injection-molding business. It continues injecting a few products of its own
during three months of the year. It is also searching for customers for its
injection-molding services, to minimize the losses from maintaining idle equipment
Although these losses have affected the owners, labor has borne the brunt of the
adjustment All but one of the unskilled workers have been laid off, with apparently
little conflict ensuing (probably as a result of getting the regional union out of the shop).
The managers, as part of a family with other businesses (including toy importing), now
dedicate only their residual time to Minitoys.
Reform and Smal Subcontractors: Forced Restructuring of Linkages
Miscellplast depended fully on orders from clients, with no products catering to
final consumers. One of its most regular relationships had been that with Minitoys.
Thus, the demise of the toy market and the general contraction in demand in 1989 hit
the subcontractor hard. Finally, in September 1991, Miscellplast decided to redefine its
strategy.
The firm's ownership and management structure changed. The partner who had
most recently joined the firm (the one with better sales and marketing skills) resigned,
leaving the other two partners, the majority shareholder and the most specialized mold
technician, on their own. The remaining partners decided to depart from Miscellplast's
traditional business of customized mold-making and injection molding for third parties;
they are now aiming to produce a few molds for in-house injection of massive-use,
large-series containers that could be offered to large customers in the food processing
industry. Misceliplast's managers expected to close an important deal by the end of
1992 and start producing containers on a large scale by 1993.
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Using resources from another family business (small-scale cattle fanning), tim
majority shareholder decided to move the firm to Valencia, a large industrial city
160 km from the capital, in December 1991. During its 20 years in La Trinidad
(Caracas), the firm had rented land and a shed; in Valencia, it would own both land and
plant Construction of the large plant infrastructure absorbed most of the partners'
capital, so they postponed investments in new equipment Miscellplast had laid off all
its La Trinidad production workers except for two willing to move to Valencia. The
partner with mold-makingskills hired another mold specialist in Valencia and started
developing the new molds. With the majority shareholder and his son, then, there were
six people working at the new Misceliplast.
In SUm: "Restructuring asDisPaa
This subcontracting network has thus disappeared since it was first examined in
1987. And by mid-1992, the two firms had themselves withered away as manufacturers,
at least temporarily. The client firm is returning to import activities, and the
subcontractor is restructuring and trying to cater to a different market (massive use
containers) through different strategies (using its own molds) and in a different location.
For both firms, the share of value added has fallen or disappeared and neither has
developed, export capabilities.
In the restructuring of the firms' operations, labor probably has suffered the
greatest losses. More than 75% of the original unskilled jobs have been lost. In both
finns, the only workers who remain are those with special skills. And the opportunity
cost of underutilized or idle managerial and technical skills and capital during the
restructuring also was not negligible.
But one would like to think that, in industry, energy does not disappear but is
transformed. What survives that is of value is not the network, or even the firm, but the
personal skills that again are being put to use. Managers have turned to activities that,
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given the managers' experience, may prove most resilient and profitable. Paradoxically,
the firm that was the customer in the subcontracting relationship is seeking to use its
plastics equipment as a subcontractor (on the side of its importing business), and the
former subcontractor is seeking to increase its independence and to produce for final
markets.
An interesting question is whether a different type of policy support would have
smoothed and shortened the restrcturing process, mitigated its social costs, and
minimized idleness or underutilization of valuable technical skills.
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SUBCONTRACTING NETWORK 2: "TRANSTOYS"
CONTRACTING IN AND OUT IN THE TOY SECTOR
Noebher 2,1987: Transtoys'office is locatd in downtown Caracas, in one
of the old residential buildings lining Avenida Urdaneta that have been gradually
swallowed up by comnercial us Nothing in the surroundings suggest the presence
of the ofices of a large toy company, but when I reach the building's dark lobby, If ind
indications to Transtoys that I follow to the secondfloor. The office is in what must
have been a large aparbment compartmentalized into many cubicles that hold two
secretaries, a couple ofadbninistrative assistant, an behind a dart sober wooden
door, the odffice of Mr. K. This elderly Italian businesman bears the rare distinction of
being well regarded both by union leaders (with whom he once joinedformes to
denounce an illegal mi0e episode)and by his fellow businessmen. In his accented
speech, he describes the maze of subcontrMting networks that his fin has developed
Five years later, he would explain the disappearace ofehe network partly on grounds
o "better programing."
May 5,1992: Mr. M. afrya4iddle-age4 Italian man, is the owner of
Filmplast We meetfor dse first tme dring my second visit to the countrj, at his
Qaracasolce, a large, smewhat messy and inkkwn space close to the downtown
area. Severi people and loads of comuter paper and machinery fill the place. His
son, who studies business adbninistration ata good university and is likelyt succeed
hisfather as the head of this sitable company listns anntatvely our discusin,
nodding from time to time to show his understanding of the situation and functioning
of the enterprise. Photos oft large, modem ndustrial building hang prominendy on
A cot.
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May 4,1992: Cosmeplast's plant is in Caracas, but reaching it is no easy task
Iflrst must drive about half an hour from downtown, to the end of the South-West
highway and past the end of the metro line. Then I must cross Caricuao, a
working-class public tenement, the most populous one in Caracas, that seems like a
bustling capital city in its own right. Next I must venture onto the old road to Los
Teques, a narrow, winding road that must have been overgrown and isolated two or
three decades ago, but now cuts its way ruthlessly through the crammed "ranchos"
(squatter settlements) of Ruiz-Pineda, where rural and urban lives mix
indistinguishably. Finally, I take a detour, leave the "ranchos" behind, and land on an
isolated little plateau among the mountains, the site of an industrial zone with large,
well-built structures. After driving around the zone several times and still failing to
fnd Cosmeplast's address, I stop at a building that, according to a sign on the door,
houses a plastic toy producer whose name is familiar. Behind me arrive two young
women, smiling and shy in their Sunday dresses. They ask me whether Iam coming to
visit the company. I tell them that Iam only going to ask for an address. They come
closer and beg me to tell the guy at the door that they are with me. "We are looking
for a job. .. If you introduce us, maybe they will let us in. . ." I ask my question,
introduce them, and go, wondering what will besome of these two kids walking around
in an isolated industrial zone beyond Caricuao and Ruiz-Pineda.
Ifound that I had passed the Cosmeplast building at least three times-I often
think that plastics factories try to hide their identities. Mr. C., an educate4 apparently
recently arrived South American immigrant, receives me. This is no family business:
there is something quite impersonal about it. Mr. C tells me that Cosmeplast is the
Venezuelan "plastics arm," so to speak, of a French company producing household
items.
July 1992: Mr. K., from Transtoys, easily provided me with the names and
telephone nwnbers of all his former subcontractors. Yet three months of telephone
calls and faxes have failed to get me interviews with the managers of two of them,
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Packingplast and Microplast. I have penetrated several layers of receptionists and
secretaries at Packingplast and gotten the names of all the important managers. But
every time I am about to set an appointnent with one of those managers, something
comes up-a trip, a meeting, a promotion... And at Microplast, I am stonewalled
and cannot get through to either of the two main managers. They seem to have given
orders not to be bothered; in call after calL no matter the lime, I am told that no
manager is at the plant When Ifnally leave the country, I still have been unable to
talk to either.
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SUBCONTRACTING NETW0RK 2: "TRANSTOYS"
CONTRACTING IN AND OUT IN THE TOY SECTOR
The core of the second subcontracting network is composed of six firms: the
client, which I refer to as "Transtoys," and five subcontractors of diverse sizes, regional
locations, and technical capabilities-Filmplast, Heelplast, Cosmeplast, Packingplast,
and Microplast (Table 1). All of these firms, including the client firm, have other
customers in the plastics sector or in other industries. Thus, in examining the links
among these firms, I am focusing on only part of a large, complex industrial web.
A. THE ORIGINS
Early Contracting Out The "Barbie" License and Dress-Making
Transtoys, a large-scale toy company, was created in 1969, and it has been
producing toys, balls, and dolls ever since. Its plant, a good-quality, shed-like building
on a large lot, is in San Felipe, the capital of an agricultural state. San Felipe, a quiet
agricultural town four hours from Caracas, is an nlikely place fir a large
manufacturer-my interviewee states that "we located in San Felipe because we had a
property there." But the town is right on the corridor between Caracas, Valencia, and
Barquisimeto, three of the main urban centers in Venezuela. San Felipe also offers a
large group of home workers with few job alternatives. Indeed, Transtoys has now
become a key source of jobs for women in the town-and the women a good source of
inexpensive labor for Transtoys.
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Table 1 GenralCharcNIsds fSaIf-acig ewok2,1987
Regional location Year feuded
(distance from (length of relationship
Firm client,ki) with dient,years) Main products
Transtoys (client) Central west 1969 Toys, balls, dolls
Filuplast Central(320) 1966(3) Extred film, mlded pars
Heelpiast Capital(280) 1980s(1) Toy partsheels
Cosmeplast Capital(280) 1987(1) Toy puts, household im
Packingplast Central(120) n.a.(2 nnths) Contaiws, pans
Micropast Central(220) n.a.(1) Toy pts,houehold items
In 1979, Transtoys obtained an exclusive license to produce the Barbie doll in
Venezela-a major turning t in the firm's development The firm had been
producing lowquality toys and balls, primarily through rotational molding and
blow-molding of plastics, that required relatively little skill and quality control. Now the
firm had to prepare itself to turn out a more complex andsohisticu
production process for the Barbie doll involved not only molding plastic pat, bt also
and applying hair, paintingthe dol's iatures, cutting and sewing the
dresses, assembling the dolls, and packaging thorn according to the license's precise and
In the midst of the two oil booms of the 1970s, Venezuela was an attractive
market Imported inputs were inexpensive and easy to procure. Getting an exclusive
license to manufactue a special product was the only thing a firm needed to "make a
killing" in tic industry. Having achieved that, Transtays soon started renewing its
plastics mlding eqitwinjection-moldingcapacity-ndseeidng
ways to procure the rest ofthe components.
The firm's managers deided to do all the plasticstrnfeainnhoss.
well as the hair aplc tic h assembly, and the puckging. But they opted to
contract out the making of the dresses: auoaigthe production of such small pice
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was difficult, and the labor required would overwhelm the plants space and the firm's
manageialca cty
Tin firm stated contracting out dress-making in 1979. It began by training
some of the in San Felipe, providing them with the basic materials and
somn equiponnt to start operations After some trial and error, the firm identified the
best performers, iniped tinm take on apprentices to expand their operations, and,
finally, provided the capital for a dress manufacturing venture, Coafecciones, headed by
the most experienced and enterprising seamstress. Although Transtoys paid
Confecciones by the piece, managers considered the relationship very stable and close:
when asked for the number of workers in Transtoys, the manager would always include
the 80 workers of Confecciones.
Lobbying for Trade Advantages: The Strengtheningof CAVEFAJ
Transtoys' operations remained relatively unchanged through the early 1980s,
when the economic measures constraining toy and raw matril imports were put in
place. At first, Transtoys was not bothered by resin supply problems: with a long
history of large consumption of domestic resins, it could access the "empresas mixtas"
directly and gradually increase its quota without much problem.
But in 1983 and 1984, Transtoys' operations were affected, as the government's
classification of toy mechanisms and specialized components (joints, eyes, synthetic
hair) in tin category "toys," under tin import ban imposed in 1983, created a vicious
circle for toy makers. They confronted a growing demand for their goods thanks to the
import substitution encouraged by the economic measures. Yet they could not take
advantage of tin opportunity because tin same economic measures prevented them
from procuring imported pieces that they believed local manufacturers could not
produce to aporaestandards.
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Manufacturers dncted their efforts toward lobbying for the separation of the
talff code for toys into two subcategories-finislrd toys and toy components-rather
than experimenting with ways to prodhce the missing m localy (my
interviewee insisted that local production could not be economicaly justified). It was at
this time that CAVEFAJ, the Venezuelan Chamber of Toy Manufacturers, got its initial
push. Created in 1975, CAVEFAJ had rmained sma and oalthroughout
the 1970s In 1983, when toy importers serving the Venezuelan market were
constrained from continuing their activities, many turned to manufacturing-and joined
the hamber. Putting their ita nizationabilities to work, they
transformed CAVEPA into one of the strongest and most articulate business
organizations in the country. By 1985, CAVEFA had succeeded in getting the tariff
code disaggregted.-That enabled toy makers to import mechanisms under an
affordable tariff and to sell Venezuelan-made toys locally under the full protection of
import prohibitions. Between 1985 and 1987, this combination of factors generated
some of the fastest growth the toy industry has experienced.
Transtoys, one of the best-known and most vocal members of the chamber,
benefited from the new policies, as the trends in its sales irustrate.' In real and bolfvar
terms, sales had grown in 1983 (19%) despite the debt crisis. They improved markedly
during 1984 (46%), thanks to the import prohibitions, but then declined in 1985 (-12%).
During 1984-85, unable to import achanisms for manufacturing its most sophisticated
products, Transtoys focused on simpler, lower-cost plastic toys. In 1986, after the
restrictions on imports of mechanisms were relaxed, Transtoys could resume production
SThe trends cited here am based on sales figures in current terms obtained from the
Transtoys interviewee, deflated by the plastics manufactures' price index produced by
the Venezuelan Central Bank, and converted into dollars -sn the average exchange
rate given in the IMPs Interational FianacialStatistics Yearbeek 1992, p. 731. The
figures provided by the interviewee were Es. 27 million for 1982, Es. 32 million for
1983, Bs. 51.3 million for 1984, Bs. 51.8 million for 1985, and Es. 107 million for
1986. The deflated figures are Es. 29.66 million, Es. 35.14 million, Es. 51.3 million,
Bs. 45.8 million, and Ba. 89.54 million. The figures in real terms and in dallars are
$6.91 million, $8.18 million, $7.31 million, $6.04 million, and $11.1 million.
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of complex, higher-cost products. As a result of this shift, and of the general demand
expasion precedipg the general elections, sales jumped in real(bolfvar) terms by almost
100% in 1986. When interviewed in 1987, managers expected a75% increase in sales
in real terms between 1986 and 1987.
B. PROTECTION PLUS DEMAND EXPANSION: THE MID-198k
Tightenkn Re n Markets
Just as Transtoys' production was growing rapidly, so was that of other toy
producers and other plastics manufacturers, with the help of a pre-electonl
expansionary fiscal policy. But the only resins available were those that the empresas
mixtas could produce; imports of resins that could be produced domestically were
prohibited or, in case of critical deficits, channeled through the empresas mixta. The
resin quota system became more and moe constraining for otherwise successful
producers. And the private distributors holding the monopoly over the distribution of
resins manufactured by the empresas mixtas started exhibiting arbitrary and often
abusive practices 2
Mattel (Transtoys' parent corporation and the licenser for the production of the
Barbie doll) helped Transtoys gain access to resins that were not produced in Venezuela
through its international procurement networks. But Transtoys had to buy resins that
could be produced in Venezuela from domestic sources. The firm had avoided major
procurenrnt problems in 198345, but in 1986 it started experiencing serious input
The prices and delivery of domestic raw materials were totailly
unpredictable. Private distributors added unjustified charges to resin prices, and
required advance payment with a certified check. Supplier-financingarngmtswr
2 Thewissumof resin distributionis<dsuse further inucnratnaae ,ih
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a sheam ifadeal had been mule to pay forfthe rin in two (30-day and W-day)
adistr woud wait to receive te second pynt fm providing the
materiaL These practices not only eroded a fir's capital, they also led to
unpedctbility in its own deliveries
Resin supply goblets were cited by Transtoys' pnral manager as the main
mason that the firm had sowed its expansion plans. In 1987, the firm hadsigifi
equipment,-including 15 injection-molding machines,5rotation-molding furnaces,
5 blow-malders, and a small mechanic' workshop with some capacity for repairing
machinery and molds. But with no new investment sr 1984, thr equipment was
aging; the oldest machine was 28 years old. Transtoys had plans to update the
equipment by udding four new Italian machines for injection molding, blow-molding,
and rotation molding. But the poor prospects for incmased resin supply from the
empresas mixtas raised doubts among managers about their future plastics
Liquiityand Fordm tchange as CebSrants b Growth
The resin supply problem, although rated highest by the Interviewee, was not the
only one preventing firmis fromrexpanding operations in the face of growing demand
Obtaining local capital for invsttnents had become difficult Under growing inflation
fixed' tAniir atesbecame stzonglynegtive,1Mdconsequently, the supy of credit
lagged or was availbe only at highly speculative (and illegal) rates. Commercial banks,
said my interviewee, "peer to deposit their bolfvares in the central bank rather than
lending them, because in lending t interest is low and the risk high." The tight
liquidity and low ati interest rates in the mid-1980s gave rise to th first
"black" financial market in Venezuelt's history (Ianan1990:4, 7).
In *d theiabilltytoobteandoliars for pu.ae of equipmentuandsparm
parts atroSd especially when requestediat the preferential raefixed by the g
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restricted investment Dollar quotas at the preferential rate of Bs. 14.5 per dollar were
administed by RECADI, a unit of the Fomento ministry created for that purpose in
1983. It was rumored that quotas were purchased at a prmium- premium that was
increasing as the demand for dollars grew and the parallel, free-floating exchange rate
diverged more and more from the official, preferential rate. The alternative, of course,
Was to purchase dollars in the parallel market, where the exchange rate was over Bs. 30
per dollarby the end of 1987.
Lack of capital in itself was not the binding constraint on Transtoys' investment
plans, however. The general manager reported that the firm had access to a foreign
credit line and to its own financial resources; he emphasized the importance of resin
supply as a constraint. Yet the turbulence in the financial and exchange markets during
the mid-1980s did represent a source of uncertainty for the firm that it had to factor in
to its plans for future investments.
Temporary Mold Imports: Contracting In and Contracting Out
Just as for Minitoys, discussed in the first case study, molds were a crucial
aspect of Transtoys' firm strategy. Transtoys never acquired molds locally or made
them in-house. It imported molds for the production of its own line of toys from the
United States, Spain, or Germany. For the production of the Barbie doll, its main
product line, it rented the molds from Mattel through the temporary-import mechanism.
The Mattel molds had sophisticated and delicate mechanical features 3 and
several were required to produce a single doll. They were leased by the parent
corporaion exclusively to its licensees all over the world; under Venezuelan law,
Transtoys could keep them for up to three months. Again, as in the case of Minitoys,
3Some of the Mattel mold sets-if I understood contctly--had a value of up to
DM 280,000!
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delivery of the molds sometimes could not be scheduled to cosure optimal use of
machine tint-a problem compounded by the seasonality of toy production and sales.
Transtoys' capacity,like that of Minitoys, soMetimes was overwhelmed by the number
of molds the firm had to inject and then retun, all within a few weeks. All other times,
Transtoys found itself facing long streches of idle machine tint that hurt overall
productivity and the economic efficiency of its equipment
Transtoys, like Minitoys, opted for subcontracting as a solution to unpredictable
mold overflows. It made its first foray in 1984, when it subcontracted the injection of
some of its molds to Filmplast, a large firm owned by a well-established Italian
entrepreneur who had also been successful in banking. Although Flmplast did not offer
the lowest cost or the most convenient location, it could offer the quality of service that
Transtoys required.
In 1987, Fdmplast, having established a large, modern plant in Guarenas only
four years earlier, faced a promising future as a producer of bulk extruded flm. Yet it
retained the massive injection-molding equipment with which it had started operations
more than 20 years earlier, in 1966. Responding to the surge in demand for domestic
plastic parts and products, Filmplast's mana nt ha decided to use the firm's
injection-molding capacity to provide customers with high-quality subcontracting
services. It became a major provider of injection-molding services, offering its
24 injection-molders, with mold capacities of between 20 grams and 6 kilograms, to
many customers. Fimplast's customers included large domestic toy makers, such as
Transtoys, and several foreign manufacturers of electronic appliances, such as Zenith,
Sony, and Phillips, for which Fihnplast produced TV shells and other components.
Having found its first subcontractor, Transtys still had to resolve another
problem: the underutiliztion of its equipment during certain periods of the year.
Starting in 1983, Transtoys offered injection-molding services to other firms in order to
achieve more uniform capacity utilization throughout the year. The firm's decision to
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offer subcontracting services also reflects the relatively positive environment facing
sellers of plastics transformation services. Initially, Transtays catered primarily to firms
in nearby towns (San Felipe, Barquintto), but it later extended its services to Caracas,
also began to offer rotational molding. It produced items ranging from fan vanes for a
small producer of mechanical appliances in San Felipe to plastic water bags and
collapsible containers for paramedical use for two firms in Barquisimeto and Caracas.
Transtoys' work for other firms graidually increased from about 3% of its production in
1983 to 7% in 1987.
The ability of Transtoys and Filmplast to combine their roles as subcontractors
and clients illustrates several features of these firms and of the industry. First, the firms
were flexible manufacturers: they could shift from one product to another frequently
and on short notice. Second, their ability to keep track of their many relationships and
to shift smoothly from the role of subcontractor to the role of client implied good
management abilities. And there were advantages to filling both roles: functioning on
one side of the relationship (say, as the client firm) taught Transtoys details of the trade
that could help it bargain when it played the opposite role (as the subcontractor). Third,
as this story reveals, large firms like Transtoys and Filmplast can be subcontractors, one
of the reasons why my 1987 survey data indicated the lack of clear size segmentation
between subcontractors and client firms. Such firms may have invested in capacity
exceeding what their markets could support on a stable basis, and thus faced periods of
idle equipment, or they may have shifted to new product lines and processes, leaving
older equipment underutilized. In either scenario, large, relatively robust enterprises
would be seeking jobs as subcontractors. Fourth, through multiple connections such as
those illustrated in the Transtoys-Filmplast story, the effects of unpredictability and flux
in one corner of the industry can be expected to extend beyond a single subcontracting
relationship to finns in diverse industries.
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Growing through Subentracting
While its sales growth remained moderate (1983-85), Transtays maintained only
one seasonal subcontractor, Flmplast. But when demand expansion compounded the
effect of trade restrictions, in 1986-87, Transtoys experienced a sharp increase in
demand and found new product lines economically attractive. Because expansion of its
own capacity was constrained by input uncertainties, financial illiquidity (and
uncertainty) in the economy, and difficulties in procuring dollars at low rates, it opted to
grow through subcontracting, by enlarging and intensifying its subcontracting networt
By 1987, Transtoys had expanded its network to five regular subcontractors.
Together, these subcontractors would reserve 10-12 injection-molding machines to
provide services to Transtoys. This additional capacity allowed Transtoys to enhance
its plastics transformation capacity at peak times by 70%. In 1981, Transtoys had
devoted no resources to contracting out plastics transformation. In 1987, working at a
scale triple its 1981 production, subcontracting accounted for about 35% of its plastics
transformation costs.4
Transtoys' subcontractors had a range of sizes, locations, and technical
capabilities.
Fimpat, as already described, was a large, modem, and successful company
that had opted to offer its services as a way to use old equipment during its shift to a
new, more promising product line and technical process-the highly automate& bulk
production of extruded film. For Filmplast, subcontracting was thus a transitional
4In 1987, Transtoys' cost structure was as foilows: plastics transformation costs (in
house and subcontracted) represented 30% of total costs; adiitainandi sales, 15%;
space leases, mortgages, and depreciation, 15%; raw materials, 15%; cnrce-u
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strategy, and its relationship with Transtoys was far from exploitative or subordinate.
Assuming that flux and uncertainty are just "normal" conditions, this relationship was
the best possible way for each of these firms to meet its economic needs.
Heepkt, in contrast, was a rather small firm, located in a crowded
working-class neighborhood close to downtown Caracas. In 1987, it had
seven injection-molding machines and 40 employees working three shifts, which meant
that it produced significant output The firm's main product, however, was a
standardized, rather simple, low-cost item-plastic heels for shoes-made of PVC and
high-impact polystyrene. It sold them directly in remote markets in the interior of
Venezuela and in Colombia, where it could enjoy some comparative advantage.
Heelplast started serving Transtoys in 1986. At peak times, Heelplast reserved two of
its injection-molding machines for Transtoys, although on average contract work for
other firms accounted for only about 20% of its production in 1987.
Cosmeplast was a medium-size plastics transformation firm "captive" to a
French conglomerate that produced such varied household items as detergents, sponges,
and plastic tableware. The conglomerate, having decided to integrate plastics
transformation into its production process, had made a significant investment in starting
up Cosmeplast (nine injection-molding machines), creating capacity that exceeded its
needs in the 1980s. The overinvestment in capacity may have been made in the
expectation of greater needs in the future. Or it may have been to take advantage of a
good purchase opportunity. The fact is that by 1987 Cosmeplast had idle capacity,
which it decided to rent to Transtoys. Yet Cosmeplast could offer only plastics
transformation services-it did not have major mold-making, mold aint , or
quality control capabilities.
Packingplast was a large-scale and Microplast a small-scale firm. Although both
firms refused to be interviewed in either 1987 or (992,1I was able to get some
informatin on them from Transtoys. Transtoys had learned about Packingplast, the last
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subcontractor it engaged, through the business association AVIPLA, whose members
it highly. Transtoys was very satisfied with Packingplast's services and
planned to expand its business with the firm. In contrast, Microplast had displeased
Transtoys during 1986-87; it had treated molds inadequately and produced poor-quality
output. In 1987, Transtoys planned to end its relationship with that firm.
Transtoys seemed to have two types of relationships with its subcontractors:
one characterized by trust aid respect-such as that with Filmplast and, in the future,
probably with Packingplast as well-and the other more casual-with firms that had
more of a "sweatshop" nature, such as Heelplast and Cosmeplast. Yet there were signs
of potential instability and detachment in all the subcontracting relationships.
First, Transtoys never assigned more than one piece of each product to any of its
subcontractors, to avoid the risk of a subcontractor copying the product Second,
although the subcontractors regularly reserved for Transtoys a certain number of
injection-molding machines, Transtoys controlled injection performance and
productivity through the method of payment: it paid by the piece. Thus, to optimize
revenues from each machine or mold, had to speed up production. Third, Transtoys
provided technical assistance to the subcontractors only when they had problems,
although some knowledge was transferred through the norms and standards established
and through advice on colors, injection times, maintenance of the molds, and packaging
and transport methods. Fourth, although the modality of raw material provision varied
according to the subcontractor, the most common arrangement was for the
subcontractor to supply the raw material-an arrangement that transferred to the
subcontractor the risk of technical malpractice and waste. Fifth, Transtays' manager
thought that subcontractors benefited more from subcontracting relationships (they used
their idle capacity and avoided cumbersome final-market transactions) and that client
firms suffered because of inadequate service (delayed deliveries, bad reproduction of
colors, bad packaging, insufficient maintenance of tools).
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According to Transtoys' manag1meN, integrating all the plastics transformation
operations that the firm was subcontracting in 1987 would have been 50% cheaper.
Again, it was supply-side problems-and not Transtoys'unconditional preference for
subcontracting-that led the firm to contract out work rather than expand its
transformation capacity.
Alternative Mehnmafor Reducing Labor Costs
Cutting labor costs was not perceived by Transtoys as the main reason for
subcontracting. Nor could I demonstrate, using a few labor-related variables, that it
was a hidden reason for subcontracting. None of the subcontractors was small enough
tosly escape labor regulation (Table 2). Indeed, two (Filmplast and Packingplast)
were very large and their features clearly diverged from those of a "sweatshop."
In addition, the locations ofthe client and its subcontractors were inconsistent
with the use of location to avoid highly unionized regions. The client was located in a
region and a city with relatively little union activity, and the subcontractors in cities and
regions well-known for the combativeness and omnipresence of their regional trade
unions. And while the client firm had an enterprise union, which in Venezuela is
perceived as a co-optive management-labor partnership, the subcontractors were
affiliated with regional trade unions, perceived as more antagonistic toward
management 5s
sThese conventional perceptions, of course, may fail to apply in particular cases: an
enterprise union may have gained extraordinary cnesosfor its mebr; a
ndium-size firm may escape labor regulation if located in a bard-to-reach comr oMan
urban squatter setdenent, even if it is in a highly unionized city. Yet the available
evidence challenges the assumption that Transtys may have used ubcontract for
labor-saving or cost-cutting purposes only.
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TaW 2 Eml 1met"miUn InsiW --- Sbes A&-tIng etork2,9
rmnnt Cast wmke
Firm worker (occupation) Type of unionizatin
Transtys 253 250 during peaks Enterprise
(assembling,
Flmplast 290 0 Regional trade
Heclplast 40 n.a Regional trade
Cosmeplast 50 10 or more(a a
Packinglast Large scale na. na.
Microplast Small-scale na. n.a.
nLa. Not available.
Source:bIterviews with managers,1987
Transtoys was trying to cut labor costs and to lessen the burden of labor
management. But it was pursuing these l through means other than subcontracting.
It contracted casual labor, mainly to perform activities complementary to plastics
processing. During the frak period in 1987, Transtoys engaged up to 370 casual
workers-one and a half tines its plabor force at theplant This casual labor
pool was composed in part of women working in their homes,sewing doll dresses, or
akin wigs-up to 250 women at times. These home wors were paid by the piece.
At the plant, up to 250 casual workers would be engaged to work.in assembling and
packaging during peak times (the second halfof the year, before the Christmas season).
Plant-based casual workers reportedly received the same wage rate as permanent
workrs, afhough during onfrpaut oftheyetruad thpywere deprived of the benefits to
which workers engaged for a minimum of three months were entitled. lhe number of
casual workers had doubled every year between 1983 and 1987.
Besides casual workers, Transtoys also relied on the sewing firm it had
basis. By paying this fin by the piece, neTyrans ferredtoComfecciones the risk
of f n in productivity adlity. in tunm , couldtransfer part of
thatriskdowntoWitsworkers,tlmughitsownpiece-ratepaymuntsystem.
een he ers eeOf 19C7
In 1987, ont would have said that this clienttr aingnfor
three reans: (i)to respond to asurge in contracts due to import substitution-that is,
th diversion of demand to local toy produws created by moono and trade
policies;(ii)to overcoat the constraints imposed on planning by the need to
import adds ty from ti parent firm; and (iii) to avoid the risks, due to input
xn-cerCtaintisof investing in its own capacity. Although there were plans to expand the
firm's installed capacity, subcontracting still was considtd necessary under those
conditions Nevertheless, management thought thata
problems, including high rates for the services,loss of quality control, and financial
costs and material risks of transport Thus, in 1987, one would have concluded that this
was a rather precarious capacity-subcontracting network
C. AFTER smUCTURALADJUsm
The Cleat Capes with Al me Holdag on to the Safest Product Lin
The adjustment program that started in 1989implied a drastic reduction Af
who prefermd tim design and the quality of foreign-made goods now had access to
high-priced imports, and the purchasing power of the middle class was being eroded.
And becase the policy shift allowed inexpensive Asian imports into local markets, it
also affected thm low-cost, low-q ysegnwnt ofte markst. 'Dntywhich was
substituting thigher- imhpos% skrthe deawnd for maany of Its product lines
dridig In addition, productioafthe
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uncertainties facing the country. After ft attempted coup on February 4,1992, for
example, Transtoys had to interrupt its operations for a whole month.
In response to this situation, fir client firm reduced its line of products to the
"safest" ones-those in which it could maintain some degree of market control because
of product dif Iaion and consumwr loyalty. It held on to two lines of toys awl duls
that it could produce under exclusive license from Mattel(the Barbie doll) and from a
recent licenser, Walt Disney Productions. These lines are produced primarily through
injection molding, so that the firm's injection-molding capacity was being utilized
intensely while other equipment remained underutilizle Thus, by 1990, the "excess
demand" rationale for subcontracting had disappeared, and the client firm decided to
eliminate all subcontracting arrangenrnts.
The second major reason for subcontracting reported in 1987-the need to
overcome operational constraints imposed by the practice of temporary imports of
molds-also lost importance after adjustment. Eliminating other product lines yielded
more available machine time to deal with the licensed product Mattel sent a better
programmer to help Transtoys design its production schedule. The improved
operational planning helped prevent Ithe unmaneable peaks in the demand for
machine-time attributable to unexpected arrivals of temporarily imported molds. The
manager of the client firm also manifested a more relaxed attitude toward the use of
imported molds. When I asked what he would do, now that he had released all his
subcontractors, if he received several molds at the same time, he answered that "the
molds would wait." In 1991, for example, when the firm received 148 molds in
September, it negotiated a delay in their use until 1992. This attitude might result from
changes in the regulations regarding temporary importation.' But it may also reflect a
6 Icaldmt rta xlnto of wby Mnlwoube willng to acptsbchlmngkid
loss of for the firm of the business of manufacturing: in passing, tim
manager indicated that the firm may be grndally shifting to toy imports.
Just as in the case of Minitoys, the phasing down in the 1990s of the lines of
business that had occupied Transtoys in 1987 was not accompanied by an immedite
sale of plastics equipment. Th reason may be twofold. Fus, th firm
may not want to lose its processing capabilities in case demand surges again. Second,
now that many producers are reducing the scale of production or shifting to other
activities, the market for this type of equipment may be depressed; the machines may be
too depreciated to be salable.
The fact is that Transtoys, whose main role in subcontracting relationships had
been that of the client, is now searching for clients to use its idle capacity. The share of
plastic transformation activities that it performs for other firms has increased recently to
about 10% of its total processing tint, and the manager would like it to continue to
increase.
A rRespond In Diverse Ways to Adustment
The dissolution of this network has had widely varying effects on the
subcontractors. Filmplast, for example, was hit badly by some of the events in 1989.
Most important, it suffered decapitalization because the "letters of credit" sold by
RECADI for the purchase of imported inputs and equipment failed to be recognized by
the incoming government.7 TM firm had expected to pay the letters at the preferential
rate, but instead was forced to pay thn at the high floating exchange rate. Moreover,
after the liberalization of imports, Filmplast lost several contracts to foreign suppliers.
S In other wrs, once RCADI was dissolved by dhe incoming
had been gratd "Inner Mfcredit" at tim pmefemmntial exchange ra- were forced to repay
tihemat the free-floating ec angSrt.
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ft had to lay off many workers and give others (those it wanted to keep) long paid
"vacations". After the normalization of its financial situation, it started shifting fir
emphasis of its production. Blow-molding industrial containers and extruding
bio-oriented polypropylene film proved to be its most resilient activities. Focusing more
on generic products with a mass market, rather than custom-made items for specific
clients, also seemed a safe strategy.
Filmplast thus fully undertook the transition that had seemed only incipient in
1987. It gradually abandoned injection molding (which, together with blow-molding,
now constitutes only 15% of the firm's production) and emphasized film extrusion. In
the three years after its crisis, it completed major expansion projects, increased its
employment, expanded its production of film to Bs. 1 billion a year, and reduced its
reliance on subcontracting projects.
A set of supply- and demand-side forces pushed Heelplast out of the market
altogether. When asked why the firm had declared bankruptcy, the manager responded
that the main reason hal been the plummeting demand for its final product, heels. The
reason for the decline in demand, in his opinion, was the increase in prices. And the
increase in prices was due, in turn, to the impact on costs of several factors. First, nde
lb lation led to fluctuations and increases in the cost of resins, particularly resins
such as PVC and polystyrene, which depended on imported components. Second,
changes in labor reguladons and andated cerled to the nemulation of financial
liabilities related to labor payments (social security, ICE,8 retirement reserves), which
reportedly sometimes reached 400% of wage payments. Third,flnanclal narket
n led to swelling financial costs, which decapitalizd the enterprise and
made it impossible to renew its equipment (interest rates paid went from 15% in the
quasi-black market of the late 1980s to 42% in 1990). In passing even part of the costs
Instituto Nacional de Capacitacidn Educativa, the Venmezelan national training institute.
on through the pr- of its products, the firm lost competitiveness domestically, as well
as relative to Colombian producers, and hence lost markets.
In 1989, Heelplast started eliminating shifts, and in 1991, it decided to close
down. It is now in the process of selling its equipment. All of its workers have lost
their jobs.
Cosmeplast had higher stakes in the toy market. it not only injected molds for
Transtoys, it also produced toys for direct sale. The decline of the toy market thus
greatly affected the operations of this firm Its labor force declined by 50%, from
50 workers in 1987 to 25 in 1992. Together with the downsizing, there was a shift to
greater use of male workers, presumably because of the change in the Labor Law, which
allegedly made using female labor costlier for firms. Cosmeplast now focuses on
producing cheap household items for final markets and the injection molding cosmetics
containers for a single client. It also plansto create a line of bottles and other
containers that it would produce using two blow-molding machines. That project
would generate only four additional jobs (according to the manager interviewed, two
women for each of two work shifts). But it is expected to generate significant benefits
for the firm, which plans to blow-mold bottles for the use of other enterprises in the
same conglomerate, as well as under subcontracting arrangements with other client
firms.
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SUBCONTRACTING NETWORK3: "MULTINAC"
BACK TO VERTICAL INTERATION
August 8,1987: I was iterested in studying this subcontrcting network not
because it serves one of the largest multinational concerns in Venezuela-Multinac-
but because I had head about Me extraordinary experience of one of the
subcontractors Justinplast People attributed that experience to its restless manager,
Mr. P., an educated man in his early forties. Mr. P, the son of aformer dean of the
Universidad Central de Venezuela, had a history of political activisn and had decided
to become a mediwrn-scale industrialist. Reaching him is diffcult, and when Ifinally
meet him, I soon realize why he is so short of time: he has enough enthusiasn,
*nrmation, and ideas to talk to any interlocutor for hours. His conversation is rich
but chaotic; provdcaie statements streamby tooquickly to allow the listener to ask
what assumptIons ainsider' knowledge cause him to say what he does. In Caracas
he uses hisfater's old law pice I two small roomsinan old section of downtown. The
oce is funished with what look like museum pieces, and is walls are lined with
shelves of old leather-bound law books.
tow hours from Caracas. To ge feruL ote eers offthe msain road into a small
industrial zone designed for small- and msediu-scale enterprises and sold under
highly subsidized terms ofcredit by ronusra th Venewuelan Corporation for
the Small and Medisum Industry, a semi-private organization. The industrial zone,
although it may have been in existence for 15 years, is only half' occupied Abundant
trees and bushes in the zone msake the strong heat of te valley mor ebarunbe.
Justinplast occupies afiwored spot inthe industrial zowe; sited towart the bock of the
small plateau on which the zone is locate4 it overlooks the wide central valleys and
gets to be the first to pollute their breew.
Justinplast has an imnaculately maintained facility composed of two simple
structures: one for the offices and the manufacturing, the other for storage. It has a
small but very green flower garden in the front (in contrast with the overgrown
surroundings), afriendly receptionist a row of modem administrative cubicles on the
second foor, and a clean, spacious production area, with high ceilings, comfortably
distributed manufacturing activities, and a wide door that opens toward a vista of the
valleys. All the workers I see in the production and quality control areas, except for
one technician, are women.
May 7,1992: Mr. P. is no longer at Justinplast. He is now the president of
Corpoindustria, and his shocking and challenging statements are being broadcast on
the radio and printed in newspapers. His move is encouraging, I think, and symbolic
of what many have done during this controversial administration: he has packed up
the intellectual tradition of his father, his education, his political activis, and his
direct experience with a small enterprise and multinational deals and taken them with
him into a policymaking body. But his departure appears to have hurt the firm.
May 12,1992: Belgplast like Justinpla4 is a relatively well-performing flrm
and it also impresses me. But the plant and the people in it leave me with quite a
dfferent feeling. Belgplast is located among many other old small- and medium-scale
factories that have sprouted up spontaneously on the hills along the Panamerican
highway, between Caracas and Los Teques, about a half-hour drive from downtown
Caracas and not farfrom Multinac. After climbing a steep, narrow road, one reaches
a rather inelegant, plain, gray building crammed among similar structures. Entering
Belgplast's office is like going into a modest home through the back door: you walk up
a narrow, metal staircase, knock on a metal doo, and enter a tiny reception room and
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ten a narmw corridor tat islied with three secretarial dess and ends at the
managers' oqiie. Definitely not afussyininistrative stnuctura
My interviewee,Mr. M., one of three young parners in tis venture, keeps me
waiting a long time He has sunimoned all his technicians and specialized workers-
about eight people, including afemale engineer who is de quality control nwnager-
into his little pIc. They have someting important to discu ss Anoter sign, perhaps,
of a nonhierarchical structure and direct intrafirm conuI Mr. 12, another
partner, has an unfriendly appearance and avoids me completely. Mr. G., a young
engineering graduate from my university in Caracas, is te only non-Belgian partser;
he is afirst-generation Spanish-Venezuelan. After a pleasant and interesting meeting
wi& Messrs. M. and G., Mr. G. takes me through the plants. Belgplast includes the
injection molding unit to which the office is attache4 a blow molding unit still under
construction, and a sister mold-making company. All look clean, organize4 and well
maintained and lighte4 but the work environment is nevertheless far less pleasant tan
hat at Justinplast.
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SUBCONTRACTING NETWORK 3: MULTINAC"
SHIFTING BACK TO VERTICAL ATION
In this third snetwork the client firm is the local subsidiary of a
large, US.4ased mulin corporation best known for producing personal care
items and writing devices. In 1987, the multinational which I will call "Multinne," had
four plastics manufeturi g subcontractors: Justinplast, Geraplast, Colomplast, and
Belgplast(Table 1). These notes tell why and how Multinac, after having pursued a
strategy of vertical dising during the 1970s and 1980s, started a process of
selective integration in the 1990s. A recurrent theme in this story is the interplay
between national policies and multinational strategies as deterninants of subcontracting
decisions.
Genal sof Network 3,1987
Rietioaadocation Year fonded Subecribed capital, Main prodact
diutare from agof Bs. milhon produced for
Firm client) + ustiship) (% natinaal capital) fltwk
Client Maltiac Cupitl3bgon 1954 B. 150 million P hygiene
(0%) iten bamnint
Gennaplast.at
Be-lat
CentalbR0gion 1977
(50 I=) (6).
CealRegon u.
(ElknQ (4)
Uns. na.
Capital Region 1981
(20m) (1.5)
Bs. 4 mifion
(100%)
na,
(100%)
s razo
bafpoint pen
botdes, caps
Bottles, caps
Banp
n.a. Not available.
a. The t of Germaplast and Coiomplaa could not be interviewed directly.
The available information was provided by Multinae'sa in our 1987 and 1992
inriews.
Table 1
AKE THOIGN
Multinac arrived in Venezuel in 1954, whin ti country was still under tie
dictatorship of Marcos Nrez Jimtnet The corporation settled in Venezueln an
importer of finished goods and continued in this role, with steadily increasing sales,
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. But as the country entered its current period of
Western-style democracy and launched its first exin import-substitution
industrialization in the 1960s, Multinac was gradually forced to incorporate higher
shares of national content into its finished products. It integrated the injection molding
of ballpoint pen pars, which it then assembled in its own plant.
Two policies pursued by the Luis Herrera Campfns administration in the early
1980s-aimed at restoring maCOconomicbalance after the oil booms of the 1970s-
helped shape Multinac's subcontracting history. First, fiscal and, consequently,
aggregate-demand contraction weakmned the markets for Multinac's products. Second,
trade liberalization slowed its plans for increased local production of parts and products.
. 1 - - - -Elsewhere, another venurewas also feingtiefcsofhsecnmc
masures. Thrown out of busines by the sudden flooding of Venezuelan markets by
mported cassettes in 1980, the three Venezuela partners of the Japanese corporation
Hitachi started searhing for new uses for their injection molding capacity. Together
they established a finn (here called "Justinplast") that started operating in Valencia in
1980. After a few experiments with different multinational corporations-competitors
in the injection molding of components for toothbrushes and razors-Justinplast
managed to establish an agreement with Multinac under which Multinac would provide
the beginning of Mut slngest subdosractijventure in Venezuela, on lasting for
morethan acade. They also markethe end ofMultinacsinhouse injection
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molding: in 1981, Mtltinac sold its injection molders and delegated all major plastics
transformation to Justinpiastexcept for the extrusion of film for wrapping and the
tmonnforming of caps for plastic razors. Its relationship with Justinplast was exclusive
until 1983, when new economic aimed at curtailing imports of both
final products and plastic raw materials-led Multinac to diversify its subcontracting
network.
Subcon ctin the 198s: A P tIve-Sum Game?
When Multinne decided to expand its subcontracting network, it published bids
for services and reportedly selected its suppliers according to strict criteria of
cost-efficiency and quality-a rare practice in Venezuelan industry. Through this
process, Multinac entered into subcontracting relationships with Germaplast (1983),
Belgplast (1985), and Colomplast (1986) -all firms that focused on producing
intermediate products under custom orders, enjoyed good reputations as high-quality
producers, and were known for close ties with foreign sources of technology (hence the
names that I have chosen to assign them).1 The firms seemed far from being
"sweatshops."
By providing its subcontractors with relatively large orders, Multinac helped
them increase their capacity utilization and thus their efficiency. In particular, Multinac
encouraged, and conlbuted to, transaction-specific investments by Justinplast, its
closest associate in 1987, sharing the risk burden with that firm. Multinac helped all of
its subcontractors define higher standards of performance in products and processes and
develop systems for quality control and for corrective maintenance of equipment and
molds. Through its international networks and under a convenient financing plan, it also
andmentuKpenern M se d p i h cma in their
counriesof origin facilitated theirmcs to technology and know-how. Colomplast
was owned by aColotianieconomic group.
assisted its subcontractors in imparting raw materials that could not be produced in
Venezuela.
In turn, Multinac benefited from its subcontracting relationships in at least two
ways. Its management, well known for its conservative apprach to investing in "risky"
Latin American countries, used subcontracting to avoid large investments in plastics
transformation. And during times of severe supply-side problems, subcontracting saved
Multinac the hassle of managing a complex plastics transformation operation. Multinac
did not have to procure domestic raw materials-its subcontractors did that Nor did
Multinac have to build and update the necessary productive capacity, maintain
equipment, manage a low-skilled labor force, or find scarce specialized workers to
operate machines and maintain molds. Multinac's subcontractors did all of that, at a
piece rate.
Despite the apparently mutual benefits, even in 1987 a few cracks could be
spotted in the network. First and foremost, Multinac's managers frequently reiterated
that in-house production of parts would be cheaper and more controllable than
subcontracting their production to domestic plastics manufacturers. According to my
Multinac interviewee, the cost of injection molding would be 60-70% lower in-house
than under the subcontracting arrangements. Clearly, local management wanted to
convey that investing in plastics transformation capacity was highly desirable. But the
central managers opposed that strategy throughout the 1980s, reportedly because of
economic uncertainty in Venezuela and for reasons related to the corporation's global
strategic planning.
Other details revealed the tenuousness of the trust between the partners.
Despite its suppliers' goo reputations, Multinac took measures to prevent
opportunistic behavior, such as never giving any subcontractor (except Justinplast) the
mold for more than one component of a product. To transfer to its subcontractors the
(admittedly low) risk of raw material waste, Multinac left to them the task of procuring
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contribution to rnntion-speciflc investments by Justinpiast and the sharing of
technolocal knowledge with that subcontractor.
e "MrketIgP t" and "Acdbutal Just-In-TIme"
The next president of Multinac came from the parent corporation's marketing
section. Probably inspired by the trade-deterring measures of 1983, the "marketing
president" arrived with the intention of increasing sales by 200%, and soon started
acting on it Raising sales by 200% involved an extraordinary effort by Justinpiast,
which produced all the components for a product that had traditionally constituted 75%
of Multinac's sales in the Venezuelan market
Afterconducting an opinion pol in 1982-83, Multinac decided that its plans to
triple the production of disposable razors were supported by both demand and
opportunity. The president ordered implementation of the plan in just 30 days.
Multinac's goal was to get distributors to agree to buy a three-month stock, rather than
the usual 15-day stock; besides aggressive advertising to attract more consumers, the
strategy was to offer a larger profit to distributors through special sales and other
marketing mechanisms in which the new president of Multinac was well versed. Sales
was to be the driving force of the strategy.
The sales plan had to be translated into a production plan. At the many meetings
held to discus production prgramming, Justinplast's mana warned of the
difficulty of pursuing the sales program as proposed, but the program nevertheless went
ahead. Justinpiast had to introduce a third production shift, add personnel, and redesign
its assembly line. The assembly line was semi-automated and enhanced with
computerized quality control stations at certain points on the line, and the physical
structure of the assembly line was redesigned so that Justinpiast could fit mere assembly
workers in the same space and increase productivity. Multinac shared the costs of
Justinpiast's restructuring. Multinac's parent company Jaer transferred the concept of
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Justinplast's semi-automated assembly line to other subsidiaries in Latin America
(photos of the busy assembly line still hang on tie walls of the Charallave plant).
Although thre was some delay in initiating production, the results were
satisfctory. The pressure of demand down the line left little chance for products to
accumulate anywhere along the assembly line. Justinpiast had thus achieved, in the
words of its manager, adefacto just-in-time program. Although Ihave little way to
confirm this assertion, three achievements by Justinplast in 1983-85 seem to support it:
the atainment of minimum levels of inventory, on-line quality control, and optimal use
of the space.
The "Auditing President": Cost-CuttingR ab C
Multinac named new president in 1985. This president came from the auditing
department, and rationalizing production and cutting costs became the new for
the subsidiary.
The "auditing president" found that the sales drive of 1983-85 had imposed a
heavy toll on Multinac's cost structure. Although revenues had also increased, the new
sident judged it necessary to streamline the subsidiary in Venezuela, probably
following orders from high up in the corporation. Suppliers were an easy target for
cost-cutting efforts. And as Multinac's main supplier, Justinplast now found itself under
great scrutiny, and under increasing pressure to streamline and restructure.
In August 1985, Multinac's mana t decided to vertically integrate the
assernly operation for the disposable razors. It also decided to robotize the operation,
to achieve large savings in labor costs. This step limited Justinplast to the injection
molding of plastic parts for razors and the nmlding of, and application of bristies to,
tootbruhenThe robot episode hal several cosqecsfor Justinplast.
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To begin with, the elimination of a line forced Justinplast to reduce its labor
force by one-third (50 workers), seriously straining the relationship between
managment3and labor. Justinpiast's labor force, typically constituted by more than
two-thirds women, was represented until 1986 by a firm-levelunion managed primarily
by women. Highly organized, the union had achieved significant benefits for labor, not
only in pay, but especially in the quality and organization of work2 The firm-level
union had also successfully resisted penetration by the regional trade union, which,
according to the manager interviewed. was "violent" This result was good for
management, since it was likely to ensure smoother negotiations and more peaceful
relations with labor, but it was also good for the workers. As the leaders of their firm
union, the predominantly female workers could represent themselves and be
independent from a trade union that, like most regional trade unions in Venezuela, was
male- and party-dominated. Justinplast had prided itself on the good labor relations that
it bad maintained until 1985; in the opinion of my interviewee, they accounted in large
part for the firm's success.
The massive layoff of 1985 was compounded by problems in the business
environment of the 1980s. In the aftermath of the layoff, a raw material crisis developed
that workers perceived as concerning managemnt more than the labor discontent.
They responded in the only way that they thought would get management's attention:
they dissolved the firm-level union and called the regional trade union back in. Labor
relations, immediately became more tense and combative. But this desperate move by
the women workers failed to restore the stability and trust that they had enjoyed before.
Not only was a belligerent union now intervening, but in 1987, Justinplast entered much
harder times than it had ever experienced before.
2 Within the tight limits imposed by the multinational custontr, workers had certain
autonomy to organize the production process in the plant. The shop, as described
earlier, was a model of cleanliness,spaiosesand good rgnaton.
- 446 -
Inappropriate Technologies, RIsi, an Finances
The robot episode had one more significant consequence that illustrates the
complexity and interconnectedness observable in firm strategies-even for relatively
small firms like Justinplast. After all the fuss about it, Multinac's robotized assembly
line broke down in December 1985. Because of serious quality control problem, the
robotized process turned out defective products that failed to sell. As sales dropped
markedly, so did production. And if Multinac was not assembling, Justinplast could not
injection mold. Justinplast's production stagnated until May 1986. As its use of resins
declined the rigidity of the resin distribution system became obvious to Justinplast.
Unable to justify the resin purchases it wanted in 1986, Justinplast had to settle for a
smaller quota from the empresas mixtas.3 Because quotas were defined solely on the
basis of historical consumption, the 1987 quota also was restricted. Resin problems
resonated in further production problems and in labor problems (as described earlier).
The robot episode had one more consequence for Justinplast. The firm's
involuntary decline in production was difficult to explain convincingly to the banks
financing its operations. An interruption in cash flow was seen as a sign of financial
"sickness" and therefore of increased financial risk. Thus, Justinplast's relationships
with banks also became strained.
This string of Multinac-Justinplast stories was told with great vehemence and
passion by my Justinplast interviewee, and with great detail, though in a scattered and
chaotic fashion. I have recounted them here to the best of my understanding, based on
extensive notes from three interviews in 1987. During a fourth interview, in 1992, with
3Empresas mixtas" are the snail group of corporations producing polymers and resins in
Venezuela. They are joint ventures of the Venezula state (through the state-owned
petrochemical corporation), domestic private -apital(Gpo Zuliano), andintrntioalcapital (from the United States, Japan, or Prance).
the successor of my 1987 interviewee, I confirmed some of the old facts and collected
new ones to be used in the rest of this case study. Although some of the 1987 stories
sounded faniastic even to me, they do capture the complexity, paradoxes, desperation,
and pride experienced by those who work with small-scale entrrnif
"modern"-in developing countries.
C. CHANGES SINCE 1989
Adjustment or Corporate Shake-Ups?
The significant evolution in Multinac's strategy since Venezuela initiated its
strutural adjustment program in 1989 might be interpreted as a reaction to the changes
the program introduced in the business environment. But it can also be seen as simply
an acceleration of measures already in place to respond to Multinac's larger strategic
goals. This view is confirmed by the fact that some elements of Multinac's recent
strategy seem inconsistent with "rational behavior" in the context of an adjustment of
the sort Venezuela experienced. There is also a possibility, discussed below, that
strategies proposed by Multinac's local management, based on its domestic perspective,
clashed with corporate goals drawn up by the corporation's central management.
Batflng Others' Imports, Returning to One's Own
A clear result of trade liberalization has been an increase in the share of imported
finished products in Multinac's sales. According to my Multinac interviewee, the firm's
main competitor in Venezuela (also a local subsidiary of a multinational corporation)
started importing finished goods right after the opening of markets in 1989. Imports
constituted the single most important threat for Multinac's operations in Venezuela.
Multinac responded to its competitor's move with an even more aggressive import
strategy. By 1992, Multinac had added to its three series of locally produced writing
devices three sophisticated pens that it imported from other subsidiaries of its parent
* . *.L7t -;t z - Sc %.. T~d. -
pain Latin America it from o s in Japan. It was also impoting the
most complex items in its line of tine razors (as I discuss below, the disposable plastic
A third traditional ar- of Multnts production in enezuela waits personal
care p (shaving cream, shampoo roil-on r). Plastic for
pressure valves in the shaving cream cans were produced and assembled in Venezuela
under contract with a pressure valve producer, which, in turn, subcontracted the
production of sonm plastic parts to Colomplast. The blow molding of bottles ad the
injection molding of caps for the shampoos ind rolons also had traditionally been
subcontracted locally-to (ermIaplast it Colomplast. During 1988-91, Multinac's
Am in Venezuela had seriouslycn m d'iclnet
molding, as part of the subsidiary's long-sadn-uuntil 1989, uscesu-us
to increase the integration of long-series plastics transformation. Maaeethad
reached the point of preparing an investment program for the blow molding production
li=
Here the mismatch between the perspectives of the local subsidiary an those of
the paren company aa became obvious. As Multine prepared to implement the
k-house blow-molding programin 1991, Multinac's paent company decided to sell its
personal care line at the global level to another corporation. The investmet plans were
now-bandnedshampoo and roll-on lines had to be shed. As a result, in 1991,
Multinac reduced its labor force to about 200 people, half its size in 1987. (ermaplast
and Colomplast probably were also hurt by this decision of the multinationa
thpera ont fa o tbo wds.FR
47'
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Further Selective Integration
Under Multinac's long-held plan to integrate plastics transformation, t criteria
for selecting what to integrate were the sophistication of the product and the scale of its
demand and production. Because Multinac had a dominant positio in the Venezuelan
market and catered to a large group of consumers, its managers believed that the
subsidiary could vertically integrate simple goods that could be produced in large
quantities. Besides the aborted plan to integrate blow molding of shampoo bottles,
anoter main target was the injection molding of components for the disposable razors.
As early as 1987, Multinac was considering plans to invest in injection molding
equipment and end its ties with Justinplast
Justinplast, which had already lost much of its Multinac business (first because
of t decline of business under t "auditing president," and thn because of the
substitution of Multinac's robotized razor assembly line for Justinplast's semi-automated
one), tried to avoid further cutbacks. It promised Multinac that it would assume a
larger share of the burden of resin procurement and inventory costs, and it cut its own
personnel. But this time Multinacs investment plans were approved by the parent
corporation, and t process of vertical integration went ahead while Justinplast
struggled with its labor problems.
Multinac imported alarge, technically sophisticated injection molding line that
enabled six operators to control t injection molding operation that reportedly had
occupied at least a third of Justinplast's more than 100 workers. For Multinacs
efficiency and revenue, pursuing local management's idea to integrate Ut large-scale
production of disposable razors proved t best possible decision. Disposable razors
were being produced in-house at a fraction of t cost of tir production under t
subcontracting arrangement When demand dropped in Venezuela because of
adjustment program, this cost advantage allowed Multinac to negotiate export deals
with otr subsidiaries and distributors of its parent corporation in other regions. In
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1991, two years after installing the new production line, Multinac was exporting 40% of
its sales4 of disposable razors to Australia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, and
Puerto Rico. In 1992, it planned to concentrate its exports in Latin America, adding
Guatemala and Peru to its list of customers. Multinac's disposable razor is the only
Venezuelan-made product that it has ever exported.
Subcontracting as a Transition Strategy
The segment of its old subcontracting deals that Multinac retained under its
"selective integration" strategy is the subcontracting of more intricate components and
products made in relatively small quantities. n 1992, Multinac maintained
subcontracting deals with three prestigious plastics manufacturers: Colomplast,
Germaplast, and BelgplasL Colomplast and Germaplast were still blow molding some
bottles and injecting caps of small product lines. Belgplast was a growing partner, in
charge of the injection molding of all components of several lines of ballpoint pens, and
of the small bottles and caps for correction fluid. Obviously, Belgplast had absorbed the
share of Justinplast's business that the client firm had not integrated.
When I visited these firms in 1992,I might have said that Multinac had already
reached a good, stable balance between vertical integration and subcontracting, under
the current circumstances. I might have been ready to describe the firms' situation in
1992 as clearly reflecting Multinac's new approach to industrial subcontracting:
"selective" integration. But my short experience in observing the evolution of firm
4In 1991, Multinac's total revenue amounted to Bs. 130 million a month, equivalent to
$28 million a year. Its line of razors accounted for 80%, or $22 million, of its total
revenue that year.
5Frangoise Carr6's 1993 dissertation on the evolving banking system in Prance, pwoduced
at the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at M.I.T., develops this idea of using
casual, temporary labor as a transition strategy.
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strategies and government policies in Venezuela has taught at that "the current
circumstances are never to be talen for granted.
One factor that could disturb Multinac's make-or-Wy balance would be yet
another radical strategic shift by the parent company-for example, a decision to buy or
sell another line of products. Another factor that could lead to a change in the share of
subcontracting would be a more aggressive stance by Multinac's local
example, convincing corporate maaeet that Venezuela could produce more of a
given component or product, and thus transforming today's short-series goods into
long-series exportable goods. In this case, it would be interesting to see whether such
an expansion is effected through vertical integration-which seems to be the preference
of Multinac's localn -or through systems of "preferred suppliers," a strategy
that the parent corporation, following global trends, might want to impose on local
management
In another possibility, the parent company might decide that even the
samil-seriescopo could be imported from well-established, lower-cost
subsidiaries in other countries, theretby optimizing the corporation's supplier networks
internationally. In such acase, components subcontracted locally today would be
impored, and the supplier network would simply disappear;
Which of these outcomes im mwost likely? It depends to some extent on the
nature of the product. For example, shipping empty, standardized containers and
bottles betwveen countries involves unjustifiable tasrtcosts. If the corporation has
any good (technical, economic) reason to produce the contents in Venezuela, then the
containers must also be produced in Venezuela. But in borderline cases in which
technical aspects do not matter, national policies and the national business environment
may make the difference, The equation cosdrdby the corporation may involve the
costs and risks of transporting the finished good on one side, and the costs and risks of
local production (upon which policies, business enviwnumunt,ad efforts by potential
4ow 'rw >7~
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subcontractors to improve productivity bear heavily) on the other. And
groups at the subsidiary level and at the tranSnI headquarters may weigh such
costs differently.
Whatever the outcome-stillUgiven the political instability
plaguing Venel since 1989-nother way to view Multinac's "selective integration"
strategy is as a bwnsiden swtqy. Multinac is fully utilizing its plastics transformatin
capacity, rn three daily shifts. Despite local managmnt's drive to integrate as much as
possible, the firm has invested only to the point at which it could still guarantee the most
efficient use of labor and equipment
It then subcontracted the production of shorter-series products. Most of these
shorter-series products could have been produced with the same injection molding
machines with which Multinac produces the disposable razors. But if the production of
other items had been integrated, Multinac would have needed to retool the machines
frequently, to implement different quality control and finishing for the new products,
and, probably, to procure different types of resins for them. Integrating the jncessing
of, say, 100 more tons of resin in the form of three more products might have involved
far more effort and cost than producing 100 more tons of disposable razors.
Subcontractors could take care of those costs and other burdens related to the
production of the short-series products.
Subcontactr'Rspo Learning to Diversify and Be Ficible
The cases of the "loser" and the "winner" from Multinac's restructuring are
illustrative of the options open to subcontractors. The "loser" is, of course, Justiuplast,
and the "winner" that I have chosen to describe is Belgplast.
Justinplast relied heavily on the business tharMultinr provided. But, despite its
previously close tics with its customer,it has been displaced from the network. The
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finn experienced asharp slump in 1988, when Multinnc integrated the inection molding
of disposable razors, and agin19&9, when Multinac took away the production of
toothbawaushe-s.
ustinplastrespondedby sAarting up its own production o othbrushes.. Taking
advantage of the experieMne a trough its relationship withMultina Ju pa
imported sophisticated Gerainurhinery for the injection-molding and automatic
assembly ofoEthbrushes, and pr uMredthe same types of materialsused by Multina
(now possible because of the openof resin markets Financial support and
marketing advice offered by another company in which Justinplast's managers were
partners made the shift possible. Because Justinplast is catering to final markets for the
first time, it needed to learn a great deal about marketing. Justinplast has conducted
research on consumers' oral hygiene preferences; it has courted large distributors and
supermarkets to ensure outlets for its toothbrushes; it has even reached out to hospitals
and dentists' offices, offering to customize its toothbrushes for promotional purposes by
stamping doctors' and institutions'names on the handles
At the ame time, Justinplast has diversified its clientele in the subcontracting
market Earlier it had served Multinac almost exclusively, but ft now serves at least
10clients in varied sectors, mostly manufacturers of industrial and agricultural goods.
It produces parts and components for toys, ventilating fans, car batteries, industrial
filters, smoke detectors, cosmetics containers, disposable hypodermic syringes, electric
household appliances and equipment for chicken farms. Justinpiat's relationships with
its new customers have been steady, although the anunts it produces foreach client
are relatively small. The need for frequent retooling and shifting between products may
reveal a loss in the productivity of capitaL. Another clear sign that Justinpiast's pace has
slowed is that ft now works two shifts, compared with four shifts at the pea of its
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Belgplast not only has been successful in absorbing some of the production for
Multinac previously performed by Justinplast, along with some of that by other Multinac
subcontractors, it has also done well in attracting new business among large foreign
corporations in Venezuela. As a result, the firm was able to increase its labor force
from 35 in 1987 to 70 in 1992. The firm's success in attracting goodclients is explained
by a number of important assets that it can offer. First is its low overhead. The three
partners in Belgplast's venture are its administrative, engineering, and production
managers, and the plant is a simple structure located in a low-cost area.
The second important asset is Belgplast's modem machinery. Belgplast was
created only in 1981, and it has since accumulated a battery of 15 injection molding
machines with diverse capacity. The oldest was bought new in 1981; the most recent
acquisition was in 1992. The new equipment imposes a heavy burden of fixed capital
costs and depreciation on total production costs, but it also brings technological
sophistication and, potentially better injection molding results, both of which Belgplast
has been able to exploit.
The third important asset that Belgplast can offer its customers is, in the
managers' words, "a disciplined and well-trained labor force." Belgplast's workers are
not affiliated with any union; they apparently rejected the advances of the regional trade
union, as has happened in so many other firms. Management has preferred to distribute
among its workers for their own use the monthly contribution that otherwise would be
given to the Federation of Unions.
A fourth factor that has helped Belgplast is its aggressive outreach strategy.
Belgplast's managers produce a catalogue of the firm's equipment and current products
and capabilities that they distribute among large users of plastics transformation
services. Preparing the catalogue has given the managers a good sense of the firm's
technical potential and production costs, enabling them to participate with little effort
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and good results in the few bids for services issued by large corporations seeking
plasticst atinsuppl
Fifth, the managers' national and professional linkn have provided Belgplast with
good access to technology licenses fromBelgi'm. Although fir nature of these
arrangements could not be ascertained, one of Belgplast's customers declared that the
firm's access to such licenses (for such simple things as the pressure-closure mechanism
for a shampoo cap) gives it a competitive edge.
The last-yet nevertheless important-asset that Belgplast can offer is its cose
association with a small firm that makes and repairs molds. As Ishow in my discussion
of subcontracting network 1, molds are a valuable part of a firm's equipment, yet skills
for their construction and maintenance are scarce in Venezuela Even if plastics
manufacturers often rent molds from multinational corporations through the temporary
import mechanism, or "borrow" them from their customers, having the skills to handle,
repair, and maintain a mol adds much to a subcontractor's value.
In terms of costs and technical qualities, then, Belgplast appears very
competitive. Yet in interviews, the managers acknowledged financial and technical
limitations. On the financial side, a combination of high interest rates and fir timing of
raw material deliveries and contractual payments has hurt the firm. Belgplast must pay
for resins in advance, while its clients pay 30 days after delivery.
On the technical side, the managers reported two constraints that limit capacity
utilization to 60% of the equipment's potential, despite the rapid growth of demand.
First, there are too few specialized technicians and workers capable of optimizing
retooling times and the productivity and maintenance of molds. In these managers'
opinion, the producers of resins upstream are attracting many engineers who could have
been hired downstream by the plastics manufacturers, awl this is affecting the
manufacturing industry.
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Second, Belgplast lacks an organizational framework to improve its operational
planning, a limitation for which management acknowledged that it was responsible. Its
effort to keep overhead low has spread sarce managerial and technical skills too thin.
The managers' time spent on marketing, procurement, and generI administrative tasks
has limited the time they have to resolve pressing technical issues-for example, how
best to achieve flexible, smooth injection molding of many diverse, high-quality
products, at the lowest possible cost, using a technology designed for long-series
production.
If one were looking for examples of firms pursuing "flexible specialization" in
the Venezuelan plastics industry (which I am not necessarily), Belgplast comes the
closest among the firms in the sample visited. Two questions about this firm remain
open: Will te small size of the managerial team become a constraint to further growth
in a business in which dealing with numerous clients is the norm? And why would this
firm want to introduce a line of finished toys to its already successful intermediate
product lines? Despite what the firm's success as a subcontractor suggests, its
managers believed that producing for the final market was less troublesome and plagued
with uncertainties than being a subcontractor.
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SUBCONTRACTING NETWORK 4: "TRANSCHOOL"
MERGER AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO VERTICAL INTEGRATION
The client fim in this subcontracting network, Transchool, resulted from a joint
venture between Venezulan capital(80%) and capital from alarge U.S. manufacturer.
Since it started functioning in 1965, Transchool has produced finished goods for use in
schools and offices (markers, highlighters, watercolors, glues, crayons, erasers). It has
an administrative office in downtown Caracas and a large assembly plant about 40 km
from the capital. In 1987, its strategy for procuring plastic parts was clear: the firm did
not want to transform plastics in-house. Instead, it had four permanent subcontractors
in the plastics industy, generally firms that had a relatively good reputation, had skills in
making and repairing molds, and were located in nearby towns (see Table 1).
With the onset of adjustment in 1989, however, Transchool sbifted from
subcontracting plastics transformation to a process of slecdie begrwdie similar to
that undertaken by Multinac (Subcontracting Network 3). My notes on this case study
focus on the reasons for the firm's strategic shift, the details of its emerging,
post-adjustment strategy, and the impact ofthe shift on the subcontracting firms.
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General ofae Network 4,1987
Firm
Client:
Transchool
Blowplast
Hispaplast
Location
(distance from
client, kIn)
Central region
Central region
(30)
Caracas
(35)
Belgplast Capital region
(40)
Moldplast
Techplast b/
Caracas
(35)
Central region
(150)
Year of creation
(length of
relationship,
years)
1965
1973
(5)
1969
(6)
1981
(1)
1986
(6) a/
n.a.
Subscribed
capital, Bs.
millions
(% national cap.).
0.631
(80)
n.a.
(100)
n.a.
(100)
n.a.
(100)
I
(100)
n.a.
Main products
(produced for
this network)
School and
office items
Plastic
containers and
parts
Plastic
containers and
parts
Plastic
containers and
parts
Plastic
containers
Plastic parts,
finished toys
n.a. Not available.
a. Moldplast was not created until 1986, but Transchool has used mold making and
mold repairing services offered by Moldplast's future owners before Moldplast was
founded.
b. Techplast's management could not be interviewed in 1987 and 1992; any data
presented come from my interviews with Transchool's managers.
A. BEFORE 1987: MERE SPECIALIZATION
My 1987 interviewee, the firm's procurement manager, had been with
Transchool for five years. During that period, Transchool had contracted out the
molding of all the plastic parts and components that it needed. In plant, it engaged in a
few processes of chemical transformation (for example, mixing material for
manufacturing crayons and watercolors), assembled markers and highlighters, and filled
and packaged bottles. My interviewee presumed that this practice dated to the creation
Table 1
w
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of Transchool in 1965. However, it is likely that local subcontracting and importation
Of OCUE strategies, in tandem with diverse import
and liberalization efforts by the government, as
had been the case for Multinac and other subsidiaries of trasnational corporations.
The firm had opted for total vertical disintegration of plasticsfi
because of management's belief that specialization was the best possible strategy. When
asked whether the firm had compared the costs of subcontracting to those of in-house
production of plastic components, the procurement manager responded negatively:
"We do not want to enter that b ... Plastics transformation is a complex
endeavor, and as long as there are local producers who are willing to take the risks, we
will continue to contract such services out." And subcontractors, in the opinion of
Transchool's manager, did not opt to produce for final markets because, lacking direct
access to a technology and a "product," they could not reach final markets directly.
"They need to specialize... How could they operate otherwise?"
Subcontracting plastics transformation services was thus a matter of technical
specialization, where "technical" aspects involved not only production but also market
access issues. For the customer, subcontracting made it possible to avoid cumbersome
and risky practices, such as getting access to input markets, managing low-skill labor,
and procuring specialized skills.
Transchool was more than a producer, it was also a production manager. It
maintained a small stock of resins, particularly those that could not be produced in
Venezuela and whose procurement it could negotiate through its parent company? But
maintaining such a small stock did not imply a major hassle or cost, and it supported the
operations of the subcontractors when they ran short of resin. Indeed, when resins
the resin stock for its clients.
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became increasingly difficult to obtain in 1986-87, Transchool started to consider
expanding its inventory to include other resins produced in Venezuela.
Transchool was also in charge of procuring the molds (or mold blueprints, in a
few cases) from the parent company headquarters. It imported such molds on either a
temporary or a permanent basis, depending on the nature of the product market, and
allocated them among its plastics transformation subcontractors. For the few molds that
were produced locally, all design specifications came directly from the parent firm.
Similarly, all technical specifications for manufacturing came from the parent firm; the
subsidiary transmitted such specifications in the way of advice on raw materials, colors,
treatment of molds, and th like. According to Transchool's management, no
suggestions were requested (or even allowed) from te subcontractors. Yet one of the
subcontractors (Moldplast) mentioned at least two cases in which it changed procedures
in order to cope with input inadequacies.2
The subcontractors played the role of direct managers of the plastics
transformation process. They procured most of th domestic resins, negotiating resin
quotas with th empress mixtas or their distributors; thy decided on the labor
contracts and the forms of labor management; ty had to maintain the appropriate
equipment; and, at the request of Transchool, tey maintained mold repairing skills.
2 Moldplast received a mold from Transchool that had an operational problem: because
of the texture af the mold and the nature of the domestic raw material, the mold would
not release the molded pieces smoothly when it was opened after injection. In such
cases, a particular lubricant would be used to facilitate release, but for some reason this
lubricant was not available to Venezuelan producers. Experimenting with different
lubricants, the technician at Moldplast realized that sesame cooking oil, commonly used
in Venezuela, worked just as well as the imported lubricant was expected to work. On
another occasion, after having lust two months of production because of problems with
procuring a certain kind of nylon, Moldplast found that an exunuion nylon produced
locally could be injected with results no worse than those attained with the appropriate
nylon. Moldplast proposed the susiuinand Transchool approved it.
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3. TRANSFERRING THE BURDEN OF FLUX:
ACROSS FIRMS AND TO LABOR
Transchool's manager presented a general picture of a mutually beneficial
technical specialization among the members of this subcontracting network. But it is
likely that certain economic burdens were unequally distributed between client and
subcontractors. First, the Transchool network probably experienced fluctuations. The
type of products assembled by Transchool had a markedly cyclical demand (particularly
the school product lines, which experienced demand peaks in August-September).
Second, Transchool did not buffer the impact of the fluctuations arising from irregular
patterns of production caused by temporary mold imports (described for the case of
Minitoys and Transtoys in Subcontracting Networks 1 and 2), nor, because it did not do
any injection mold itself, did Transchool share that impact Third, by paying on a
piece-rate basis (as opposed to a cost-plus basis), Transchool transferred to its
subcontractors the risk of cost variations. Finally, by forcing its subcontractors to
compete among themselve-by comparing and keeping a tight check on rates charged
by different subcontractors-Transchool ensured that individual negotiations to raise
service rates in order to account for cost variations would be minimize. Transchool
thus may have been transferring the impact of demand and cost fluctuations almost fully
to its subcontractors.
Did the subcontractors transfer the burden of fluctuations, in turn, to their
workers-as toy manufacturers appeared to do, through the use of casual labor? If not,
how did subcontractrs cope with such fluctuations?
In contrast to Transchool, the subcontractor firms had a minimal share of
workers categorized as "temporary" or "casuaL" Apparently, the use of temporary
labor in this sbotainontwork followed the pattern that I had observed in other
netork: t ws riete toardcopleenaryprcesesin peak periods
(assemblin& packagin& labeling) andnot to regular plastics auatrnoperations.
Yet the absence of union reprsentation may have facilitated the dismissal of workers
categorized as "permanent" I found some evidence of this practice: some of the
subcontracting firms reported having changed their employment levels over time.
A transfer of the burden of uncertainty by the firms to labor, by making wages
the residual variable is likely, although hard to prove on the basis of the information
reported by managers. This network did not necessarily follow the traditional model of
cost-cutting subcontracting (Table 2). The size of the subcontractors was diverse (from
very small firms with just over 10 employees to firms that had more than a hundred and
were larger than the client). And most of the subcontractors were located in regions
more susceptible to union influence than the client's location.
Table 2 Labor-Related Factors Influencing the Decision to Subcontract In
Subcontracting Network 4,1987
Size Temporary or Female
(number of Unioni- Location casual labor labor
Firm employees) zation (region) (number) (number)
Client 110 Firm Capital1 40 45
Blowplast 42 None Capital 5 6
Hispaplast 140 Trade Capital0 15 68
Belgplast 35 None Capital 1 0 25
Moldplast 14 None Capital 0 0 3
Most of the workers in subcontracting firms were not unionized. But managers
of non-union subcontracting firms alleged-as perhaps could be expected-that their
workers got a better deal than they would have under union-sponsored collective
contracts. One firm gave workers several wage increases in an inflationary year
(although I could not find out from which basis and at what rates).3 Another gave
The manager probably highlighted this fact in relation to the problem, aleady discussed
in other case studies (see Subcontracting Network 1, for example), that collective
workers the contributions t it would have paid to the federation of union had it been
unionizd But Icould not ppverzain whether or ot lack of unionization resuled in
lower laborn
What was obvious was that coped with uncantniese t
by each client by maintaininsg a broad array of clieutt. Blowplast rimintainerd about
70 clients,of which 20 were regulr. Hserved 120 clients, though not
regularly. Belgphawt had about 10 clients in 1987. Mokpasa tiny enterprise with
three small injection molers, had six regular clients in1987.
C. AflER ADJUSTMEN: INTEGATING S IMLER' TASKS
THROUGH ACQUISITION
Transchool's response to the adjustment program was similar to Multinac's
(discussed under Subcontracting Network 3). In 1991, two years after the adoption of
the economic reform program, Transchool decided to acquire a middle-sized plastic
manufacturer. By 1992, it was producing up to 45% of the total volume of plastic
components that it required. This decision was far m-r surprising than Multinac's,
however Multina had been signaling its desire tO integrate vertically, while
Tranachool had always declared that sucnrcigwas its preferred option.
For Multinac, the changes in the environment after adjustment finally made it
possible to pursue t corporate galIt For Transchool, changing external
factors seemed to reshape firm strategy. According to Transchool's athe
decision to integrate vertically was made because of fluctuation in the i charged by
subcontractors. In one instance, Transchool had signed an export contract, but its
subcontractors could not ma in the price originally offered and the contract fell
through. Subcontractors were pushed to increase their rates by unexpected inflation in
contracts nby regional tu unions were locking in w iweuse fornulas at
-465
resin prices, "dollarized" by trade liberalization. Although the problem with the price of
resins is not expected to recur, the client still considers the services of local supples to
be overpriced, especially for simple, mass-produced items.
Transchool has classified the types of plasticit requ b
price, which is correlated to their technical sophistication. It now produces in-house
less sophisticated items oriented toward mass consumption; it still subcontracts those
whose production requires more complex techniques or quality control.
D. ANGERED YET SURVIVING SUBCONTRACTORS
Subcontractors expressed discontent with Transchool, because of what they
perceived as a unilateral shift to a cost-cutting strategy, at the expense of quality.
Nevertheless, most still produce for the client, although on a smaller scale, and two are
even lending technical assistance to Transchool's nascent plastics venture. Because the
subcontractors had a diverse clientele to start with, most seem to have beeu able to
adjust to the decline in this segment of the demand for their products.
Blowplast is a ardium-size family enterprise, founded 20 years ago, that claims
to produce about 1,600 types of products (many of them standardized containers
differentiated by color, label, and the like). It has gradually increased its emphasis on
blow molding services-mainly for producing bottles and containers-which te own
perceives as facing a more dynamic market and less competition than injection molding
services. The firm caters to t pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries, as well as to
in t pro household appliances and other household items. The owner and
founder believes that te key to the firm's survival and success lies in its attention to
quality, its ability to repair and maintain molds (through a sister enterprise in the same
plant), and its ability to offer in-house silk-screening of containers.
levels that were far lower than inflation rates during the late 1980s.
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All has not been easy for Blowplast, however, and the firm experienced a slump
in employment. In 1987, it had 42 employees. In 1989, under the advice of a German
technician hired to assist with the restucturing of the enterprise, it hired up to
70 people, but productivity levels worsened. Finally, by 1992, it had engaged in a
process of capital intensification that led to a decline in the labor force to 39 people.
Productivity, claims the owner, has gone up.
Blowplast has also ventured into the exporting business, although still on a
casual basis. The owner claims that the firm wants to "serve its loyal local clientele
first."
Hispqlast is a large enterprise and part of a larger group to which it also
provides plastic parts. Like Blowplast, it focuses on the production of containers and
other plastic components for the pharmaceutical industry. Its business also experienced
a trough in early 1989. Interestingly, managers attribute the 1989 crisis to the
uncertainty created by the February riots, rather than to the economic reforms or to the
declining demand from the client firm Transchool Since 1989, its volume of production
has stayed practically unchanged, mostly because of stagnating local demand but maybe
also because of labor constraints. Hispaplast reportedly has faced discipline problems
among its unskilled workers and a scarcity of skilled workers.
Hispaplast depended to a great extent on the indirect demand generated by the
pharmaceutical contracts awarded by the state-managed Social Security Institute
(IVSS). The crisis that the IVSS suffered in 1992 has resulted in a decline in its orders
of pharmaceutical products, and increases in the prices of medicine have affected
demand by the private sector. Consequently, medicine containers have not been in high
demand. The interviewees did not fear competition from imports, as potential importers
of containers could expect prohibitive inventory costs.
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Hispaplasts exports have been casual and quantitatively insignificant, thanks
(according to the firm's managers) to inconsistent policy. Hispaplast described an
advantageous deal to export baby bottles to Spain that failed because of an "archaic"
trade restriction that the trade liberalization program has not touched. When Hispaplast
was ready to ship the order, management found out that the shipment could not be
made until the Ministry of Health certified the purity of the product. Hispaplast could
have easily demonstrated the product's quality; its having closed the deal with a
demanding foreign customer also attested to the product's quality, and in any case, the
burden of proof of the product's quality should have fallen on the importing firm and
country. Yet officers of the Venezuelan Ministry of Health insisted on following a very
slow legal procedure that finally upset the clients and destroyed the deal.
Despite ups and downs in business, Hispaplast's employment has not changed
significantly since 1987. This stability can be attributed to the presence of the regional
trade union.
Belgplast, which also features in another example of this study (in Network 3, as
one of Multinac's subcontractors), is a medium-size enterprise that enjoys European
technical support and has mold making and repairing capabilities and good professional
staff. Although its managers showed displeasure with the unreliability of Transchool as
a client, the firm seemed unaffected by the loss of its business. The firm maintained
good relationships with a number of large foreign and domestic corporations that
demanded precision work, although in short runs. Managers perceived the firm's only
problem as finding the organizational mechanisms that would allow it to increase
productivity in order to respond to thriving demand. Although exporting did not figure
in their plans, they knew that their clients were thinking of producing for export markets
and they were ready to respond to stricter quality standards. Employment in this
non-union firm doubled between 1987 and 1992.
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Moldpat was a very small firmin 1987. Its main asset was a small but good
team of mold making specialists, who hal decided in 1986 to start an injection molding
business. Their first project, producing toys for the final market, failed because of
problems in marketing and distribution. As a transition strategy, Moldplast then started
injection molding for other firms, and by 1987, it bad 14 workers. In 1987, its largest
contracts were those with Transchool; other clients were small local enterprises.- The
firm wasapprea because of its mold making and repairing capabilities and its high
percentage of skilled and experienced plastics transformation personnel. In at least two
cases, Moldplast technicians had successfully replaced scarce imported materials with
substitute materials (lubricants, nylon varieties), thereby avoiding the disruption of the
production process and lowering production costs for its client. Possibly, the managers'
disappointment with the firm's inability to launch its independent project (production of
toys for the final market), exacerbated by the demand contraction of 1989, led them to
dissolve the enterprise. In 1992, 1 could not locate Moldplast's managers, hence I have
no information on their fate and the reasons for their decision to leave the business.
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SUONTRACTING CASE 5: "CARPLAST"
AN AUOM ESUPPlER WITH AN OPENMIND"
July1987: Searching for a large industrial buiding on the outskirts of Ca n
the State of Miranda, I drive across a bushy plain spotted with industrial projects here
and there and threatened by a steamy afternoon thunderstorm. Originally a smal
agriculural center, in the mid-1970s Ca tried to develop into a center of
heavy-industry wader the decentralizaton policies introduced during thefirst Carlos
AndrEs Psrez administration. Cda andaneighboring Charallave were indeed promising
candidates for industrial decentralizationfrom Caracas: they are located only an
hour's drive from Caracas, in a wide valley without serious spatial constraints to
uban or industrial growt and are well connected by a large highway to ajor cities
in the central region(Caracas, Maracay Valencia). Yet the rather quiet scene visible
from the main road# gf Cda suggests that e eforts to attract industry may have not
been as successful as expected r that he results wr not sustained after the 1970.
Ifinaily spot a large puswr representing the finn/m searching for as an
equipment producer. I thought thatIwas coing to visit an independent automative
supplier, but obviously my plasis manaufacturer belongs to a larger industrial group;
The group occuspies a large, modern-looking industrial conqplex surrowaded bylarge
guards gves me a pass and directs me to the farthest building. I climb the stairs to the
offices, which house several engineering and administrative employees, and meet my
interviewee, who is Manager of Planuing cund Methods for the larger group and also
mnages plastics transformation. Mr. P. welcomes me into a large office decorated
with posters ofnodem cars.
- 471 -
May 7,1992: Although there are few changes in the landscape, there has
obviously been a reorganization in the industrial group. Mr. P. is now Director of
Planning and Costs. He remembers my first visit and appears to be as accessible and
willing to talk as the first time. As we enter his office, something strikes me. The office
is now full of plastic pieces of all types, from transparent plastic glasses to large pieces
of household appliances. Mr. P. prepares to offer me an explanation.
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SUBCONTRACTING CASE 5: "CARPLAST"
AN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIER WITH AN "OPEN MIND"
This case study relates the story of a subgroup of three plastics manufacturing
units in a larger economic group, composed of 14 such units or enterprises, that supplies
the automotive industry. The units, which I will call interchangeably "Carplast," "the
firm," or "the plastics manufacturing units," acted in 1987 rAs suppliers for the major
automotive corporations with assembly operations in Venezuela: Ford, General
Motors, Fiat, and Renault. Carplast comprised a small scrap recycling unit, a small
blow molding and thermoforming unit, and a medium-size injection molding unit. The
three units shared management, technical personnel, and raw materials, but were
registered as independent fiscal units for tax purposes. They were legally created during
the first oil shock, although the recycling unit did not operate properly until 1984. The
general characteristics of the manufacturers in 1987, as reported by my interviewee, are
summarized in Table 1.
I have constructed this case to illustrate three points: (i) how the restructuring
of a large economic group that serves multinational corporations has influenced the
response of this captive plastics manufacturer to structural adjustment, (ii) the impact of
the type of market it faced on its strategy both in the pre-adjustment and the
post-adjustment periods, and (iii) the choice of strategic means for coping with
post-adjustment uncertainties, which for this plastics manufacturer have been manifested
in a pressing need to diversify production and markets. The case finishes with some
observations on labor relations in Carplast.
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General Characteristics of Subcontracting Case 5,1987
Reg. location
(distance from clients,
kIn)
Carplast I
(injection
molding)
Cda, state of
Miranda, Central
region
(100-300)
Subcontractors
Carplast H
(blow molding,
thermoforming)
Cda, state of
Miranda, Central
region
(100-300)
Carplast II
(plastics
recycling)
Ca, state of
Miranda, Central
region
(100-300)
Year founded (length of 1975 1975 1984
relationship with (12) (12) (3)
clients, years)
Employment (number of 30 16 6
workers)
Subscribed capital
(Bs. millions) a/ 8.1 0.54 0.29
Fixed assets 17.143 3.1 1.5
(Bs. millions) a/
National capital(%) 100 100 100
Main products Automotive parts Automotive parts Recycled
(steering wheels, (a/c ducts, other material for use
water containers, a/c pieces) by sister firms or
a/c pieces, etc. for sale to other
firms
a. 1987 official exchange rate: Bs. 14.5/dollar.
A. LARGE ECONOMIC GROUPS AND PROTECTIONISM
Using Political Clout
In 1987, imports of automotive parts and components were not prohibited in
Venezuela, but they bore a 100% tariff, enough protection to allow inefficient producers
to compete comfortably with imported products. Protection in the automotive industry
was motivated, as in so many other developing countries, by an intention to spur the
Table 1
w
wlx
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development of diverse backward linkages-and it was advocated by entrenched local
interests associated with assembly operationa
As a result of protection, in several instances Carplast was able to produce
substitutesfori t MonEnt.To do so, CarpIast needed not only the incentive
to substitute provided by a semi-captive demand, but also ac to then restricted input
markets. Belonging to a powerful economic group was thus a valuable asset. Carplasts
parent economic group gotadvant concessions the riod 1983-88.
According to a former Fomento official interviewed in 1992, this group had enough
political clout to obtain dollar quotas, import permissins, and price deregulations with
relatively little effort.
Beneffling ro Internal Transfers
My Carplast interviewee in 1987 revealed the firm's low-risk and comfortable
stance. The plastics manufacturing units were not financially autonomous from the
larger group; significant transfers and cross-support took place, to their benefit. My
interviewee admitted that the larger group not only provided Carplast with management
and technical support, it also paid for the units' services and infrastructure. The larger
group had organized the plastics transformation units so as to minimize fiscal burdens:
even though technical factors did not justify three separate plastics units, they were
formed as legally distinct entities to reduce tax liability.
Iaeffclencdus: Not Quite Just In Tme
An indication of the less than efficient functioning that structural market
conditions generated and that protection made possible was the significant accumulation
of inventories at the end of the production process. My interviewee admitted that the
plastics mnanufacturing units normally maintained, for certain pieces, an inventory
equivalent to two to three months of production and in some cases upto a year. The
Of MMS
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reason for this inefficiency was thei of mass production technology for
the narrow, fluctuating, and uncertain final markets forambiles in Venezuela in the
mid-1980s. The protection provided by trade policy afforded Carplast the margin to
make inefficient use of spwce and capital.
Facilitating Awe to the Right Res
The behavior of Carplas's parent group was also manifest in Carplast's
relationships to its input markets. Carplast did not suffer significantly from tie limits
imposed on plastics producers by the domestic resin monopolies. Because of the nature
of the products it produced, Carplast used neither high-nor low-density polyethylene,
the Venezuelan-made resins that presented the worst supply problems. Instead, it used
resins such as polypropylene, nylon, and polyester, none of which was locally produced.
Polypropylene could be bought from local importing firms (at a 53% premium over the
world price), but Carplast chose to import it directly. Nylon and styrene could not be
obtained in Venezuela, so Carplast imported them directly, too. The firm also used
other resins, such as vinyl and PVC, that were mixed and sold locally by private
distributors that had better reputations and operated under more competitive conditions
than the distributors serving the "empresas mixtas."
To import resins, Carplast still needed official approval, which could take up to
eight months. To import in the mid-1980s required the right connections, to push
through the requests for dollars and import permits, and the capital for the high-priced
imported resins. Carplast's parent group-and its large clients in the automotive
business-had both, and Carplast avoided the input-side problems that plagued so many
other -rdcr.
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LAirnig kom teAnnakfrs: Technologies and bMarkets
If trade protection allowed for some economic inefficiCicy, woddng for large
foreign car assemblers nevertheless obliged Carplast to pay close attention to process
and product quality and delivery standards. Carplast did not have systematic programs
to enhance productivity, but it strictly monitored production processes. It had
developed a process manual for its technicians and workers describing the main features
of the equipment and trouble-shooting procedures. It also welcomed periodic visits by
the Venezuelan Council of Norms and Standards (COVENIN) and by its own
customers, who checked and approved shop practices.
Carplast had installed a quality control laboratory that subjected regular samples
of raw materials and products to different tests (chemical and mechanical tests;
resistance to pressure, heat, discoloration). The quality control procedures were so
complete and well done, and so rare in the sector and the region, that Carplast soon
started offering its lab services to other firms. According to the interviewee, for a few
simple products the firm had been able to exceed the quality offered by U.S. and
German producers. For example, Carplast had been able to substitute an improved car
window edge for a U.S.-made edge made of PVC. An Argentinean producer of air
conditioners for automobiles had traditionally imported a plastic container from
Germany, but was now importing it from Carplast. Large car assemblers, instrumental
in arranging import-export deals among suppliers and assemblers in different countries,
had helped Carplast close some deals of this kind.
Adjustmeut Wiltand Without
Manufacturing was hit hard by the mcocnmcsaiiainadajsmn
measures that Venezuela introduced in 1989. Hardest hit was the automotive industry.
In 1989 alone, the year of the first stabilization and adjustment measures, production in
the automotive industry declined by alnwst 70% in real terms and employment by
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almost 30%. In 1990, a recovery was observed in production (30% growth over the
weak 1989 base), but employment continued declining (4%). The severity of the blow
can be explained by the fact that car assemblers and producers in Venezuela had enjoyed
some of the highest protection from the regulatory system that the 1989 adjustment
program was to eradicate. After adjustment, Carplast's customers either stopped
domestic operations altogether or started substituting gradually for local production
with increasing car imports. Some automotive producers that had judged it risky to
invest in Venezuela (for example, Honda, Mitsubishi, and Eastern European companies
such as Lada) were encouraged to do so by the liberalization measures. Yet they are
doing so mainly as assemblers, and they now have the freedom to import a large share
of their parts and components from their home countries or from lower-cost countries.
A Mitsubishi official, for example, reported that most plastic components used in the
firm's locally assembled cars were imported from Japan.
Carplast and its parent economic group were hard hit by these changes. For
Carplast, belonging to a large economic group was a mixed blessing in the adjustment
environment. On the one hand, Carplast's access to a broader capital base enabled it to
weather the adjustment storm much better than many other small suppliers, which, as
some of my other case studies show, did not survive. For example, when the
government decided not to honor the "letters of credit" incurred by many Venezuelan
importers at the preferential exchange rate, Carplast's debts to foreign raw material
providers soared in bolfvar terms to levels that the firm would have been unable to cover
on its own. The larger economic group helped Carplast recover from its losses, which
amounted to Bs. 18 million, equivalent to 80% of the value of the fixed assets of the
three units in 1987. On the other hand, the larger economic group, which had long
relied on favors it obtained under the protective trade regime, suffered more than other
enterprises from the sudden elimination of that regime (other enterprises were more
accustomed to "hardship").
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After the early emergency assistance to Carplast, units in the large economic
group received t message that they now had to start becoming financially viable.
Although my Carplast interviewee did not explicitly discuss reorganization, Iinferred
from his comments that a restructuring had taken place that had made each unit more
autonomous. No longer able to pursue its strategy of high-quality, but inefficient,
production, Carplast has also had to restructure its operations.
The three plastics transformation units that composed Carplast in 1987 have
now been merged into a single plastics manufacturing unit with diversified processes. In
1987, the burden imposed by taxes and ocher regulations was relatively significant for a
firm that had no other financial and economic concerns. But since 1989, when the firm
began having to take production costs and overhead seriously into account in order to
maximize profits, the tax issue has become irrelevant. Consolidating the three units
reportedly conserves on space and administrative procedures, and it allows for an easier
transfer of resources across units.'
B. THE TYPE OF MARKET
According to my Carplast interviewee, the protectionist policies of the 1980s did
not result in extraordinary growth in the volume of each good demanded from
automotive suppliers, as happened in the toy sector. Although the automotive industry
had always enjoyed a certain degree of protection, eroding incomes in the 1980s had
affected car purchases. Even in the peak production year of 1986, gross output in the
automotive sector did not reach the boom levels of the 1970s.
SAlthough, on the basis of the deacription of the units that I received in 1987, their
independent registration did nct imply any constraints to internal resource transfers.
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But the protectionist nrasures of the 1980s did provide an additional incentive
to explore new options for import substitution. Thus, Carplast found itself producing a
larger variety of products, but in relatively small runs. Only the 100% tariff protection it
enjoyed and the financial support of the larger group made it possible for this supplier to
survive with such low production levels. The share of capital costs in total costs was
high (because of capital intensity), and frequent retooling added further to Carplast's
costs. The type of market also influenced some of Carplasts labor practices, as
discussed er.
C. CARPLASTS POST-ADJUSTMENT STRATEGY
Product Diversification
Surprisingly, Carplast has decided to diversify away from automobile parts and
into such varied items as plastic glasses, large containers, and household appliance
components. Producing a diverse range of goods is not a new practice for Carplast.
Even when Carplast worked only as an automotive supplier, it had toproduce multiple
parts in short runs. Thus, the workers are used to the frequent retooling that this new
product diversification involves. The important differences between the old product
diversification and the new one are, of course, the kind of products, their technical
requirements, and the demand for marketing capability that they impose on managers.
Producing durable, transparent plastic glasses in a plant that used to produce
black, PVC automotive parts has required shop-level adjustments. Maitaining hygiene
in handling parts and products and ensuring the purity of the materials are now
paramount concerns for plant managers. The breakability of the finished products has
required different treatment by the unskiiled workers charged with gathering, packing,
and boxing the products. And producing components for household appliances has
required updating Carplast's processes handbook and introducing new quality standards
and parameters.
- 480 -
Searching for New Oleuts: Local Focus
Catering to new markets has also presented a new challenge to managers. First,
they have been pushed out of their offices to seek new customers for their
subcontracting services. They have stated by approaching companies in adjacent towns
awl regions, and they have competed fiercely with other potential local suppliers. One
could even go so far as to say that the restructuring has had an unexpected positive
effect an the local and regional economies. Earlier, entrenched in their conventional
supplier relationships and in their quarters, managers of firms like Carpiast had goten to
know neighboring producers only through local social ties. Location was exogenous to
tiforced on the firms by administrative measures such as the
decentralization decree of the mid-1970s. Now, forced to create new markets,
managers are finding that casual social acquaintances have become the source of new
local economic relationships
Second, the new situation has encouraged managers to seek customers in final
markets. Carplast has increased its production for final markets from zero in 1987 to
20% of the total value processed in 1991. But this has required effort-selecting the
right product, creating the molds, developing quality standards, assembling the product
and packaging it attractively, determining prices, and identifying distribution outlets.
Managers have had to stretch themselves thin to cope with the new needs of the fira
Carplast is launching a venture targeting final markets with its transparent plastic glasses
and some containers used in agricultural production. While managers will need
connections with established distributors in order to place the glasses in the market, they
have decided to reach agricultural producers in their homes. By dealing directly with
users, Carplast expects to absorb the premium charged by intermediaries and to be able
to change higher prc- than if it were dealing with large parnrs.
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At first glance, Carplast's story may sound like a sad one-that of a supplier that
had to scramble to find new options when it lost its main source of demand and its main
source of comparative advantage. But a closer look suggests that the firm has done
relatively well. Carplast's sales fell between 1989 and 1990, but then recovered and
grew in real terms in 1991.2
Carplast's success is due not only to the support from its parent economic group
during its 1989 crisis, but also to the leaming accrued during years of working with
transnational corporations and to its experience with diversified production during the
1980s. Carplast now exports more than 10% of the value of its production to other
Latin American countries. These exports are made under deals initiated in the 1980s
and intermediated by the automobile corporations for which Carplast was then working
(for example, exports of soft steering wheels to Brazil and plastic water containers to
Ford in Argentina), but also under new deals closed with the assistance of new
customers (parts for white-line appliances exported through Hoover to Colombia).
Carplast can cope well with the technical requirements of product diversification
(frequently turning the machines on and off, frequent mold changes, effective handling
of many types of raw materials and finished products) because of its experience during
the 1980s with highly diversified and relatively short runs.
Yet the 1980s did not teach Carplast how to make these shop floor practices
most resource-efficient. Managers recognize the need to cut costs (the change in my
interviewee's title from Manager of Planning and Methods to Director of Planning and
2 Sales in current terms went from Bs. 37.5 million ($1.08 million) in 1989 to
Bs. 59.2 million ($1.3 million) in 1990. These figures include a large c increase due
to the impact of the bolfvar's devaluation on the large share of imports used by Carplast
(overall inflation in the country was over 80%). In 1991, sales in current terms grew to
Bs. 87.3 million ($1.54 million), reflecting an increase in the volume produced,
according to my interviewee.
Costs reflects, somewhat comicaly, this recognition), but have not yet squarely
addressed the issue of shop floor and methods. My interviewee talked
about "old and slow machines," but not abort new ways of the work around
such machines.
The 1980s also did not ptpare Carplast to reach out to other firms and to
households and to market a broad range of products. But marketing now attracts the
of managememore than productivity and shop floor practices. Carplast's
new export deals and emptsto undercut intermediaries in makets for agricultural
containers are two examples of new efforts that the firm has undertaken in sales and
marketing. But much is still to be learned.
And in the 1990s, under a regime requiring the constituent units of the larger
economic group to be financially autonomous, Carplast and its sister units will be foced
to learn how to deal better with issues such as productivity, quality, efficiency, and
profitability.
D. OBSERVATIONS ON LABOR PRACTICES
Importing Mold Making Abilities
Like many other plastics manufacturers, Carplast faced problems in finding
skilled personnel. Its solution was to train personnel in-house. In 1987, the firm had
52 production workers, most of whom were considered medium-skilled. Labor
turnover has been relatively low; some worken have been with Carplast since its
creation in the mid-1970s. A couple of them were apprentices whom the firm was
'obliged" to take under tin INCE program.? Half tin workers were women; the
]INCEB(the National Institute for EAdction and Training)has a national program that
requires firms over a certain size topay a m hly Nu proportionate to the
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interviewee reported that women were much better at tending the machines than men,
but that "we need men for the retooling process."
The injection molding unit had 30 workers in charge of loading and monitoring
the machines and collecting and controlling the quality of the molded products and
preparing them for shipment The blow molding and thermoforming unit had
16 workers, and the recycling unit six workers, performing similar tasks in tending
machines and processing the products. Three engineers shared the operational planning
responsibilities for the three units, and six qualified technicians oversaw the production
processes and trained the production workers.
Carplast's workers were not affiliated with the regional trade union. The
workers, like those in other firms in my case studies, apparently has agreed to firm-level
collective contracting. Carplast's management-worker collective contract, in the
opinion of the management interviewee, greatly improved on the regional trade union's
collective contract, and labor relations in Carplast were fairly smooth and uneventful.
The few labor-related problems that Carplast encountered related to lack of mold
making skills and lack of infrastructure that would allow for better use of the personnel.
The lack of in-house mold making abilities was an important weakness of the
technical team. Although the firm had a mold workshop, it was very limited. This lack
constrained Carplast's ability to propose substitutions for certain components and parts.
Carplast contracted the production of its molds directly in Italy, "where they are cheaper
and better." In preparation for exporting soft steering wheels and plastic water
containers to Brazil, management planned to contract the production of the molds in
Portugal. The interviewee suggested that importing specializd technicians had even
been considered; facing a similar problem, a sister firm (a producer of aluminum
automotive pieces) had decided to hire a technician directly from Portugal.
value of their payroll or to take apprentices from INCB's prograrns, pay them a salary,
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Low Capacity Utilzmatl" ""Labor or Wrong Type of Market?
Another labor-related problem that my interviewee reported was one that, in his
opinion, limited the firm's ability to work three shifts. At the time of my 1987 interview,
Carplast worked only one eight-hour shift, a practice that seriously underntlizes plastics
transformation equipment and leads to unnecessarily high production costs per unit.
Turning the machines on and off at the beginning and end of each day wastes resources
and is not the best way to handle machines constructed to work continuously. The
interviewee perceived the size of the market as part of the explanation-the number of
units demanded could justify capacity utilization of only 50%. But he also stated that
adding second and third shifts was prevented by the schedule of public transportation to
the outskirts of Cda, which ended at 6:00 pm.
This explanation does not appear to hold water, however. It is possible that the
plastics transformation units (that is, Carplast) were the only ones in the entire industrial
complex needing 24-hour operation; aluminum stamping and assembling, for example,
do not require continuous, 24-hour machining. Yet it is difficult to believe that such a
large economic group could not devise the means to transport 50 workers around a
small area. A more important reason for maintaining one shift may have been labor
regulations preventing women (50% of the workers) from working evenings and nights.
A strong structural factor related to the type of the market faced by Carplast
may have in fact made it unnecessary to implement three eight-hour shifts. As the
interviewee had reported, demand had not grown markedly after 1983. Yet trade
protection had created the opportunity to substitute for the imports of many different
components, although the runs for each were small. Carplast thus faced a combination
of small runs, multiple products, and weak demand. If producing each product required
and allow them to acquire skills on the job.
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retooling the machine and a day's shift was enough to produce the small amounts of
each good that were demanded by the customers, then working three shifts was not
necessary. Thus, the structure of the market determined Carplast's production
practices, and the large profit margins allowed by trade protection made the inefficiency
and high cost of such practices feasible.
Transferring the Short-Term Costs of Adjustment to Labor
Carplast may have used the changes in 1989 to restructure its labor pool. Most
of the medium-skilled workers were laid off in 1989, when Carplast suffered the "letters
of credit" financial crisis. But after negotiations with the plant-level union, the firm
rehired most of the workers affected, starting with those with more skills and longer
experience in the firm. In mid-1992, Carplast had more workers than the three
independent units had had in 1987. The technical, administrative, and managerial staff
had grown from about 12 in 1987 to 17 in 1992, reflecting the new marketing and sales
needs; production workers increased slightly to 51 in 1992. Labor thus bore the brunt
of adjustment in the short run, but in the long run employment recovered to its old
levels.
As Carplast has diversified its production, shop practices have changed.
Workers have had to become accustomed to handling different types of products. And
the production of products with massive runs (containers, glasses) has created a need to
add second and third shifts. Carplast planned to start 24-hour operation of some
machines in late 1992. This time, the manager did not mention any constraints relating
to transportation of workers. Needs have probably led to solutions.
